Policy Analysis

Three experts examine how Moscow, Beijing, and European capitals are navigating the crisis and what their choices reveal about the future of the global order.

The war’s effects on Syria have largely fallen below the radar, yet no one should forget how much has changed there since 2024, nor how important it is to preserve the government’s accomplishments against Iran and its partners while acknowledging the conflict’s local economic consequences.

Renewed warfare with Israel aside, Hezbollah will not be permanently undone unless one of two scenarios occurs: regime change in Iran, or the complete dismantlement of the group’s domestic financial system and political power.

Even as the war proceeds, much more must be done to identify how Tehran and its terrorist partners are adapting their procurement and fundraising networks to evolving conditions in the Middle East.

Beijing has been mostly talk and little walk so far, but once the war ends, it may decide to help Tehran rebuild militarily in return for oil.

Tehran is targeting the soft underbelly of the U.S.-Israeli campaign—the oil sector and vulnerable Middle Eastern states—but allied officials can counter this strategy by taking concerted steps to bolster their regional partners, stabilize oil markets, and suppress the regime's military capabilities.

Through their continued unwillingness to take on the militia and break Iran’s hold over Lebanon, Beirut and the LAF have effectively chosen the more calamitous path of war with Israel.

By offering military expertise and technology to the Gulf states, Kyiv has given the U.S. government a unique opportunity to counter Iran and Russia while boosting the security of American partners and forces in the region.

Instead of regime change, try regime weakening.

Three experts discuss how Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and pro-Iran militias in Iraq have reacted to the war so far, outlining steps Washington and its regional partners can take to keep them from escalating further.

The two conflicts may appear unrelated, but an al-Qaeda haven in Iran, threats from the Islamic State, and separatist ambitions could supercharge the risks to regional and global security.

The de facto halt to Gulf oil shipments has already helped Moscow win back India as a major oil customer, while the rise in global prices could greatly refresh its depleted Ukraine war budget.

Beijing is just as concerned about its Gulf partners as it is about China’s “old friends” in Tehran.

If the Iranian threat to the Middle East is brought to an end, the loose alliance of actors who have long sought this outcome must manage their differences to avoid the regional mistakes made after World War I.

If Beirut fails to disarm the group, target its financial and political foundations, and hold it accountable for a long list of violations against the Lebanese people, a much bleaker alternative scenario will unfold.

For the first time, the region is on the path to sidelining militias and reaping the potential stabilization benefits, though significant obstacles remain.

By using Syria’s newfound resources as a coalition member and negotiating military assignments at the U.S. embassy, the two governments could offset many of the concerns raised by the withdrawal of American combat units.

Four experts explain why reversing the conflict’s effects on oil and gas production and tanker traffic from the Gulf will likely take much longer than many people realize, with only limited supply alternatives in the meantime.

Iran’s fractured opposition and years of repression make rapid regime change unlikely.

If President Trump gave the Lebanon front just a fraction of the attention he has directed toward Iran and Gaza, he could wind up with the newest Arab member of the Abraham Accords—and a Nobel Peace Prize.