REBUILDING ALLIANCES AND COUNTERING THREATS IN THE GULF

LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT & SIMON HENDERSON

Introduction

The Trump administration has an opportunity to reset, tighten, and maximize America’s strategic relations with the Gulf states. For the United States, expanded security cooperation and coordination could be a force multiplier in campaigns to achieve key foreign policy goals, including countering Iran’s destabilizing policies and defeating the Islamic State. Thus far, Gulf leaders have expressed optimism over the new administration’s gestures, despite its America First rhetoric. However, the new administration also faces challenges, including those brought about by its own emphasis on “radical Islamic terrorism.”

The first essay in this two-part transition paper is intended as a guide to navigating complex U.S.-Gulf relations. As such, it provides an overview of the basic tenets of the relationship, stressing the importance of rapport to bilateral ties and providing key policy priorities. The second essay narrows the focus to the Washington-Riyadh link, the most important of America’s ties with the conservative Gulf. This section analyzes the differences in view, options for U.S. policy, and some anticipated Saudi responses on the core issues: oil, radical Islamic terrorism, Iran, Yemen, Syria, Gulf allies, and the Sunni bloc.
PART 1
How to Chart a Path Forward with the Gulf States

LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT

The Trump administration has an opportunity to reset, tighten, and maximize U.S. strategic relations with the Gulf states. These countries were profoundly disappointed with U.S. policies toward the region under President Obama, especially vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, and are longing for a new relationship. For the United States, expanded security cooperation and coordination could be a force multiplier in campaigns to achieve key foreign policy goals, including countering Iran’s destabilizing policies and defeating the Islamic State (IS).

Indeed, countering Iran and crushing IS also top the Gulf states’ list of priorities, making these countries highly receptive to deepening relations aimed at achieving these goals. The Gulf states have been closely following the White House’s words and actions, and generally speaking, they like what they see. They have especially welcomed the president’s top political appointments—Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, along with CIA director Mike Pompeo—who view Tehran’s foreign policies as a grave threat requiring a forceful response, or who at least are perceived to value close partnerships with the Arab Gulf states. As Saudi foreign minister and former ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir stated on January 24, “We are very optimistic about the Trump administration.”

Yet the relationship faces major challenges, chief among them differences in perspective on the region’s fundamental problems, and likewise on long-term solutions to those problems. This means that multilateral short-term fixes typically do not address root causes, from a U.S. perspective, and come at the expense of similar problems down the road. Also, despite strong overlapping interests and institutionalized collaboration across a number of sectors, the U.S.-Gulf relationship is sensitive. Special challenges may emerge connected to the new U.S. focus on “radical Islamic terrorism,” particularly in regard to Saudi Arabia, which views itself as the protector of the Islamic faith and Muslims worldwide. Already, the Gulf is quietly anxious about new blanket suspensions on entry to the United States for citizens of the Gulf’s Muslim-majority allies and neighbors.

As a guide to navigating complex U.S.-Gulf relations, this section highlights basic tenets in the relationship, rapport building, and key policy priorities.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

The U.S.-Gulf relationship has been compared to a troubled but traditional marriage: there is no possibility for divorce, and substitute partners—like Russia for the Gulf, or Iranian negotiating partners for the United States—bring on unwelcome challenges. In other words, strong mutual interests between America and the Gulf compel deep security, economic, and other ties from both sides, despite the complications in the relationship. In this vein, following are four tenets of U.S.-Gulf relations, based on a clear-eyed assessment, to guide the administration as it considers fresh strategies toward the Gulf.

AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GULF STATES IS NOT A ONE-WAY STREET, AS SOME DEPICT; DESPITE CHALLENGES, BOTH SIDES DERIVE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES. These mutual benefits encompass extensive U.S. military facilities and personnel on Gulf soil that serve security interests for the United States and the host countries alike; counterterrorism cooperation against groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda with a focus on operations, ideology, and financing; and extensive trade, with Saudi Arabia being America’s largest trading partner in the Middle East.

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The Gulf states are far from a monolith; each country has a different set of security priorities that translates into different levels of interest in and commitment to cooperation with the United States on certain issues. Each state’s unique security concerns are based largely on the ruling elite’s perception of what represents the most formidable threats to the country—e.g., Iran and Iran-supported elements inside the country; the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other Sunni terrorist groups; or larger neighbors with expansionist ambitions or those exerting stifling political pressure. Expanding cooperation with Gulf partners toward meeting certain U.S. foreign policy goals is best achieved by considering the natural inclinations of each partner.

