Policy Analysis

As the U.S. administration shifts towards an economics-first approach to foreign policy, Jordan will need to find ways to emphasize the benefits of the two countries' decades-long broader strategic relationship in public messaging—both for its own national security interests and as a way to assuage public concerns.

In Jordan, Hamas is working to create a misleading narrative that conflates support for ending the war in Gaza and the Palestinians' right to self-determination with supporting Hamas.

Given the politically charged nature of this issue, it is important to scrutinize unemployment numbers carefully, assessing the latest data in the broader context of Jordan’s economy over the past several years.

Today, there is a fear of the resurgence of threats to Jordan from its eastern borders, which are de-facto controlled by armed groups loyal to Iran.

The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities.

Amman worries that the war in Gaza will increase Hamas’s domestic popularity and embolden the group’s supporters—especially with Jordan’s upcoming parliamentary elections in August 2024.

According to new polling, the percentage of six Arab publics who believe America has had a positive role in the war amounts to just 7%.

The growing regional trend of normalization with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Turkey—have stoked the anger of the Syrian opposition.

In a new public opinion poll, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in March/April by an independent regional firm, Jordanian citizens demonstrate a strong aversion toward Israel but remain in favor of regional de-escalation.

Approval for contacts with Israelis remained steady through 2022, even as hesitancy on Abraham Accords continued.

Regional polls from March and August reveal shifting power dynamics, as economic conditions and relations with Israel continue to weigh on citizens’ minds.

For the Abraham Accords to be truly successful, cooperation between member countries must necessarily extend to partnerships of more accurate and far-reaching media sources.

As drug smuggling increases across Jordan’s border with Syria, Jordanian authorities need to seek solutions in both the security and social spheres.

While Arabs polled in March see Russia as responsible for spiking food prices, frustration with prior governance failures and economic challenges are also evident in certain Arab states with struggling economies.

A new public opinion poll in Jordan, commissioned by The Washington Institute and conducted in March, documents a surprisingly solid popular rejection of Russia’s “military action” in Ukraine.

Popular attitudes in Jordan have shifted slightly over the past year in a direction generally more favorable to the United States.

Analyzing the physical structures of refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan sheds light on dynamics between the state, humanitarian organizations, and refugees.

One underlying issue should be of particular concern during this trip: the ongoing Syrian crisis and the humanitarian and security burdens shouldered by Jordan.

Arab and Mediterranean countries with common interests are creating new shared tools that can be used to combat Turkish and Iranian influence in their regions.

The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat.