How to Secure Mosul
Lessons from 2008—2014

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In early 2017, Iraqi security forces (ISF) are likely to liberate Mosul from Islamic State control. But given the dramatic comebacks staged by the Islamic State and its predecessors in the city in 2004, 2007, and 2014, one can justifiably ask what will stop IS or a similar movement from lying low, regenerating, and wiping away the costly gains of the current war. This paper aims to fill an important gap in the literature on Mosul, the capital of Ninawa province, by looking closely at the underexplored issue of security arrangements for the city after its liberation, in particular how security forces should be structured and controlled to prevent an IS recurrence. Though “big picture” political deals over Mosul’s future may ultimately be decisive, the first priority of the Iraqi-international coalition is to secure Mosul. As John Paul Vann, a U.S. military advisor in Vietnam, noted decades ago: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last.”1

This study focuses on two distinct periods of Mosul’s recent history. In 2007–2011, the U.S.-backed Iraqi security forces achieved significant success, reducing security incidents in the city from a high point of 666 per month in the first quarter of 2008 to an average of 32 incidents in the first quarter of 2011. Then, in 2011–2014, the trend reversed, until monthly security incidents had risen to an average of 297 in the first quarter of 2014. This research is aimed at deducing what political drivers and security strategies contributed to the partial success and later the failure of the Iraqi security effort in Mosul.

Explanations for both the 2007–2011 successes and the failures of 2011–2014 are easily identified. In the earlier span, Baghdad committed to Mosul’s stabilization and Iraq’s prime minister focused on the issue, authorizing compromises such as partial amnesty and a reopening of security recruitment to former regime officers. Elections produced a provincial council and governor with whom urban Sunni Arab Moslawis, as Mosul residents are known, could identify. While the U.S. military was embedded in Mosul until 2011, the ISF achieved a basic “unity of command,” and key command positions were allocated to respected officers, including...
Sunni Arab Moslawis, in part as a result of U.S. urging. Available government troops in Mosul were increased, including through significant local recruitment of Moslawis from poorer Sunni Arab neighborhoods.

During the 2011–2014 stretch, by contrast, the Islamic State’s victory was assured by chronically deficient unity of effort and unity of command among Iraqi government, Kurdish, and Ninawa factions. Baghdad and the Kurdish-backed Ninawa provincial leaders worked at cross-purposes throughout the three-year period. Indeed, the command climate set by Baghdad’s politically appointed commanders resulted in security forces conducting operations intended to humiliate and punish Moslawis. From the outset of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s second term, Baghdad tinkered with command and control in Mosul, undoing the reasonably depoliticized security structure that existed until that point. The constant shuffling of commanders destroyed the ISF’s remaining cohesion.

Given the strategic opportunity posed by the future liberation of Mosul—an opportunity that may not come again—digesting and making use of these lessons is vitally important. Assuming neither Kurdish Peshmerga nor Shiite militias flood the city, an outcome the coalition is trying to prevent, Moslawis may initially be more open to working with the ISF, following two and a half years under the Islamic State, than at any point since 2003. But Mosul residents will also be closely watching their liberators for signs of a return to 2014, with its punitive measures, restrictive curfews, and the widespread specter of arrest.

At the political level, Ninawa requires genuine pragmatic governing consensus, not just a shifting series of “enemy of my enemy is my friend” alliances. On this front, the U.S.-led coalition has made a good start by bringing together for general dialogue Baghdad and the Kurds, plus the Ninawa provincial leadership, ahead of the Mosul battle. A compact among these factions should consist of simple ground rules for future political conduct. In such an arrangement, the provincial council and any security coordination committee must be a consensus-based decisionmaking body. Likewise, the recruitment and management of local government bodies and police should formulatively reflect the pre-IS composition of the city’s population. Major recruitment of urban locals to the police force, including returning minorities, is a priority.

At the operational level, requirements include stable depoliticized command appointments and much stronger unity and coordination among federal Iraqi, Kurdish, and local Ninawa security forces. The Ninawa Operations Command (NiOC) remains the most appropriate command-and-control architecture, but the concept needs to be implemented much more effectively than in the pre-2014 years. Just as the U.S.-led coalition has successfully worked since 2014 to encourage Iraqi promotion to high command of talented Counter-Terrorism Service officers, the coalition should now use its influence and advisors to optimize NiOC’s leadership and setup. Such efforts should include the establishment of key coordination bodies on overall security policy, community relations, intelligence sharing, and checkpoint placement. To aid coordination, Iraq should be encouraged to locate NiOC as close as possible to the Ninawa Provincial Council and police headquarters.

Coalition support to the stabilization effort should continue well after the liberation of Mosul. For more than a decade, the city’s reconstruction needs have been unmet, and the coalition should encourage Iraq to target reconstruction in the areas most likely to present havens for IS and other militant actors. This means greater focus on the poor Arab neighborhoods at the city’s outer northwest, southwest, and southeast edges. Moreover, urban security must be linked to stabilization of rural militant “hotspots” like Badush, Ash Shura, and Tal Afar, from which a disproportionate number of IS fighters have come. Related coalition tasks are to help develop strong capabilities for Ninawa security forces in countering organized crime and for local governments in fighting corruption, given that IS will first reemerge in Mosul’s criminal underworld, as it did after the decimation of its predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq, in 2010.

In helping prevent the reemergence of a negative
Ninawa Map Situating Mosul City

Mosul Neighborhoods
political backdrop such as that in 2011–2014, along with the attendant mistakes in setting the leadership and coordination of Ninawa security policies, international partners can be an asset. First, the U.S.-led coalition needs to itself act in a coordinated manner. The current coalition against the Islamic State is far more useful than a unilateral U.S. mission, drawing on key contributors such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Canada, to name just a handful. Such an alliance, including some of the world’s largest economies and security-assistance partners, can help amplify diplomatic pressure in stressing the need for consensus approaches to Ninawa in discussions in Mosul, Erbil, Baghdad, Ankara, and even Tehran.

If the mandate of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) were extended, the coalition’s leverage could be expanded beyond the liberation of Mosul. Following the Mosul liberation, U.S. forces should commit to at least three more years of extraordinary security cooperation, subject to review and extension. The aim would be to provide a bridge for this enhanced security-cooperation relationship into the new Iraqi government in 2018–2022. The message should be clear: in contrast to the hasty departure in 2009–2011, the United States and its partners would be demonstrating commitment to intensified security cooperation with Iraq through the CJTF-OIR multinational framework for the midterm, in order to permanently defeat IS in Iraq. Such an effort should entail ongoing contribution to a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Iraq (CJSOFT-I), enhanced intelligence cooperation, continued U.S. presence in the Combined Joint Operations Command (CJOC), and a sturdy Build Partner Capacity (BPC) effort.

These steps could greatly increase U.S. and coalition leverage for Ninawa’s long-term stabilization. For instance, the coalition could stay directly engaged in the development of Ninawa-based security forces. If the coalition continues to train and equip Iraqi army forces at the large bases near Baghdad, Taji and Besmaya, then Western governments will be better positioned to ensure Moslawi and Ninawa recruits are brought into the army in appropriate numbers, a key reconciliation metric. Similarly, the Italian Carabinieri training for the Iraqi Federal Police allows monitoring and influence over the development of new locally recruited Federal Police forces for Ninawa. Specialized training initiatives could not only sustain coalition leverage but also directly assist in Ninawa’s stabilization. Examples might include special forces and intelligence training for counterterrorism and counter-organized-crime operations; development of a “Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence for the Iraqi Army and Federal Police”; and development of border security and logistical capacities to support operations in ungoverned spaces far from existing logistical infrastructure, such as the Ninawa-Syria border.

Most of all, the coalition’s command staff, U.S. Central Command, and Washington DC leaders must remain involved with the details of Mosul’s stabilization long after political decisionmakers in coalition capitals have forgotten about the place. The coalition’s attention is simultaneously the cheapest and the most important investment that can be made in Mosul. Keeping the Baghdad, Kurdistan Region, and Ninawa leaderships focused on stabilization, and keeping them communicating and coordinating, is the greatest contribution the coalition can make.

■ INTRODUCTION

The Islamic State is likely to lose control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and the capital of Ninawa province, within the next four months. This means that by early 2017, the city will probably be under the control of Iraq’s security forces and the Ninawa Provincial Council for the first time since June 2014.