When it comes to the hotly debated issue of terrorism and the Gulf states, the reality is that most U.S. partners are both part of the problem and part of the solution. All the Gulf countries are strong counterterrorism partners on the operational level (e.g., breaking up plots), and many engage in extensive counterterrorism-financing work and other kinds of anti-terrorism campaigns. However, most also feed the terrorism problem by way of various domestic and regional policies that they pursue to secure their interests. Oman and, in many ways, the UAE are special cases in that both have gone to great lengths to promote interreligious tolerance. Engaging Gulf governments on common areas of understanding as well as areas of disagreement relating to counterterrorism will best serve U.S. security interests.

The Gulf’s ruling families have survived many difficult periods over the past half-century, but the current climate is especially challenging and will test the strength and flexibility of the monarchies and U.S.-Gulf relations. The combination of threats from Iran and its allies and from Sunni militant groups, aftershocks from the Arab Spring, including the collapse of regional states, the plunge in the price of oil and government budgets, and bulging youth populations with unprecedented access to empowering communication tools creates pressure on the Gulf states from all sides. The United States has a stake in supporting sustainable economic, social, and political reforms pursued by Gulf partners.

**Strengthening Rapport**

In developing bilateral ties, building strong personal rapport with Gulf leaders is especially important for reasons linked to local culture and tradition. With respect to America’s Gulf partners, close relationships are understood to enhance U.S. influence on Gulf policy. The following undertakings help maximize strategic cooperation.

**Prioritize Personal Relationships At the Leadership Level.** Gulf society is deeply hierarchical, so relationships must include the U.S. president and vice president together with the Gulf’s kings, emirs, and crown princes. However, most also feed the terrorism problem by way of various domestic and regional policies that they pursue to secure their interests. Oman and, in many ways, the UAE are special cases in that both have gone to great lengths to promote interreligious tolerance. Engaging Gulf governments on common areas of understanding as well as areas of disagreement relating to counterterrorism will best serve U.S. security interests.

**Maintain Frequent Contact During Good Times and Difficult Times.** An open wound in the Gulf is the previous administration’s decision not to involve Arab partners from the start in the political process that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the Iran nuclear deal is known. As UAE ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba remarked in October 2016, “You cannot over-communicate...whenever there’s a problem, you don’t fix the problem by not talking to each other, you fix the problem by talking to each other.”

On the U.S. side, this should involve

3. “Strengthening U.S. Partnerships in the Middle East,” YouTube video, 130:34, posted by “seeprogress,” streamed live October 25, 2016, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa8q_g66DU8&feature=youtu.be&t=1m38s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa8q_g66DU8&feature=youtu.be&t=1m38s).
key stakeholders such as Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson and Director Pompeo via regular phone calls and visits.

- **USE CARROTS RATHER THAN STICKS.** In regard to America’s Gulf partners, encouraging regional policies favorable to U.S. interests should be pursued privately through negotiation rather than intimidation and threats. A key question to consider: What can Washington provide to its Gulf partners in exchange for a more U.S.-friendly policy regarding a priority issue? Often, such a transaction includes some kind of public recognition from the White House or department head. This tactic recognizes that U.S. partners pursue certain regional policies to achieve specific security or other fundamental interests and that asking them to abandon an interest-based policy is significant.

- **BE GENEROUS WITH PRAISE WHEN PRAISE IS DUE.** Public recognition goes a long way in the Gulf, where a premium is placed on reputation. Public praise will help foster relationships and benefit U.S. interests.

- **RECOGNIZE DIFFERENCES, BUT DON’T ALLOW THEM TO DEFINE THE RELATIONSHIP—UNLESS THEY INDEED REPRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH A GIVEN COUNTRY.** The United States can influence the Gulf states on a range of issues but cannot transform these states. When it comes to profound systemic changes, the United States will need to wait for its Gulf partners to believe it is in their interest to make those adjustments.

**POLICY PRIORITIES**

Civil war, interstate conflict, and rising extremism on all sides have exacerbated longstanding threats to U.S. security interests emanating from the Middle East. Today’s priorities in the Gulf should include addressing the most critical threats—namely, Iran and the Islamic State—together with U.S. partners, while providing deep support to Gulf efforts to move toward principles of good governance, which also will help bolster U.S. security interests.

