ON MAY 16, 2014, Libyan general Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity “in order to eliminate the extremist terrorist” groups that have been destabilizing the country. He had been planning the campaign for two years, first stumping for a revamped army and only later attacking the government for its inertia and ties to Islamists.

Many had written him off as a disgruntled officer of the ancien régime in a new arena populated by revolutionaries. A divisive figure, he never won sufficient support from Libyans during the 2011 revolution to have the prominent role he felt was naturally his due, though, as discussed later, in 2011 he did win some significant support. Some mistrusted his ties to former leader Muammar Qadhafi, which stretch back to the 1960s. Others faulted his personality and maverick deeds.

Haftar’s opponents denounce Operation Dignity as a thinly veiled power grab. They say he is a Qadhafi loyalist with ties to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who never accepted the authority of the interim government established during the revolution.

But in acting now, Haftar has exploited Libyans’ anger at a paralyzed government, as well as their insecurity and alarm about growing Islamic extremism. Many are flocking to his campaign to restore order, ignoring the latent authoritarianism at his movement’s core.

Although Haftar’s campaign poses risks to Libya’s nascent democracy, allowing the government to neglect the country is an even greater threat to its well-being. The challenge facing Washington and its allies lies in balancing Haftar’s aspirations against the need to nurture a pluralistic state. By supporting Operation Dignity while also promoting democratic reform and building state institutions, the United States can help Libya emerge from the crisis gripping the country. Examining Haftar’s life will better allow policymakers to understand the lurking pitfalls inherent in his movement while highlighting its potential to extract Libya from the morass.

WHO IS KHALIFA HAFTAR?

Khalifa Abul-Qasim Haftar was born in 1943 in the city of Ajdabiya. He is a member of the Firjan tribe, a medium-size clan dispersed across Libya. After finishing his elementary education, he moved to Dar-nah for his secondary studies from 1957 to 1961. In September 1964, he enrolled in the Royal Military Academy in Benghazi, believing it was the best way to “change the monarchical regime.” It was there that he met future leader Muammar Qadhafi, who had begun his training in late 1963. Haftar claimed to be a fervent believer in the philosophy of Egyptian
president Gamal Abdul Nasser, views that caught the attention of Qadhafi, who was recruiting cadets for his plot to overthrow the monarchy. Indeed, Haftar admired Qadhafi’s virtues, calling him “an angel.” Haftar, whose acquaintance with Qadhafi was largely limited to official meetings, participated in the 1969 revolution to remove foreign military bases, establish a democratic system, and build a strong army to help the Arabs “confront our true and sole enemy, the Zionist enemy.”

Some current news reports errantly claim that Haftar was a member of the twelve-person Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), composed of Qadhafi’s closest confidants. Instead, Haftar belonged to the larger and less significant Free Officers’ movement, which numbered between sixty and eighty men recruited by Qadhafi at the military academy. While the RCC largely planned the 1969 coup that brought Qadhafi to power, the Free Officers’ role was mainly limited to implementing the RCC’s plans. And whereas other Free Officers who defected to the rebels during the 2011 revolution—e.g., Gen. Abdul Fattah Yunis and Suleiman Mahmoud al-Obeidi as well as Maj. Omar al-Hariri—appear in the 1970s Western accounts of Qadhafi’s life and the revolution, Haftar is absent. He said that on the night of the 1969 revolution, he helped prevent planes at the U.S.-controlled Wheelus Air Base in Tripoli from defending the monarchy, an insignificant task given that the king’s forces were concentrated elsewhere.

Having been appointed to the artillery corps following his 1966 graduation from the Royal Military Academy, Haftar was promoted to captain after the 1969 revolution. Shortly thereafter, he traveled to Egypt to study its military organization. From 1971 to 1973, Haftar completed courses in Egypt in operations and commanding artillery brigades and battalions. He claims that he commanded the Libyan contingent during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and participated in crossing the Suez Canal. Haftar was later appointed artillery commander in Tripoli, and he contends he tried to resign from the army in 1974 and again in 1976. In 1975, he was appointed commander of Tobruk’s defenses, and between 1976 and 1978 he commanded Libya’s air-defense system. Haftar does not appear to have seen any action in the brief 1977 border war between Libya and Egypt. After Qadhafi purged the armed forces in April 1977, Haftar was assigned to insignificant units for three years.

In 1977–1978, Haftar was sent to the Soviet Union to complete a general staff course at the Vesterel Military Academy. According to Haftar, he took charge of the initial Libyan maneuvers on the Chadian border—possibly in 1978 but more likely in 1980—and was in command when Qadhafi invaded in 1980. Promoted that same year to colonel, his highest rank under Qadhafi, he remained in Chad until 1981. Two years later, he returned to the USSR for a general leadership course at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy.

Haftar was commander of the city of Tobruk from 1981 to 1986, and he noted that he was one of the first people to assist Qadhafi after the April 1986 U.S. bombing of his Bab al-Aziziya barracks. That same year, he was appointed commander of the Eastern region. Following a series of Libyan defeats against Chad in 1987, Haftar claims that he returned to Chad along with several thousand soldiers to lead Libyan forces there. Though two sources from the period confirm Haftar’s claim, a Libyan officer counters that he merely commanded Libya’s forces in eastern Chad. What emerges from these accounts is that Haftar likely commanded Libyan troops in Chad for short periods, but was never the architect of the war. Even when Haftar returned to Chad in 1987, al-Rifi was overseeing troop deployments from his base in the southern Libya city of Kufra and was perhaps the overall commander. Haftar was sent to reinforce and oversee forces at the eastern base of Wadi Doum, then the war’s principal theater. Chadian soldiers said Haftar was one of the best Libyan officers they faced.