As liberation draws near, a focus has understandably emerged on the “big picture” regarding Mosul’s future. How can Arabs, Kurds, and microminorities work together to govern and stabilize the city and province? How can the disputed boundaries between federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region be managed and resolved? How can justice and reconciliation be
balanced in the aftermath of the Islamic State’s bloody two-and-a-half-year rule? Worthy studies are proliferating on these issues.³

Immediate postliberation requirements are also receiving detailed study. The humanitarian and internally displaced persons (IDP) issues are eliciting unprecedented attention, drawing on the lessons of the liberation operations in Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah.⁴ For Iraqi and coalition planners in Iraq, meanwhile, the military challenges of liberating Mosul city are most pressing.⁵

This paper aims to scrutinize a less studied aspect of postliberation governance—namely, the issue of security arrangements for Mosul and, in particular, how security forces should be structured and controlled to prevent an IS recurrence.

Regarding IS’s 2014 takeover of Mosul, even as understanding the political context is critical, the seizure was fundamentally a military victory brought about when one group of militants defeated an inadequately staffed on-duty security force, while the vast majority of Moslawis hunkered down. Moreover, the security failure in Mosul, which triggered a wider collapse of five Iraqi military divisions and the loss of one-third of Iraqi territory, was caused by a string of avoidable mistakes in the command and control of the city’s security forces. Indeed, Mosul over the last decade has been a tale of two cities. In 2007–2011, effective security steps led to partial stabilization of the city, whereas in 2011–2014 the government did practically everything wrong, causing the situation to unravel.

This paper extracts lessons from these sharply contrasting experiences to offer advice on how the Iraqi government, the Kurdistan Region, and the international coalition should recruit and structure Mosul’s postliberation security effort, with a focus on practical, detailed measures to be planned now and executed rapidly after liberation. While implicitly acknowledging the importance of root causes in stabilizing Mosul over the long term, the paper holds that, in the next year, fixing the city’s security forces and command structure is an arguably more urgent endeavor.

Mosul’s Physical and Human Terrain

In the most recent census, taken in 1987, Mosul’s inner city was estimated to have a population of 664,000. As assessed by the World Food Programme in 2003, the overarching Mosul district, including the rural areas directly adjacent to the city, was determined to have 1.43 million residents.⁶ Given these figures, Mosul vies with the southern oil port city of Basra for status as Iraq’s second-largest city. Ninawa province had an overall estimated population of 2.44 million, according to the WFP.⁷

Spread across both banks of the Tigris River—about ten by twelve miles with an outer perimeter of some forty miles—Mosul is a large city by Iraqi standards, only somewhat smaller than Baghdad, which is sixteen by sixteen miles. In area, Mosul far surpasses the other great Sunni cities in Iraq: in the 1987 census, for instance, Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, had an estimated urban population of 192,000 inhabiting a land area covering just five by five miles. Mosul’s size and population are joined by a deep history of continuous urban settlement stretching back over four millennia. As a political and commercial center, this legacy dwarfs that of all Iraq’s other Sunni population centers.

Urban development in Mosul has given the city an intensely bifurcated character.⁹ The city’s traditional heart is on the west bank of the Tigris, which Moslawis call “Aymen” (right bank, facing downstream). This area includes the narrow streets and markets of the old city, as well as the provincial council and governor’s headquarters plus the big mosques and compounds of many old Moslawi families. But Aymen has another side, consisting of long-established urban sprawl, populated by various generations of newcomers, including a belt of very rough, crowded, and poor Arab neighborhoods constituting the city’s northwestern arc—Tanak, al-Islah al-Zerai, and Zanjili.

The newer side of Mosul, on the east bank, is known as “Aysar” (left bank, facing downstream). The site of ancient Ninawa, this area was developed during the 1970s–80s heyday of Iraqi growth as the
city’s modern sector, with a high-rise skyline. Mosul’s revered university, famous for its medical departments, is on the Aysar side, along with newer municipal offices and government-provided housing for university staff, doctors, engineers, soldiers, and police. Beginning in the 1970s, Aysar was more cosmopolitan, populated by professionals and a higher proportion of non-Arab and non-Muslim residents. As with the Aymen side, the outer edges of Aysar were poorer and neglected, with a high proportion of military families.

Modern Mosul is also a strongly Arab city, with election results in 2009 suggesting a 65.7% (61.2% Sunni and 5.5% Shiite) Arab share of the population, plus minority communities of Kurds (27.4%), Turkmen (3.3%), Christians (2.1%), Shabak11 (0.9%), and Yazidis12 (0.6%). The longstanding urban Moslawi Arab families have a distinctive culture and a sense of superiority over rural Arab tribesmen and other Arab and non-Arab newcomers, whom they consider “foreigners.”13 Mosul also provided huge numbers of officers to Iraq’s military, reflecting heavy recruitment among the educated Moslawi elite during the Ottoman and British Mandate eras.14 In events such as the 1959 uprising against the Baghdad government, the military families of Mosul sought to seize the country’s leadership from the communist-leaning Prime Minister Abdul Karim al-Qasim.15

As the International Crisis Group has noted, Mosul was also the center of “a dominant Sunni form of religiosity.”16 Rasha Al Aqeedi, a Moslawi scholar, has written extensively on the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise in Mosul during the 1960s–80s, accelerated by Saddam Hussein’s “Faith” campaign in the sanctions-era 1990s.18 Under the Faith campaign, the Baath Party elevated local Islamists and built large numbers of mosques in Mosul, sponsoring religious forums and brooking early expressions of religious intolerance against the city’s Christian population in the late 1990s.19 Exclusionary Arab chauvinism also intensified, reflecting old grudges between urban Moslawis and pro-government Kurdish tribes, as well as new racist narratives nurtured by the Saddam regime during the genocidal Anfal campaigns (1987–1988), which targeted the Kurdish, Yazidi, and Turkmen communities.

Losing Mosul 2003–2007

In April 2003, as Saddam’s military collapsed, intense fear mounted inside Mosul. In particular, Moslawis dreaded a revanchist Kurdish invasion, recalling previous clashes with the Kurds in 1959 and probably also reflecting the terrible record of conflict between the Baathists and Kurds since the 1970s. A newer fear also afflicted the Moslawis—that of a Shiite invasion from southern Iraq, with former oppositionists backed by Iran arriving on the tanks of the U.S. invaders. As one Moslawi recounted, “We did not know the Shiites, and when we saw the first television images of their million-person march on Karbala, bloodily cutting their scalps along the way, we were astonished and horrified. We asked, ‘Are they coming to get us?’”20

The increasingly influential Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi clerics and leaders in Mosul stirred these emerging fears in the hearts of local Sunnis.21 Very quickly, these Moslawi fears appeared to come true. Although the U.S. military garrison commanded by then Maj. Gen. David Petraeus tried to establish a representative Sunni-Arab-led local council and partial amnesty for repentant low-level Baathists, this effort to reassure Arab Moslawis was undermined by a sequence of political and security events, such as Kurdish looting and the creeping placement of Kurdish flags within Mosul city.22 Kurdish expansionism was thus a key driver of the Sunni insurgency. In the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s fall, Moslawis noted another manifestation of Kurdish influence-building: the imposition of a Kurdish-backed outsider Sunni politician, the tribal figure Mishan al-Jabbouri, as governor.23

In late 2004, the situation worsened considerably from a Sunni Arab Moslawi perspective. That February, General Petraeus and his U.S. 101st Airborne Division had left Mosul and they were backfilled by smaller U.S. units, resulting Mosul city from seven U.S. battalions to three.24 The hastily rebuilt Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Police Service units proved unable to cope when al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) shifted its effort from
Fallujah to Mosul in November 2004. On November 11, AQI shattered the local security forces, overran the fourteen new police stations in the city and temporarily took over Mosul, foreshadowing its later victory in 2014. The solution seized by the government of Iraqi prime minister Ayad Allawi was to stack the new Iraqi army units being built for Mosul with Kurdish recruits, with entire Peshmerga units being incorporated wholesale into the new 2nd Iraqi Army division. Baghdad also sent Shi’ite-commanded Special Police Commandos from the Ministry of Interior to help secure Mosul.