**1. COUNTER IRAN’S DESTABILIZING POLICIES**

Defense secretary Mattis’s expressed intent to counter Tehran’s regional aggression has been welcomed with open arms in the Gulf, where the view that Iran is the most dangerous actor in the Middle East could not resonate more strongly. Riyadh, in particular, views Tehran’s support for Shiite militants in the region, and threats to control maritime trade routes, as its top challenge and will embrace cooperative efforts to counter such trends. Cooperation should target Iran-supported efforts to destabilize the Gulf states themselves, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which are traditional areas for Iranian destabilization campaigns, and incorporate expanded cyber-defense assistance from the private sector. Supporting Saudi Arabia’s defense of its southern border from Houthi attack and pushing for political solutions to the catastrophic wars in Yemen and Syria should be additional areas of focus. The administration appears to be on the right track in considering the risk of Iranian nuclear development as part of the Iranian problem, not the whole of it.

**2. COUNTERTERRORISM**

The Gulf states view the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq, and beyond as an existential threat. Yet military cooperation in the anti-IS campaign has been limited by these countries’ concern about Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his allies filling the vacuum left by IS territorial retreats, and by the commitment of their military resources to threats closer to home, such as Yemen. Expanded operations with U.S. Gulf partners to counter Iranian destabilization efforts in the region, including the regime’s support for Assad and the Houthis, could affect the Saudis’ calculus regarding Syria.

Areas such as countering terrorist ideology and ending the flow of financial support to terrorist groups from the Gulf require continued discussion with U.S. partners. Yet most Gulf governments have alliances with ultraconservative groups inside, and sometime outside, their countries that complicate
such broader counterterrorism campaigns. Abu Dhabi stands out as a particularly effective partner to work with on counterterrorism matters because of its comparatively strong emphasis on religious tolerance and its more limited ties to ultraconservatives. Already-robust counterterrorism cooperation should thus be deepened and expanded with the UAE.

3. SUPPORTING MOVEMENT TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY, INCLUSIVENESS, & RULE OF LAW

Campaigns to destroy IS and roll back Iranian aggression will see stronger results if the underlying dynamics that allow for vulnerability to such aggressors are addressed. This includes toleration of extremist ideology and destructive sectarianism. Without dealing with such issues, the risk is high that new manifestations of old problems will emerge. Some Gulf states have been forced by severe budget crunches to consider and pursue expansive plans to reconfigure the economic and social foundations of their societies, as the traditional compact between rulers and citizens based on the distribution of oil wealth threatens to dissolve. The United States should fully support movement toward accountability, transparency, rule of law, inclusiveness, participation, and other good-governance principles. For the United States, the governance problem in the Gulf is both a rights issue and a security issue.

PART 2

The Burden of History in the U.S.-Saudi Relationship

SIMON HENDERSON

The Trump administration’s policy toward Saudi Arabia will likely be a key element in broader U.S. foreign policy over the next four years. The kingdom regards itself as the leader of the world’s Muslims and the Arab world, as well as, by virtue of its huge oil reserves and cheap production costs, a leader of the energy world. The “grand bargain” of U.S. security guarantees in exchange for responsible Saudi behavior, particularly relating to but not confined to oil, has been tested in the years since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Now, President Trump’s emphasis on America First will test the residual complacency of the friendship and intertwined history of both countries, which began with a meeting in 1945 between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Salman’s father, King Abdulaziz, known as Ibn Saud.

The House of Saud, the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, was likely delighted by five words in President Donald Trump’s inauguration speech: “We will reinforce old alliances.” The kingdom had become exasperated by the disdain with which President Obama referred to the kingdom. But later in the same sentence, other words may have set alarm bells ringing in Riyadh: “[We will] unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism…” Saudi Arabia, which regards itself as the leader of the world’s Muslims based on its custodianship of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, does not consider the terrorism of the Islamic State or al-Qaeda to be Islamic. Such terrorists are, in Riyadh’s terminology, not Islamic but rather “deviants.”