Whatever his skills, Haftar’s command did not last long: He made disastrous mistakes, such as dispatching Libyan columns to recapture the city of Fada, only for these columns to be mauled—and requiring a secondary force to rescue them, which was also
crushed.\textsuperscript{36} In another blunder, he failed to send out reconnaissance patrols to search for Chadian troops.\textsuperscript{37} The Libyans were demoralized,\textsuperscript{38} failing to fire a single artillery round when the nimble Chadians attacked them.\textsuperscript{39} Then, on March 23, 1987, Haftar and four hundred Libyan soldiers were captured by Chadian forces fifty kilometers from Wadi Doum.\textsuperscript{40}

In Haftar’s defense, author Florent Sené notes that Qadhafi had taken control of the war effort and ordered Haftar to take Fada,\textsuperscript{41} and Haftar said as much in a 2012 interview.\textsuperscript{42} Chadian officials remarked that Haftar was “half-heartedly carrying out his orders from Tripoli...in [the] hope that the order would be rescinded.”\textsuperscript{43} And after losing their local Tebou trackers after Qadhafi tried to assassinate their leader, the foreign Libyan forces could no longer operate in the unfamiliar Chadian terrain.\textsuperscript{44}

**TURNING TOWARD THE LNSF**

Haftar said it was the Chad war that led him to turn against Qadhafi. “I was suffering from lack of morale,” he told a journalist. “This was due to our total incomprehension of Gaddafi’s senseless determination to carry on with the war.”\textsuperscript{45} But after the 2011 revolution, he alleged that the 1980 invasion had been necessary to repel the foreign forces amassed on the Chadian border.\textsuperscript{46} As he explained in separate interviews in 1988 and 1991, Haftar actually began to reconsider his support for Qadhafi much earlier, after an April 15, 1973, speech in Zuwarah, where Qadhafi announced that power would be turned over to the people through popular committees, and that laws would be repealed in favor of revolutionary proclamations.\textsuperscript{47}

But the final straw came during his seven months as a prisoner of war, when Haftar learned that Qadhafi denied the mere existence of a battle in Chad, the existence of POWs, and, most important, that he even knew Haftar.\textsuperscript{48} In Haftar’s words, “During our entire incarceration period, Qadhafi did not acknowledge any of us. Instead, he lied and still does. He claims a delegation was sent to negotiate and [Chad’s then president] Hissène Habré arrested them.”\textsuperscript{49}

When he learned of Qadhafi’s denials, Haftar said he asked Habré to introduce him to Muhammad Yusuf al-Magariaf, head of the exiled opposition Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF).\textsuperscript{50} Whereas other Libyans confirm Haftar’s account,\textsuperscript{51} some sources counter that the LNSF was chosen by default because none of the other opposition groups wanted to work with the POWs.\textsuperscript{52}

At times, Haftar has provided an alternative interpretation, claiming that his popularity in Cyrenaica posed a threat to Qadhafi, convincing him to dispose of his rival. “Qadhafi found in this mission a propitious opportunity to get rid of me and my companions,” he told an interviewer in 1988.\textsuperscript{53} In the same interview, he noted that Qadhafi paid “terrorist gangs” to blow up the prison where the POWs were held.\textsuperscript{54}

In 2011, Haftar argued that he initially rebuffed Qadhafi’s decision to send him to Chad in 1987, arguing that the balance of forces was not in Libya’s favor.\textsuperscript{55} In 2012, he again claimed that he refused to take command of the war several times and that his acquiescence was “conditioned on stopping this war after a tactical withdrawal.”\textsuperscript{56} Haftar’s account of himself as a disillusioned soldier does not dovetail with other evidence. Just weeks before his capture, he confidently sent Qadhafi a message boasting, “I will draw them [Chadian forces] here and crush them. In two weeks, I will salute you from [the Chadian capital] N’Djamena.”\textsuperscript{57} In 1990, two Libyan POWs told a U.S. diplomat in N’Djamena that they believed Haftar’s defection stemmed from self-interest and personal ambition.\textsuperscript{58} As for the balance of forces, the Libyans clearly had the edge both quantitatively and qualitatively, armed as they were with surface-to-air missiles, fighter jets, and tanks against their Chadian foes, whose mechanized units consisted of Toyota pickups mounted with Milan antitank missiles.\textsuperscript{59}

Nevertheless, Qadhafi’s attitude likely contributed to Haftar’s defection. In February 1987, Qadhafi—whose official government policy held that no forces were stationed in Chad\textsuperscript{60}—said, “The information mentioning the concentration of Libyan troops in northern Chad...is lies,”\textsuperscript{61} and following the fall of Wadi Doum he repeated the charge.\textsuperscript{62} These denials disheartened the POWs. One prisoner, using the pseudonym Omar al-Mukhtar, wrote that his Chadian jailers broadcast Qadhafi speeches in which he
asserted that the Libyan captives were “mercenary gangs.” Qadhafi was equally disparaging in his denial of Haftar’s role, asking the regime’s number-two official during a speech, “Do we have someone in the army whose name is Haftar? Is he a policeman or what?” On another occasion, Qadhafi allegedly said, “If you are speaking about a shepherd in the desert named Hafaytir, then I know him. I do not know anyone with this name [Khalifa Haftar].”

But Qadhafi later lamented Haftar’s defection, saying, “He was my son and I was like his spiritual father.” Moreover, the Libyan leader classified Haftar as a POW rather than a defector, and allowed his family to continue receiving his military salary. Haftar later confirmed this status, noting that his family received partial military benefits until 1993, when his participation in an attempted coup against Qadhafi led the latter to terminate Haftar’s salary and sentence him to death.

Haftar’s apparent conversion from loyal soldier to dissident took less than a month. On April 16, 1987, he urged “the Libyan people and army to overthrow the rotten regime.” He would later call Qadhafi the “greatest heretic, Antichrist, and hypocrite” and the “Abu Jahl of the twentieth century,” in reference to one of the Prophet Muhammad’s most ferocious adversaries in Mecca. After meeting with LNSF leader Magariaf, 700 of the approximately 2,000 POWs joined the organization. On March 25, 1988, the LNSF announced Haftar’s defection, with Haftar noting his decision, “to join the struggling noble national forces striving to sweep away the tyrannical government.” The Libyan National Army (LNA), as the LNSF’s armed wing was called, is the same name used by Haftar’s troops in Libya today. Westerners, however, called it the “Haftar Force” or the “Libyan Contras.” At its peak in Chad, the LNA had 1,200 fighters.

The CIA likely began training the Libyan dissidents around this time. In January 1989, the newsletter Africa Confidential reported that Haftar’s forces were training in the United States and several African countries. Thirty American instructors were teaching the LNA in Chad. Other reports noted that the CIA made contact with the Libyans in October 1987. The best recruits were selected for further training in Colorado. In 1990, two Libyan POWs told a U.S. diplomat in NDjamena that they saw Americans training the LNA at two camps in Chad.

In 1991, U.S. officials confirmed that intelligence operatives had been training the LNA in Chad since the end of the Reagan administration, a claim subsequently acknowledged by the State Department and confirmed by other sources. In his memoirs, Smith Hempstone, a former U.S. ambassador to Kenya, revealed that the CIA had “turned and retrained” the POWs. In 2011, former CIA operatives admitted that the agency had trained the LNA.