With government control of Mosul barely reestablished, the country held its first national and provincial elections in January 2005. The Sunni Arab boycott against voting resulted in a forty-one-member Ninawa Provincial Council dominated by thirty-one Kurdish bloc members and five Shiites. This position, in turn, allowed the Kurdish and Shiite blocs to dominate the appointment of local officials and the awarding of local contracts. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) became primus inter pares in Ninawa via Khosro Goran, ostensibly the deputy governor but actually the power behind the throne in Mosul and Ninawa. Goran and the Iraqi military chief of staff, Babakir Zebari, who was also a KDP member, worked directly with the Kurdish commander of the 2nd Iraqi Army division, Maj. Gen. Jamal Muhammad, to achieve de facto Kurdish domination of city’s security. With Kurdish staffing levels of 63 percent versus the city’s 27 percent Kurdish population, the division unnerved locals but at the same time lacked the manpower to fully control the city. Even when Mosul’s police force was led by a capable Moslawi Arab, Brig. Gen. Wathiq al-Hamdani, this force was not supported by the Interior Ministry in Baghdad.

These circumstances presented Sunni Arab Moslawis, and particularly the demobilized former regime officers, with their nightmare scenario of revanchist domination by Kurdish and Shiite outsiders. The response, a powerful insurgency, resulted in an average 230 security incidents per month in 2004. The number doubled in 2005, averaging 467 per month, and stayed at this level throughout 2006 (averaging 437). In late 2006, Mosul security suffered a new blow from the “reverse surge” dynamic, whereby the U.S. military sent half its Ninawa battalions to the Baghdad area, leaving only one in Mosul, and the Iraqi army sent two battalions south as well. During this period, AQI’s successor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), surged in the reverse direction, fleeing the surge in central Iraq and Anbar and refocusing its efforts on Mosul. As noted in the RAND Corporation’s authoritative study of ISI documents, key leaders such as ISI minister of war Abu Ayyub al-Masri, ISI operational leader Abu Qaswarah (born name Mohamed Moumou), and today’s Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were present in Mosul at this time. ISI empowered a new emir, Abu Yasir al-Saudi, to ramp up Mosul operations in 2007. This resulted in increased numbers of high-impact prison breakouts and attacks—notably, the January 25, 2008, one-ton bomb that resulted in three hundred dead or wounded and leveled part of Zanjili neighborhood, and the subsequent January 26 assassination of staff Maj. Gen. Saleh Muhammad al-Jabbouri, the provincial director of police staff. Combined with record numbers of attacks in Mosul—685 in January 2008, rising to an apex of 747 in March 2008—these spectacular strikes shook Baghdad and the coalition out of their complacency regarding Mosul. A new phase of the struggle was about to begin.

SUCCESESES: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MOSUL, 2007–2011

In 2007, an average 610 security incidents occurred in Mosul per month. By 2008, that monthly average had fallen to 456. The following years saw even more dramatic falloffs, with an average 222 monthly incidents in 2009, 56 in 2010, and 21 in 2011. Degraded fidelity in incident reporting may account for some of the reduction, with smaller numbers of U.S. troops on the ground to accurately record events. That said, U.S. advisors were present in Iraqi security forces command hubs in Mosul until the complete pullout in September 2011. Comparative press
reporting also indicates that the above numbers are broadly accurate for higher-visibility types of violence—e.g., shootings and bombings—as opposed to kidnapping-murders and terrorist extortion of businesses, which are harder to detect and count. The statistics are corroborated by anecdotal reporting regarding growing peacefulness in Mosul during 2008–2011. How was this turnaround achieved, and what lessons from the experience can be applied to future Mosul stabilization?

**The Changing Strategic Backdrop**

In early 2008, the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was beginning to operate more confidently in the security sphere as a result of the U.S. military surge’s successes in Anbar, the broad Baghdad area, and Diyala. The next target for the surge appeared to be Mosul. In January 2008, far more security incidents were recorded in Mosul than in Baghdad—685 versus 425 in the capital. Though the Basra security operation—Saulat al-Fursan (“Charge of the Knights”)—delayed the main Mosul security offensive until May 2008, an increased level of Iraqi government focus and commitment to Mosul security was apparent from early 2008 onward. In May 2008, at the start of the Umm al-Rabiayn (“Mother of Two Springs”) security operation, Maliki visited Mosul to meet with Moslawi and tribal leaders and discuss amnesty arrangements.39

Prime Minister Maliki’s newfound interest in Mosul was driven partly by an emerging, ultimately temporary, alignment of Baghdad and Mosul’s Sunni Arabs on the issue of Kurdish expansionism. During the course of 2008, Maliki began to throw his weight around, displaying the improved capabilities of the Iraqi military. That autumn, he applied military pressure against the Kurds in the disputed territories of northern Diyala province, evicting the Peshmerga from a swath of towns including Qara Tapa, Jalula, and Jabbarah. For most of the stabilization period (until 2011), the federal government and Moslawi Sunni Arabs were somewhat in sync regarding the Kurds.

This dynamic was reinforced by the January 2009 provincial elections in Ninawa, as expressed in a powerful turnout by Sunni Arabs, their first in local elections, and their winning 48.4 percent of the vote and an absolute majority in nineteen of the provincial council’s thirty-seven seats. Running on an explicitly anti-Kurdish platform, the Hadba list overturned four years of Kurdish domination of the provincial council and governorship. Security gains were already apparent before Hadba placed the urban Moslawi businessman Atheel al-Nujaifi in the governor’s seat, but they accelerated rapidly after the elections. Whereas the first quarter of 2008 had seen an average 666 security incidents per month, just 412 occurred in the final quarter of 2008.40 In the second quarter of 2009, with the Sunni-Arab-dominated provincial council in place, the monthly average dropped to 244 incidents.41 For the first time since Saddam’s fall, the majority of Mosul residents felt they were back in charge. Even major insurgent actors like the neo-Baathist Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) viewed Hadba’s victory as facilitating the partial downscaling of their military operations as soon as mid-ranking former regime officials were reintegrated into local governance and security organs.42

**Iraqi Security Strategy until 2011**

These overarching changes in Mosul were complemented by smart moves in Iraq’s U.S.-influenced security strategy. Perhaps the most impressive element of the new approach entailed the changes being rapidly made to Ninawa’s command structure. Kurdish domination of security was brushed away with the establishment of the Ninawa Operations Command (NiOC), a three-star headquarters designed to run all the security forces in the federally administered parts of Ninawa province. The officer placed in charge of NiOC was staff Lt. Gen. Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq, a respected Moslawi officer from the old city neighborhood of Bab al-Jadid.43 General Riyadh severed the relationship between the Kurdish deputy governor, Khasro Goran, the Kurdish chief of staff, Babakir Zebari and Mosul’s 2nd Iraqi Army division.44
By 2008, the division was also under a Sunni Arab commander, staff Maj. Gen. Muta Habib al-Khazraji, a professional soldier with Iraqi and U.S. training. Ninawa’s police forces were also now commanded by a local Moslawi officer, staff Brig. Gen. Khaled Hussein al-Hamdani.

From 2008 onward, the Iraqi and U.S. forces allocated to Mosul were increased. The two removed Iraqi army battalions were returned, as was the U.S. battalion removed from Mosul city. Armored and mechanized forces drawn from the 9th Iraqi Army division and Iraqi Police Service were moved up to Mosul along with a U.S. Special Forces task force, Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), and Ministry of Interior SWAT teams. When the Mosul security operations were launched beginning in May 2008, the city was hosting nineteen battalions of Iraqi army, Federal Police, and U.S. troops. Just as important, the Mosul security offensives of 2008 and 2009 had adequate engineering and life support services, largely provided by the U.S. military. Such provisions allowed a set of fortified combat outposts (COPs) to be established along the western entrances to Mosul, the side open to the Syrian desert and neighboring Tal Afar, the routes by which foreign fighters reached Mosul. Engineering support also allowed for the repair of old antitank trenches along Mosul’s southwestern quadrant and prevented uncontrolled vehicle movements into the city.

