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The Iranian Security Threat in the Western Hemisphere: Learning from Past Experience

Matthew Levitt

World attention on Iran centers on the threats to international security posed by the country’s nuclear program. As Iran presses on in its efforts to become a nuclear power, the regime in Tehran also employs an aggressive foreign policy that relies heavily on the deployment of clandestine assets abroad to collect intelligence and support foreign operations, all of which are aimed at furthering Iranian foreign policy interests. From a U.S. perspective, Iran’s massive diplomatic presence in the Western Hemisphere presents a particularly acute problem. In response to Iran’s abuse of the diplomatic system, the international community should collectively press our friends and allies in Latin America to severely restrict the size of Iran’s diplomatic missions to the minimum needed to conduct official business.

The vast majority of world attention focused on Iran appropriately centers on the threats to international security posed by the country’s nuclear program. As the December 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report made clear, not only does Iran continue to make steady progress enriching its uranium stocks, but “the agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.” Even as Iran presses on in its efforts to become a nuclear power, the regime in Tehran also employs an aggressive foreign policy that relies heavily on the deployment of clandestine assets abroad to collect intelligence and support foreign operations, all of which are aimed at furthering Iranian foreign policy interests.

From a U.S. perspective, Iran’s massive diplomatic presence in the Western Hemisphere presents a particularly acute problem. Over the past decade, Iran has vastly expanded its presence in South and Central America, opening new missions and populating them with far more people than required for normal diplomatic duties. “While much of Iran’s engagement in the region has been with Venezuela and Bolivia, it has nearly doubled the

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number of embassies in the region in the past decade and hosted three regional heads of state in 2010,” noted General Douglas Fraser in April 2011 before Congress. Consider, for example, the Iranian embassy in Nicaragua, which is reportedly staffed with some 150 employees. One of Tehran’s largest embassies in the region, it is located in a small country with which Iran has limited commercial ties. In recent years, Iran has promised significant foreign aid to and investment in the country. Visa requirements have been waived for Iranian nationals traveling to Nicaragua, making the country an attractive point of entry into the region for Iranian operatives.

Concern over Iran’s oversized diplomatic presence in the region is neither new nor solely academic. Consider the finding of Argentinean officials investigating the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires by Hezbollah operatives working in tandem with Iranian intelligence agents. According to Argentinean intelligence, the Iranian ambassador to Buenos Aires at the time, Hadi Soleimanpour, had a track record of engaging in espionage under cover of diplomatic activity. Prior to his posting in Buenos Aires, Soleimanpour served as chargé d’affaires and then ambassador to Spain from 1985 to 1989. “During this period,” investigators determined, “Soleimanpour was instructed by the Iranian government to take charge of the collaboration of a group of five residents of Spain with a view to providing the Pasdaran, or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) with support in the event a reprisal action was carried out against the U.S. and Israel.” He was subsequently indicted for his role in the AMIA bombing.

Testifying before Congress in the weeks following the 1994 attack, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, expressed concern that Iranian embassies in the region were stacked with larger than necessary numbers of diplomats, some of whom were believed to be intelligence agents and terrorist operatives: “We are sharing information in our possession with other States about Iranian diplomats, Iranian terrorist leaders who are posing as diplomats, so that nations will refuse to give them accreditation, or if they are already accredited, to expel them. We have had some success in that respect, but we have not always succeeded.” Another witness recounted meeting with senior government officials in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina regarding overrepresentation at Iranian embassies in the region in March 1995—eight months after the AMIA bombing. Officials in Chile and Uruguay, the countries of most concern regarding Iranian overrepresentation at the time, indicated that “the activities of those at the [Iranian] embassy were being monitored and that this was very clearly a concern.”

