Imagining the Border

Options for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Issue

David Makovsky
with Sheli Chabon and Jennifer Logan
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About the Authors

DAVID MAKOFSKY, Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of The Washington Institute’s Project on the Middle East Peace Process, is also an adjunct lecturer in Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. An award-winning journalist and former executive editor of the Jerusalem Post, he has achieved international recognition as an expert on Arab-Israeli affairs. Highly sought after as a radio and TV commentator, Mr. Makovsky also contributes regularly to major print outlets such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Foreign Affairs. He is the author of numerous studies on Arab-Israeli relations, most recently the critically acclaimed Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East, coauthored with Dennis Ross (Viking/Penguin, 2009).

SHELI CHABON and JENNIFER LOGAN are recent Schusterman young scholars in the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute.

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DAVID MAKOFSKY
Ziegler Distinguished Fellow
Director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process
Settlements and Swaps:
Envisioning an Israeli-Palestinian Border

AS ISRAEL AND the Palestinian Authority (PA) resume negotiations over the coming months, most observers believe the talks will focus on security and territory before addressing other issues. Whether the parties negotiate directly or through U.S. mediators, the gaps between them on these two issues would appear to be more bridgeable and less deeply emotive than their differences on the future of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees.

This belief, however, derives from flawed conventional wisdom regarding the impact of Israeli settlements on potential territorial compromise. Settlements have definitely complicated efforts to reach such a compromise, and one can understand why so many observers, not just Palestinians, oppose them. Yet it is incorrect to assert—as many do—that settlements are evenly distributed throughout the West Bank or take up such a large amount of land that they preclude a two-state solution. In fact, most settlers live near Israel’s pre-1967 boundary, and the vast majority of them reside in areas that constitute a small percentage of the West Bank. Accordingly, a border agreement may be more plausible than it is generally believed to be.

In past (and ultimately abortive) negotiations, both sides reportedly proposed territorial exchanges—commonly referred to as “land swaps”—as a means of addressing Israel’s desire to retain certain lands east of the pre-1967 boundary. Through such exchanges, Israel would be able to extend its recognized border to include certain settlement blocs near the old boundary. In exchange, the PA would extend its control to certain areas inside pre-1967 Israel; these areas would in turn become part of a new Palestinian state.

This report—through analysis, detailed maps, and key demographic data—outlines potential options in the event that negotiators once again broach the idea of land swaps during new rounds of talks. Whether or not the parties can resolve the powerful issues of Jerusalem and refugees prior to conditioning the societal landscape for such discussions, they may be able to bridge the territorial differences sooner.

To be sure, Henry Kissinger’s “constructive ambiguity” sometimes has advantages. But ambiguity can also be destructive, and in the case of territorial negotiations, it is important to demystify the issue. Doing so requires an understanding of where demography meets geography in the West Bank—without reliable, up-to-date information regarding the West Bank’s geographic contours and the location and size of Israeli and Palestinian population centers, imagining the shape of a future border is impossible.

This report takes as its starting point the preferences that the two sides appear to have brought to the table. Outside parties cannot determine which principles should guide resolution of the border issue; that decision is in the hands of Israel and the PA. The role of this study is to illuminate the possibilities for satisfying territorial criteria that the parties themselves have already articulated. The range of scenarios and maps presented here is designed to give policymakers concrete options; neither the author nor the Washington Institute for Near East Policy necessarily endorses any of these proposals.

BACKGROUND
Given that the land swap idea was addressed as early as the 2000 Camp David talks and persisted through the 2008 negotiations between former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and PA president Mahmoud Abbas, the issue may well reemerge in some form during new talks. In July 2000, swaps were discussed at length at Camp David, and in December of that year, they were formally mentioned in the bridging proposals put forward by President Clinton, known as the Clinton Parameters. Specifically, those proposals described potential land swaps involving Israeli annexation of less than 3% of the Occupied Territories and allowing for a near 1:1 territorial exchange between the parties. (The term land swap does not by definition mean an exchange of equal amounts of land.) On
December 27, 2000, the Barak government’s security cabinet approved the Clinton Parameters as a whole, including the land swap idea. Although the cabinet had reservations, these were centered on technical issues, not on the principles underlying the proposals.3

During the 2008 Olmert-Abbas negotiations, the two leaders agreed that for any land annexed by Israel as part of a territorial deal, the Palestinians would receive equal amounts of land from within the 1967 boundary. Olmert proposed a swap that would have met this 1:1 requirement, but the parties disagreed on the total amount of land to be exchanged. Olmert wanted to swap 6.3% of the territories acquired in 1967, while Abbas would only agree to 1.9%. Soon thereafter, the peace talks collapsed with the December 2008 outbreak of hostilities in the Gaza Strip; as a result, Olmert did not have an opportunity to bring his entire proposal before the cabinet.4

In a speech to an Israeli peace group on September 19, 2010, Olmert stated,

I will repeat the things I believe in and I think there is no other way. First, we must reach quickly an agreement [stating] that the territorial solution will be based on the borders of ’67. When we deal with [the size of the] land exchange, I don’t want to discuss now if it is this percentage or that percentage. I don’t want to interfere, as this is certainly not my intention to impact moves the government is making. So there are some among you who think we should do a land exchange of this percentage and those of a different percentage. I have a specific percentage in mind that can wrap up the discussion. And the difference of what I think and what I know the Palestinians are thinking is even smaller than what I thought when I made my proposal to them. We are very close on this point, at least as I know the views today of the Palestinian leadership and the views that I presented to them.5

The current Israeli government has not taken an official stance on land swaps, much less on whether it would accept a 1:1 exchange.6 But it has not ruled out such swaps, and various signs indicate that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators may well discuss the issue as new talks unfold. Indeed, at the White House ceremony relaunching the peace process, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared, “We recognize that another people share this land with us. And I came here to find an historic compromise that will enable both peoples to live in peace, security and dignity.”7 Similarly, according to the Associated Press, a February 2009 cable sent by a U.S. diplomat indicated that Netanyahu had “expressed support for the concept of land swaps, and emphasized that he did not want to govern the West Bank and Gaza but rather to stop attacks from being launched from there.”8

Abbas has also frequently called for swaps based on the pre-1967 boundary as a baseline for territorial adjustments. In a July 2010 interview with Jordanian journalists, for example, he noted, “We have said that borders need to be on a 1967 basis, with agreement on land swaps equal in value and size.”9 Such statements illustrate his recognition that the Palestinians will not gain the exact pre-1967 lands, but rather territory in compensation.

This report outlines three potential land swap options should Israel and the PA decide to trade settlement blocs for offsetting land within Israel’s pre-1967 boundary. Each of the three scenarios would involve 1:1 swaps falling between Abbas’s 1.9% threshold and Olmert’s 6.3% target; in no instance would Israel annex more than 4.73% of the Occupied Territories. The accompanying maps show that such exchanges would go far toward achieving objectives supported by large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians—for the former, retention inside Israel of territory on which a sizable majority of Israeli settlers live; for the latter, gaining control over territory from within pre-1967 Israel that is equal in size to the land Israel gains in the West Bank.

The alternative—continued ambiguity—allows opponents of peace to frame the issue in their terms. More specifically, it enables Palestinian critics to allege that Israeli territorial offers constitute “Bantustans” or noncontiguous enclaves, and that Israel is therefore not serious about a two-state solution. And it allows Israeli critics to argue that the Palestinians want to uproot all 300,000 settlers living in the West Bank, causing something approaching a civil war in Israel. Both of these critiques have been so powerful that they have made the idea of compromise highly unlikely.
Accordingly, engaging these critiques directly is vital to demystifying the issues at stake. And illustrating what land swaps would actually look like is essential to countering those who would wrongly invoke straw-man accusations. In short, a Palestinian state resulting from the scenarios discussed in this report would be contiguous, not broken up into cantons (see the “Methodology” section of this chapter for a discussion of contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank). And the fact that most Israeli settlers are concentrated near the 1967 boundary means that even a minimal land swap would allow the great majority of them to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper, without interrupting West Bank contiguity. The exact number of settlers to remain in their current homes would depend on which map the parties chose.