Further aiding successful security efforts in Mosul in 2008–2011 was new local recruitment activity. Though the city’s police forces were never adequately supported by the federal Interior Ministry, steps were taken to localize the recruitment and ethno-sectarian makeup of other security forces. In the view of U.S. and Iraqi leaders alike, the urban fabric of Mosul suggested that the Sahwa (awakening) model of tribal militias from central and western Iraq could not simply be replicated here. Very early in the Mosul security campaign, NiOC opened up recruitment centers in Mosul to increase local Sunni Arab participation in the 2nd Iraqi Army division. As a result, 900 former officers and 1,300 new recruits were hired, largely from the poorer Sunni Arab areas on the Aymen (western) side of Mosul. As one Moslawi noted, “Frankly, Maliki’s decision to pardon former army officers and allow them to return to the service has had a great impact on the Mosul operation’s success.” The ethnic balance of the 2nd Iraqi Army division was also restored with more wholesale measures: the majority-Kurdish 8th brigade was moved to Habbaniya for training, never to return, and was backfilled, at various points, with more diverse units such as the 3rd, 12th, and 28th brigades.

By January 2009, the government also began to rebalance the Federal Police makeup in Mosul. Whereas the first Federal Police brigade deployed to Mosul, known as “Knights’ Raid,” had been originally intended for Samarra and was Shiite heavy, the second Mosul Federal Police unit, “South Mosul,” was recruited largely from the Aymen (western) side of the city, staffed by 75 percent Sunni Arabs. Six Ministry of Interior Emergency Response Brigade (ERB) battalions, paramilitary police forces deployed within the city, were primarily Arab-staffed and Moslawi-recruited. Though many Iraqi army, Federal Police, and ERB units still had Kurdish commanders, the character of Mosul’s security forces had become significantly more localized by mid-2009.

Lessons for Future Stabilization

Notwithstanding the progress described here, no one living in or traveling through Mosul in 2010–2011 would claim the city was fully stabilized. The ISF rarely felt supported by a half or more of the population, and for contractors, being identified as working with the security forces was still very dangerous. In many areas, the ISF was only willing to undertake foot patrols if the area was saturated with forces in a prepared operation. And ISI undoubtedly held a vise-like grip on more than $9 million per month in organized-crime revenues. But despite these very real caveats, Mosul was a great deal safer than it had been in 2007. From a high point of 747 incidents per month in March 2008, the level of reported incidents had fallen to an annual average of 21 per month in
2011. Further, ISI, the Islamic State forerunner, suffered a collapse in membership. According to RAND’s forensic accounting of ISI membership rosters in Mosul, the group may have had “fewer than half as many active fighters in January 2009 [357] as it did in September 2007 [792].” For their part, Moslawis enjoyed relaxed security measures such as the end of curfews and the reopening of closed-off streets. The locals looked forward to further normalization and had hope for the future.

These modest successes can be explained, in large part, by Baghdad’s relative commitment to Mosul’s stabilization and attention to the issue by Iraq’s prime minister, through measures including authorizing compromises such as partial amnesty and a reopening of security recruitment to former regime officers. A provincial council and governor were elected with whom urban Sunni Arab Moslawis could identify. While the U.S. military was embedded in Mosul until 2011, the ISF achieved a basic kind of “unity of command,” and key command positions were allocated to respected officers, including Sunni Arab Moslawis, in part due to U.S. urging. Further, troops available in Mosul were increased, including through a significant measure of local recruitment of Moslawis from poorer Sunni Arab neighborhoods.

By Mosul standards, the achievements of 2007–2011 offered a promising platform on which further improvements might have been built. Of note, the major successes of the period did not result from gold-standard counterinsurgency operations; rather, the reduction of violence came about through basic decisions to invest political capital and devote resources and through the partial implementation of conciliatory polices. For instance, the Ninawa police were serially underresourced and understaffed throughout Mosul’s quiet years in 2010–2011. Owing to petty rivalries, NiOC and the 2nd Iraqi Army division had a barely functional relationship. Army and Federal Police units were in a lamentable state in terms of staffing levels, logistics, and training. And reconstruction never reached most battle-damaged and deprived parts of Mosul, where the insurgency still held some support. If Mosul was greatly improved notwithstanding the above flaws, one can imagine what further achievements might have been possible if the security campaign had been resourced and provided with a road map agreed to by the federal government, local government, and ISF. Alas, the situation instead turned in an entirely negative direction and all gains were lost.

### FAILURES: DISINTEGRATION OF SECURITY STRUCTURES, 2011–2014

The deterioration of Mosul security in 2011–2014 can be described as a series of sharp escalations. From January 2010 until January 2012, an average of 33 security incidents occurred per month, with little month-to-month variation within the period. This steady state ended in February 2012, when incidents jumped sharply to 105 for the month. In the first half of 2012, the monthly average was 87, rising to 128 in the year’s second half. In the first six months of 2013, the monthly average rose to 195 incidents, increasing further to 242 in the final six months. This suggests that, by spring 2013, Mosul had regressed very rapidly to 2009 levels of insecurity. The first half of 2014, leading up to Mosul’s fall, saw an average of 347 incidents per month, including a terrifying 208 attacks in the week prior to the Islamic State assault on the city on June 6–10, 2014.

### The Changing Strategic Backdrop

Whereas Mosul security began falling apart in 2012, the broader insurgency across Iraq had begun as early as late autumn 2010. Moslawis did not immediately share in the souring of the national mood that attended Nouri al-Maliki’s appointment for a second term as prime minister. Moslawis certainly had grievances—stalled reconciliation and reconstruction, stagnation of security reforms—but for almost all of 2011 Mosul stayed relatively peaceful, stubbornly clinging to the fragile security that had been won.

Under the surface, however, the conditions were emerging for a major security crisis in Mosul. From
the very start of 2011, a confrontation had begun between the federal government and Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi.\(^6\) Between December 2010 and April 2012, Nujaifi executed a pivot toward the Kurds and away from Baghdad, with negative consequences for the relationship between the federal security forces and the Ninawa administration.\(^7\) This schism was at the root of the Mosul security crisis: the local government increasingly placed itself in the Kurdish camp, undermining Sunni solidarity and aligning the provincial government against the very federal structures that were responsible for securing Mosul.

On February 25, 2011, the governor supported a “day of rage” against the national government aimed at publicizing torture allegations against the Iraqi security forces, the first of many such protests in 2011.\(^7\) In the larger dynamic, while Maliki sought to split off anti-Kurdish Sunnis and minorities\(^7\) to undermine Nujaifi, the Ninawa governor jumped on the anti-Maliki Sunni bandwagon to shift attention away from his own unpopular U-turn toward with the Kurds.\(^7\) Nujaifi’s tactics were politically effective, gaining him reappointment in the June 2013 provincial elections—in- albeit reliant on Kurdish backing\(^7\)—but exacerbated strains between the ISF and Moslawis. Throughout 2012 and 2013, the Ninawa Provincial Council and the Islamic Sunni Endowment (Iraq waqf) highlighted every ISF misdeed, including mistreatment of female prisoners, torture of detainees, inaction that permitted the death of a hunger striker, and fatal shootings at protests.\(^7\) Nujaifi’s political campaign against the ISF ran parallel to an increasingly militarized protest movement run by JRTN in Mosul.\(^6\) A diverse range of actors—the Kurds, urban Moslawi elites, and Baathist insurgents—seemed to sense the potential for breaking Mosul away from Baghdad’s orbit.

In the background, an ever more potent actor, known first as the Islamic State of Iraq and later as the Islamic State—as well as by the monikers Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Daesh—had its own ambitious plans for Mosul, which it had targeted, along with other sites, in coordinated bombings beginning in mid-2011. By 2012, the civil war in Syria had begun to dissolve the border between Iraq and Syria, giving the Islamic State access to heavier equipment such as armored vehicles and artillery shells. By mid-2013, IS had launched its “Soldiers’ Harvest” campaign\(^7\) to weaken the ISF with intensive assassinations of on- and off-duty personnel, as well as a sharply escalated program of attacks on local government officials and offices in Ninawa.\(^7\) While Baghdad and provincial leaders undermined each other’s efforts in Mosul, the Islamic State acted determinedly. From May 2013 onward, the group began to interdict the Baghdad–Mosul highway and oil pipelines, creating a growing sense of isolation in Mosul.\(^7\) Within Mosul, IS began to institute cleansing programs as if it already ran the city, escalating its intimidation of non-Muslims, journalists, and teachers.\(^8\)


Though a range of local actors stoked tensions between Baghdad and Mosul, the federal government also deserves a large measure of blame for the self-destructive security strategy it implemented in Mosul in 2011–2014. The seeds of Baghdad’s culpability in Mosul’s fall can be seen as early as April 2011, when Maliki sought to replace the Moslawi officer serving as Ninawa provincial director of police, Maj. Gen. Ahmed Hassan al-Jabbouri, with one of the prime minister’s favored officers, the controversial Federal Police commander Maj. Gen. Mahdi al-Gharawi, a Shiite from Maysan province who was tied to allegations of torturing Sunnis in Baghdad.\(^8\) Though the effort to sack Jabbouri failed, Maliki’s government tried many times to replace Ninawa’s police chief over the heads of the governor and provincial council, eventually removing Jabbouri’s successor, another Moslawi officer, Maj. Gen. Khaled al-Hamdani, in April 2014. Mahdi al-Gharawi was meanwhile installed as the commander of the Mosul-based 3rd Federal Police division in April 2011, charged with responsibility for the almost entirely Sunni Arab Aymen (western) side of Mosul.\(^8\) His appointment to this role, and later as the head of all Mosul security...
The past year was especially hard after some army soldiers began harassing us. They became very sectarian and abusive. They would hit and humiliate people for no reason at checkpoints. Many of them would arrest people and demand money for their release.