Amazingly, Iran’s intelligence penetration of South America has expanded significantly since the AMIA bombing. In 2005, the commander of U.S. Southern Command indicated that the Iranian presence in the region has grown from just a handful of embassies in the 1990s to six embassies in 2005 and ten by 2010. At the same time, Iran has built “cultural centers” in seventeen different countries since 2005. Coupled with other developments, such as the now regular flights between Tehran and Caracas, Venezuela,
which law enforcement officials have taken to calling “Aero Terror,” Iran’s increased presence in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere presents a clear and present danger to U.S. security.¹⁰

Argentina has twice suffered terrorist attacks executed by Iranian and Hezbollah agents, and the investigations conducted by Argentinean prosecutors and investigators—with significant U.S. assistance—helped uncover Iran’s use of diplomatic cover to carry out espionage and support terrorism. A closer look at the role of Iranian diplomatic personnel and institutions in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center there two years later offers significant insight into Iran’s abuse of diplomatic privilege and the extent of the threat presented by such abuse.

Exporting the Revolution

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the new regime began crafting the idea of actively exporting the revolution. The goal was to extend the new Shia Islamic regime’s reach to liberate “oppressed” people around the globe. The revolution was seen as the first step toward a global Islamic movement, not the culmination of a strictly domestic national struggle against the Shah. Various government ministries and agencies were ordered to leverage their resources and their authority to facilitate such exportation—none more so than the military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran). Indeed, under the new Iranian Basic Law, “the Army and the Sepah (Pasdaran) should be organized in such a way as to achieve that goal. They will be responsible not only for the defense of the national borders, but also for the observance of the ideological mission of the jihad in God’s name—that is, extending the Rule of God’s Law all over the world....” As the Argentinian prosecutor’s investigation would later conclude,

An analysis of the information that has been gathered in this case shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the realization of acts of terrorism abroad was not the outgrowth of an unusual foreign policy instrument, but was instead based on the principles of the Iranian revolution of February 1979, the ultimate goal of these principles being to propagate Iran’s fundamentalist view of Islam throughout the world.¹¹

American intelligence shared this assessment. According to a 1986 CIA report, “Iran’s support for terrorism stems primarily from the perceptions of the clerical regime that it has a religious duty to export its Islamic
revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant struggle against the perceived oppressor states.” Four years later U.S. intelligence assessed that Iranian leaders, including then President Rafsanjani, would continue to use terrorism as a tool to further a variety of foreign policy goals, including the use of hard-line elements to aggressively export the revolution. Argentina, it seems, featured high on the agenda of countries Iran deemed ripe for revolutionary export.

In the early to mid-1980s, Iran established a robust intelligence network in South America, which already featured a significant Muslim population in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Venezuela. The importance Iranian ideologues attributed to Iranian activity in South America is apparent from a document seized during a court-ordered raid of a Vicente Lopez residence located twenty-five minutes north of downtown Buenos Aires. The document displays a map of South America marking the areas populated by Muslim communities and suggests a strategy to export Islam to South America and from there to North America. Highlighting areas densely populated by Muslims, the document states that Argentina will be the “center of penetration of Islam and its ideology” as it moves “towards the North American continent.” While Iran’s diplomatic presence in the region has grown over time, exponentially so in the past few years, its roots and founding purpose reach back over three decades.

**Diplomatic Buildup Precedes Attacks**

In 1983, an Iranian sheikh, Mohsen Rabbani, left Iran for Argentina. He entered the country on a tourist visa, but the real purpose of his visit was to be a “religious representative of the Iranian state.” Rabbani’s arrival in South America sparked the trend of Iranian government officials flooding South America as intelligence agents under diplomatic cover. In 1986, Mohammed Reza Javadi-nia moved to Buenos Aires as well and a dedicated Iranian intelligence network in Argentina was born. According to an FBI report, Javadi-nia was believed to be an agent of Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance (*Ershad*), which together with other Iranian government agencies such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Quds Force, the Cultural Bureau, and the Foreign Ministry, was thought to have provided cover for Iranian intelligence activities. In the case of *Ershad*, these would be under the guise of religious activity. Previously, the FBI determined that Javadi-nia served in similar capacities in Belgium, Spain, Colombia, and Brazil in the mid to late 1980s. Then, from 1988 to 1993, he served as a cultural attaché at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires. When Mohsen Rabbani took over that position in 1994, just months before the AMIA at-
tack, Javadi-nia became an embassy chauffeur. When he returned to Iran the following year, however, the attaché-turned-driver assumed “a high official position” suggesting his embassy job title was less important than his true function in Buenos Aires.  