Such aid was consistent with the policies of President Ronald Reagan, who aggressively pushed for regime change in Libya. His first covert CIA action was to support Qadhafi’s Chadian opponents in order to “bloody Qaddafi’s nose,” as Secretary of State Alexander Haig put it. In 1985, the agency devised Operation Tulip to overthrow Qadhafi using the LNSF, with the LNA serving as the best force to achieve this mission.

Haftar denies having links with the CIA, but does not deny receiving U.S. assistance in Chad to fight Qadhafi. “America helped me in Chad, possibly political help,” he cryptically told the author in December 2011. But in interviews with Libyans, he has repudiated claims that he cooperated with the CIA—even when presented with Western articles to the contrary. “This is all fabrications,” he has said. Nevertheless, upon his arrival in Libya in March 2011, he told the Washington Post that he had communicated with the CIA before his departure and later told the New York Times that he had frequently spoken with agency officials during his years in exile. Despite such exchanges, after the revolution he asserted, “We had no contact on the personal level (with foreign intelligence services) and we have no knowledge of any contacts (during the revolution).”

A 1990 coup in Chad forced the LNA to evacuate its troops. On December 7–8, 1990, U.S. forces evacuated approximately six hundred Libyans on a Hercules 145 to Nigeria. But within twenty-four hours, Libyan pressure compelled the Nigerians to rescind the offer and the LNA members were
transferred to Zaire, where they remained for three months, with occasional visits from U.S. officials. The United States promised the country’s leader aid in exchange for harboring the Libyans. But when Congress refused to approve the arrangement, the Libyans were expelled on February 9, 1990. Omar al-Mukhtar claims that Haftar and the LNSF leadership abandoned the troops to their fate as they sought refuge elsewhere.

Washington then asked Kenya to shelter the LNA forces for ninety days, offering in return to release $5–$10 million in frozen military aid. The United States subsequently constructed a camp to house the LNA forces, manned round-the-clock by CIA officers. On May 16, 1991, 350 LNA fighters were evacuated to the United States and the rest were voluntarily repatriated to Libya. When they arrived in the United States, the POWs received $80, food stamps, and free health care.

Later that year, the LNA opened a training camp in Virginia, four hours by car from Washington DC. It was composed of three large buildings with an obstacle course and trenches, according to a visiting journalist. Four hundred fighters from twenty-five states came for one-week training courses and lectures explaining the LNSF’s doctrines. “Here we can engage in every type of training,” an officer said. Haftar told the journalist that the fighters were training “for commando and fedayeen operations.” Haftar told another interviewer that there were three training camps on American soil.

HAFTAR’S MANY FACES

Haftar is a quiet, even timid man, eschewing the bombastic shouting that other Arab secularists and Islamists employ. Eschewing chicanery, he does not shy away from answering all questions. He prefers to speak Arabic with foreigners even though his English is fluent.

Nevertheless, the two above-mentioned Libyan POWs, in a meeting with a U.S. diplomat in N’Djamena, related that Haftar was a brutal soldier who used everything from poison gas to napalm in Chad and that he was equally harsh with Libyan soldiers who crossed him. Those who refused to join the LNA were placed in an unbearable prison, where twenty men died of gastroenteritis in the first two weeks. These tactics fostered an environment in which Haftar’s soldiers “disliked him and feared him.”

Although U.S. diplomats could not corroborate any of the details provided by the POWs, they nonetheless believed them. Other reliable sources related much the same about Haftar’s methods. François Soudan, a reputable journalist who spent decades covering Libya and Africa, wrote that Libyan prisoners who refused to join the LNA were beaten and that, to harden his troops, Haftar had his soldiers kill deserters and Chadian prisoners in front of new recruits. Moncef Djaziri, a respected Libya scholar, wrote that Haftar killed those who refused to join the LNA. In 1981, the vice president of the Forces Armées du Nord, a Chadian rebel faction led by Hissène Habré, told a journalist that, on Haftar’s orders, a Libyan captain executed sixty-one Chadian civilians accused of collaborating with the faction. And Omar al-Mukhtar said that Haftar ordered the execution without trial of an LNA soldier accused of murder, rebuffing the pleas of LNSF leaders who complained that such tactics were reminiscent of Qadhafi.

TO AMERICA

Haftar arrived in the United States in 1990 and, in August 1992, met with Qadhafi’s cousin and diplomatic troubleshooter, Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam, in Geneva. In 1993, Haftar and other LNSF officials met several times with Libyan military officers to provide assistance for what would be a failed coup attempt that October. Along with other LNA officers, Haftar circulated a memorandum criticizing the LNSF leadership’s announcement that it had directed the coup. This provided the backdrop for his resignation from the LNSF on February 13, 1994. A month later, on March 17, he announced the creation of the Libyan Change and Reform Movement. In 1996, several news outlets claimed inaccurately that Haftar had returned to Libya and that he was spearheading attacks in the country’s eastern section. In reality, these operations were being carried out by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. In 2000, Tripoli sources claimed Haftar’s return to Libya was
imminent. Around this time, he met with Abu Zayd Dorda, Libya’s representative to the United Nations. Little else is known of Haftar’s time in the United States, except that he lived in Falls Church, Virginia, until 2007 and then moved to Vienna, Virginia, where he remained until 2010.

REVOLUTION

Haftar returned to Libya on March 12, 2011, and shortly thereafter announced he was heading the rebel army. The interim government, known as the National Transitional Council (NTC), however, designated Younis as chief of staff. For several weeks confusion persisted over who was in charge, until the NTC vice chairman stated that Haftar held no position in the army. Haftar’s rift with the civilian and military leadership widened after the unsuccessful operation to capture the city of Brega. Haftar openly questioned the battle plan, calling the mission “a failure.” Sources describe Haftar as behaving “like a little child,” with arrogance, and believing he was entitled to the position. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam wrote that when Haftar returned, he “saw himself as the savior” and clashed with the entire senior military leadership.

Nor was Haftar promoted after Younis’s assassination in July 2011, and the position remained vacant. In Haftar’s version of events, narrated to the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, NTC leaders had rebuffed a group of military officers who were lobbying for his appointment. These leaders apparently contended, “If we appoint Haftar military leader, he will overthrow us.”