**CORE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLES**

As stated previously, neither the author nor The Washington Institute takes any position on which principles should govern a land swap if Israel and the PA decide to pursue that option. Instead, this study is based on principles that the parties themselves have apparently discussed with each other, namely:

1. A land-swap ratio of 1:1
2. Israeli annexation of areas that are home to approximately 70%–80% of settlers
3. Israeli annexation of a minimal amount of land acquired in 1967
4. No Palestinian dislocation
5. Measures that satisfy Israeli security concerns
6. A contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank.

These principles are the basis for the first three scenarios (corresponding to maps 1–3) discussed in the next chapter.11

Regarding the 1:1 principle, full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory was the basis for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty of 1994, and Israeli negotiations with Syria, so it is not surprising that the Palestinians want the same formula applied to them. After the 1967 war, however, the drafters of the operational part of UN Security Council Resolution 242 removed a word suggesting that the parties return to the status quo ante as part of a peace agreement. Therefore, Israel feels no legal obligation to cede territories equal to the amount of land that came under its control during that war, a stance hardened by the fact that there was no Palestinian state at the time (the West Bank and east Jerusalem were controlled by Jordan). Yet for political reasons that go beyond legal requirements, Israel may decide that meeting Palestinian territorial demands may be the only way to achieve final resolution of the conflict. In that scenario, territorial exchange options based on a 1:1 ratio may help satisfy each party’s political needs and allow them to reach a permanent peace deal.

The Palestinians’ objective is less achievable if they stick to their position of past decades, namely, that Israel must relinquish the exact same territory it gained in 1967. At the 2000 Camp David summit, Yasser Arafat accepted the idea of land swaps as a way to reconcile ostensibly contradictory ideas: a return to the pre-1967 lines and the retention of most Israeli settlements under Israeli sovereignty. Abbas has publicly and repeatedly endorsed this position, with various caveats (e.g., the swaps should be minimal, and the land Israel provides should be of reasonable quality). A major issue for Israel is minimizing the political pain and societal dislocation that would result from displacing settlers. No matter how one draws the map, a West Bank land swap would involve dislocation several times greater than that of the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, which was traumatic for many Israelis. Hence the second principle listed above: each of the first three map scenarios in this report proposes a swap that, while consistent with the 1:1 principle, would maximize the number of settlers in the land annexed to Israel. Indeed, tens of thousands of settlers could be spared dislocation even as the Palestinians establish a state equal in size to one drawn according to the pre-1967 lines. Specifically, the three maps show how Israel could annex lands holding a minimum of nearly 70% of the settlers or a maximum of 80%.
The third principle—minimizing the amount of land swapped—aims to ensure that the proposed exchanges are acceptable to both sides, and that swapped land is of reasonable quality.

The fourth principle is illustrated by the maps as well: that is, no Palestinian villages would be annexed to the Israeli side of the border under any of the scenarios proposed herein.

 Needless to say, no territorial deal can be reached without agreement on security principles, since the two issues are closely intertwined. Israel must be certain that its territorial concessions will lead to security, not increased vulnerability. Accordingly, the fifth principle focuses on key factors affecting security, such as protecting Ben Gurion Airport by maintaining an Israeli buffer zone on the western edge of the 1967 boundary, and ensuring that the land proposed for Palestinian annexation in Chalutzah does not fall too close to the Israeli military base in Zeelim. Similarly, maps 1 and 2 show Israel retaining the road between Maale Adumim and Kfar Adumim, which some consider a potential security benefit because it would afford Israel better protection in the event of an attack from the east.

Although this report takes security arrangements into consideration, all parties should understand that the Israeli government could theoretically decide to compromise the other principles laid out here—most notably, maximizing the number of settlers in annexed land—for security concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, not all security considerations necessarily bear on the area near the pre-1967 lines, which would be most affected by swaps. For instance, one major Israeli concern centers on the Jordan Valley area that forms the eastern frontier of a potential Palestinian state (along with a few “listening posts,” or military early-warning stations). Netanyahu has been careful to emphasize that his interest in this area lies in averting Gaza-like smuggling via the eastern border. In a March 2010 speech delivered in Washington, he stated, “Experience has shown that only an Israeli presence on the ground can prevent weapons smuggling. This is why a peace agreement with the Palestinians must include an Israeli presence on the eastern border of a future Palestinian state. As peace with the Palestinians proves its durability over time, we can review security arrangements.”12 This declaration essentially concedes eventual sovereign Palestinian control over the entire Jordan Valley, given that Netanyahu is insisting only that the parties negotiate the terms of Israel’s long-term presence along the eastern border. Such a concession—which would have been unthinkable under previous Likud governments—means that the territorial differences between the parties are now fundamentally resolvable.

The sixth principle addressed in this study involves maintaining the contiguity and flow of traffic in both Israel and the future Palestinian state. A preface note is in order here: many previous works have already outlined options for resolving the core issue of Jerusalem’s future, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet as the Methodology section later in this chapter will elaborate, certain aspects of the Jerusalem issue would necessarily affect any West Bank territorial proposals.

Indeed, the contiguity issue is particularly complicated in the areas surrounding Jerusalem because settlements annexed to Israel will need to maintain a direct route to the city without precluding the contiguity of Palestinian north-south transportation or access to east Jerusalem. These traffic flows can be maintained with existing overpasses and tunnels, the construction of a few new roads, and a degree of creativity.

For example, maps 1–3 show potential Israeli annexation of Route 60 from Gush Etzion to Jerusalem so as not to obstruct the most direct driving route between the two areas. When crossing the Palestinian town of Beit Jala, Route 60 becomes a 900 meter tunnel. If Palestinians were to gain sovereignty over the land above the tunnel—with Israel retaining sovereignty over the tunnel itself—traffic from Gush Etzion to Jerusalem would not be affected, and Palestinians living on the east side of the road would still have access to towns on the west side (e.g., Husan) via an above-ground route. Likewise, Israeli annexation of Maale Adumim and Route 1 would require a Palestinian overpass to avoid disrupting south-north traffic from Bethlehem to Ramallah.
Again, discussing traffic flows in Jerusalem proper requires its own study, and many good ideas have already been published. In any scenario, several new roads would have to be built; the parties should discuss this fact clearly in any bridging proposal.

**COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WITHIN A YEAR?**

In the event that the parties resolve their differences over security and borders, they will be left with two courses of action. The first is to hope that the political traction gained via progress on those fronts would build momentum toward resolving the conflict’s thornier narrative issues: Jerusalem and refugees. Because these issues cut to Israeli and Palestinian religious, historical, and emotional self-definition, resolving them will require extensive public conditioning before negotiations. Ideally, resolving the easier issues first would produce enough such conditioning to build public support for the necessary concessions on the tougher issues. Alternatively, the parties could decide to reach agreement on borders and security while deferring other core issues to a future date.

The current approach adopted by the parties seems to favor the former, more comprehensive approach. In their September 2010 White House meeting, Abbas and Netanyahu stated their commitment to reaching a framework agreement on all major issues within a year, believing that it would not take long to determine whether the conceptual differences were bridgeable. If negotiators are in fact able to close the gaps within that timeframe, the parties could then tackle the detailed, intensive task of writing a treaty. This commitment to the comprehensive approach offers more room for diplomatic tradeoffs to counterbalance painful concessions—that is, by expanding the number of issues on the table, the parties would have greater space to maneuver, making concessions on some issues in exchange for achievements on others. Even if they fail to reach a grand deal, the parties could fall back to a modest strategy, focusing on a more feasible security and borders deal instead. Their intentions in this regard will become apparent in the coming months.

