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ISLAM IN THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

By Robert Satloff

“Activist Islam” has emerged as a critical new force in the Palestinian uprising and a new wild card in the intra-Palestinian debate over the political direction the ten-month old revolt should take. The recent publication of the Islamic Resistance Movement’s covenant, which brooks no compromise with Israel, is but the most visible evidence of a new force in Palestinian politics distinguished by its fundamentalist, organized and often violent character.

- *Islamic activism was, in many ways, the spark that ignited the Palestinian uprising and one of the principal engines that has maintained it.* It provided a simple and recognizable vocabulary that could appeal to the masses of Palestinians untouched by the rhetoric and ideology of long-standing nationalist groups. In so doing, it mobilized large numbers of Palestinians who had never previously participated in any sort of political activity.

- *The participation of Islamic groups in the uprising belies the notion that Islam and nationalism are inherently contradictory and mutually exclusive.* In their early years, the flagrant anti-nationalist activity of the Islamic organizations lent credence to the contention that “religion versus nationalism” was a zero-sum game. Whereas at the beginning of the 1980s, Islamic groups fed off their disdain for the mainstream Palestinian political groups – secular and leftist nationalists – today they thrive on a visceral hatred for Israel and the Israeli occupation. This trend is akin to the secular-religious alliance in pre-revolutionary Iran and within the opposition movements in Egypt today.

- Three groups are representative of the various roles the Islamic movement is playing in the uprising: *Islamic Jihad*, which played a critical and underexplored role in the “spontaneous” explosion of Gaza rioting in December 1987; *Hamas*, the Muslim Brothers’ front organization; and, perhaps most importantly, the *Islamic wing inside Fatah*.

- *The Islamics tend to constitute the pivotal “swing” group of activists, forcing other nationalist groups to seek out alliances and areas of coordination with them.* As autonomous organizations, the Islamic groups have not been represented in the “unified leadership of the uprising.” Nor have they sought membership in that closed circle which has included only

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local activists of Fatah, George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Nayif Hawatimeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine Communist Party. But because the Islamics have a significant following among the Palestinian masses in the territories, the uprising leadership has been acutely sensitive to their wishes and requirements.

- *Unlike the "unified leadership," the Islamic element of the intifada has always maintained a well-rooted organization with a publicly recognized, clearly identifiable local leadership.* An important segment of the Islamic political activist movement in the uprising is an outgrowth of charitable and service organizations that have been operating freely in the territories for years.

- *Through the mosques, Islam has provided an important element of the uprising's foot soldiers, headquarters and communications networks.* Religious observances are opportunities for political organizing; mosque loudspeakers (along with Ahmad Jibril's al-Quds radio station and the celebrated leaflets of the uprising) have replaced conventional media as the way to transmit the news, information and directives of the uprising. With only one exception mosques have been the sole Palestinian institution exempted from suspension or closure.

- *On the immediate issue of combatting Israel, Islamic groups share basic objectives and seem firmly in league with the nationalists.* Both sides seem to have agreed to set aside their vast strategic differences over the future of "Palestine" in order to struggle against Israel. This activity earns the Islamics valuable nationalist credentials and permits a useful tactical accommodation with their erstwhile (and potentially future) nemeses.

- *An unprecedented range of tactical cooperation has evolved between the Islamics and nationalists.* These sometimes tacit, sometimes overt alliances assume a variety of forms and exist among virtually all permutations of coalition partners; only the Communists are outside the orbit of religious-nationalist cooperation. Such efforts range from agreement not to encroach on each other's territorial prerogatives to the sharing of vital communications, logistical and information systems. They also engage in joint

undertakings of recruitment, financing and the execution of terrorist acts.

- *There is, however, a contest among the different Palestinian factions for rhetorical, political and organizational dominance of the course of the uprising.* On one level, this involves various methods of proving one's anti-Israel credentials as well as evincing an ability to command the allegiance of more and more Palestinians. On a more important level, this battle is a "fight for the soul of Fatah." The main protagonists are Fatah traditionalists intent on coopting the massive tide of Islamic sentiment under the Fatah umbrella and Islamic activists eager to steal Fatah away from itself and its "capitulationist" external leadership.