Hadi Soleimnpour and Ahmad Reza Asghari, another senior Iranian diplomat, arrived in Buenos Aires in June and July 1991 respectively. Soleimnpour arrived complete with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) espionage experience he had accumulated in Spain, to serve as Iran’s new ambassador to Argentina. Asghari, a suspected IRGC official whose real name was Mohsen Randjbaran, according to Abolghasem Mesbahi, a former senior Iranian intelligence official who defected to the West, was to be an embassy employee. Upon the men’s arrival, security procedures were tightened at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires. For example, the administrative secretaries who used to meet Iranian diplomatic couriers at the airport were stripped of their responsibility, and Asghari himself now oversaw this communication channel personally. “It is clearly suspicious,” investigators concluded, “that upon the arrival of Hadi Soleimnpour and Ahmad Reza Asghari—in 1991—the Iranian Embassy hardened the controls on the diplomatic couriers reaching the Iranian Embassy.” According to witness testimony, Asghari—who would later play a central role in the AMIA bombing—was one of a few embassy employees directly involved in the Israeli embassy bombing.

Against the background of this enhanced security posture, the arrival of Iranian officials in Argentina in the days leading up to the Israeli embassy attack is particularly telling of the events to come. Jaffar Saadat Ahmad-Nia, an attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Brasilia, arrived in Buenos Aires as a diplomatic courier on January 21, 1992. He stayed in the country just one day. Ahmad-Nia returned to Argentina on March 16, the day before the bombing. This time, he stayed just two days and departed the day after the attack. On both trips, his embassy driver would later recall that Ahmad-Nia traveled to Buenos Aires via Foz de Iguazu in the tri-border area; according to Argentine diplomatic cables, the diplomatic visa requests submitted to Argentina for these trips were both marked “very urgent.” During Ahmad-Nia’s second trip, his driver noticed that he was especially protective of the bag he carried and would not let anyone else touch it. According to Mesbahi, who recognized Ahmad-Nia’s photograph when German intelligence debriefers showed it to him after his April 1998 defection in Germany, Ahmad-Nia’s MOIS cover name was Erfanyan. “When it came to operational actions,” Mesbahi stated, “Ahmad-Nia was always ‘on site,’ where he acted as head of the operation and resolved any logistics problems that arose.”

Another Iranian diplomatic visitor to Argentina at this time was Mohammad Ali Sarmadi-Rad from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran. “Owing to his activities in Turkey, whose main purpose was to export the Iranian revolution,” Argentinean intelligence officials already suspected him of being an Iranian intelligence official. A year after his arrival in Argentina, Sarmadi-Rad was appointed Iran’s ambassador to Uruguay. In January 1992, however—several weeks prior to Moussawi’s assassination—he applied for
a diplomatic visa and traveled to Buenos Aires. The purpose of this trip, authorities determined, was “to finalize coordination and preparation activities for the attack on the Israeli embassy” planned for mid-March. An Iranian embassy driver would later testify that he picked up several Iranian diplomatic visitors at the airport. These visitors only stayed for short periods of time and almost always resided at the same hotel, which was around the corner from the Israeli embassy. This, investigators concluded, hinted at the likely activities these visitors were conducting in Buenos Aires: “nothing more and nothing else than the intelligence [was] needed to blast such [sic] diplomatic building.”

Mohsen Rabbani—Preacher, Agent, Diplomat

Summarizing their investigation and the intelligence to which they were privy, prosecutors concluded that “the driving force behind these efforts [to establish an Iranian intelligence network in Argentina] was Sheik Mohsen Rabbani. ... From the time of his arrival in the country in 1983, Mr. Rabbani began laying the groundwork that allowed for the later implementation and further development of the [Iranian] spy network.”