**LAND SWAP IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

Whichever peacemaking route the parties take, they will face many practical barriers if they decide to negotiate land swaps. The most obvious issue is Israel’s clear unwillingness to cede additional territory to a Hamas-run Gaza as long as the group remains committed to Israel’s destruction. More likely, lands adjacent to Gaza would be swapped only if Gaza reverted to PA control, or if Hamas accepted international criteria for becoming a legitimate negotiating partner—neither of which is likely as of this writing.

If Israel does not give Palestinians control over areas near Gaza, the PA may have trouble agreeing to recognize Israeli annexation of an equivalent amount of West Bank land. This issue is not paramount to the Israelis—in their view, short-term legal designations are less important than acknowledgments that a given area is slated to become part of Israel and is not under dispute. Abbas and President Barack Obama have both made clear publicly that once a border is demarcated, they would not object to Israeli construction in settlements that will fall within Israel. Therefore, even if land swaps are agreed to but not immediately completed, there should no longer be cause for controversy regarding Israeli construction in West Bank areas that are to remain in Israeli hands.

**METHODOLOGY**

Some notes on the data are required before turning to the study’s detailed swap scenarios and conclusions. The baseline used for land calculations is approximately 6,195 sq km, or 2,392 sq mi—this is the amount of territory Israel occupied in the 1967 war, including the West Bank, Gaza, the northwest quarter of the Dead Sea, and all of the formerly Jordan-held part of Jerusalem (commonly, if inaccurately, referred to as east Jerusalem) except Mount Scopus. This figure excludes the Golan Heights, the Sinai Desert, and half of the 26 sq km “No Man’s Land” where the 1949 armistice was applied.13 (Although the CIA World Factbook includes all of No Man’s Land in calculating the territory occupied by Israel in 1967, this area was never under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty; accordingly, this paper includes only half of No Man’s Land in the baseline figure. And
Finally, in calculating potential swaps, this study is guided by three elements articulated by one or both of the parties. First, although negotiators understand the importance of ensuring territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state—a key principle in determining the swaps suggested herein—this does not currently include contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank. Accordingly, this study's calculations do not factor in a possible sunken-road or elevated highway corridor between the territories (sometimes referred to as “safe passage,” a term used in the original Oslo Accords) because it is difficult to envision Israel yielding sovereignty over such a route due to security concerns. That is, if terrorists launched attacks from said corridor, Israel would likely close it down. These sovereignty concerns could also be heightened by perceptions that the corridor would, at least symbolically, cut Israel in two. Yet the parties have discussed a variety of options for such a corridor, including sunken roads and tunnels. Any of these options would involve a relatively small amount of land, constituting only a fraction of 1% in any overall territorial calculations (e.g., a corridor from northern Gaza to the point on the 1967 line intersecting the West Bank town of Tarqumiya would be only 36 km long).

Second, the Palestinians have insisted that the land Israel cedes to them be equal in quality to the land Israel gains. It is not precisely clear what that formulation means to them; for the purposes of this study, “quality land” is assumed to mean land that is arable as well as useful for industrial purposes. Accordingly, none of the maps presented in this study envisions Israel ceding territory in the area southeast of the West Bank, an approach that has been suggested in other studies. Although geographically convenient, this land is composed of hard rock and is not arable.

Third, Gaza’s greater population density compared to the West Bank should be factored into any swap. Specifically, in the scenarios outlined in this study, more of the land that might be ceded to the Palestinians is adjacent to Gaza than to the West Bank.
Three Land Swap Scenarios

Any resolution to the territorial component of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be based on both the Palestinians’ desire for a contiguous state and Israel’s desire to annex settlement blocs largely adjacent to the 1967 boundary. The 1:1 land swap scenarios outlined in this chapter would create a contiguous Palestinian area in the West Bank, limit the exchanges to a small amount of territory, maximize the number of settlers absorbed into Israel without dislocation, appear to satisfy Israeli security concerns, and guarantee that no Palestinians will be displaced. The aim of these scenarios is to provide reference points for policymakers grappling with the tradeoffs between demography and geography in the West Bank.

During the 2000 Camp David negotiations, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak called for Israeli annexations incorporating 80% of the settlers. As in 2000, the large majority of settlers continue to live in a minority of the settlements, and these blocs take up a small fraction of West Bank territory that is largely—but not exclusively—near the pre-1967 boundary. Many settlers moved to these blocs because they believed that they would still be in Israeli-controlled territory even in the event of partition. In other words, many of the settlers recognize in practice that partition may occur, even if most tend to hold hawkish views regarding such a development. A peace settlement would guarantee that they are living in Israel and not on land whose status is questioned internationally; without a territorial deal, their status will remain in limbo.

From the Israeli government’s perspective, a massive withdrawal from the West Bank would be gut wrenching. No Israeli administration could evict a large majority of settlers—the prospects for social unrest would be too high, as presaged by the problems accompanying the much more modest Gaza disengagement in 2005 (see the “Comparison to Geneva” section that follows for more on that issue). But a territorial deal that allowed Israel to annex the most heavily populated settlements would make the political costs more bearable.

In addition, if 80% of the settlers were brought into the tent and accepted a land swap deal that allowed them to remain in their homes, the remaining settlers would be more likely to soften their opposition. That is, they could come to realize that resisting the most commonly proposed solutions (e.g., receiving compensation for their lost land) without the support of the full settler community would be politically difficult and could isolate them from the bulk of the Israeli population. Understanding that the settlers are not monolithic in their outlook or circumstances is central to finding a viable solution.

Scenario 1

The scenario presented in map 1 would allow Israel to annex lands holding 80.01% of the settlers. These “bloc settlers” are distributed among forty-three settlements; the remaining settlers live in seventy-seven communities defined herein as nonbloc settlements. Map 1 includes four areas that are likely to be the most contentious in any territorial negotiation: Ariel, the zone north of Ariel, the area north of Jerusalem (referred to here as Expanded Ofra/Bet El), and Kfar Adumim. Other areas included in this map are settlements that the Palestinians do not greatly contest, either because they are obviously adjacent to the 1967 lines or because they would meet clear Israeli security needs. This scenario involves Israel annexing all of the most-contested areas, so implementing it would require Israel to cede more land to Palestinians than other scenarios.

The city of Ariel is contentious because of its location: 17 km from the 1967 lines, which is significantly farther than blocs such as Maale Adumim (immediately east of Jerusalem) and the more populated parts of Gush Etzion (just south of Jerusalem). Yet Israelis will bargain hard for Ariel because of the more than 19,000 settlers residing there. Additionally, more than 11,000 settlers live in the bloc north of Ariel.

Like Ariel, Kfar Adumim is contentious because of how far it extends into the West Bank. Yet some—but
not all—Israeli security officials believe that annexing it is necessary for defending against potential attacks from the east.

The area north of Jerusalem includes two contentious settlements: Bet El and Ofra. Bet El holds biblical resonance and, along with Ofra, is home to the national settler movement leadership. This has led many to speculate that annexing these two large communities is pivotal to reaching an overall agreement on the settlements.

To achieve its 80% demographic objective, Israel would have to annex only 4.73% of the overall territory under consideration. This is a rather surprising finding, contradicting the popular assumption that Israel would have to incorporate far more territory in order to keep such a large percentage of settlers in their homes. In fact, this percentage of land is well within the range suggested in the Clinton Parameters of December 2000. It is also worth noting that if one raises this figure above 5%, identifying areas Israel could cede that are of equal quality to the lands it would gain becomes much more difficult.

