Policy Analysis

Hostage-taking has served multiple purposes for Hamas, including a novel use of cognitive warfare. This may prove to be a turning point in terrorist strategy that governments will need to learn how to counter effectively.

Regardless of rhetoric, Erdogan quietly benefits from conflicts like the recent twelve-day war between Israel and Iran—both in terms of bolstering Ankara's regional profile and in deflecting attention from domestic issues.

The ongoing Israeli military presence on the Philadelphia Corridor may prove an explosive flashpoint for Egypt-Israel relations given domestic pressures and internal fears in Cairo.

Even if an incursion into Rafah occurs without sparking a clash between Israeli and Egyptian forces, Israel will be facing two key challenges in its relationship with Egypt: the eventual status of the Philadelphi corridor and the rapid rise of support for Hamas inside Egypt itself.

The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities.

The question of Hezbollah’s role in the conflict—or relative lack thereof—is a matter of interpretation within Lebanon. In contrast, support for Hamas is more widespread across Lebanese society, although very positive views are especially concentrated in the Shia community.

Amman worries that the war in Gaza will increase Hamas’s domestic popularity and embolden the group’s supporters—especially with Jordan’s upcoming parliamentary elections in August 2024.

According to new polling, the percentage of six Arab publics who believe America has had a positive role in the war amounts to just 7%.

Without clearly stated goals and a well-defined exit strategy, Israel risks its counteroffensive becoming a punitive effort that costs immense civilian deaths while failing to establish lasting stability and peace in its southern sector.

Recent polling indicates a strong sense of national unity among Israelis in the aftermath of Hamas' attack. While trust in political leadership remains low, overall confidence in the military and police is high.

Syrians' responses to Hamas’ attack—and subsequent Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip—have been varied, splitting along regional, political, and ideological lines.

Recent Washington Institute polls have tracked Gazans’ views on Hamas and the ceasefire with Israel, along with a wider regional decline in popularity for Hamas and Hezbollah.

A unique new public opinion poll from Saudi Arabia sheds light on popular attitudes there toward a potential deal to “normalize” relations with Israel.

When examining the legacy of the Oslo Accords, one clear outcome is the way in which diplomatic breakthroughs—along with their failures—have deeply shaped public attitudes towards the conflict. Thirty years later, fresh polls emphasize the deep erosion of trust and support for the two-state solution in Palestinian (along with Israeli) society, but a lingering hunger for some kind of breakthrough.

The lesson of this current episode with Abbas should be that more research is called for to throw light on this half-forgotten chapter of history to refute such claims. Only more accurate information can help remove the Khazars from the shadows of mystery and antisemitism and place them instead in the correct historical context.

The sense of helplessness that deepened during the course of the intifada was also accompanied by the need to find a source of the blame. In the eyes of the Israeli public, that blame was placed squarely on Palestinian leadership.

A personal journey through peace, politics, and the legacy of the Accords

While insufficient, a collapse of the Oslo edifice would come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination.

The Oslo Accords were seriously flawed but now must be preserved. Some of the mistakes can probably be fixed over time to make sure the historic agreement does not remain a breakthrough into a dead end, but instead paves the way towards a stable compromise between Israel and the Palestinians.

As we look back at the legacy of the accords, it is not the Oslo Accords that failed us, but Israelis and Palestinians who failed Oslo.