- *Through the first nine months of the uprising Islamic groups were able to keep their attention on the common Israeli enemy without sacrificing ideological beliefs in the apostasy of other Palestinian groups.* Some inter-group sniping and criticism surfaced, but, for the most part, it was marginal. Across the spectrum of Palestinian politics the sole issue at stake had been maintaining the confrontation against Israel. There were no fundamental political issues to divide the Palestinian community. In the absence of an active political process, either on the international front or - more importantly - on the ground, the Palestinian groups were agreed on the need to maintain the confrontation against Israel.

- *However, strategic differences among the various Palestinian groups have now surfaced as a result of the injection of just such political debate in the wake of Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank.* This has damaged inter-group cooperation and threatens to drive a wedge between nationalist and Islamic groups that had been coordinating throughout the course of the uprising. The recent publication of Hamas' political covenant is indicative of the deep and fundamental antipathy Islamic activists have toward any talk of accommodation with Zionism and indicates the lengths to which the Islamic groups will go to derail any effort at moderating Palestinian demands.

- *In the long term, the emergence of Islamic activists as powerful actors inside the territories threatens to move the Palestinian political debate even further away from*

reconciliation with Israel. To most Islamic activists "a two-state solution" is – at most – an element of a "strategy of phases" leading to the dismantling of Israel. For some of them even discussion of a "two-state solution" is a moot point. Indeed, much like the emphasis of Israel's religious-nationalists on the right of Jews to settle in the West Bank, Islamic activists uniformly list "repatriation" – the right to return to homes and land inside the Green Line – as their non-negotiable chief demand.

This is reflective of the ideology of Islamic activism, in which there is no room for Jewish sovereignty in Muslim land. But it is also a reflection of demographics – the central role played by residents of refugee camps involved in the Islamic movement, especially in Gaza. For them the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, and the repudiation of irredentist claims to pre-1967 Israel, is no victory. The greater the role of Islamic activists in the daily confrontation against Israeli rule in the territories, the more difficult it will be in the future to separate tactics from the Islamic activists' strategic vision of a "Zionist-free" Palestine.

ISLAMIC GROUPS AND THE UPRISING

Gauging the precise role of Islam in the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, is a tricky matter. On the one hand, it is foolhardy to conclude that Islamic fundamentalists are "in control" of the uprising. On the other hand, it would be a profound error to dismiss the role of Islam and simply revert to viewing the uprising solely through an outmoded lens of traditional nationalism.

Islamic cultural and linguistic motifs are clearly visible in the words and deeds of the uprising. However, there is no single barometer by which to measure the political impact, organizational ability or coercive power of Islamic groups. Nor is it easy to define the rules that govern relationships between Islamic and traditional nationalist groups or even the place of Islam within those nationalist organizations.

There are literally scores of Islamic organizations active in the territories, the large majority of which are legally functioning social, charitable, educational and religious societies. On some level all

have been touched by and play some role in the uprising. This study, however, concerns only those Islamic groups that are principally political in nature. Of those, three groups have been critical to the development of the uprising and are representative of three different streams of Islamic political activism: Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Islamic Fatah.

ISLAMIC JIHAD

Islamic Jihad (*al-Jihad al-Islami*) is the most radical, violent and innovative of Islamic organizations. Its origins are in Gaza, where Islamic Jihad was founded in the late 1970s by young Palestinians whose first encounter with activist Islam was during their enrollment in Egyptian universities. Unlike the evolutionary program of the traditional Muslim Brothers, Islamic Jihad maintains an activist approach to revamping Islamic society and a posture of confrontation against the enemies of Islam.

Islamic Jihad was the first religious organization in the territories to call for direct action against Israeli rule – not within the framework of conventional Palestinian nationalism but in the name of Islam. In Islamic Jihad's ideology, violence is an acceptable and sometimes preferable tool of politics, useful for overthrowing corrupt Arab regimes, cleansing Muslim society of leftist and Marxist apostates and ridding Muslim lands of foreign forces.

Like most clandestine organizations in the territories, Islamic Jihad operates on a cell-based network of five-to-six person "families." In late 1987 it could claim the active support of about 200 students among the Islamic University's 4,500 student body, with a total of about 2,000 to 4,000 adherents throughout the territories.