In terms of population, this scenario would allow Israel to annex lands containing 239,246 settlers, or 80.01% of the total settlement population. The remaining 19.99% of the settlers (59,782 people) are scattered throughout the remaining 95.27% of the relevant territory. Of course, the number of residents in annexed lands jumps to 428,457 if one includes the Jewish population of east Jerusalem. In that case, the portion of Jewish residents living outside the 1967 boundary who would be permitted to retain their homes and become part of Israel proper would increase to 87.76%.

Regarding the territory Israel would cede under this scenario, map 1 shows six potential land swap areas totaling 293.1 sq km: one northeast of the West Bank, one northwest of the West Bank, two on the southwestern edge of the West Bank, and two more adjacent to Gaza. This distribution is in line with the principle that more of the ceded land should be adjacent to Gaza than to the West Bank, as discussed previously. Moreover, all of the areas are potentially arable—indeed, one of this study’s novel findings is that the parties could further reduce the number of dislocated settlers by considering viable land swap areas beyond those discussed to date. Two such areas are the excellent farmlands northeast of the West Bank and the unpopulated zone southeast of Gaza, referred to herein as northern Chalutzah. The area adjacent to Chalutzah is already irrigated, and there is no reason why Chalutzah itself could not be irrigated as well. The area could also serve as an industrial site rather than farmland. After all, more Gazans are currently employed by industry than agriculture; according to a 2006 census, 18% of the territory’s 267,000 residents work in industry, compared to 12% in agriculture.

**SCENARIO 2**

In this scenario, Israel would not annex Ofra or Bet El, or even some of the smaller settlements in that area. As a result, the number of settlers in annexed lands would be around 73.31% of the total settlement population, including those in and north of Ariel. As shown in map 2, Israel would annex thirty-eight settlements, leaving eighty-two outside its jurisdiction.

Compared to scenario 1, the number of settlers permitted to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper would decrease from 239,246 to 219,223. These settlers currently live on 4.31% of the total land under consideration; accordingly, the amount of territory Israel would be required to cede in return would drop to 267.0 sq km. Meanwhile, the number of settlers whose lands would be left outside Israel would increase to 79,805.

These figures change sharply if one includes the Jewish residents of east Jerusalem in the calculations. In that case, the number of people in the lands that would be annexed jumps to 408,434, or 83.65% of Israelis currently living outside the 1967 lines.

Regarding the territory Israel would cede under this scenario, map 1 shows six potential land swap areas totaling 293.1 sq km: one northeast of the West Bank, one northwest of the West Bank, two on the southwestern edge of the West Bank, and two more adjacent to Gaza. This distribution is in line with the principle that more of the ceded land should be adjacent to Gaza than to the West Bank, as discussed previously. Moreover, all of the areas are potentially arable—indeed, one of this study’s novel findings is that the parties could further reduce the number of dislocated settlers by considering viable land swap areas beyond those discussed to date. Two such areas are the excellent farmlands northeast of the West Bank and the unpopulated zone southeast of Gaza, referred to herein as northern Chalutzah. The area adjacent to Chalutzah is already irrigated, and there is no reason why Chalutzah itself could not be irrigated as well. The area could also serve as an industrial site rather than farmland. After all, more Gazans are currently employed by industry than agriculture; according to a 2006 census, 18% of the territory’s 267,000 residents work in industry, compared to 12% in agriculture.

**SCENARIO 3**

In this scenario, Israel would not annex the settlements in Expanded Ofra/Bet El, the bloc north of Ariel, or the contentious Kfar Adumim, which collectively hold 34,444 people. As a result, the proportion of settlers in annexed lands would be around 68.49%, including Ariel. Israel would annex thirty-two settlements in all, leaving eighty-eight outside its jurisdiction (see map 3).
Compared to scenario 2, the number of settlers permitted to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper would decrease from 219,223 to 204,802. These settlers currently live on 3.72% of the total land under consideration; accordingly, the amount of territory Israel would be required to cede in return would drop to 230.2 sq km. Meanwhile, the number of settlers whose lands would be left outside Israel would increase to 94,226.

If Jewish residents of east Jerusalem are included, the number of people on the lands that would be annexed jumps to 394,013, or 80.70% of Israelis currently living outside the 1967 lines.

A FOURTH SCENARIO?
The three scenarios outlined above seem to have the best chance of being accepted by both parties. Yet other scenarios could be put forward as well. For example, one could propose an iteration of the maximalist scenario with the addition of Kiryat Arba, located on the outskirts of Hebron. (Religious access to Hebron’s Tomb of the Patriarchs, which both Judaism and Islam consider the burial place of biblical Abraham and other patriarchs and matriarchs, may be one of the thorniest nonterritorial issues.) According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, this community is home to 7,100 settlers, making it by far the largest nonbloc settlement not included in map 1. A fourth scenario could allow access to Kiryat Arba via an Israeli-annexed route that would begin southeast of the West Bank and avoid Israeli annexation of any Palestinian villages.

COMPARISON TO GENEVA
Each of the first three maps would entail a much larger land swap than envisioned in the 2003 Geneva discussions conducted by private Israeli and Palestinian citizens—individuals who had served in previous administrations but whose views often varied from those of the two governments (see map 4). The Geneva Initiative’s smaller swap proposal would have allowed only 166,429 settlers—barely more than half of the total settlement population—to remain in their current homes and be annexed into Israel. This would have required uprooting 132,599 settlers—a full 38,373 more than the number called for in map 3, and 72,817 more than in map 1.

To put these numbers in context, the entire 2005 Gaza disengagement required Israel to move only 8,000 settlers, a process that convulsed the country for months. Even now, several years later, many of the settlers are still living in temporary housing and have not received all of the promised government compensation. Proposals modeled on the Geneva approach of uprooting much larger numbers of settlers could prompt serious social unrest in Israel, in addition to giving far fewer settlers a stake in supporting a peace agreement. In short, compared to the dislocation suggested by other plans, any of the scenarios outlined in this study could drastically decrease Israel’s societal turmoil while maintaining the same 1:1 land swap ratio that characterized the Geneva exercise.

VOTING PATTERNS
As discussed previously, the scenarios outlined in maps 1–3 are aimed in part at minimizing the pain for Israeli decisionmakers, thereby making a solution more likely. Interestingly, recent voting behavior indicates that the bloc settlers who would be annexed under these scenarios may be amenable to such land swaps. In fact, the correlation between where the settlers live and how they vote is remarkably strong. In the 2009 Knesset election, for example, bloc settlers felt comfortable voting for the Likud Party and its presumptive prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, largely shunning the more radical National Union (NU) settlement party, which opposes any form of territorial partition with the Palestinians. In contrast, nonbloc settlers clearly did not believe that Netanyahu would represent their interests.

According to published electoral figures, approximately 26,451 of the 94,477 bloc settlers who voted in 2009 chose Likud. The second-most popular choice was NU, which received less than half as many votes in the forty-three bloc settlements (12,972). This contrasts sharply with voting patterns in the seventy-seven nonbloc settlements, where NU received approximately twice the number of votes as the second-place Likud (a margin of 10,886 to 5,016). In other words, the Israeli electoral map in the West Bank essentially...
presages the West Bank territorial map. That the bloc settlers voted for Netanyahu while the nonbloc settlers voted for NU reflects the latter’s resistance to territorial swaps. One could debate the bloc settlers’ intentions in choosing Netanyahu, of course. Perhaps they believed that voting for him would achieve the same result as voting for NU (i.e., continued opposition to partition), but with more finesse. Or perhaps they wanted to ensure that any partition would protect their interests. In either case, most of the nonbloc settlers apparently did not wish to gamble on Netanyahu’s intentions.

