Policy Analysis

As the U.S. administration shifts towards an economics-first approach to foreign policy, Jordan will need to find ways to emphasize the benefits of the two countries' decades-long broader strategic relationship in public messaging—both for its own national security interests and as a way to assuage public concerns.

The ongoing Israeli military presence on the Philadelphia Corridor may prove an explosive flashpoint for Egypt-Israel relations given domestic pressures and internal fears in Cairo.

In Jordan, Hamas is working to create a misleading narrative that conflates support for ending the war in Gaza and the Palestinians' right to self-determination with supporting Hamas.

Even if an incursion into Rafah occurs without sparking a clash between Israeli and Egyptian forces, Israel will be facing two key challenges in its relationship with Egypt: the eventual status of the Philadelphi corridor and the rapid rise of support for Hamas inside Egypt itself.

The question of Hezbollah’s role in the conflict—or relative lack thereof—is a matter of interpretation within Lebanon. In contrast, support for Hamas is more widespread across Lebanese society, although very positive views are especially concentrated in the Shia community.

In the last two months, China has continued its regional economic expansion, making concentrated progress with energy and development deals. Though less pervasive, Russia, too, has added to its economic portfolio in the region.

Without clearly stated goals and a well-defined exit strategy, Israel risks its counteroffensive becoming a punitive effort that costs immense civilian deaths while failing to establish lasting stability and peace in its southern sector.

Syrians' responses to Hamas’ attack—and subsequent Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip—have been varied, splitting along regional, political, and ideological lines.

Recent Washington Institute polls have tracked Gazans’ views on Hamas and the ceasefire with Israel, along with a wider regional decline in popularity for Hamas and Hezbollah.

When examining the legacy of the Oslo Accords, one clear outcome is the way in which diplomatic breakthroughs—along with their failures—have deeply shaped public attitudes towards the conflict. Thirty years later, fresh polls emphasize the deep erosion of trust and support for the two-state solution in Palestinian (along with Israeli) society, but a lingering hunger for some kind of breakthrough.

As rival Palestinian factions clash in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh camp and Hamas-backed militants capture UNRWA schools, new polls indicate that public frustration in Gaza and the West Bank has grown to the point where many would back popular protests.

The sense of helplessness that deepened during the course of the intifada was also accompanied by the need to find a source of the blame. In the eyes of the Israeli public, that blame was placed squarely on Palestinian leadership.

A personal journey through peace, politics, and the legacy of the Accords

While insufficient, a collapse of the Oslo edifice would come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination.

The Oslo Accords were seriously flawed but now must be preserved. Some of the mistakes can probably be fixed over time to make sure the historic agreement does not remain a breakthrough into a dead end, but instead paves the way towards a stable compromise between Israel and the Palestinians.

As we look back at the legacy of the accords, it is not the Oslo Accords that failed us, but Israelis and Palestinians who failed Oslo.

Results from a new public opinion poll conducted in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem show key differences between Palestinian attitudes and those of respondents elsewhere in the Arab world when it comes to relations with Israel and the roles of the United States, China, Russia, and other regional powers.

In Gaza, most residents are strongly supportive of increased Arab involvement in the conflict and half are open to normalizing ties with Israel were Saudi Arabia to do so. A majority of West Bank residents, however, remain hesitant about such a proposal.

With an opportunity to subtly expand its influence in the West Bank, Hamas is less likely to risk an all-out war with Israel from Gaza as they did in 2021.

Approval for contacts with Israelis remained steady through 2022, even as hesitancy on Abraham Accords continued.