Among the known leaders of Islamic Jihad are: Dr. Fathi Abdul Aziz Shqaqi, a Rafah physician, deported in July 1988; Shaykh Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahman Odeh, lecturer at Gaza's Islamic University and imam of two Gaza mosques, deported in April 1988; Shaykh Jabir Ammar of Gaza; Ahmad Muhanna from Khan Yunis; and Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the once-imprisoned leader of a Jihad cell who is now the inspirational leader of the Mujamma society in Gaza.

Though its leadership and membership

are primarily based in the Gaza Strip, Islamic Jihad operates throughout the territories. Indeed, Jihad has undertaken many operations in the West Bank and many agents implicated in Jihad terrorist attacks against Israeli targets have been Jerusalemites and West Bankers. For example, Islamic Jihad participated in the June 1983 stabbing of yeshiva student Aharon Gross in Hebron; the October 1986 Dung Gate grenade attack against the Givati brigade in the Old City; and an abortive suicide car bomb attempt against Israeli government offices in Jerusalem.

At its core the ideology of Islamic Jihad calls for rapid and violent change of Muslim society and "holy war" – jihad – against both Arab regimes and Israel. Most, though not all, of Islamic Jihad looks toward Khomeini's Iran as a model. Years after Sunni Islamic activists abandoned the Khomeini revolution as a misguided adventure, Jihad continues to see Tehran as a beacon of inspiration. In an al-Fajr interview in August 1987, Shaykh Odeh lauded the rise of Khomeini as "an important and serious attempt to achieve Islamic awakening [and] to unify the Islamic nation." Iran, he argued, "is the only country which concentrates on the Palestinian cause ... we consider Arab regimes and Israel to be two sides of the same coin."¹

If Islamic unity is the end, violent jihad – confrontation until victory – is the means. Indeed, jihad is an indispensable tool for evicting foreign elements from the Muslim world as well as the most effective unifying force among Muslims themselves. What separates Islamic Jihad from traditionalist Muslim groups is its willingness to state bluntly its goal of destroying Israel and of extirpating not only Zionists but all Jews from Muslim lands.

According to Jihad sympathizer and former al-Aqsa preacher Shaykh Asad al-Bayyud al-Tamimi, deported to Jordan in 1970, "The birth of the Islamic Jihad [in Palestine] is the outcome of a divine act ... the jihad sweeps away the state of the Jews and the infidelity it represents."² And in the words of Shaykh Odeh, "Palestine is the battleground in the confrontation with the Jews and Zionism."³

Statements by Islamic Jihad operatives and sympathizers echo their leaders' belief in the irreconcilable conflict against the

Jewish state and their commitment to waging jihad against Israel. As a 22-year-old Palestinian said before the military court that convicted him of murdering an Israeli: "We are members of the Islamic Jihad. We appreciate death more than life. We either achieve victory and liberate our land, or die. We have not forgotten the massacres committed against us each day. I will gladly accept the court's sentence, for I have no remorse over what we have done."⁴

ISLAMIC JIHAD AND THE PLO

Islamic Jihad's policy toward other Palestinian groups, both nationalist and religious, has ranged from criticism and condemnation, on the one hand, to cooperation and coordination, on the other. In this regard it is important to appreciate the varieties of opinion existing even within the tight network of Jihad activists. Most continue to revere Khomeini. Some do not. Most accept tacit arrangements with other Palestinian groups. Some do not. It is useful to make two analytical distinctions – first, between declarative statements and operational policy and second, between the pre-intifada era and the current period.

Islamic Jihad has historically been contemptuous of nationalist Palestinian groups as well as of less activist Islamic groups. The former fail to view the fight for Palestine within an Islamic framework, while the latter fail to realize that only complete and immediate revolution can remedy the endemic ills of the decrepit Islamic world.