The most devastating impact of Mosul’s dysfunctional command structure was felt in the ISF’s abject failure to overcome the Islamic State assault on June 6–10, 2014. By the eve of this attack, Baghdad’s inept tinkering with the ISF leadership had destroyed all cohesion and confidence within Mosul’s units. In the months immediately preceding the assault, as incident numbers surged to 346 in April 2014, the ISF was reshuffled yet again for no discernible reason. Thus, a new 2nd Iraqi Army division commander from the Badr Organization was appointed but then had his command appointment canceled when he failed to pay the customary bribe to the selection board.

Baghdad’s effort to remove the Ninawa police chief resulted in Maj. Gen. Khaled al-Hamdani’s removal in March 2014, whereupon he was reassigned to briefly command the Mosul-based 3rd Federal Police division before himself being removed from that new role during the June 2014 crisis. NiOC commander Mahdi al-Gharawi was in Baghdad on vacation on June 3, 2014, despite having received explicit warnings of the exact timing of a major IS attack on Mosul on June 5. When he arrived at NiOC to command the battle, Gharawi was immediately superseded by two Maliki envoys, Iraqi deputy chief of staff for operations staff Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan and Iraqi Joint

forces at Ninawa Operations Command from April 2014 onward, became a lightning rod for criticism and a constant source of tension between the Mosul police and the ISF.

Further self-destructive changes of command were a defining feature of the 2011–2014 period in Mosul. As the U.S. shut down its presence in Ninawa in September 2011, the Maliki government wasted no time in removing local officers and replacing them with political appointees. Within days of the U.S. withdrawal, Baghdad replaced staff Maj. Gen. Abdul Karim Hassan Khudair, hardly a great officer but a known quantity in Mosul, with Maj. Gen. Bassim Hussein Ali al-Tai, a Maliki-supported officer fresh out of commands in Baghdad and Basra. At the same time, the government removed the 2nd Iraqi Army division commander, a tough Sunni officer from Anbar, staff Maj. Gen. Nasser Ghanim al-Hiti, in favor of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen Jassim al-Furayji, a much less capable Maliki-supported Shiite previously in charge of 17th Iraqi Army division in southern Baghdad.

The politicization of ISF command appointments had severe repercussions for the city’s stability. Under weak commanders chosen for their political loyalty or their ability to purchase their appointments, inherent problems in the Iraqi army and Federal Police units worsened as corruption and absenteeism increased. The number of on-duty personnel plummeted. NiOC and the 2nd Iraqi Army division became focused on fighting Baghdad’s political war against Nujafi and Mosul’s protesters, targeting their efforts on arresting antigovernment imams and local municipal officials. As perceived by Moslawis, the ISF’s attitude changed during the second Maliki term in line with the new climate introduced by the commanders appointed after the U.S. withdrawal. As early as late 2010, Iraqi army and Federal Police formations in Mosul were putting up Maliki campaign posters and flying Shiite flags. ISF road and bridge closures seemed arbitrary and intended to humiliate and punish Moslawis. IS and JRTN attacks on the ISF drew more brutal responses from the security forces, creating a feedback loop. Curfews became more prevalent from the spring of 2012 onward. The higher numbers of Shiite officers began to impose their customs on the Sunni city, such as by harassing Sunni weddings taking place during the Shia mourning period of Ashura. Moslawis were never very keen on the ISF, but starting in 2011 they increasingly referred to them as “Maliki’s forces.” As one Moslawi noted in 2014:

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Forces Command head staff Maj. Gen. Aboud Kanbar, whose precipitate retreat order\(^{100}\) on the evening of June 9 seems to have turned a major neighborhood-level uprising into a security collapse that shattered five Iraqi divisions and surrendered a third of Iraq to IS for nearly two years.

**Lessons for Future Stabilization**

The massive failure by Mosul’s security forces in spring 2014 arose from a chronic lack of unity of effort among the various factions, virtually ensuring an Islamic State victory. From the outset of the second Maliki term, Baghdad upset the command-and-control balance in Mosul, undoing the reasonably depoliticized security structure that existed until that point. Egregiously exemplifying Maliki-era cronyism was the September 2011 shuffle of NiOC and 2nd division commanders, whereby the experienced command team was removed just as soon as U.S. forces were no longer present to object. The constant reassignment of commanders in the lead-up to the Mosul battle destroyed the ISF’s remaining cohesion. The clear lesson is that post–Islamic State Mosul requires nonpoliticized command appointments and a stable command environment.

At the strategic level, the fall of Mosul was the clear consequence of chronic political infighting. Baghdad and the Kurdish-backed Ninawa provincial leaders worked completely at cross-purposes throughout the 2011–2014 period. Instead of fighting the Islamic State, they spent most of their effort undermining each other—the governor, Kurds, and police on one side, and the federal government, Interior Ministry, and ISF on the other. Moslawis were subjected to collective punishment that undoubtedly fed the protest movement and insurgency, benefiting Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi in his battle with Baghdad but damaging the efforts to provide security or civic unity.

Future stabilization, then, will require a genuine governing consensus in Ninawa, not just a series of “enemy of my enemy is my friend” alliances. The Kurds ultimately suffered a two-and-a-half-year economic, humanitarian, and security nightmare because they and their ally Nujaifi helped undermine the ISF. For its part, Baghdad tried to beat Ninawa and Kurdish politicians in their own backyard and predictably failed, losing Mosul and a third of the country in the process. The cost of such game-playing to Nujaifi, removed from the governorship in June 2015,\(^{101}\) and other Ninawa politicians may become clear in the next provincial elections in June 2017. The cost to the province’s people has surely been steep.

**APPLYING HISTORICAL LESSONS TO POST-ISLAMIC-STATE MOSUL**

In assessing the applicability of lessons from Mosul’s past decade to the post–Islamic State era, a critical question involves the extent to which Moslawis have changed after two and a half years of IS rule. The most obvious answer is that the city has become far more Arabized and “Sunnified” than it was even in early 2014. In the first month of IS rule, Shiite Arabs, Shiite Turkmen, Yazidis, and Shabak are likely to have almost entirely left, along with almost all Christians, many Kurdish citizens, and many Arabs who believed they might be targeted for political reasons. Totaling up the likely initial outflow in June–July 2014, about 30 percent of Mosul’s population fled, including the vast majority of non-Sunnis.\(^{102}\) When liberated, Mosul city is likely to be 85–90 percent Sunni Arab, and many minorities will be hesitant to return until their security and property rights are ensured, if at all. Providing incentives for and managing the safe and orderly return of IDPs to the now-Arabized city will be a major challenge.

As during previous security transitions in 2003–2004 and 2014, Moslawis are likely to be stunned and fearful, initially passive but increasingly sensitive to negative signals from the security forces. Indeed, Moslawis will be prepared for the return of their worst fears—revanchist Kurdish Peshmerga or Shiite militias flooding the city, seizing territory, looting, flying flags, and “disappearing” perceived enemies. If this does not happen, then Moslawis will settle into suspicious watchfulness over the new authorities. After thirty-plus
months of IS occupation, a scramble will probably ensue to claim the mantle of the “inside resistance,” with local groups “self-liberating” their neighborhoods in the latter stages of the battle. At this point, the IS will struggle mightily to differentiate friend from foe, and indeed such resistance forces may include JRTN and other former insurgent actors. Moslawis may immediately seek justice and revenge against IS sympathizers, particularly the rural Ninawa tribesmen who have played such a large role in the jihadist group’s urban security forces in Mosul.\textsuperscript{103} Local leaders could emerge quickly, including many new nonestablishment actors with impressive records of civic service during the city’s two-and-a-half-year Islamic State ordeal.