The “issues” papers promptly posted on the White House website after the inauguration would have also concerned Riyadh. The first, titled “America First Energy Plan,” called for policies that “lower

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costs for hardworking Americans and maximize the use of American resources, freeing us from dependence on foreign oil.” It went on: “President Trump is committed to achieving energy independence from the OPEC cartel and any nations hostile to our interests.” The next sentence, however, hinted at compromise with Saudi Arabia, the effective leader of OPEC: “At the same time, we will work with our Gulf allies to develop a positive energy relationship as part of our anti-terrorism strategy.”

The second issues paper, “America First Foreign Policy,” declared that “defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority.” Indeed, defeating the Islamic State (IS) is Riyadh’s concern as well, although the Arab coalition it leads to this end has been of questionable effectiveness. The next sentence reads: “To defeat and destroy these groups, we will pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations as necessary.” The meaning is clear—the United States wants to work with allies, although there is also the implication that if necessary, it will act alone.

Of likely greater concern for Riyadh is Trump’s populism and his evident desire to recognize the often unvarnished views of his voters. It is fair to say that the perception of many ordinary Americans toward Saudi Arabia is ugly: Saudis are viewed all too frequently as misogynistic head choppers little different from the IS henchmen who threaten the kingdom as well as much of the Middle East and even Europe. For adult Americans, memories also persist of 9/11 and the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi; for an older generation, there was the 1973 Saudi-led oil embargo of the United States over its support for Israel. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has spent millions on lobbyists and public relations campaigns to improve its image, to little avail. It could not stop Congress last year from passing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, or JASTA, which enables Americans to sue the Saudi government for its alleged support for terrorism.

For the moment, the reality is nuanced. On January 29, President Trump spoke by telephone with King Salman, their first full exchange beyond the brief message of congratulations that the Saudi monarch had delivered after the November election. The conversation reportedly lasted more than an hour. The White House readout mentioned the following topics: the strategic partnership, the fight against radical Islamic terrorism, challenges to regional peace and security (including Syria and Yemen), the nuclear agreement with Iran, and Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. In an apparent hat-tip to King Salman’s energetic young son and likely intended successor, Muhammad bin Salman—who was almost certainly listening in on the call if not actually taking part—Trump voiced support for the kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic program, seen as being the signature project of MbS, as the deputy crown prince is known.

There was no public evidence of rancor in the conversation, in contrast to the truncated exchange between Trump and Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull. Given this early portrait of the U.S.-Saudi relationship under Trump, what follows is a breakdown of the likely order of bilateral priorities, differences in viewpoint, options for U.S. policy, and some anticipated Saudi responses. Comparatively little of this content was likely addressed in full during the Trump-Salman conversation. At eighty-one, the king has a declining ability to take part in significant policy discussions. Fortunately, MbS is entrusted to act as the king’s surrogate.

OIL

The advent of U.S. shale oil has lessened America’s dependence on imports and contributed to what is likely a comparatively low price outlook for the foreseeable future. As the world’s largest exporter, Saudi Arabia still provides crucial oil supply to many countries, particularly in Asia. But weak prices mean low revenues for the Saudi government and therefore budget cuts. In the last two years, Saudi attempts to force U.S. shale producers out of business by flooding the market have failed. To save an OPEC agreement on cutbacks in the cartel intended to bolster prices, the kingdom has been forced to cut more deeply

than it intended, prompting further painful revenue shortfalls. If, in his discussion with Salman, President Trump was asked for a compromise on this front, he likely declined. The United States should be suggesting that the kingdom’s economy become more efficient through the further reduction of subsidies and less extravagant spending. (On a national level, Saudi Arabia buys huge amounts of top-level military equipment, including from the United States, that it lacks the capacity to absorb and operate. On a personal level, royal spending can make for embarrassing headlines: MbS was reported last year to have spent $550 million on a luxury yacht.)

**RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM**

This topic is high on Trump’s list of priorities because of the perceived threat to the United States. Few signs indicate he would be sympathetic to Saudi claims that such terrorism has no link to the Wahhabi religious traditions in the kingdom. (A year ago, Saudi authorities drastically reduced the powers of the religious police after they discovered most Saudis who joined IS had been members.) Trump may also be doubtful of Saudi protestations claiming no official links with the 9/11 hijackers. A way forward would be a Saudi admission of some culpability for what happened. Financial assistance to the families of 9/11 victims is one option. Since the two senior princes who were paying off al-Qaeda not to attack in the kingdom—Salman’s elder full brothers, Sultan and Nayef—are now dead, reaching a deal should be easier. The focus on this problematic aspect of the bilateral relationship could shift with the change of President Trump’s national security advisor.