Shaykh Odeh, for example, faults both sets of organizations for their tacit alliances with anti-Islamic Arab rulers – who are only marginally less satanic than the Zionists themselves. He castigates "reformists in the Muslim Brothers movement for their reconciliation with the Arab regimes [instead of maintaining] total struggle." On the other hand, he reproaches the PLO for "accepting reconciliation" with the Arab leaders instead of aligning with "the most important and effective liberation movement in the region" – the Iranian revolution.⁵

Shaykh Hijazi al-Burbar, imam of a mosque near Ansar II, was much blunter in his condemnation of the PLO. "The PLO accepts a Palestinian state and a Jewish state. Islam wants all of Palestine. There's nothing to negotiate."⁶

During the months of the intifada, however, direct Islamic Jihad criticism of the PLO has been muted. No one denies that irreconcilable differences remain on such strategic issues as the outline of a post-Israel Palestinian state and on such tactical issues as dialogue with "democratic forces inside Israel," (to use the PLO formulation). But it is a fair generalization to state that common ground has been found even among such wildly different groups as Islamic Jihad and Habash's, Hawatimeh's and Ahmad Jibril's organizations - all except the anathema Communists - in terms of the immediate fight against Israeli occupation.

Indeed, it is useful to contrast articles written about Islamic Jihad by al-Fajr journalist Said Ghazali in 1984 and 1987. In 1984 he wrote that Palestinian Muslim fundamentalists championed a policy of "direct and enthusiastic criticism of the PLO's political and ideological programs" and were virulently opposed to the leadership of Yasir Arafat because of his "collusions" with Christians and Marxists.⁷ Three years later so much had changed in the relationship between Islamic Jihad and the PLO that Ghazali could ask "Why do ... Islamic movements maintain good relations with the secular Palestinian national movement?" His answer was that "those in the Islamic struggle consider the fundamental conflict to be between Israel and all those fighting the occupation, including national forces."⁸

Even in the months immediately preceding the uprising Shaykh Odeh noted that "political and ideological differences with the PLO are not a justification to use violence against national forces ... Our principal disagreement is with the Israeli occupation."⁹ Once the intifada was underway this attempt to "agree-to-disagree" was elevated to formal policy. In an interview with an Israeli journalist, Shaykh Yasin welcomed the fact that the "occupation has united the entire Palestinian people. All Palestinians are Muslim and all Muslims believe in God. The occupier must be ousted first and then we will solve the problems between us."

Yasin even went so far as to admit the possibility of the Islamics permitting Arafat to act as their diplomatic negotiator - "only on the condition that he make no concessions."¹⁰ And Shaykh Bassam Jarrar,

an important figure in the Islamic movement in Ramallah and al-Bireh, told an interviewer that he "finds no justification for refusing alliances between the PLO and the Islamic groups."¹¹

Underpinning this seeming change of heart is a clear strain of operational pragmatism that can be traced from Jihad's early days of activity in the territories. Indeed, it seems as though setting the ideological margin against Zionism gave Islamic Jihad the freedom to make whatever tacit alliances would be necessary to maintain the confrontation against Israel. In a 1987 interview, an al-Bireh imam stated that "the Jihad Islami's stands are more flexible in dealing with the PLO than [even with] other Islamic factions."¹² Among the nationalists, coordination with Islamic Jihad made tactical sense as well. It offered the promise of fresh troops eager to take the battle directly to Israel at a time when "armed struggle" in general, and the PLO's military option in particular, were losing their viability and, in some quarters, their mass appeal.

The genesis of a relationship with Fatah was struck up soon after the first murmuring of Islamic Jihad activity in the territories. From the outset it was an operational, not a political, convergence of interests. The Hebron stabbing in 1983; the explosion of a Jerusalem bus in 1983; the abortive car bombing; and the six-man escape from a Gaza prison in 1987 are all examples of joint Islamic Jihad-Fatah operations. At times, Fatah has recruited among Islamic Jihad for its activities. At other times, it has provided weapons, communications networks, training and logistical support for Islamic Jihad undertakings. For example:

- In a 1984 parliamentary address, Jordan's prime minister admitted that recruitment by al-Jihad exists inside Jordan, in both the political and military sectors, and he acknowledged contact between Jihad and various fedayeen groups in the Kingdom.

- Fatah activists in Jordan recruited the members of the Jihad squad involved in the 1986 Dung Gate attack from among Palestinians visiting Amman. The squad itself was in existence for two years prior to the attack, during which time two of its members had again traveled to Amman.