In addition, the total number of nonbloc voters raises a noteworthy demographic point. Just 24,794 of the nonbloc settlements’ 59,782 residents voted. Since settlers are generally believed to vote in high numbers, this tally indicates that the number of adults in those settlements might be low. In other words, if most of the adult population voted, then more than half of the nonbloc settlers could be children—an assumption strongly supported by anecdotal evidence.

FATE OF NONBLOC SETTLERS
Theoretically, the parties could pursue an alternative scenario in which nonbloc settlers are not displaced at all, but rather remain where they are under Palestinian sovereignty. On paper, this approach has surface appeal because it would eliminate the need for coercive dislocation. Perhaps the two sides will agree on such an approach, but there are several reasons to be skeptical of such an eventuality.

First, virtually all of the 300,000 settlers in the West Bank moved there not to live under Palestinian sovereignty, but rather to live under Israeli control. More likely than not, only a small fraction of them would choose to remain in lands ceded to the Palestinians, resulting in major dislocation regardless of whether it was imposed by the state.

Second, for the small number who chose to remain in a Palestinian-run West Bank, it is unclear whether they could live there harmoniously. For example, they would likely lose all of their social services (e.g., free schools, health care). Moreover, the Palestinians view settlers as the people who stole their land. Assuming the Palestinian Authority permitted settlers to remain in their homes, it is far from certain that they would be able to keep their land, let alone own it.

Third, once Israel withdraws its military forces from nonannexed portions of the West Bank, Hamas elements and other extremists could decide to take advantage of the situation and settle longstanding scores with remaining settlers. The settlers would in turn seek to defend themselves, resulting in potentially grave escalation and perhaps forcing Israel to return to the areas from which it had withdrawn. Some have even speculated that the most hardline settlers could initiate a confrontation that forces the Israeli military to return and demonstrates that the PA is unwilling or unable to provide proper protection against extremists.

For these and other reasons, allowing nonbloc settlers to remain in the West Bank might complicate the implementation of any peace agreement. Accordingly, the parties must consider the fate of these settlers very carefully.

In planning a smooth relocation of nonbloc settlers, creative thinking would be necessary to avoid the problems that followed the 2005 Gaza disengagement, many of which stemmed from a lack of sufficient Israeli governmental planning. A U.S.-Israel panel devoted to this key issue would be extremely helpful in determining how to avoid potential problems. One idea that has gained broad support inside Israel is offering increased compensation to nonbloc settlers who agree to relocate voluntarily, thus reducing the scope of forced evacuations.

LAND SWAPS IN THE GALILEE?
Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman has proposed another, more controversial type of land swap. According to his Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) Party, any swaps should involve people, not just land; that is, Israel should give the Palestinians both the land and the people who inhabit it. During a September 28, 2010, UN General Assembly speech, he argued that “the guiding principle for a final status agreement must not be land-for-peace but rather, exchange of populated territory. Let me be very clear:
I am not speaking about moving populations, but rather about moving borders to better reflect demographic realities.21

Lieberman’s plan centers on the Triangle (see maps 5 and 5a). The idea has led to charges of racism against him because it would change the borders in a manner that pushes Israeli Arab citizens out of Israel. The mayor of Umm Al-Fahm, the largest Israeli Arab city, has declared that he would petition the Israeli Supreme Court to avoid any such denaturalizing, which he considers highly immoral.

Even if one sets aside moral issues, there is considerable debate as to whether Lieberman’s plan would have its intended effect of significantly altering the ratio of Jews to Arabs inside Israel. According to an August 2010 Central Bureau of Statistics report, Israel is currently home to 1,555,700 Arabs.22 This figure includes 263,500 Arabs living in east Jerusalem, most of whom are not Israeli citizens.23 A Triangle land swap—which would encompass only Arab towns in the area, not Israeli towns—would affect approximately 218,865 Arabs,24 or 14.07% of the Israeli Arab population and 2.87% of Israel’s total population. Viewed another way, the Arab percentage of Israel’s total population would decrease from 20.40% to 18.04%. And Israel’s Jewish-to-Arab ratio would change from 3.7:1 to 4.3:1.

If east Jerusalem Arabs were included in such a swap, Lieberman’s plan would affect 482,365 people, and the Arab percentage of Israel’s total population would decrease from 20.40% to 15.02%, with two-thirds of Israel’s Arab population intact. Some would view this as a major decrease, while others would argue that it is not an appreciable change to the demographic landscape.25

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to demystify the territorial dimension of Israeli settlements in order to facilitate peacemaking. As discussed previously, analyzing the intersection of demography and geography shows that the parties could feasibly implement a land swap that meets six key goals:

1. A 1:1 land swap ratio
2. Israeli annexation of areas that are home to approximately 70%–80% of settlers
3. Israeli annexation of a minimal amount of land acquired in 1967
4. No Palestinian dislocation
5. Measures that satisfy Israeli security concerns
6. A contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Even the smallest swap proposed in this study—scenario 3, which calls for the exchange of roughly 3.72% of the total land under consideration—would allow Israel to annex territory containing nearly 70% of the settlers. Such territorial options have been facilitated in no small part by Netanyahu’s concession regarding the future of the Jordan Valley.

Of course, Israelis and Palestinians must decide whether they are interested in land swaps and, if so, what principles will guide their negotiations toward that end. Outside parties cannot shoulder the responsibility of proposing such principles. They can, however, illuminate the ground on which the two parties stand. Specifically, the Palestinians could gain the equivalent of 100% of the land Israel acquired in 1967, while Israel could annex the relatively small portions of the West Bank that contain a large majority of the settlers. Careful analysis of the realities on the ground and the maps in this study shows that these two objectives are reconcilable if the parties choose to make them so.
MAP 1: Land Swap Option 1

- Land Swap: Israeli to Palestinian
- Land Swap: Palestinian to Israeli
- Israeli settlements
- Palestinian communities
- East Jerusalem
- No Man’s Land
- 1967 Green Line
- Barrier completed
- Barrier under construction
- Israeli/Palestinian overland route
- Highway
- Primary road

Sources: See copyright page.

Israeli to Palestinian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>% of Baseline</th>
<th>Settlers + Population**</th>
<th>% of Total Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Net1</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net2</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net3</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net4</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net5</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net6</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net7</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net8</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Palestinian to Israeli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>% of Baseline</th>
<th>Settlers + Population**</th>
<th>% of Total Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net1</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net2</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net3</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net4</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

Areas to be Israeli
- 63 settlements containing 239,266 settlers (98.01% of all settlers)
- 8.77% of baseline territory

Areas to be Palestinian
- 77 settlements containing 19,737 settlers (99.9% of all settlers)
- 99.2% of baseline territory

---

* Areas considered unpopulated.
†‡‡ The total jumps to 428,457 when Jewish residents of east Jerusalem plus West Bank settlers are included.

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MAP 3: 
Land Swap: Israeli to Palestinian

Primary road
Overland route
Israeli tunnel/Palestinian Barrier completed
1967 Green Line
No Man’s Land
Palestinian communities
Israeli settlements
Land Swap: Israeli to Palestinian

5 km

Beersheba
20

Airport
5

Eshkolot
Ar-Ramadin
Al-Burj
Qalqiliya
Beit Awwa
Zeelim
60

Shaare
Ni’lin
Deir Matityahu
Shima
Sderot
Beit Ula
Alfe 3
Shaare
Ni’lin
Deir Matityahu
Shima
Sderot
Beit Ula
Alfe 3

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Summary
Areas to be Israeli:
- 32 settlements containing 204,802 settlers (84.63% of all settlers)
- 22.7% of baseline territory
Areas to be Palestinian:
- 68 settlements containing 64,262 settlers (15.37% of all settlers)
- 26.3% of baseline territory

† Baseline figure for total Gaza/West Bank area is 6,195 km² (includes northwest portion of Dead Sea, one-half of
* Areas considered unpopulated.
‡‡ The total jumps to 394,013 when Jewish residents of east Jerusalem plus West Bank settlers are included.
** No Palestinians currently reside in Israeli settlements.