In 1983, prior to his departure for South America, Rabbani met Mesi-bahi, then an Iranian intelligence official, and explained that he was being dispatched to Argentina “in order to create support groups for exporting the Islamic revolution.” While that was his true assignment, Rabbani entered the country on other pretexts. Argentinean intelligence determined that his entry into the country on a tourist visa notwithstanding, Rabbani would represent the Iranian Ministry of Meat and oversee quality control for meat purchased for export to Iran when he arrived in Argentina on August 27, 1983. According to “various sources of information” employed by investigators, Rabbani was also affiliated with the Organization for Islamic Culture and Propaganda, which “operated under the aegis of the Spiritual Leader” and was supported when operating abroad by the Ministry of Islamic Culture, Ershad. His task, Iranian defectors reported, was to recruit people to further the ideology and objectives of the new, revolutionary Iranian regime.

Rabbani spent several months assessing what “opportunities” there might be to neutralize U.S. and Israeli activities in Argentina. Having determined that prospects were both plentiful and worth pursuing, he made plans to remain in the country and received a permanent residency permit in July 1984. In addition to sending encoded surveillance reports, complete with maps and proposed tactical plans, back to senior intelligence officials in Iran, Rabbani held leadership positions at the al-Tauhid mosque in as early as 1983. By 1987, he had formally assumed leadership of the mosque. According to the National Land Registry, the al-Tauhid mosque was owned by the government of Iran in 1984. Its expenses, affirmed an Argentine national who worked as a secretary at the embassy, were defrayed by the Iranian embassy.

Such evidence, and much more, led Argentine judicial authorities to later conclude that the Iranian intelligence structure established in Argen-
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The Iranian security threat consisted of a long list of individuals associated with a variety of official Iranian government agencies. These included the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS, or VEVAK—Vezarat-e Ettalaat Va Nniyat-e Kashvar), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC or Pasdaran), the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Ershad), the Organization for Islamic Culture and Propaganda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce, which was “represented by the company known as the ‘Government Trading Corporation’ (GTC) and fully linked to the Office of the Jihad Zasandeghi (Ministry of Reconstruction or Construction Crusade).”

Citing “significant evidence...of a classified nature,” the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism would later conclude in Congressional testimony that “the Iranian government does use its embassies around the world in support of terrorist activities.”

By the early 1990s, with this intelligence network in place, Iran found itself well-positioned to carry out logistical support for terrorist attacks in Argentina. CIA reports from the time assessed “President Rafsanjani and other Iranian leaders will continue selectively using terrorism as a foreign policy tool to intimidate regime opponents, punish enemies of Islam, and influence Western political decisions.” This willingness to employ terrorism, the CIA added, “reflects the leadership’s own views as to the utility of terrorism as well as pressure from hardliners to continue exporting the revolution.”

Diplomatic Support for Terror Attacks

Rabbani traveled to Iran several times in advance of the AMIA bombing. After his February 1994 trip, he returned with diplomatic credentials as the Cultural Attaché accredited to the Iranian Embassy. Rabbani’s new diplomatic passport, along with his wife and children’s new service passports, was marked with an issuance date of February 15, suggesting the primary purpose for this trip was to arm Rabbani with diplomatic immunity prior to the AMIA attack.

Iran learned the value of diplomatic immunity two years earlier when Kazem Darabi, who played a Rabbani-like role in the 1992 Mykonos bombing in Berlin, was arrested by German authorities within weeks of the attack. The decision to accredit Rabbani as a diplomat just months before the bombing enabled him “to go about providing material support for the operation with relative ease, while at the same time guaranteeing him diplomatic immunity following the attack.”

Shortly after the meeting in Iran at which Iranian officials authorized the AMIA bombing, Iranian diplomats started requesting diplomatic visas for visits to Argentina. In October 1993, visas were requested for Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance (Ershad) Undersecretary Ali Janati and Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Director of the Cultural Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coming on the heels of Rabbani’s appointment as Cultural Attaché, their proposed six-day visit raised concerns among investigators—not least because of Janati’s seniority and the fact that his brother was described by witnesses as a Revolutionary Guard official and
“a well-known terrorist and member of the hard line faction.”