- Following a shoot-out between Israeli

troops, and Jihad and Fatah escapees convicted in October 1987, Israeli military authorities outlined the logistical support Fatah had been extending to Jihad, which included provision of weapons such as Soviet AK-47 rifles and U.S.-made M-16s.

- When Shaykh Odeh appealed his deportation order in late 1987 his lawyer was none other than the chief Fatah spokesman in Gaza, Fayez Abu Rahme.

ISLAMIC JIHAD IN THE UPRISING

The uprising has already entered Middle Eastern lore as a spontaneous explosion of popular outrage of mythic proportion. Indeed, there can be little doubt that fury at the dismal prospects for any sort of political, social or economic improvement, aggravated by a series of local, regional and international political events, was at the core of the Gaza rioting.

In retrospect, however, one critical factor that has been overlooked in explaining the origins of the uprising is the effect of the high-intensity confrontation between Israeli authorities and Islamic Jihad in Gaza in the weeks preceding December 9, 1987. While there was surely no directive issued by Islamic Jihad to take to the streets and alleys of Jabaliya refugee camp, the cumulative effect of those weeks of confrontation was akin to "saturation bombing" of the local community that rendered violent rioting a logical next step.

Throughout the 1980s Gaza has been a violent place. In the early years of the decade much of the violence was caused by Palestinians fighting Palestinians, with Islamic activists challenging leftist nationalists for political and cultural dominance. In recent years, however, there has been a distinct growth in Palestinian violence aimed at Israelis, warning signs of the emergence of a more confrontationist Islamic movement.

This was especially the case after the May 1985 Jibril prisoner exchange. It is important to note that of the more than 1,100 Palestinian prisoners released, only about 10 percent were actually members of Jibril's organization. A large number of the 606 who were allowed to return to their homes at that time were, in fact, hard-core Islamic activists including many leaders of Islamic Jihad and other groups. Relatively soon thereafter,

Islamic Jihad attacks on Israelis became more frequent, most notably the February 1986 grenade attack in Gaza's market; the stabbing of two Israeli taxi drivers in late September and early October 1986; and the Dung Gate attack in October 1986.

The immediate series of events that culminated in the Gaza riots began in May 1987, when six members of Islamic Jihad escaped from a prison in Gaza, inaugurating a large-scale Israeli manhunt for their recapture. Tensions were heightened in July when two members of Islamic Jihad were convicted of the previous year's taxi driver murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. Within a month, Jihad assailants shot and killed the Israeli commander of Gaza's military police force. By October events were moving rapidly:

- Three Palestinians attempting to evade a Gaza roadblock were shot dead by Israeli troops, precipitating widespread demonstrations in local refugee camps and a student strike in Gaza City.

- Less than a week after their escape from a desert prison three members of Islamic Jihad were recaptured.

- That same week, four Palestinians and an Israeli Shin Bet agent were killed in a shoot-out at Gaza City's main intersection. At least two of the dead were members of Islamic Jihad who had escaped from prison in May.

- In response to the shootings, riots broke out at Gaza's Islamic University leading to a confrontation with Israeli troops, during which two Palestinians were killed in gunfire. Rioting spread to Jerusalem where hundreds of Palestinians clashed with Israelis at the Temple Mount.

Finally, on November 16th, Israeli authorities arrested Islamic Jihad leader Shaykh Odeh and ordered his deportation. Students at the Islamic University again exploded into violent demonstrations that were quelled by Israeli troops. It was only following this series of events that the other immediate and localized precipitating factors occurred, namely the November 25th hang-glider attack and the rumor-ridden December 8th traffic accident.

In retrospect, then, confrontation bet-

ween Islamic Jihad and Israeli authorities in the summer and fall of 1987 played a far greater role in readying the Gaza population for mass action against Israeli rule and for setting the stage for the outbreak of rioting in early December than has been usually assumed. The spontaneous rioting of local Palestinians in response to perceived Israeli attacks on Islamic Jihad – either through shoot-outs or arrests – underscores the links between the shadowy underground organization and the larger population. It highlights the emotive power the former held over the latter. Islamic Jihad's power, it seems, rested not so much on its ability to compel people into a disciplined uniformity but to impel them into the streets, confronting the Israelis as best they could.