Haftar was a gadfly during the revolution, unwilling to play by the rules. He also failed to demonstrate the political acumen of other senior officers. For example, throughout the revolution General Obeidi largely remained in his base in the eastern city of Tobruk, rather than angling for the chief of staff position in the Benghazi political trenches. Although Obeidi discussed the position with the NTC on several occasions, he was never given the promises he felt he needed to effectively command the troops.

In his defense, Haftar faced an uphill battle with the NTC, whose leaders were wary of Qadhafi-era officials. NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who himself reportedly called Haftar “arrogant,” staffed NTC positions almost exclusively with neophyte disdents and regime opponents rather than Qadhafi officials with requisite experience. For this reason, Jalil never fully trusted his military officers, and in fact he sought to marginalize them by funneling military aid to the militias. Trying to explain his differences with Jalil and other revolutionary leaders, Haftar recently said that he was brushed aside because he refused to work with the Muslim Brotherhood members commanding the revolution. Others, however, said it was the revolutionaries, rather than the NTC, who refused Haftar as military chief. And it is likely that some of those who rejected Haftar were Islamists, though not necessarily members of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization.

Haftar’s revolutionary exploits were mixed. Though he courageously led troops at the front early on, he receded from the limelight after his rift with Younis. In July 2011, regime loyalists tried to kill him in his Benghazi residence. He then moved his operations to the western city of Zintan, where his subordinates claimed he was leading the rebels. Even as the revolutionaries entered the capital, he continued to assert, in an interview with Al-Arabiya, that they were under the military’s command. In the same interview, he acknowledged the presence of Islamist radicals in Libya. But he believed “it is necessary to reach an understanding with them,” by employing people with influence over the extremists to persuade them to change their ideas. In September 2011, he purportedly gave residents of Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte twenty-four hours to leave or be considered regime remnants subject to the same treatment as POWs.

In November 2011, 150 officers met to select Haftar as the military chief of staff. But neither the NTC nor the revolutionaries who had toppled Qadhafi accepted Haftar as their leader, and another officer was chosen for the post. The next month, Haftar clashed with fighters from Zintan when his convoy ran a checkpoint under their control. Days later, Haftar’s son Saddam was shot in an altercation with Zintani forces at a bank. The same Zintani brigades...
are now supporting Haftar in his attacks against the unproductive parliament and the Islamist militias. In July 2012, he escaped another assassination attempt when gunmen shot up his house.140

As the security situation deteriorated in 2012, Haftar barnstormed the country stumping for a revamped army and criticizing the political paralysis of first the NTC and then the elected parliament, known as the General National Congress (GNC). In September 2012, he criticized politicians for preventing military officers from participating in discussions to rebuild the army.141 Later that month, he announced a plan to rebuild the army. It focused on creating a 20,000-person force to restore security, integrating revolutionaries, reinstating dismissed Qadhafi-era military officers, establishing a chain of command, tightening border control, and collecting weapons.142 In June 2013, he extended his reform plan to include the government. His proposal called for stripping the GNC of its powers and creating an emergency government with fewer ministers. He urged “permitting the army powers [in their new composition] to impose security by force... whatever the consequences” and “preparing to confront any developments by announcing martial law... announcing the government will carry it out...the parliament will oversee it...and the army will implement it.” In a nod to the federalist movement, Haftar urged the GNC to hold rotating sessions in Benghazi, Sebha, and Tripoli.143 Such was the case under the monarchy Qadhafi overthrew.144 In 2014, he called for deposing the GNC and replacing it with an interim government composed of “national forces and parties” to be headed by the Supreme Judicial Council. He further pressed for the creation of a defense council that would take control of military affairs and integrate the brigades into a national army.145 His ploy failed miserably, though, and he was largely ridiculed. Facing the threat of arrest in Tripoli, Haftar hunkered down in Cyrenaica to prepare Operation Dignity.

Days after announcing Operation Dignity, however, the pan-Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat published an interview with Haftar in which he stated, “If I am asked [by the masses to be president], I will not hesitate in responding to their request.”150 Haftar has vacillated on this issue, notably so in February and March. First he said that running for president “is completely not mentioned now.”151 Weeks later, he sent a different message when he said, “I do not seek a political post. But if the people elect me, then [I] welcome it.”152 Later, he again reversed course, saying, “I have no aspirations for [political] authority.”153

Taking a page out of Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s playbook, Haftar attacked the Muslim Brotherhood for being the source of Libya’s security woes, dubbing it a “malignant disease.”154 This came as a surprise to some, because the Brotherhood had not been behind the violence rocking Libya. However, in September 2012, he held cordial discussions with the group’s leader.155 He further stated that he had been planning Operation Dignity for two years,156 and told another interviewer it would take six months to complete.157 Haftar later declared his goals to be “ending the state of chaos, the manifestation of terrorism in Libya, rebuilding the armed forces, and supporting the civil state institutions.”158 He also claimed, “The enemy we are confronting is the enemy of the entire world, and it is as if we are fighting on behalf of the world, because al-Qaeda is known in the entire world.”159 On June 22, 2014, Haftar ordered all Qatari and Turkish nationals to leave Cyrenaica because their leaders supported terrorism.160
Since his failed February coup, Haftar has retooled his message to expand his base, cobbled together a coalition of former Libyan army soldiers, federalists, and tribal militias. His key constituents remain disgruntled military and security officials from the Qadhafi era, some of whom fought on the loyalist side during the revolution. Haftar has claimed that 70,000 soldiers, constituting 90 percent of the military, support him. Shunned by the new government, the security services and military have been targeted by Islamists for persecuting and prosecuting them under Qadhafi. Since January 2012, at least 122 assassination attempts have been made against military and security figures. Haftar has also picked up support, in particular, from Cyrenaican federalists who want to create as much space between eastern Libya and the GNC as possible. They view Operation Dignity as a vehicle to achieve these aims. Other titular figures, such as Tripoli military police chief Mukhtar Farnana, have thrown their support behind Haftar, but they do not control any forces.

Several tribal militias have joined Haftar as well, but their support and cohesion are suspect. Because fighters from Islamist brigades such as Ansar al-Sharia and the February 17 Brigade belong to the same Cyrenaican tribes, they are unlikely to fight against their fellow clansmen. In the west, tribes such as the Warfallah and Warshefana, which have seen their influence wane in the post-Qadhafi era, have joined Haftar.