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Summary

Areas to be Israeli
• 19 settlements containing 166,429 settlers
  (55.66% of all settlers)
• 2.19% of baseline territory

Areas to be Palestinian
• 101 settlements containing 132,599 settlers
  (44.34% of all settlers)
• 97.81% of baseline territory

Palestinian to Israeli

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc</th>
<th>Km²</th>
<th>% of Baseline</th>
<th>Settler Population</th>
<th>% of Total Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>.40%</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chajilutish</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest 2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>.38%</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triangle</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>226.3</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>166,429</td>
<td>55.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Palestinian to Israeli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc</th>
<th>Km²</th>
<th>% of Baseline</th>
<th>Settler Population</th>
<th>% of Total Settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North of Ariel</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ariel</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>70,598</td>
<td>23.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Jerusalem</td>
<td>Jewish neighborhoods</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>.36%</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maale Adumim/Kfar Adumim</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>.15%</td>
<td>34,600</td>
<td>11.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betar Illit/Gush Etzion</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>.50%</td>
<td>45,365</td>
<td>15.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Edge</td>
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<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
<td>not incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>166,429</td>
<td>55.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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MAP 5: Triangle Land Swap Option

Summary

Areas to be Israeli

- 43 settlements containing 239,246 settlers (80.01% of all settlers)
- 4.73% of baseline territory

Areas to be Palestinian

- 77 settlements containing 59,782 settlers (19.99% of all settlers)
- 95.72% of baseline territory

Israeli to Palestinian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Km²</th>
<th>% of Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalutza</td>
<td>not included</td>
<td>not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest 2</td>
<td>not included</td>
<td>not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangle</td>
<td>144.2</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOTAL: 293.1

% of Baseline: 4.73%
**MAP 5a: Triangle Detail**

- **Land Swap: Israeli to Palestinian**
- **Land Swap: Palestinian to Israeli**
- **Israeli settlements**
- **Palestinian communities**
- **1967 Green Line**
- **Barrier completed**
- **Barrier under construction**
- **Highway**
- **Primary road**
- **Minor road**

**NOTE:** Predominantly Jewish towns are denoted by italics.

**Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population*</th>
<th>% of Total Israeli population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Jews</td>
<td>5,757,700</td>
<td>75.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs plus east Jerusalem Arabs</td>
<td>1,555,700</td>
<td>20.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs in Triangle area</td>
<td>218,865</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Arabs plus east Jerusalem Arabs minus those in Triangle area</td>
<td>1,336,835</td>
<td>18.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Jews minus those in Triangle area</td>
<td>5,757,000</td>
<td>77.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Jew: Arab ratio in Israel (pre-swap):** 3.7:1

**Jew: Arab ratio in Israel (post-swap):** 4.3:1

*Includes all permanent residents.
Current Land Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Km²</th>
<th>% of East Jerusalem*</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli neighborhoods</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>189,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian neighborhoods</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>263,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As defined for the purposes of this study, east Jerusalem contains 66.0 km² of land, including half of No Man’s Land but excluding Mount Scopus and the 1.15 km² Holy Basin.
Appendix: Profile of Settlement Blocs and East Jerusalem Jewish Neighborhoods

1. North of Ariel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immanuel</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karne Shomron</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maale Shomron</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nofim</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakir</td>
<td>1,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 5
TOTAL POPULATION: 11,621

2009 KNESSET ELECTION: National Union, 29.6% (1,603 votes); Likud, 28.2% (1,529 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: Sections of the completed separation barrier run to the east of Immanuel settlement and to the north and west of Karne Shomron and Maale Shomron settlements.

CHARACTERISTICS: Most of the towns in this bloc were founded from the mid-1970s to early 1980s. Although most of the inhabitants are tied to Gush Emunim, a messianic political movement dedicated to establishing a robust Jewish presence in the West Bank, some settlements have a different composition: Immanuel, for example, is composed of ultra-orthodox Jews (or Haredim), while Karne Shomron prides itself on attracting North American olim (immigrants).

2. Ariel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ariel</td>
<td>16,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barkan</td>
<td>1,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Netafim</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revava</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 4
POPULATION: 19,737

2009 KNESSET ELECTION: Likud, 44.0% (4,309 votes); Yisrael Beitenu, 28.5% (2,794 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: Most of the bloc lies outside the separation barrier, except for the city of Ariel, which is mostly encompassed by the barrier except on its western side. Israel initially planned to extend the barrier around the Ariel bloc, but the proposal drew international condemnation and was abandoned following an Israeli Supreme Court ruling.

CHARACTERISTICS: The city of Ariel, by far the bloc’s largest settlement and the fourth-largest in the West Bank, was founded in 1978 by a Likud parliamentarian. Today it is home to the Ariel University Center of Samaria, which enrolls around 9,500 Jewish and Arab students from throughout Israel, making it one of the country’s largest institutions of higher education. In 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his governing coalition declared Ariel the “capital of Samaria” and
reaffirmed its integral nature to Israel, echoing a similar vow by Ehud Olmert. Demographically, the city is mixed between religious Zionists, other observant factions, and more secular Jews, many from the former Soviet Union (e.g., more than 9,000 mostly secular Russian Jews have moved to Ariel since 199032). Much of the bloc’s recent infrastructure funding has come from evangelical Christian groups in the United States and other nations.

3. Western Edge/Modiin Illit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfe Menashe</td>
<td>6,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bet Arye–Ofraim</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elkana</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etz Efrayim</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashmonaim</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Haoranim</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matityahu</td>
<td>1,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mevo Horon</td>
<td>1,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modiin Illit</td>
<td>44,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naale</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nili</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranit</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaare Tikva</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>79,687</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 13
TOTAL POPULATION: 79,687

2009 KNESSET ELECTION: United Torah Judaism, 33.8%; (10,127 votes); Likud, 20.2% (6,050 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: Four towns lie completely within the barrier (Etz Efrayim, Elkana, Shaare Tikva, and Oranit), seven are almost completely encompassed (Alfe Menashe, Bet Arye, Modiin Illit, Hashmonaim, Kfar Haoranim, Matityahu, and Mevo Horon), and two lie outside it (Nili and Naale).

CHARACTERISTICS: Established in 1970 by the Ezra Youth Movement, Mevo Horon is one of the earliest Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Other settlements in the bloc were founded in the 1980s, including the religious kibbutz Etz Efrayim, the mixed religious and secular community of Shaare Tikva, the Oranit kibbutz, Bet Arye, Hashmonaim, Nili, Naale, Matityahu, and Kfar Haoranian (though legal issues prevented residents from actually moving into this last settlement until 1997).

Approximately half of Hashmonaim’s residents are new immigrants from North America, and almost all are religious Zionists. Matityahu is another religious moshav (agricultural cooperative) founded by a group of U.S. settlers.

Established in 1983, Alfe Menashe is close to both the 1967 lines and the Palestinian town of Qalqiliya. This has made its inclusion on the Israeli side of the security barrier controversial, creating a loop that isolates various Arab villages from the rest of the West Bank. In 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the barrier must be rerouted. Construction on a new route began in 2009, with the aim of excluding various Arab villages from the Israeli side.

