Policy Analysis

The debates sparked by Decree No. 39 raise questions about how the country will bridge the troubling gaps between official government discourse and victims’ rights.

Recent clashes between Damascus and the Kurdish forces in Aleppo highlight the risk that stalling integration talks may trigger broader violence.

By comparing the outcome of Iraq's recent elections with the country's demographic trends, a clear difference emerges between the proportion of Iraqis whose votes are represented in the new parliament and the Iraqi population writ large.

To prevent hawkish actors from once again seizing the initiative, Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and moderate Shia factions need to come together during the post-election period and work on fundamental tasks like implementing the constitution and strengthening institutions.

For many Iraqis who dreamed of a state built on the rule of law and robust institutions, the outcome of this year’s vote feels like a major setback.

The UN Support Mission in Libya and the country’s rival legislatures are pushing to restructure the electoral authority, an effort that risks politicizing one of the country’s few remaining trusted institutions.

While Sudani leverages his position as prime minister to pursue another term, Iran and its militia proxies increasingly favor a weaker leader who won’t challenge their influence.

While the “GenZ 212” movement emerged from protests over maternal deaths and government neglect, it has evolved into a decentralized, quickly mobilizable digital network that continues to highlight Morocco’s governance problems.

While those deemed responsible for crimes committed under the Assad regime must face justice, the sweeping purge of public-sector employees threatens to deepen divisions in an already fragmented nation.

The violence in Suwayda has exposed the limits of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s control of Syria. But the assumption that the Druze community there is a monolith does not bear out: Damascus and Jerusalem are vying for influence amid the various leaders competing for power in the southwestern Syrian governorate.

Twenty years on from the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq continues to suffer from a deep crisis in the practice of its democracy.

With signs of fewer Iraqis prioritizing their national identity, Iraqis are likely to see another elections cycle shaped by subnational identities in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

If Sharaa wants to avoid repeating Assad’s mistakes, he may have to genuinely decentralize political power and establish a federal system, though this would raise difficult questions about resource allocation.

Elections in which Kurdish voters can authentically choose their leaders are not only what Kurdish citizens deserve; they increase the likelihood that the KRG will address the myriad concerns about its governance.

Given the complicated baggage that Sadr brings into Iraq’s political game, his re-entry into formal politics after a years-long hiatus will likely destabilize the internal Shia political landscape.

The protest movement’s ability to weather pressures from the Assad regime has allowed Suwayda to remain an impressive display of solidarity, tenacity, and bravery, alongside a willingness after over a decade of conflict in Syria to still demand a better future.

Türkiye’s latest elections have allowed the YRP to demonstrate success in certain areas of President Erdogan’s traditional, pious base in Türkiye, emphasizing the waning power of Erdogan’s political message after his shift away from ideologically guided politics.

Iraq is in real danger of losing its checks and balances and failing as a constitutional democracy due to the rapid collapse of a separation of powers.

The United States, in recognizing the limits of its traditional “bloc-building” approach, faces the imperative to adapt to a multipolar reality. Embracing multipolarity as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy could pave the way for more flexible and effective international engagements.

With regard to Sudani’s visit to America, we need to see what the Iraqi PM can achieve before confirming this important invitation. Sudani can be a real prime minister of a real sovereign state if he wants to be, but that will require taking risk.