**YEMEN**

The civil war in Yemen is a subset of the larger Iran problem, but Tehran’s primary focus seems to be on Syria and Iraq. U.S. policy should be to split the alliance between the rebellious Houthi tribesmen and the forces of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, destroying the latter and using Saudi money to break the link between the Houthis and Iran, with this relationship probably being more pragmatic than ideological to begin with. Publicly, MbS owns this war, having initially depicted himself as its architect after being appointed defense minister in 2015. As time has passed and the military stalemate has deepened, he has distanced himself from the conflict. Privately, MbS is said to be looking for a way out, which creates an opportunity for U.S. diplomacy.

**SYRIA**

Syria represents an additional subset of the Iran problem. Riyadh has strived to force the removal of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, hoping thus to deliver a strategic setback to Iran in the region. For its part, the Trump administration apparently wants to separate the Russians from Iran. Meanwhile, Riyadh is leading an Arab coalition against the Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq but has also been funding and supplying jihadist anti-Assad fighters. The Trump team needs to work with Riyadh to make sure U.S. and Saudi efforts are aligned.

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GULF ALLIES

Five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman—all host U.S. bases or other military facilities. Saudi Arabia, the largest member in terms of territory and population, has none on its territory. Yet the kingdom is often depicted as the leader of the GCC, and past U.S. administrations have occasionally made the mistake of treating it as such, to the irritation of the other member states. President Trump should not reward less than full cooperation in a strategic partnership with a special status.

THE SUNNI BLOC

Although the UAE probably has the better, albeit semi-clandestine, relations with Israel, attitudes are fast changing in the kingdom, as attested by an increasing number of high-level contacts and exchanges.5 While mutual suspicion of Iran is no doubt the main driving force behind these moves, the Trump administration should further encourage the development of ties between U.S. allies and recognize that, while still an obstacle, the lack of a full Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is no longer an insurmountable hurdle to such relations.

Hinting at how the Trump administration will handle the Saudi relationship was the presence in the Oval Office during the call of Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and advisor. Like MbS, Kushner is in his thirties, and both have law degrees and a business background. Indeed, MbS’s plan to reform the Saudi economy is a policy the United States should encourage despite doubts about its feasibility and the danger that it will serve mainly to prompt princely crony capitalism.

However it develops, any diplomatic bonding by Kushner with MbS should avoid the appearance of taking sides in royal family politics. The Saudi heir apparent is Muhammad bin Nayef, the crown prince and interior minister and, for many years, Washington’s favorite Saudi prince because of his cooperation on the counterterrorism portfolio. MbN, as he is known, strikes observers as being increasingly sidelined, but writing off his fortunes would be premature, especially given that he is thought to have wider support in the House of Saud than MbS. A transition could easily come in the next four years, considering an eighty-one-year-old sovereign with a range of ailments. The two most likely alternatives are that MbN withdraws from the race because of his own health problems or King Salman changes his preference for crown prince, promoting MbS and pushing MbN to the side.

Another Saudi prince who could become important to the bilateral relationship is MbS’s younger full brother, Khalid bin Salman, a former F-15 pilot who recently started a two-year graduate course at Georgetown University. Khalid was a member of MbS’s official delegation when the deputy crown prince visited Washington in June 2016 and since then has established networks in the city. He is being seen as a modern-day version of Bandar bin Sultan, who also trained as a fighter pilot before dominating the U.S.-Saudi relationship for more than two decades as ambassador in Washington.

The Washington-Riyadh link is the most important of America’s ties with the conservative Gulf states, but it faces a range of complex challenges. The relationship requires careful attention.

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LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT is the Barbara Kay Family Fellow at The Washington Institute, where she specializes in Arab Gulf politics and U.S.-Gulf relations. Prior to joining the Institute, she worked for more than ten years as a Middle East analyst for the U.S. intelligence community, including at the Central Intelligence Agency and Science Applications International Corporation.

SIMON HENDERSON is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute, specializing in energy matters and the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf. A former journalist with Financial Times, Henderson has also worked as a consultant advising corporations and governments on the Persian Gulf.