Modiin Illit was established in 1996 and is by far the largest Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Almost completely Haredi, it has the highest fertility rate among all Israeli communities, with an annual growth rate of 9.5%. The city’s rapid growth can also be attributed to its central location halfway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

4. Expanded Ofra/Bet El

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bet El</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geva Binyamin</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kochav Yaakov</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ofra</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psagot</td>
<td>1,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,023</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 5  
TOTAL POPULATION: 20,023

2009 KNESSET ELECTION: National Union, 42.5% (3,325 votes); Likud, 18.9% (1,481 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: The bloc lies entirely outside the separation barrier.

CHARACTERISTICS: Many of the settler leaders affiliated with the religious Zionism movement live in this bloc, particularly in Psagot, Bet El, and Ofra.36

5. North of Jerusalem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Givat Zeev</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givon Hachadasha</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Adar</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15,866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 3  
TOTAL POPULATION: 15,866

2009 KNESSET ELECTION: Likud, 41.4% (3,096 votes); Kadima, 19.0% (1,421 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: All settlements in this bloc lie entirely within the barrier.

6. East Jerusalem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JEWISH NEIGHBORHOOD</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiyon</td>
<td>12,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Hill (Givat Shapira)</td>
<td>7,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>26,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Ha-Matos</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Ha-Mivtar</td>
<td>2,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Homa</td>
<td>9,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Quarter</td>
<td>2,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maalot Dafna</td>
<td>3,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Scopus</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Yaakov</td>
<td>20,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Zeev</td>
<td>42,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Eshkol</td>
<td>3,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Shlomo</td>
<td>15,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot Alon</td>
<td>42,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>189,211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF JEWISH NEIGHBORHOODS: 14  
TOTAL POPULATION: 189,211

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2009 Knesset Election: No data available on total east Jerusalem vote tally.

Barrier Status: All areas of east Jerusalem lie on the Israeli side of the separation barrier.

Characteristics: The 1967 war resulted in Israel’s capture and annexation of east Jerusalem, an area previously ruled by Jordan and populated by a Palestinian majority. The international community considers housing built on this land illegal, but Israel disputes this claim, viewing the bloc’s communities as neighborhoods of greater Jerusalem. Such neighborhoods tend to be well integrated into the city’s infrastructure, and successive Israeli governments have asserted that east Jerusalem is an inseparable part of Israel. The United States has left the issue ambiguous, referring to east Jerusalem construction as “housing.” The housing includes the following communities:

East Talpiyot. Located in southeastern Jerusalem, this neighborhood was established in 1973 during the period of rapid settlement development that followed the 1967 war. It is a mostly secular neighborhood, although it does contain fifteen synagogues. In December 2007, Israel announced plans to build 400 new units in East Talpiyot. The construction, which began in 2009, establishes Israeli housing only footsteps from the Palestinian neighborhoods of Sur Bahar and Jabal Mukabar, making any future separation more difficult.

French Hill (Givat Shapira). In 1969, construction began on French Hill to create a land link between west Jerusalem and the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. The current population is mostly Jewish, including a large number of immigrants from South America and the former Soviet Union. In recent years, an increasing number of Arabs have been buying apartments there due to its proximity to the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital, making it one of the most ethnically diverse neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

Gilo. Established in 1973, Gilo is a large residential neighborhood on the southwestern outskirts of Jerusalem. Its growth over the years has created a wedge between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Although traditionally a mixed community of secular and religious Jews, it has recently been absorbing mostly Haredi families. It also has a large Russian population, absorbing 15% of the post-Soviet immigrants who have settled in Jerusalem since they began to arrive en masse in the 1990s. In 2009, the Jerusalem Planning Committee approved the construction of 900 new housing units in Gilo.

Givat Ha-Matos. Givat Ha-Matos is an Ethiopian caravan village in southern Jerusalem, built in 1991 to house the large influx of Ethiopian Jews airlifted to Israel. Currently, four plans have been proposed to build 3,500 additional housing units there.

Givat Ha-Mivtar. Givat Ha-Mivtar is a northern neighborhood established in 1970. It was originally planned as part of a sequence of Jewish communities called the bariah (hinge) neighborhoods, meant to connect west Jerusalem to Mount Scopus. In 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol ordered government clerks to bypass the ordinary procedures and allow Givat Ha-Mivtar and the other hinge neighborhoods to be built as quickly as possible; the government even subsidized land to expedite the process.

Har Homa. Plans for Jewish housing on Har Homa, a neighborhood in southeast Jerusalem, were drawn up in the 1980s but were stalled for a number of years by both environmental groups and Palestinians using the Israeli court system. Construction finally began in March 1997 under the first Netanyahu administration, which viewed the process as a legitimate expansion of Jerusalem. Most current residents are young families who moved to Har Homa in search of affordable housing. On November 8, 2010, to the displeasure of many in the international community, the Jerusalem municipality approved the construction of 1,345 new housing units in east Jerusalem for Jewish Israelis, primarily in Har Homa.

Jewish Quarter. The Jewish Quarter, populated mostly by Haredi Jews, is home to the revered Western Wall and numerous synagogues and yeshivas. As such,
it is a major pilgrimage site for the Jewish people and a
top tourist attraction.

Maalot Dafna. Maalot Dafna was built in 1972 as
another “hinge” neighborhood connecting west Jeru-
usalem to Mount Scopus. Many of its secular and mod-
ern orthodox Jewish residents moved out in the 1990s;
the majority of current residents are Haredi.

Mount Scopus. Located in northeast Jerusalem,
Mount Scopus is the site of both the Hebrew Uni-
versity (founded in 1925) and Hadassah Hospital
(founded in 1934). Between 1948 and 1967, it was an
Israeli enclave within Jordan’s borders. It has long held
strategic importance for defending Jerusalem.

Neve Yaakov. Located in northeast Jerusalem, the
original village of Neve Yaakov was established in
1924. A new neighborhood was built on the site of
the original following the 1967 war and populated by
Jewish immigrants from Bukhara, the Soviet republic
of Georgia, Latin America, North Africa, France, and
Iran. A large number of Russian and Ethiopian Jews
settled there in the 1990s.

Pisgat Zeev. The largest Jewish neighborhood in east
Jerusalem, Pisgat Zeev was established in 1984 to create
a contiguous link with Neve Yaakov, which had been
isolated from other Jewish areas. It had a large homo-
genous Jewish population until spring 2004, when a
large number of Palestinians with Jerusalem residency
moved to the neighborhood in order to remain on the
Israeli side of the separation barrier.

Ramat Eshkol. Located in north Jerusalem, Ramat
Eshkol was the first neighborhood built in the city after
the 1967 war. Construction began in 1968, advancing
the government policy of creating a contiguous link from Shmuel Hanavi to French Hill and the Hebrew
University on Mount Scopus.

Ramat Shlomo. Established in 1995, Ramat Shlomo
is a large, mostly Haredi housing development in
north Jerusalem. On March 10, 2010, the Jerusalem
municipality approved the construction of an addi-
tional 1,600 apartments there. The announcement
came during Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel,
drawing strong condemnation from Washington and
exacerbating U.S.-Israel tensions.

Ramot Alon. Situated in the northwestern part of
Jerusalem, Ramot Alon (often called simply Ramot) is
one of the city’s largest housing developments. It was
established in 1974, and construction continues today.
The population is ethnically and religiously diverse,
with a growing number of young orthodox and Haredi
families and a large English-speaking community.

7. Maale Adumim/Kfar Adumim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maale Adumim</td>
<td>34,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Adumim</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS: 2
TOTAL POPULATION: 37,400

2009 KNESSET ELECTION:
Likud, 44.1% (7,106 votes).

BARRIER STATUS: The entire bloc lies outside the com-
pleted barrier (though new barrier sections are under con-
struction on part of Maale Adumim’s western border).