Assuming neither Peshmerga nor Shiite militias flood the city, which the Iraqi and coalition government have worked hard to avoid in preliberation coordination efforts, Moslawis may initially be more open to working with the ISF than at any point since 2003. This is an important and possibly unique window of opportunity. With access to satellite television until at least IS’s June 2016 ban on receivers, Moslawis have watched the ISF recover and beat the jihadists in numerous battles. Now, Mosul residents will be watching for whether their liberators immediately turn back the clock to 2014 with punitive measures, restrictive curfews, and the widespread specter of arrest. For all its faults, IS garrisoned Mosul with a light street presence and removed many of the restrictions on vehicle and foot movement within the city.\textsuperscript{104} Moslawis may also make other comparisons between the new administration and the Islamic State’s form of governance. These residents have now seen IS operate with minimal red tape, mount major urban cleanup campaigns,\textsuperscript{105} resolve legal disputes rapidly,\textsuperscript{106} and open up government and military land for public use.\textsuperscript{107} The liberation of Mosul may thus have unpredictable and surprising effects on Moslawi expectations in both governance and security. Based on the historic difficulty of delivering good governance in postconflict settings, one should anticipate the onset of a degree of Moslawi disillusionment unless measures are taken to reassure and placate local concerns.

A Supportive Strategic Backdrop for Mosul’s Stabilization

When Baghdad, Erbil, and Ninawa are better aligned, security policies are more likely to be effective in Mosul and surrounding areas. Thus, stabilization of Mosul would ideally play out against a strategic backdrop rooted in constructive, pragmatic, and realistic leadership exercised by officials in Baghdad, Erbil, and Mosul. While such a standard might sound naive or unachievable, the current war has left Iraqi, Kurdish, and Ninawa leaders exhausted and open to new options. Such a framework might include a strategic compact based on some form of sustainable consensus over the immediate “rules of the game” in post-liberation Mosul and a vague longer-term process for deciding on the future shape and status of the province. To be sure, zero-sum politics in Mosul such as those evident in 2011–2014 cannot be allowed to return. Already, one can see the seeds of such conflict: proxy fighting between the KDP and its rivals in Sinjar,\textsuperscript{108} intense rivalry between former governor Atheel al-Nujaifi and present governor Nofal Hammadi,\textsuperscript{109} and intra-Sunni feuding involving the Iraqi Islamic Party and Mutahidun blocs at Ninawa-focused conferences.\textsuperscript{110} Only a genuine Iraqi consensus will be able to survive the inevitable downscaling of international attention that will follow Mosul’s liberation.

A particularly sensitive and critical issue is the status and future shape of the Ninawa Provincial Council. With the next elections set for June 2017, when the current provincial council will have served its four-year term, a new provincial council will be selected, which would ratify a new governor. Alternatively, the existing council might select a new governor before elections. Looking ahead to these changes, Ninawa’s leadership has two obvious models. First, one might look at the relative calm of Mosul in 2009–2011 and conclude that stability would be best served by a pan-Sunni-Arab bloc led by an urban Moslawi governor and unified by Arab supremacist rhetoric, as occurred under Hadba. Although such an arrangement might make sense in a heavily Arabized Mosul, it is nonetheless an unsavory prospect. The second and more likely alternative might
be some version of what exists in Kirkuk today: a governor backed by the province’s most powerful ethnosectarian trend (i.e., Sunni Arabs in Ninawa) who can nonetheless leverage his popularity and strong performance as governor to place limits on the behavior of the majority bloc and to strike trilateral deals involving both the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad. A temporary change in governorship could easily be engineered before elections, and such a sustainable preelection bargain among Mosul’s major blocs is arguably very important, because the coming provincial polls may be indecisive and controversial. Given the evident failure of the Sunni and Kurdish blocs in Ninawa over the last four years, the provincial vote may be atomized to an unprecedented degree, with even the KDP struggling to maintain control of the Yazidi vote if elections are vouchsafed with credible local and international observation. Further, many new political actors may emerge from new vectors of society, especially in Mosul city. Under such circumstances, one promising option may be to find a nonpolitician acceptable to a broad spectrum of Ninawa voters to govern during the sensitive postliberation years.

Moslawis will need a reassuring political climate in which major issues are deferred until later. Iraq should thus be encouraged by the coalition to adopt steady, substantive decentralization using existing provincial-powers legislation112 rather than controversial concepts such as the formation of a “Sunni Regional Government”113 or the breakup of Ninawa into new identity-based provinces.114 Near-term initiatives should stress the potential for overlapping “dual nexus”115 administrative and economic arrangements such as exist in Kirkuk—and have basically existed in Ninawa ever since 2003.116 More broadly, the government needs to focus its efforts on the speedy return of state institutions banned by the Islamic State—the governor’s office, the provincial council, the municipalities, the district and subdistrict administrators and mayors, the ministry branches, the treasury branches, and, most important, the police and the courts. Special attention needs to be invested into urgently reestablishing expedient major-crimes courts with “traveling judges” enlisted for weeks at a time to minimize score-settling through extrajudicial means.117 Quick-fire property courts must also be established to rapidly remove squatters from the homes of returning IDPs.118

The normalization of Mosul will also require the rapid instituting of certain economic and social programs. The Islamic State’s takeover of Mosul was partly an expression of class warfare, with poorer rural and urban Sunnis using the movement as a means of social mobilization.119 Indeed, Mosul’s “have-nots” were never a priority before 2014: security operations checked the “clear” and “hold” boxes but rarely the “build” box.120 This was especially true at the deprived edges of the city to the west, northwest, and southeast, where extensive battle damage was still unrepaird even during the least violent period in 2011. Neighborhood-level ISF leaders could tell in 2010–2011 that the insurgency was not being entirely snuffed out because it was surviving among the poorest and most vulnerable populations.121 Alongside the need for simple economic development122 and employment in the neediest neighborhoods, the government must focus on education, recreational, and welfare programs for other vulnerable sectors such as widows and orphans, prisons and juvenile detention facilities, and youth in general.123

**New Iraqi Security Strategy in Liberated Mosul**

As previous sections have made abundantly clear, the single most important determinant of postliberation stability in Mosul will be excluding any substantive Kurdish Peshmerga or Shiite militia involvement in the urban battle to liberate Mosul. Kurdish and Shiite flags must not appear. Indeed, the easiest way to direct Mosul down a dark path again would be to stir local fears of another era of punitive garrisoning by outsiders seeking to destroy Mosul as a center for Sunni Arabism. A new security strategy for Mosul can proceed from this foundational acknowledgment.

In Mosul security, the “missing link” has always been integration and cooperation of the significant ISF, local police, and Kurdish security campaigns. U.S.
involvement through Ninawa Operations Command initially allowed a minimum level of such coordination, but this degraded over time into counterproductive competition among security agencies. Although still embodying the right approach, NiOC must be supported by better national-level leadership, meaning a less sectarian and less corrupt government than existed during the Maliki era. NiOC must also be led by more capable officers, either respected Counter-Terrorism Service generals who have won the war against the Islamic State or Moslawi officers, and preferably both. And NiOC needs to achieve far greater coordination than at any point in the past, working closely with federal, Kurdish, and local leaders. For real “unity of command” under NiOC, political consensus is a necessary precondition. Here, points of disagreement such as exact dividing lines between Kurdish and NiOC jurisdiction in the disputed Kurdish-controlled areas need to be shelved for a few years. For all actors, the permanent suppression of IS must be the main effort. Ninawa’s new police chief should also be a traditional military figure from Ninawa, quite possibly a known Moslawi general such as staff Maj. Gen. Wathiq al-Hamdani, who previously served as police chief in 2006–2007.