The importance of tribal identity in Libya should not be overstated. Unlike the tribes of Iraq and Yemen, a single Libyan tribe is frequently spread out across the country, thus diluting links and loyalty. Some Libyan clans have migrated to neighboring countries. Qadhafi himself justified his intervention in the Chadian civil war on the grounds that many of his fellow tribesmen lived in Chad.

The identity of Libyans is based on the tribe, largely because the state never existed. In contrast to Iraq and Lebanon, sectarian affiliations are not strong, since Sunni Arabs make up approximately 91 percent of the population. Though federalism has its supporters in Cyrenaica, regional identities are relatively weak compared to Syria. Unlike Egypt, class consciousness does not exist because in the rentier state that is Libya, there are virtually no classes.

This does not mean, however, that Libyans mobilize on a tribal basis. In explaining tribal links, the anthropologist Dale Eickelman has noted that they appear ‘to have existed more as a set of ordered names that provided a range of potential identities at different times than as a base for sustained collective action.’ Mobilizing Libyan clans is difficult because they do not have hierarchical structures with paramount sheikhs. A cogent example of this inability to muster forces followed Yunis’s assassination. His Obeidat tribe, one of the largest in Cyrenaica, threatened to avenge his murder several times, but it never did.

The Zintani brigades are Haftar’s prize pickup because they allow him to project power in the capital, far from his strongholds in the east. Among the factors that persuaded them to join forces with Haftar was their mutual animosity toward Qatar and the influence allotted to its local Islamist allies such as Abdul Hakim Belhaj and the Salabi family.

Marshalled against Haftar is a coalition of disparate militias, drawn from the country’s 250,000 registered revolutionaries, many of whom are now inactive. Much has been made of Ansar al-Sharia’s Benghazi branch, but it remains as much, if not more, a social movement than a full-fledged fighting force. Its members do not appear to have the unit cohesion born of battle because they did not fight together during the revolution. Journalist Mary Fitzgerald estimated the branch to have 250-300 fighters. The February 17 Brigade, with its maybe 1,500-3,000 troops, is likely the strongest fighting force in the east, given its modern weapons and members’ experience during the revolution. The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, which broke off from the February 17 Brigade, is also active in Cyrenaica but numbers no more than 1,000 full-time fighters. In the west, Islamist units such as Libya Shield and the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room, formed after the revolution, have taken up the banner against Haftar but face serious limits on their force projection. They are less cohesive units than a patchwork of militias facing internal divisions. Moreover, Libya Shield’s leader has been unwelcome in Benghazi.
for some time. In the past few weeks, mediators such as the Benghazi Council of Elders have tried to broker a ceasefire, but Haftar rejected their efforts, noting that he will not end his operation until the terrorists “either leave Libya or are buried in it.”

**ISLAMISTS VS. NON-ISLAMISTS?**

Viewing the conflict as Islamists against non-Islamists oversimplifies the situation. Indeed, the raging battle in Libya is at least as much between those who have received GNC patronage and those who have not. Many of the “Islamist” brigades targeted by Haftar are quasi-state bodies commissioned for ministerial protection. Their leaders, such as former February 17 Brigade chief Fawzi Bu Katif, have received ambassadorial posts. In contrast, those fighting the central government have been marginalized, as illustrated by the experience of the federalist movement. Many of its leaders, such as Abu Bakr Buera, are disgruntled officials who have not benefited from the revolution. Buera, a former professor at the Gar Younis University (now the University of Benghazi), unsuccessfully lobbied for an NTC seat. Spurned in favor of other the parvenus, Buera joined the federalist movement to express his grievances. Returning dissidents from the LNSF who were denied government positions, such as Hamid al-Hassi, have also joined the federalists, while his cousin Salam al-Hassi was appointed an intelligence chief by the NTC.

The same is true for Tripolitanian tribes sidelined by the new government. The Warfallah, Libya’s largest clan, prospered under Qadhafi and their stronghold of Bani Walid held out even after the capital fell. The NTC and GNC have ostracized the Warfallah, favoring their rivals in Misratah. Its tribe is supporting Haftar to regain its prestige, which was stripped by Qadhafi’s successors.

Emphasizing ideology overlooks these actors’ individual grievances. In a country where the former leader fed his subjects a daily dose of ideology, many people want to avoid it at all costs. Instead, the conflict is primarily an age-old power play between those who have it and those who do not. And at the head of the opposition is a man who has been on the outside looking in for the last twenty-seven years.

**SCORECARD**

Despite their experience fighting during the eight-month 2011 revolution, none of the Libyan actors has the type of combat experience acquired by the Syrian rebels. Libya’s special forces, known as al-Saïqa, have been unable to subdue Ansar al-Sharia despite their superior training and numbers. It remains to be seen how effective an air force that used U.S. pilots in Chad and Serbian and Syrian pilots to quell a 1990s Islamist rebellion can be against the surface-to-air missiles possessed by Haftar’s opponents. Haftar’s LNA, reported at 6,000 members but likely numbering many fewer, is a hodgepodge of troops with little common battle experience. Instead, the strongest forces are revolutionary brigades from the cities of Misratah and Zintan, with their much higher level of unit cohesion and shared combat experience. Though some Mistratan brigades have come out against Haftar, a number of units remain on the sidelines. It is these de facto two city-states that will decide the fate of Libya.

Nevertheless, given the GNC’s limited influence in distant Cyrenaica and Haftar’s control of air bases in Benghazi and Tobruk, he can effectively partition the country. And such a scenario can only cause concern in a nation where a paralyzed government’s writ does not extend beyond the city limits of the capital.

**WHAT NEXT?**

Haftar’s gambit has already yielded some positive results. The gridlocked GNC, split between the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party and Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance, has ceded the stage to a new parliament. It remains to be seen whether new faces will spur different results.