CHARACTERISTICS: Maale Adumim was settled in
1976 and established as the first Israeli city in the West
Bank in 1991. It is currently the third-largest Israeli set-
tlement in the territory. Due to its growing population
and proximity to Jerusalem, many Israelis have come

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to view it as a suburb of that city rather than a traditional settlement. For example, it is connected to Jerusalem by various bus routes, and a 1.8-mi road was constructed in 2003 to directly link the two cities. Maale Adumim’s diverse population includes native Israelis, immigrants, and religious and secular Jews.47

Kfar Adumim was founded by ten families in 1979 as a community for both secular and religious Israelis. It remains socially, economically, and religiously diverse.48

**■ 8. Betar Illit/Gush Etzion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alon Shvut</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat Ayin</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betar Illit</td>
<td>36,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efrat</td>
<td>8,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazar</td>
<td>1,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Etziyon</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migdal Oz</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Daniyel</td>
<td>1,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosh Tzurim</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,012</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BARRIER STATUS**: Most of the bloc lies outside the barrier. The eastern area near Efrat is bordered by a section of the barrier.

**CHARACTERISTICS**: All of the Gush Etzion settlements were founded in the decades following the 1967 war. The majority are inhabited by adherents of the Gush Emunim movement; several, such as Migdal Oz, Rosh Tzurim, and Elazar, are communal agricultural communities known as kibbutzim.49 The towns of Efrat and Betar Illit operate independently from the rest of the bloc, though they are located in the same geographical area. The latter is an ultraorthodox enclave inhabited exclusively by Haredim. It is also the second-largest town in the West Bank; its high growth rate (6.5% as of September 2009) is due to the Haredim’s above-average birthrate.50

**■ 9. Southern Edge**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metzadot Yehuda</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shani</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS**: 2
**TOTAL POPULATION**: 900

**2009 KNESSET ELECTION**: National Union, 28.6% (108 votes); Likud, 21.7% (82 votes).

**BARRIER STATUS**: Both towns (Metzadot Yehuda and Shani) are almost completely within the barrier.

**CHARACTERISTICS**: Metzadot Yehuda, also known as Bet Yatir, is a moshav inhabited primarily by religious Zionist Jews.51 Part of Shani lies outside the 1967 line, and part within.
Notes

1. Regarding territorial issues linked to Jerusalem, note that this report deals only with areas outside the Jerusalem municipality as defined by Israel.

2. According to then foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was present at the meeting. See Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Haaretz, September 14, 2001.

3. According to Olmert (during a phone conversation with the author on December 8, 2010), there was a slight difference between the 6.3% swap that he requested and the amount of land over which Israel seemed willing to give the Palestinians sovereign control, equivalent to approximately 5.8% of the Occupied Territories. This difference is explained by the proposed land link between Gaza and the West Bank; in Olmert's view, this strip would have added 0.5% to Israel's 5.8% concession, pushing its total to 6.3% and effectively making the deal a 1:1 exchange. In a sign of further potential compromise, he also reported telling Abbas that he was willing to count the land link as 0.3% rather than the 0.5% he believed it was worth, while still maintaining a 1:1 swap. In other words, Israel would have given the same amount of total land (6.3%) but counted it as 0.2% less (6.1%). This would have allowed the Palestinians to give less land (6.1%) in return, both nominally and in reality.

4. It should be noted that there are different views on whether or not the Gaza hostilities played a decisive role in the collapse of the talks. Whatever the case, the collapse prevented further discussion of swaps at the time.


6. The current Israeli administration does not like the term "swap," believing that such wording implies a 1:1 ratio, which it has not officially endorsed. Instead, it prefers the term "mutually agreed border rectifications."


10. Some might argue that settlers could remain in Palestinian-run territory after territorial partition, forgoing any need for problematic dislocations. For an assessment of this argument, see the "Fate of Nonbloc Settlers" section in the next chapter.

11. Map 4 is merely a recreation of the 2003 "Geneva Initiative" land swap proposal and therefore adheres to principles laid out during those discussions (see the "Comparison to Geneva" section of the next chapter for more on those discussions). Maps 5 and 5a are based on Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman's "Triangle" land swap scenario (also discussed in the next chapter). Although the land proposed for Israeli annexation in that scenario matches that of map 1, the land suggested for a Palestinian state would cause the dislocation of more than 200,000 Israeli Arabs. Map 6 portrays the demographic layout of east Jerusalem neighborhoods as they stand today. As indicated previously, a separate study is needed for Jerusalem land swaps, perhaps with a different set of principles.


13. According to sources close to the Abbas-Olmert negotiations, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice summarized the status of the talks in July 2008 by stating, without prejudice to where the border was being drawn, that negotiations covered all areas taken in 1967, including the West Bank, east Jerusalem, the northwest quarter of the Dead Sea, and Gaza. The parties also debated the status of No Man's Land.


15. The figure used for east Jerusalem Jewish residents accounts only for the total number of residents in the Jewish neighborhoods highlighted in this study, using 2008 data from the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIS). A listing of these neighborhoods can be found in the appendix. The number used for the Palestinian population of east Jerusalem (relevant to calculations in maps 5 and 5a) is a JIS figure based on 2008 data.

16. Even aside from crucial factors such as Israel's demographical desire to annex the largest settlements, outlining potential scenarios that incorporate Ariel is important from a negotiating perspective. That is, more territorial options decisionmakers have to choose from during the coming rounds of peace talks, the more flexibility they will have in crafting a territorial agreement. Previous proposals, including those proffered by the Geneva Initiative, exclude Ariel from all land swap scenarios, so including it in this study's maps helps expand the menu of options available to negotiators.

17. These and other population figures were derived from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data (mostly from 2009, though for some smaller settlements, only 2007 or 2008 data was available; see the "Methodology" section of the previous chapter for more information).

18. Of course, such a route would pose a host of traffic contiguity issues.

19. Note that although the Geneva Initiative's published list of settlements to be annexed by Israel includes the town of Shani, official maps provided by the group do not. Map 4 is consistent with those official Geneva Initiative maps.

20. All voting data was derived from totals reported by the Israeli Central Elections Committee in 2009. See the appendix of this study for voting breakdowns in individual settlement blocs.


24. The number of Arabs affected could be substantially lower if one does not include Arab towns in the Galilee north of Route 65, a key Israeli military artery. Of course, roads have been rerouted in the past, but this hurdle could nevertheless complicate Lieberman's idea. Another practical limitation is the presence of an Israeli Jewish town—Katzer Charih, with a population of a few thousand—in the middle of the Triangle. Lieberman has not addressed these and other questions regarding the Triangle or Katzer Charih.

25. Another ongoing demographical debate is worth noting here: scholars Bennett Zimmerman and Yoram Ettinger have disputed the West Bank population figures published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, claiming that the actual population is significantly lower.

26. All population figures for West Bank settlements were derived from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data (mostly from 2009, though for
All population figures for east Jerusalem neighborhoods are based on 2008 data from the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.

This figure includes only the sum of the residents of the Jewish neighborhoods relevant to this study. See the “Methodology” section of the first chapter for more information.

**Notes:**


38. All population figures for east Jerusalem neighborhoods are based on 2008 data from the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.

39. This figure includes only the sum of the residents of the Jewish neighborhoods relevant to this study. See the “Methodology” section of the first chapter for more information.


49. Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, pp. 266–299.

50. Lazaroff, “Settler Population Rose.”

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The impossible is achievable:
Israel can meet Palestinian Authority territorial demands while adjusting its own borders to include the large majority of West Bank settlers.