Alongside its other needed improvements, NiOC must be a much more collaborative headquarters than it was in the past, collocated with the local government and police headquarters. With coalition help in the immediate aftermath of Mosul’s liberation, NiOC must also be more inventive and should establish a wide range of working groups and sections focused on stabilization. One such initiative should entail developing close ties with the Ninawa governor and the provincial council’s security committee, in line with the provisions of the provincial-powers law regarding the governorate’s important role in approving security operations. Unlike in prior years NiOC must also develop strong relations with the Ninawa police leadership, and indeed NiOC’s ultimate aim should be to work itself out of a job by facilitating a return to police primacy in Ninawa. NiOC should finally draw in actors as diverse as the Islamic Sunni Endowment (Iraq waqf), the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (for employment issues), the Ministry of Youth (for community-stabilization efforts), and even the media and general public. The ISF must here successfully establish security for contentious local and national elections in 2017–2018 and be prepared to deal with protests in a manner that lessens rather than exacerbates disruption.

In the past, security and intelligence efforts in Mosul were often unconnected. Behind the scenes, the U.S. and Iraqi intelligence agencies, along with special forces, were busy, while most security forces in the city were passive, spending almost all their effort protecting themselves and inconveniencing locals rather than generating intelligence or undertaking effective offensive activity. By contrast, a new security strategy in Mosul should be intelligence-led, with a special focus on countering organized crime, which is how the Islamic State will probably first reemerge in Mosul after the liberation. A joint intelligence effort, backed by coalition intelligence support, should focus on rooting out IS networks in government contracting, real estate offices, telecommunications, trucking, car sales, as well as the sale of cement, fertilizer, flour, propane, and fuel. In particular, NiOC should chair an intelligence fusion cell to draw together the efforts of Iraq’s main intelligence agencies and Kurdistan’s equivalents in Mosul.

In postliberation Mosul, the Iraqi army and Federal Police must be visible from the outset, but NiOC must act agilely to improve the public profiles of these entities. Prior to 2014, the ISF undertook a monumental program of road closures using concrete barriers, but in later years the forces lacked the (U.S.) engineering support to reposition barriers and open roads as conditions dictated, leaving Mosul entombed in concrete. Thus, a NiOC directorate of joint checkpoints should be established to prevent a return to the massive duplication of checkpointing in Mosul—whereby army, Federal Police, and local police checkpoints were interspersed, slowing traffic and aggravating locals. The Iraqi Police Service reconstruction directorate will need to be well resourced and competently led considering the Islamic State’s demolition of numerous police
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stations. This directorate should work closely with community leaders to minimize disruption to neighborhoods and impact on property prices, the “real world” concerns of citizens that shape their attitude toward the police. A major recruiting drive for the local police is the immediate priority in Mosul. The service currently boasts around 3,000 officers who escaped Mosul and have been retained by the Ministry of Interior since 2014 in readiness for the liberation. Around this skeleton, the new 15,000-strong Ninawa Iraqi Police Service needs to be built, including patrol officers for more than twenty major police stations and paramilitary police for a dozen Emergency Response Battalions in Ninawa. The police were not undermined by any glaring recruitment bias prior to 2014—they were almost all locals, with heavy Sunni Arab representation in the leadership—but they were critically under-resourced by Baghdad’s Ministry of Interior. This needs to change if stabilization is to succeed. The Iraqi army and Federal Police also need to recruit heavily from Mosul, particularly since at least eight Ninawa-recruited army and Federal Police brigades dissolved during the June 2014 collapse and the province is now underrepresented in the armed services. One option may be to dust off an unused late-2009 plan to recruit up to 14,000 Moslawis into the ISF for service in various units across the country.

U.S. and Coalition Role in Ninawa’s Stabilization

If the solutions just outlined sound somewhat familiar, that is because they were successfully applied in many parts of Iraq in the 2006–2008 troop “surge.” Too few of these ideas were implemented fully in Mosul, but given the current moment of strong U.S. and coalition leverage, an opportunity exists to nudge Iraqi security policy in the right direction, undergirded not only by the upcoming coalition role in conventionally defeating the Islamic State but also by future security cooperation with Iraq. If the coalition fails to leave behind a firm basis for security in Mosul, its forces will likely be drawn back again and again. The entity known first as AQI, then ISI, and now IS has a proven track record of regenerating in Mosul. As the U.S. spokesperson in Iraq, Maj. Gen. David Perkins, noted in 2009: “For [ISI] to win, they have to take Baghdad. To survive, they have to hold on to Mosul.” If the coalition can work with war-weary Iraqi and Kurdish leaders to forge a supportive strategic backdrop and smarter security policies, the stabilization of Mosul might just stick this time.

In working to create such a backdrop, international partners can play a role, including by avoiding a repeat of 2011–2014 and the attendant mistakes in setting the leadership and coordination of Ninawa security policy. To do so, first, the U.S.-led coalition must itself act in a coordinated manner. The current coalition against IS draws on the combined diplomatic and economic heft of not only key contributors such as the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, plus Italy—as was the case mainly before 2011—but also on major new contributors such as France, Germany, Spain, and Canada, to name just a few. Such an expanded support base could provide for amplified diplomatic pressure as the world’s largest economies and security-assistance partners collectively stress the need for consensus approaches to Ninawa in discussions in Mosul, Erbil, Baghdad, Ankara, and even Tehran. It is worth recalling also that under current International Monetary Fund and World Bank programs, these same international actors may be central in bankrolling budget support and economic reform efforts in Iraq and Kurdistan for two or more years to come, another source of potential leverage and continued relevance.

If the mandate of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) were extended temporally, the coalition’s leverage could also be expanded beyond the liberation of Mosul. The CJTF-OIR was established on October 10, 2014, in order “by, with and through regional partners, to militarily defeat Da’esh [IS] in the Combined Joint Operations Area [Iraq and Syria] in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability.” With the written agreement of Iraq’s prime
The message should be clear: the United States will not disengage from this fight after Mosul is liberated. In contrast to the hasty departure in 2009–2011, U.S. officials would be committing to an intensified security-cooperation relationship with Iraq through the multinational framework of CJTF-OIR for the midterm, in order to permanently defeat IS in Iraq. Such an effort should entail ongoing contribution to a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Iraq, enhanced intelligence cooperation, continued U.S. presence in the Combined Joint Operations Command, and a sturdy Build Partner Capacity effort. The incoming administration should commit the United States to at least three further years of extraordinary security cooperation, subject to review and extension. The aim would be to bridge the enhanced security-cooperation relationship into the new Iraqi government in 2018–2022.

These steps could greatly increase U.S. and coalition leverage regarding Ninawa’s long-term stabilization. Through such a process, the coalition could stay directly engaged in the development of Ninawa-based security forces. If the coalition continues to train and equip Iraqi army forces at the large bases near Baghdad, Taji and Besmaya, then Western governments will be better positioned to ensure Moslawi and Ninawa recruits are brought into the army in appropriate numbers, a key reconciliation metric. Similarly, the Italian Carabinieri training for the Federal Police allows monitoring and influence over the development of new locally recruited police forces for Ninawa. Specialized coalition training initiatives could not only sustain coalition leverage but also directly assist in Ninawa’s stabilization. Examples might include special forces and intelligence training for counterterrorism and counter-organized-crime operations; development of a Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence for the Iraqi Army and Federal Police; and development of border security and logistical capacities to support operations in ungoverned spaces far from existing logistical infrastructure, such as the Ninawa-Syria border.

■ NOTES


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7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 33.


10. The author wishes to thank Kirk Sowell and Nate Rabkin of the Inside Iraqi Politics team for this extrapolation of Ninawa ethno-sectarian segmentation based on a finessed reading of the 2009 provincial poll results.


20. Moslawi, Skype interview with author, name and date withheld at interviewee’s request.


23. Ibid., p. 4. Mishan al-Jabbouri was a Baathist official from al-Sharqat, south of Mosul.


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31. Iraqi security forces officer, interview by author, name and date withheld at interviewee’s request.

32. All incident data is drawn from the author’s geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) data set, which brings together declassified coalition SIGACT data plus private-security-company and open-source SIGACT data used to supplement and extend the data set as coalition incident collection degraded in 2009–11 and disappeared in 2012–14.

33. Ibid.


36. Ibid., pp. 23–25.


38. All incident data is drawn from the author’s geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) data set.


40. All incident data is drawn from the author’s geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) dataset.

41. Ibid.

42. See The Struggle over Ninewa, p. 11, http://www.aina.org/reports/inbton.pdf. In the report, former regime-element insurgents explained that “al-Hadbaa was not our list, but we backed it. Prior to the elections, we were in touch with Atheel al-Nujaifi, and we informed him of the conditions for our support.”