Some analysts believe the cure for Libya’s ills lies in security reform while others advocate national reconciliation. But Sirte and Tawergha are not Falluja and Ramadi. Qadhafi loyalists are not behind the violence and are not destabilizing the country. Still other analysts claim that Libya’s problems stem from NTC and GNC appeasement of militias. But socio-economic appeasement via subsidies and wage hikes existed under Qadhafi and is a staple of Arab politics. This is part of the Arab social contract that allows Arab autocrats to remain in power. Egypt, the most
powerful Arab nation, was forced to do a \textit{volte-face} on subsidy reductions recommended by the International Monetary Fund after riots in 1977 threatened the government’s stability.\textsuperscript{186}

These analysts’ diagnoses overlook the fundamental problem plaguing Libya—its “Qadhafication,” which left it with no state institutions and a complete absence of rule of law.\textsuperscript{187} Qadhafi’s lifelong dream was to instill his revolutionary fervor in the people to mobilize them for his struggle against imperialism and Zionism and to build a modern state. When his people failed to follow him, he blamed the bureaucracy for thwarting his revolutionary edicts.\textsuperscript{188} To reach his people directly, Qadhafi dismantled ministries and marginalized the institutional intermediaries between leader and subject.\textsuperscript{189} When those steps failed to mobilize the masses, he sought to keep the revolutionary spirit alive by dividing formal and informal authority.\textsuperscript{190} This placed him and his Green Revolution above the law.\textsuperscript{191}

The militias are now doing the same. Zintanis hold Qadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam prisoner in their town, and frequently deny him access to his lawyers and members of the International Criminal Court. A video link connects his Zintan prison to the Tripoli courtroom, preventing him from consulting his lawyers during the proceedings, in contravention of the most basic legal rights.\textsuperscript{192} Their self-conferred revolutionary prerogatives allow them to supersede the state’s authority at every turn.

Setting Libya on its feet will require a coordinated international effort to solve these dilemmas. The NATO allies that toppled Qadhafi must provide institutional experts in everything from transportation to health services, in order to train Libyan bureaucrats who were neglected for decades. But most important, these nations must focus on rebuilding a justice system that was decimated during Qadhafi’s rule. Neglect will allow Islamist actors to fill the void. And unless courts and judges are protected from the hand of rogue jihadists, it will be difficult to establish a functioning justice system. In countries like Yemen, where courts are distrusted and cases wait years for trial, citizens turn to jihadists who can provide them prompt and equitable mediation.

Qadhafi’s policies make rehabilitating the court system doubly important. In 1978, the parliament restricted Libyans to one plot of land, forcing them to sell other holdings at discounted prices.\textsuperscript{193} Today, some are trying to reclaim those lands. But this is proving impossible, because in some cities, such as Tripoli, Qadhafi’s Revolutionary Committees burned the land registry because “land belongs to no one.”\textsuperscript{194} Libyans are desperate to find anyone who can help them solve these dilemmas.

Another sector where Western nations can help is Libya’s health care system. Though Libya is relatively wealthy, it spends only 3.3 percent of its GDP on health services; its less wealthy neighbors spend a far higher proportion, with Algeria devoting 5.3 percent, Egypt spending 5 percent, and Tunisia spending 7 percent.\textsuperscript{195} The World Health Organization recommends spending 10 percent of GDP in the health sector, a figure Libya should strive to reach.

Like many sectors of the Libyan economy, health care does have its strengths. The entire population has access to health care, some 84 percent of doctors are Libyan nationals,\textsuperscript{196} and the country has a large number of hospital beds compared to other countries in the region.\textsuperscript{197} But Libya suffers elsewhere, lacking specialists in areas such as anesthesia, cardiology, gynecology, and radiology,\textsuperscript{198} along with support staff, equipment, central administrators, and health information services. And only fourteen psychiatrists practice in a country that recently endured an eight-month revolution and is still confronting terrifying instability.\textsuperscript{199} Peripheral health care providers such as pharmacists, medical technicians, and paramedics are equally lacking.\textsuperscript{200} Reflecting the foreign origins of most nurses in the country,\textsuperscript{201} 88 percent of nurses at the Benghazi Medical Center are non-Libyans.\textsuperscript{202} Separately, 30 percent of nurses are paid even though they are not actually working.\textsuperscript{203} Awareness of medical ethics also poses a problem, with physicians simply failing to show up at health facilities during worker strikes.

With respect to equipment and technology, Libya is in dire need of everything from specialized systems to basic medical tools. Only 13 percent of all medical facilities have an adult scale, stethoscope, thermometer, and an adequate source of light to examine
patients. And just 35 percent of clinics and hospitals have a computer with Internet access. Nor is there a central registry documenting referrals from local clinics and the ailments being treated.

For all these reasons, many Libyans are forced to travel abroad for complicated procedures. The funds used to pay for these trips, which cost the government precious foreign currency reserves, would be better spent upgrading the health sector.

Like all areas of the economy, the health care system suffers from corruption, with companies overcharging hospitals for all items. Indeed, the health care equipment market is an oligopoly that prevents competition, allowing existing operators to price-gouge as they please. After the revolution, health administrators discovered sixty-eight phantom health care centers employing no less than 1,200 administrators and doctors that never existed. These clinics accounted for 3 percent of all health care facilities.

Corruption extends to the practice of sending Libyans abroad for treatment, often done simply to fatten wallets. For example, one German firm that arranges such treatment takes 30 percent of the costs and sends kickbacks to the Libyans who refer the patients. Inefficiency is also a problem. A Benghazi hospital leased a CT scan machine for 5 million dinars that would cost only 1.5 million dinars to purchase. Specialty machines lie idle because they lack minor parts. And because medical equipment is frequently stolen for sale on the black market, many facilities lack the tools they need to provide services.

In contrast to many of Libya’s problems that stem from overcentralization, the health care system suffers from too many liberties afforded to the provincial authorities. In 2000, the parliament abolished the Health Ministry, delegating most of its authority to the regional level. This prevented nationwide planning, data centralization, and a functioning referral system. Today, Tripoli simply does not know the procedures outlying facilities are offering and the extent to which Libyans bypass primary health facilities and go directly to hospitals.

To remedy these challenges, the international community could usefully help Libya develop a countrywide strategy to improve health care. Aid agencies are well positioned to provide the Libyan Health Ministry administrative training to devise a computerized system to link health facilities. This would allow the ministry to centrally aggregate patient information and physician capabilities. It would also minimize inefficiencies stemming from Libyans’ reluctance to work within the referral mechanism. Western nations could invite general practitioners for specialized instruction while offering Libyan medical students residencies and subspecialty fellowships. Libya needs experts to instruct medical technicians in the use of specialized equipment. And a comprehensive study needs to be done to eliminate corruption and waste.