For reasons unknown, this trip never came to fruition. Visa requests would later be submitted almost simultaneously for Alamolhoda at the Argentinean Embassies in The Hague and Berlin on June 7 and 8, 1994. Alamolhoda arrived in Argentina within days, and despite specifically requesting a 30 day visa, he departed just four days later for Madrid where, Argentinean intelligence notes, the MOIS maintains a regional office responsible for overseeing its activities in Latin America.

On June 18, Ahmad Abousaeidi, the First Secretary at the Iranian embassy in Uruguay, followed Alamolhoda to Argentina on a 90-day visa. At least six other Iranian officials traveled to Buenos Aires for short visits in June 1994, including Iranian Ambassador to Uruguay and suspected MOIS operative Mohammad Ali Sarmadi-Rad, who made a similarly suspicious trip to Argentina in the lead-up to the 1992 embassy bombing.

Another group of Iranian diplomats entered Argentina the weekend prior to the AMIA bombing and left just two days later. Looking back on the bombing, investigators highlighted a variety of suspicious behaviors related to this group. One member, Barat Ali Balesh Abadi, appears to have traveled on a fictitious name. Former senior Iranian intelligence official Abolghasem Mesbahi testified that Abadi’s name stands out since “its meaning was both humorous and meaningless.” Balesh, Mesbahi explained, means “pillow” in Farsi, while Abadi means “deserted place that is in the early stages of development.” This individual’s travel to Argentina, Mesbahi concluded, “was undoubtedly a red herring whose purpose was to create confusion.” Another member of the group, Masoud Amiri, an attaché in the Iranian embassy in Brasilia, provided the Sheraton Hotel as his local address on his immigration form, but the hotel had no record of anyone by that name ever staying there.

In retrospect, Argentinean authorities would note that many of the passports used by the various Iranian government officials who arrived in Argentina in June and July of 1994 were brand new and issued in April and May, just ahead of their travel. Many of these officials had existing passports in good standing, suggesting they specifically sought these passports for the trip. In several cases, investigators later determined, the officials’ new passports featured sequential or nearly sequential numbers. “It therefore follows,” prosecutors determined, “that the new diplomatic cover was granted for the express purpose of generating confusion concerning the identity of these envoys, as clearly occurred in the case of Alamolhoda; this may also have been necessary in the event any other Iranian nationals entered Argentina subsequently.”

The investigation in Argentina found that cover was also obtained through the good offices of a variety of Iranian government ministries, including the Iranian Cultural Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and the Foreign Ministry which allowed agents to be embedded abroad to support terrorist plots. At the Foreign Ministry, for example, the Director for Arab Affairs, Hosein Sheikh ol-Islam, coordinated with the IRGC “to place its members in Iranian embassies abroad and participate in
Hezbollah operations,” according to a study by Hezbollah expert Magnus Ranstorp. Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Qods Force (IRGC-QF) also played key support roles in the AMIA attack. According to a Defense Department report on Iran’s military power, “The IRGC-QF stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building on existing socio-economic ties with the well established Shia Diaspora.” Among the attacks such operatives have been involved in, the report notes, is the 1994 AMIA bombing.

Conclusion

Recent events underscore just how little credence Tehran gives to the Vienna Convention and the diplomatic rights and protections it codifies under international law. On October 11, 2011, US Attorney General Eric Holder announced that a dual US-Iranian citizen and a commander in Iran’s Qods Force had been charged in New York for their alleged roles in a plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir.

Seven weeks later, members of Iran’s Basij militia, the volunteer force tied to the IRGC, responded to news that the UK, along with the US and Canada, enacted new sanctions targeting the Iranian banking sector by storming the British embassy compound in Tehran and a nearby British diplomatic residence. The attack on the British embassy, as Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the House of Commons the following day, was dominated by the Basij. “We should be clear from the outset,” Hague stressed, “that this is an organization controlled by elements of the Iranian regime.”

