العراق

On December 1, 2005, Ambassador James Jeffrey and Jeffrey White addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum to mark the publication of The Washington Institute's Policy Focus, Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency, by Jeffrey White and Michael Eisenstadt. Ambassador Jeffrey, the senior advisor to the secretary of state and coordinator

The Bush administration has many problems to keep it preoccupied in its remaining three years, including the challenges of post-Katrina reconstruction and a massive budget deficit. Plus the president and the Republicans in Congress have been weighed down by allegations of misconduct. So it is hardly surprising that some worry

The recent reports of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Iraq Survey Group, and the Presidential WMD Commission regarding intelligence and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq offer many useful insights into Iraq's weapons program and the challenges that the intelligence community faced in assessing them. But the reports offer

Though armed insurgencies can last for a decade or more, they also can have decisive periods in which their paths are set, even if those paths do not become apparent for some time. Iraq appears to be entering just such a period of decision. Starting Conditions The process of political

Daily images of carnage from Iraq and uncertainty over how to measure coalition progress continue to stoke debate in the United States. How does one assess the status of the insurgency? How are the efforts to recruit and train Iraq's security forces proceeding? What are America's options in Iraq? JACK

The July 16–18 visit to Tehran by Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim Jafari and ten other members of his council of ministers has been hailed by some as the beginning of a new era in Iran-Iraq relations. In fact, the pattern of near-term relations was set during Iraqi defense minister Saadoun

While conventional wisdom has identified the Sunni triangle as the most conflict-prone part of Iraq, the decisive battlefield for the country's political future is instead likely to take place in the Shia south. This region is already the scene of low-profile and longstanding struggles for political and theocratic authority. In

The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing about Washington's prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Largely missing from this debate has been a thorough examination of the actual military intelligence efforts conducted by professional analysts and war planners outside Washington. In The Washington Institute's

In countering insurgencies—wars without fronts, against often-elusive enemies—there is a temptation to rely on quantitative measures to gauge success. Although tracking and assessing trends in, for example, the number of insurgents and attacks is fundamental to any tactical or operational appreciation of the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq, a strategic