Washington will likely balk at funding such efforts, but European nations such as Italy might be willing to pick up the slack. Rome is Tripoli’s largest trading partner, purchasing 20.2 percent of its exports in 2013 and accounting for 13.1 percent of its imports, totaling $3.4 billion. In 2008, Italy and Libya signed an agreement whereby Rome would invest $5 billion over twenty-five years as reparations for occupying the country. Italy could earmark some of these funds to pay for institution building. Given that the Italian oil company Eni is the largest foreign operator in the country and that Italy gets 10 percent of its gas from Tripoli, Libyan stability is of paramount importance to Rome. And because Africans migrants traverse Libya to get to Italy, any instability is likely to lead to an influx. In 2012, 7,944 immigrants snuck in to the country, most from Libya.

Other European countries such as France might be enticed to fund projects to enhance regional influence in exchange for lucrative oil contracts. French defense contractors have reportedly been negotiating sales ranging from air defense systems to naval patrol boats. Health care is a sector where the French could specifically help. In 2007, the two countries signed an agreement and a memorandum under which Paris promised to train doctors and paramedics, provide technical expertise, and supply medical equipment. Expanding the scope of this agreement to include eliminating corruption and providing administrative training would be beneficial to both sides.
Building responsive state institutions will help give Libyans faith in their government. A state that is unable to provide justice, mediate land disputes, or provide efficient health care undermines citizens’ confidence and reinforces their loyalties to clan and town. Libyans are frustrated when they must go abroad for medical procedures or pay 30 percent of health care costs in a country where the social welfare state can theoretically provide every necessary service. A mere change at the upper echelons of government and an increase in political freedoms will not alter their belief that the system is dysfunctional. A complete revamping of state institutions is necessary, and only expert training can accomplish this.

Security reform is an integral part of this process. But, as in other areas, Western nations have favored a misguided bottom-up approach, training select recruits with professional military skills. Because Libyans have little loyalty to the state, the benefits of such training accrue where their allegiance is strongest—the tribe. The unique circumstances of the revolution also weigh against a bottom-up approach, because revolutionaries remain loyal to their militias. When they have joined supra-military structures, such as Libya Shield or the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room, they have done so as entire units rather than as individuals, unwilling to transfer their loyalties beyond the narrow confines of tribe and town. A top-down strategy would be more suitable to this environment.

Faith in the military as an institution is equally lacking. Qadhafi dismantled the army in 1993 and 1995. In its stead, he created brigades personally loyal to him. He ideologized the armed forces by allowing the Revolutionary Committees to control them. And with so many officers remaining loyal until his demise, few view the military as an instrument of change.

Washington should focus on establishing a senior corps of officers who can shift these allegiances to the military. Such men must come neither from the ranks of those who remained with Qadhafi until his ship sank nor from the exiled dissidents whose links to the community are tenuous. Instead, officers should be drawn from colonels and captains only slightly tainted by association with Qadhafi. Even this may prove challenging, given that the former leader oversaw all promotions. Washington must provide these officers with the managerial skills to rebuild an armed forces devastated by neglect, war, and distrust.

But until an empowered chief of staff is appointed, these goals will be difficult to achieve. Since Younis’s death, the government has turned to officers who either lack the power to impose their authority or are reluctant to use it against the Islamist brigades.

Washington and its partners should persuade the new Libyan government to appoint Haftar as chief of staff. Respected by his troops, he has the military skills and combat experience necessary to create a modern army. But most important, he is the sole Libyan willing to take on the Islamist militias that are preventing the establishment of a modern state. He is an unreformed Nasserist, admiring Arab leaders who promote a secular agenda and form a bulwark against Islamist extremism. He named one of his twelve children in honor of the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and lamented the anniversary of the dictator’s execution. These stances are anathema in the West. But, given the absence of liberals with any sway in the Arab world, such Nasserists are the region’s only hope to emerge from the instability gripping Libya and neighboring nations. Beyond his campaign against the militias, Haftar understands the challenges Libya faces. He has supported national reconciliation and referenced the lack of state institutions in several interviews and speeches. In contrast, many of his Islamist foes are especially wary of the former regime’s security services and justice system that persecuted them under Qadhafi.

Haftar’s positive attributes are often overshadowed by faults he has struggled to control. His draconian streak has emerged far too often. He declared war on a Muslim Brotherhood that denounced extremists’ attacks and committed itself to the democratic process. And he has not demonstrated that his ambitions are confined to leading the army. Haftar must temper these excesses if he is to succeed. Washington can nudge him on the right path by explaining that his role is solely to bring the brigades under the army’s banner and advising him to eschew involvement in politics. Appointing a strong defense minis-
Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down

Libya faces a number of problems that will take years to solve. Building state institutions, establishing a rule of law, and appointing a military chief of staff can guide the country to the right path. But focusing on one problem while neglecting the many others will guarantee failure. Only a coordinated strategy that tackles Libya's many problems simultaneously will ensure success. Until then, it will remain mired in the violence that threatens not only Libya but all of North Africa.

NOTES

4. “Colonel Khalifa Abul-Qasim Haftar Speaks to al-Inqadh,” al-Inqadh (Chicago), July 1988, p. 21. Al-Inqadh was the magazine of Libyan National Salvation Front, the leading opposition group.
9. Ibid., p. 20.


17. Ibid., p. 22, and Khalifa Haftar’s Facebook page, posted July 8, 2014, [http://washin.st/1t6krcw](http://washin.st/1t6krcw).


20. Ibid., p. 22. It is unclear if Haftar was commander of the city of Tobruk or of the entire region.


24. Ibid.


On November 15, 1984, Qadhafi met French president François Mitterrand on Crete. The two agreed to withdraw their respective forces from Chad. Mitterrand did so, while Qadhafi reneged, explaining why Libya had to deny having troops in Chad. Four other officers said Qadhafi’s denial regarding the POWs was the most important factor in convincing them to defect. See Ali Rizz, “Captains Left the Regime and Expressed Their Convictions in...Captor!” al-Hayat, March 23, 1993. Conscripts said the same. See Jonathan C. Randal, “Litter of Libyan Retreat Strewn across Chadian Desert,” Washington Post, April 13, 1987.


Bishara Nasir, “Colonel Haftar: We Established Military Goals inside Libya and We Have 300 Fighters in Chad,” al-Hayat, December 19, 1991; and “Colonel Khalifa Abul-Qasim Haftar Speaks to al-Inqadh,” al-Inqadh, July 1988, p. 22. According to Haftar, in the aftermath of the Zuwarah speech, Qadhafi threw civilians and officers into prison, suspended laws, appointed himself the sole leader by abolishing the RCC, issued laws that shackled Libyans, and formed the Revolutionary Committees.