Both U.S. and UK officials suggested Iran could suffer further repercussions for its actions, and it is critical that such promises prove to be more than empty words. Pointing to the 1983 and 1984 Beirut bombings, the CIA reported in 1987 that “many Iranian leaders use this precedent as proof that terrorism can break U.S. resolve” and view “sabotage and terrorism as an important option in its confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf.” It is crucial that the United States and the international community take concrete steps in response to aggressive and illegal actions such as the planned assassination of a foreign ambassador in the U.S. capitol and the storming of the UK embassy in Tehran. The international community must signal its resolve to confront Iran’s demonstrated willingness to employ terrorism and political violence to further its foreign policy objectives.

In response to Iran’s abuse of the diplomatic system, the international community should collectively press our friends and allies to severely restrict the size of Iran’s diplomatic missions to the minimum needed to conduct
official business. Nowhere is this more crucial than in Latin America, where Iran has vastly expanded its presence over the past few years by opening new missions and populating them with far more people than required for normal diplomatic duties. As the Argentinean case makes clear, the consequences of allowing such abuse of diplomatic status can be deadly. Indeed, the concerns articulated before the U.S. Congress in 1994 have only become more acute. Consider, for example, information revealed by U.S. officials that in order to execute the attack in Washington, the Qods Force apparently approved a plan to subcontract the attack to someone tied to a Mexican drug cartel. Further, according to press reports, the Qods Force plot to murder the Saudi Ambassador may have also included plans to target Saudi or possibly Israeli diplomats in Argentina.45

Governments should additionally be pressed to exercise diligence about non-diplomatic Iranian travelers connected to the Iranian government who may be engaged in illegal activities. Iranian diplomats should only be allowed to travel outside the city to which they are assigned on official business, and visits by Iranian officials should be restricted to official business only; this means no meetings with sympathizers and no speeches. Actions such as these, while short of a formal change of diplomatic relations, are not only an appropriate response to Iran’s clear disregard for the Vienna Convention and its provisions regarding the protection of international diplomats, but they can also have an immediate impact on U.S. and regional security without being prejudicial to ongoing prosecutions here in the United States.

Notes

1 This article draws on research material collected for the author’s forthcoming book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s ‘Party of God,’ (Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2012)
6 Testimony of Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Testimony at Hearing on “Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in Argentina” before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, September 28, 1995.
7 Oral testimony of Mr. Tommy Baer, president of B’NAI BRITH, Testimony at Hearing on “Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in Argentina” before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, September 28, 1995, 34.
8 Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Air Force, Commander United States Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 112th Congress, April 5, 2011.
9 “Iran’s Tentacles in Venezuela, And Elsewhere In Latin America: Iran Makes Inroads in Latin America,” Associated Press, April 5, 2011.
14 AMIA indictment, Judicial Branch of the Nation, Jose F. M. Pereya, Federal Court Clerk, Federal Judge Juan Jose Galeano, Case No. 1156, case pages 106, 265 – 106, 467, Court Office No. 17, National Federal Court on Criminal and Correctional Matters No.9, Buenos Aires, March 5, 2003, 75 (hereafter Galeano indictment)
15 Galeano indictment, 62.
17 Nisman and Burgos report, 81, 110; Galeano indictment, 98.
18 Galeano indictment, 31.
19 Galeano indictment, 237.
20 Galeano indictment, 31, 125.
21 Galeano indictment, 125.
22 Nisman and Burgos report, 195.
23 Nisman and Burgos report, 217; Galeano indictment, 117.
24 Galeano indictment, 126.
25 Nisman and Burgos report, 14.
26 Nisman and Burgos report, 226-7.
27 Nisman and Burgos report, 243.
28 Nisman and Burgos report, 227, 237.
29 Galeano Indictment, 31.
30 Testimony of Ambassador Philip Wilcox at Hearing on “Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in Argentina” before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, September 28, 1995.
32 Nisman and Burgos report, 243–245.
33 Galeano indictment, 28.
34 Nisman and Burgos report, 189–190.
35 Nisman and Burgos report, 191.
36 Galeano indictment, 30.
37 Nisman and Burgos report, 191–192.
38 Galeano indictment, 30; Nisman and Burgos report, 192.
39 Nisman and Burgos report, 193.

