Policy Analysis

Operation Trapiche revealed how Hezbollah is outsourcing operatives, criminal revenue, and financial services to build deniable capabilities in Latin America.

With the terrorist threat landscape looking ominous in Africa and other seemingly distant locales, officials should not downplay the potential risks to the U.S. homeland or discount “outside the box” insights from experts in the private sector.

If the next Israeli government fails to stop the hemorrhaging of the country’s position on both sides of the American aisle, it could become an irreversible reality with grave strategic consequences.

Although any new Israeli government will have more flexibility to work with the Trump administration on implementing the Gaza plan after this month’s election, the deep concerns Jerusalem has expressed about the “roadmap” will persist, requiring concerted, high-level diplomacy with the Board of Peace.

If U.S. officials continue to let Moscow keep Libyan factions divided while deepening the Russian military footprint, the result will be growing security threats to NATO and Africa.

Unless Washington lays out clear principles on Hamas, the differing strategic views that Ankara, Cairo, and Doha hold toward the group will inevitably erode their cooperation, especially as the implementation process enters more difficult terrain.

To prevent the type of jihadist resurgence seen after past U.S. military departures, Washington will need to sustain counterterrorism support and close any political, security, and detention gaps that IS could exploit.

A major Lebanese political leader explains why Beirut’s exaggerated fears of “civil war” with Hezbollah are no excuse for stalling efforts to confront the group and its Iranian patron.

A veteran Israeli intelligence and defense official assesses the country’s military strategy in Gaza since the ceasefire and makes recommendations for the path forward.

The memory of October 7 will still drive Israeli politics no matter which government comes to power, but this should not stop Washington from calling out strategic mistakes and reminding Jerusalem that other populations have suffered as well.

Despite relinquishing official authority, Hamas has maintained decentralized systems of governance and financing in Gaza and is attempting to expand its influence in the West Bank as well.

Ankara appears to be moving toward greater alignment with U.S. sanctions, but its willingness to commit to full cooperation remains in question.

The Trump administration should be prepared to push a suite of concrete actions immediately after Israel’s election, from delivering urgently needed interim housing to convening high-level meetings with regional mediators and avoiding steps that signal abandonment of the PA.

Former American, Israeli, and PA officials reflect on the anniversary of the October 7 attack and the devastating war that followed, offering practical ideas for gradually closing the enormous trust gap that has reopened since 2023.

Two former senior U.S. officials look back at what the ceasefire has produced—and failed to produce—in its first year of implementation, focusing on the underused leverage provided by the July 30 “roadmap” agreement with Hamas.

American negotiators may be feeling pressure to achieve a deal, but they should also appreciate and capitalize on the mounting economic strain facing leaders in Tehran.

Israel does not seem to be planning any major new security steps before the vote to address tensions with Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Turkey, and that same caution may linger with the next government—but for how long?

Washington should use this summit to convince China to put more pressure on Iran and establish safeguards on AI, but without conceding on other critical issues like Taiwan.

Given this month’s shifting threat picture, the administration should push for another compromise deal similar to the June MOU—though getting Iran back to the table will require accepting certain escalatory risks and providing more concrete security guarantees to increasingly vulnerable Gulf partners.

As the September 30 disarmament deadline for PMF militias approaches, Washington should support the Zaidi government’s efforts and ensure that the militias’ concessions are real.