SAUDI ARABIA
A Kingdom in Transition

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Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School
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Funeral of Crown Prince Nayef, 2012
The al-Saud: Main Line of Succession

Dates indicate period of rule; superscript numbers indicate order of succession. Cadet branches have no claim on succession.

- **Saud bin Muhammad**
  - **Muhammad**
    - 1742–1765 (died)
  - **Abdulaziz**
    - 1765–1803 (assassinated)
  - **Abdullah**
  - **Saud**
    - 1803–1814 (died)
    - **Abdullah**
      - 1814–1818 (executed)
    - **Mishari**
      - 1820 (lost control)
    - **Khalid**
      - 1839–1841 (died)
  - **Turki**
    - 1824–1834 (assassinated)
    - **Faisal**
      - 1834–1838 (captured by foreign enemies 1843–1865 (died)
    - **Abdulrahman**
      - 1875 (lost control 1889–1891 (forced to flee)
      - **Saud**
        - 1871–1875 (died)
        - **Saud al-Kabir**
          - Cadet
      - **Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud)**
        - 1902–1953 (died)
  - **Saud**
    - 1953–1964 (deposed)
    - **Faisal**
      - 1964–1975 (assassinated)
      - **Khalid**
        - 1975–1982 (died)
      - **Fahd**
        - 1982–2005 (died)
    - **Abdullah**
      - 2005–present
    - 19 other surviving sons
Maternal Linkages among the Sons of King Abdulaziz

This chart lists the sons of King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) and indicates their maternal relationships. Each number along the horizontal axis represents a different mother; names in the same column represent full blood brothers. Sons in the same row were born in the same year. A gray background indicates that the person is deceased. In several cases, dates and relationships are in dispute.
Supply growth is supported initially by unconventionals

Liquids supply by type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>OPEC NGLs</th>
<th>OPEC crude</th>
<th>Biofuels</th>
<th>Oil sands</th>
<th>Tight oil</th>
<th>Other non-OPEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2035</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Tight oil supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Canada &amp; Mexico</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td>2035</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

% of total (RHS)

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Oil balances suggest OPEC will be challenged

OPEC spare capacity

- Mb/d
- Spare capacity
- Call on OPEC (RHS)

OPEC share of global supply

- Mb/d
- 50%
- 45%
- 40%
- 35%
- 30%
- 25%

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Energy Outlook 2035
Crown Prince Salman
Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin
Former Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan
A strategy paper being considered at the highest levels in Riyadh sets out three options:

• acquire a nuclear capability as a deterrent

• maintain or enter into an alliance with an existing nuclear power that would offer protection

• try to reach a regional agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East

“The intractability of the region towards these efforts [to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons] is due to the rejection of a single state in the region—Israel…”

“Iran [must] reassure the countries in the region and the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful…”

Saudi ambassador to the United Nations Abdullah bin Yahya al-Moallemi, April 30, 2014 (Saudi Press Agency)
“We do not hold any hostility to Iran and do not wish any harm to it or to its people, who are Muslim neighbors. But preserving our regional balance requires that we, as a Gulf grouping, work to create a real balance for forces with it, including in nuclear know-how, and to be ready for any possibility in relation to the Iranian nuclear file. Any violation of this balance will allow the Iranian leadership to exploit all holes to do harm to us.”

“The lack of trust in the Iranian leadership which arises from its double-talk and the duality of its policies prevents us from believing what it says.”

Prince Turki al-Faisal, April 23, 2014, speaking at a security conference in Bahrain. (Reuters)
The German Marshall Fund of the United States is pleased to invite you to:

**Israel and the Middle East: Seeking Common Ground**

*A Conversation with HRH Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud and General Amos Yadlin*

**Monday, May 26, 2014**
12:30-14:30

*Lunch will be served at 12:30. The session will start promptly at 13:00.*

**Speakers**

**HRH Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud**, Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh

**General Amos Yadlin**, Director, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv
The existence of close fraternal relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is evident in many fields of activity. This fact was thrown into sharp focus when Pakistan’s highly classified K-31 research establishment received the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. Highlighting the exceptional nature of the visit, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accompanied the Saudi prince.

Dr. A.Q. Khan briefing the distinguished visitors in his office in the precincts of the KRL.

Prince Sultan visits Pakistan nuclear facility, 1999
Saudi delegation with Dr. A. Q. Khan, 1999
Chinese East Wind Missiles
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Rahed Sharif watches Chinese missiles
Sultan Qaboos of Oman meets Dr. A. Q. Khan in 1990s
Former Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan visits RAF base in UK
Saudi special forces with Russian equipment