43. Riyadh Tawfiq, the head of Iraqi Ground Forces Command at the time of writing, is an officer from an important Moslawi family who had served in a prestigious security role under the famous Iran-Iraq War hero Lt. Gen. Hisham al-Fakhri. See “War News,” posted on al-Mosul Observer, February 14, 2008, http://www.almosul.com/library/Archives/AlRasid/802a_Mosul_Observer.htm.


46. U.S. officer, interview by author, May 2008; name withheld at interviewee’s request.

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51. The author wishes to thank D.J. Elliott, who maintained the Montrose Toast blog on ISF order of battle throughout this period, facilitating the close tracking of brigade movements.


53. The author’s interviews with Mosul ISF figures yielded repeated references to less than half of local citizens being supportive of the ISF. See Iraqi officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld at interviewees’ request.

54. Ibid. The author’s interview data noted that even in 2010 Iraqi contractors still often slept on work sites for the duration of a job to protect themselves from being attacked or threatened into not working.

55. Ibid. As late as 2010, “no go” zones for unsupported foot patrols included the al-Zuhur, Muharabin, and al-Tahrir areas in northeast Mosul; the Palestine, Sumer, and Yarmijah areas in southeast Mosul; and periodically parts of Tanak, Resala, and al-Jadidah in western Mosul.


57. All incident data is drawn from the author’s geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) data set.


60. Wonderful, rich, and marvelously gossipy accounts of the internal rivalries in NiOC and the 2nd Iraqi Army division can be found in Bill Roggio’s work during his Mosul embed with the ISF in 2007 and 2008, archived at the Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/embedsiraq5index.

61. Iraqi officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld at interviewees’ request. Iraqi battalions tended to have ten to twelve operational vehicles at any time and lacked adequate fuel and spare parts; they were short of basic commodities such as body armor and ammunition as well as communications and medical supplies.

62. Ibid. As late as 2011, the poorer parts of Mosul lacked paved roads, streetlights, sewerage, or reliable power supply. At the city’s western and southeastern edges, running water was only turned on during one of four days to preserve quantity and quality.

63. All incident data is drawn from the author’s geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) data set.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.


68. In addition to very low incident figures—ranging between nineteen and fifty-two incidents per month—the atmospherics in Mosul were still quite good in 2011. Curfews remained relaxed, and the city was busy.
72. *Inside Iraqi Politics*, no. 52, January 3, 2013, p. 3.
73. Ibid.
76. Across a range of editions in 2012–13, the *Inside Iraqi Politics* team laudably documented and tracked the tight relationship, which was eventually publicized by both parties, between JRTN and the Free Iraq Intifada protest group.
77. For the best account of this effort, see Jessica Lewis, AQI’s ‘Soldiers’ Harvest’ Campaign (Institute for the Study of War, 2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/aqis-soldiers-harvest-campaign.
82. The author saw Iraqi tactical mapping in 2011 that showed the 3rd Federal Police division’s area of responsibility covering all parts of Mosul west of the Tigris.
83. Gharawi was first pursued based on torture allegations and later investigated for corruption. See *Inside Iraqi Politics*, no. 40, June 20, 2012, p. 5.
84. ISF officer, interview by author, name and date withheld at interviewee’s request.
87. Ibid.
88. One report noted that “there were supposed to be close to 25,000 soldiers and police in the city; the reality, several local officials and security officers say, was at best 10,000.” See Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul Fell—An Iraqi General Disputes Baghdad’s Story,” Reuters, October 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi-special-report-idUSKCN0I30Z820141014.
89. *Inside Iraqi Politics*, no. 87, June 20, 2014, p. 4.
91. Rasha Al Aqeedi, Skype interview by author, August 31, 2016.
92. Rasha Al Aqeedi brilliantly captured this dynamic, writing that “government checkpoints, present in almost every street, corner, office, and school, failed to stop the execution of such threats. The same scene repeated frequently: The attackers manage to penetrate a checkpoint, do their deed (assassinate, kidnap, suicide bomb, and so on), and disappear (in all cases). Security forces then randomly shower the skies with ammunition, innocent people are injured; security forces randomly circle any young man within a three-kilometer radius of the incident, and some are never seen again. The people soon forget the now-invisible terrorists and express more anger toward the flesh-and-blood security forces who injured bystanders, took innocent people into custody, and again failed to protect them. The militants win. Let 72 hours pass, and repeat.” See “Caliphatalism?” American Interest, Feb. 2, 2015, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/02/caliphatalism/.

93. Rasha Al Aqeedi, Skype interview by author, August 31, 2016.


96. In March 2014, the division passed to Maj. Gen. Abdul Muhsin al-Muhammadawi, who was removed on June 8, 2014, for failing to counterattack the Islamic State’s foothold in northern Mosul. Brig. Gen. Jawad Ali Fadhil al-Mufayji took command for less than a day before being superseded by Iraqi deputy chief of staff for operations Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan, who became acting 2nd Iraqi Army division commander in the last twenty-four hours of the division’s existence. All data drawn from order-of-battle tracking by the author and Alex Mello.

97. He was replaced by his deputy, Brig. Khaled Sultan al-Ugaydi.


102. Counting all 5.5 percent Shiite Arabs, all 0.6 percent Yazidis, all 2.1 percent Christians, all 0.9 percent Shabak, half the 27.4 percent Kurds, and half the 3.3 percent Turkmen, plus about 10 percent of Sunni Arabs.


104. The author would like to thank Aymenn al-Tamimi for sharing his great knowledge and source material on the Islamic State’s model of garrisoning Mosul, including its use of intelligence (Diwan al-Amn), Islamic Police (al-Hisba), and foreign-fighter military reserves (Jaish Dabiq).


109. Ninawa Provincial Council members, interviews by author, names and dates withheld at interviewee’s request.

110. Ibid.


115. The phrase describes overlapping administrative linkages to both the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad and was referenced in UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, “Possible Options for the Future Administrative Status of Kirkuk within the Iraqi Federation,” p. 7, Vol. 2 of Disputed Internal Boundaries Report.


118. Given that the Islamic State settled many poorer families in confiscated properties, resolution will be required for huge numbers of compounded-property claims—meaning claims in which a court may be asked to evict occupants of a confiscated property who themselves cannot return to their original home because it also was transferred by IS to a new owner.

119. Rasha Al Aqeedi writes very effectively on issues of social class and IS recruitment in “Caliphatalism?” http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/02/caliphatalism/.


121. Iraqi officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld by request.

122. Gen. David Petraeus, interview by author, Washington DC, April 7, 2004. Petraeus outlined one applicable model, including the 101st Airborne Division’s impressive tally of “first thirty days” quick wins on economic projects, including cleanup, fuel trucking, microloans, and other simple employment-generating options.

123. Iraqi intelligence officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld by request. All Iraqi intelligence agencies are currently developing basic counter-violent-extremism measures for Mosul’s vulnerable communities.

124. The 2008 study on operations of the 2nd Iraqi Army division summarizes the difficulty conventional units face when pursuing more than self-protection in Mosul. Referring to one battalion, the report noted that “most of 1/2/2’s resources were tied to manning and sustaining its own battalion COP [combat outpost] and the three platoon sized COPs. Four platoons out of a battalion may not sound like much, but when you consider the battalion had only about 70 percent of its soldiers and had a liberal leave policy of 7 & 7 (seven days on and seven days off), then subtract these 120 men from the men required to move between COPs, the men required to coordinate, command and control, and the need to keep a platoon sized element available if one of the COPs should come under attack, and you quickly run out of resources.” See Thornton, Fishel, and Tyrrell, SFA Case Study—Mosul, Iraq, p. 50, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jml/art/sfa-case-study-mosul-iraq.


126. Iraqi officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld at interviewees’ request. ISF interviewees from Mosul’s police service regularly cited a concern that the placement of police stations, along with related parking facilities and closed-off streets, was exacerbating local frustrations toward the police.

127. In 2010, the province had 16,000 police, including 6,000 in Mosul city.

128. Distinct from Emergency Response Brigades (ERBs), referenced earlier.

129. In Baghdad, slow processing of hiring paperwork left many police stations critically undermanned. It was not uncommon in late 2010 for a police station requiring five officers and seventy-five policemen to have as few as two officers and fifteen to twenty policemen available. Iraqi officers, interviews by author, names and dates withheld at interviewees’ request.


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