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54. Ibid., p. 23.
58. Michael Bajek to Ambassador, “Subject: Libyan Refugees,” memorandum, April 7, 2004. The author would like to thank Reed Brody from Human Rights Watch for providing him with this document.
68. Khalifa Haftar, interview by author, Tripoli, Libya, December 22, 2011.


97. Ibid., pp. 141–142.


110. See http://washin.st/1vQYliF.


112. Libyan writer Muhammad Qadri al-Khawja wrote a twelve-part series between July 18, 2010, and October 11, 2010, about the LNSF’s involvement in the coup. His information purportedly comes from an internal memorandum Magariaf circulated to the organization’s leadership committee. The series seeks to exonerate Haftar from the accusations Magariaf leveled at him for the coup’s failure. See http://www.libya-watanona.com/adab/elkhoja/qk180710a.htm.


Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down

Barak Barfi


144. The monarchy held sessions in Benghazi and Tripoli, but not Sebha, until 1963, when the federalist system was abolished for being overly cumbersome.


149. Two seats from Darna and two seats reserved for the Berbers have not been filled. Phone interview with committee member Abd al-Qadir Qaddura, August 8, 2014.


167. The American embassy in Libya estimated there were between 25,000-150,000 Berbers. “Libya’s Berber Minority Still Out in the Cold,” Embassy Tripoli, July 3, 2008. Tebou officials claim there are 200,000 in Libya, though this figure is likely exaggerated. Interview with Adam Rami, Head of National Toubou Assembly, Benghazi, February 19, 2011. Tuareg leaders believe there are between 10,000-12,000 in Libya. Christians comprise 2.7% of the population. Libya, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency.


169. Wolfram Lacher argues the opposite. But the examples he offers from Jabal Nafusa, namely the city of Zintan and the Berbers, are colored by ethnic overtones. They demonstrate that the identity of these two parties, minorities in their region and country respectively, strengthened when confronted by majority groups. This, however, is not the case in other parts of the country where tribal equilibrium is characterized by parity or slight imbalance. In other regions, such as Bani Walid, socio-political interests linking factions to the regime—encompassing clan bonds but also extending beyond them—explain why these groups remained loyal until after the fall. Moreover, pro-Qadhafi Cyrenaican groups—and they did exist—never mobilized to support the regime after Benghazi became the rebel capital. See Wolfram Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics,” in Jason Pack, ed., The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 151-173.


171. This author does not discount the importance of segmentary analysis originating with E. E. Evans-Pritchard and propagated by his student Emrys Peters but instead argues that other factors can equally explain the challenges inherent in tribal mobilization. Pritchard and Peters’ ideas have proved controversial in scholarly circles. See for example, Steven Caton, “Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique of the Segmentary Model in the Middle East, International Journal of Middle East Studies, February 1987, pp. 77-101.

172. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Qaddafi (Santa Monica: Rand, 2014), p. 31.


174. Noman Benotman, “Policy Briefing: Instability in Libya,” Quilliam Foundation, March 25, 2014. Another source put the number between 125,000 and 150,000. International Crisis Group, “Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Qadhafi,” December 14, 2011, p. 30. Only a small portion of these men have combat experience, and most joined after the revolution. For the exponential growth of Misratan revolutionaries after the city’s most intense battles, see Brian McQuinn, “After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups,” Small Arms Survey, October 2012, p. 40. Any attempt to seriously cite brigade figures would be Herculean, and the numbers here should be used only as rough estimates.

175. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Qaddafi (Santa Monica: Rand, 2014), p.32.


179. Of the few acute Libya analysts, Wolfram Lacher is the only one to grasp this. See his Fault Lines of the Revolution, SWP Research Paper (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2013).


183. Misratah has 40,000 registered revolutionaries, of which 22,000 are fighters. However, only about 4,000 have serious combat experience. Brian McQuinn, “After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups,” Small Arms Survey, October 2012, pp. 39–40.


186. Until the 2011 revolution, it was one of only two occasions since the early 1950s when the army has been called from the barracks to put down unrest. See Ali. E. Hillal Dessouki, “Policy Making in Egypt: A Case Study of the Open Door Economic Policy,” Social Problems, April 1981, pp. 410-416. For a first-hand account of the disturbances, see Mary Ann Weaver, A Portrait of Egypt, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1999, pp. 24–6. Most countries from Morocco to Jordan have experienced riots following reductions in subsidies. For Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, see Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, Westview, Boulder, 1996, p. 268. For Jordan, see Lamis Andoni and Jillian Schwedler, “Bread Riots in Jordan,” Middle East Report, October-December 1996, pp. 40–42. In 2008, Syria was forced to reverse subsidy cuts after strikes damaged the economy. And when the regime does succeed in reducing them, they are always accompanied by wage hikes. See “Syrian Reactions to Increase in Diesel Prices,” Embassy Damascus May 8, 2008.


188. Qadhafi attacked the bureaucracy for all of Libya’s ills. In 2008, he said, “Corruption is linked to bureaucracy everywhere in the world. The solution to ending corruption is to end this administration which manages money and put the money directly in peoples’ hands.” “Tripoli to Herald Rice Visit as Victory,” Middle East Economic Digest, September 5, 2008.

189. This theme is emphasized in the 1988 Green Charter, where it is written, “[The people] exercise [power] directly, without intermediary, and religion “is a direct relationship with the Creator, without intermediary. [emphasis added]”

191. “The ‘Charter of Revolutionary Legitimacy’ gave Qadhafi control over all of Libya's political, judicial, and economic institutions. His directives were of greater force and authority than any judicial rulings. This charter also authorized him to intervene in judicial issues and to establish special or emergency courts to override the decisions of other courts.”; Luis Martinez, “Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Libya,” Freedom House, n.d., p. 9.


195. Figures taken from the World Health Organization for 2012. Algeria’s GDP is larger than Libya’s, but its per capita GDP is smaller.


200. Ibid., p. 12.


211. Eni produced 273,000 barrels per day (bpd) before the revolution (see http://www.eni.com/en_IT/world-eni/index.shtml), accounting for about 17 percent of the 1.6 million bpd pumped in Libya.

212. Ibid.


219. Amal Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya (Surrey: Curzon, 2001); and “Al-Hawiyya fi Libiyah bayn ta’adud al-Masadir wNalktishaf al-Watan” (Identity in Libya between the Plurality of Sources and the Discovery of the Nation), unpublished and undated article provided to the author.