One irony of early intifada historiography is that while Islamic Jihad's role in the pre-uprising period has been underappreciated, its continuing influence throughout the spring and summer of 1988 has been relatively exaggerated. In fact, the opposite has been the case.

Islamic Jihad's activities – and losses – in Gaza throughout the second half of 1987 were critical factors in the outburst of December. But, whether or not they understand this, the Israelis made a concerted effort to break Islamic Jihad thereafter. Many Islamic Jihad leaders and sympathizers were jailed in the first wave of arrests; several of its leaders have been, or are slated to be, deported. In fact, considering the small size of Islamic Jihad and the relatively few expulsions, Jihadis comprise a disproportionately high number of deportees. Moreover, two of the three Fatah operatives killed (allegedly by Israeli agents) in a Limassol, Cyprus, automobile explosion were, in fact, members of Islamic Jihad working in close contact with Fatah.

Of course, Islamic Jihad continues to operate. Leaflets bearing its name periodically appear imploring the populace to rain "death to the idolaters, to America, to Israel and to the Communists," to "burn Shultz's black suitcase" and to raise the flag of "Islamic revolution ... to liberate Palestine, all of Palestine." Islamic Jihad has been responsible for attempts to stab Israeli soldiers, set roadside mines and lob grenades at passing vehicles. Sympathy among the wider population, especially in Gaza but also in pockets of the West Bank,

remains strong and recruitment at the grass-roots level continues.

Relative to other groups, Islamic Jihad's role, however, has somewhat receded. No longer is Islamic Jihad the sole agent for violent confrontation and "armed struggle." Other groups, even within the Islamic community, have learned the utility of mixing religion and direct anti-Israel activity. For all groups inside the territories, organization and expansion of the base of political activists is at the heart of the intifada today, and in that sort of contest the very nature of the clandestine, secretive, tightly held Islamic Jihad precludes its success. While Islamic Jihad continues to operate as the most extreme form of religiously-based anti-Israel activism, it has given birth to an Islamic political activism whose affect upon more mainstream Palestinian groups could very well be more threatening than what Islamic Jihad could ever hope to achieve on its own. In this regard, the two most important trends are Hamas and Islamic Fatah.

HAMAS THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE

Hamas is a direct creation of the intifada. In contrast to Islamic Jihad, it lacks a history by which to judge its activity and the sort of compromises it sees fit to make between ideology and pragmatism. The word itself, Hamas, is an acronym for al-Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya – the Islamic Resistance Movement. Like the name Islamic Jihad, Islamic Resistance Movement is a sobriquet shared with a radical Lebanese group, but (as with Jihad) the connection appears to run no deeper. It seems as though even the leaders of Hamas were improvising with their name as the uprising progressed. Their early leaflets were signed with the initials of the formal Arabic name; only later did they adopt the four-letter acronym which has now been universally accepted by Palestinians and Israelis alike and which corresponds to an Arabic word meaning "zeal."

Simply put, Hamas is an invention of the traditional Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan) and its counterpart in Gaza, the Mujamma – a front group for the Muslim Brothers that permits participation in the illegal and clandestine activities of the uprising while safeguarding the technically legal and above-board status of the

operations of the parent organizations. There is some debate among analysts as to whether Hamas is simply a facade of the Mujamma/Muslim Brothers or, perhaps, a youth wing more eager than the older generation of leaders to engage in active confrontation against Israel. While it is clear that the execution of Hamas' day-to-day activities primarily engages the youth, it would be an error to conclude that Hamas exists as an autonomous organization outside the purview of the Mujamma/Brotherhood hierarchy.

With the dissemination of leaflets in January, Hamas began its effort to capitalize on this emerging popular trend and coopt it within the framework of the traditional Muslim Brothers. To survive, let alone succeed, required a strategy that differed markedly from Islamic Jihad's; a strategy borne of the Muslim Brothers' particular historical experience.

Unlike Islamic Jihad, Hamas was spawned out of a decades-old movement that had championed evolutionary change over radical revolution as the way to render society more Islamic. In so doing, the traditional Muslim Brothers were willing to enter into tacit alliances with "apostate" Arab regimes, namely Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states, as well as to cooperate tacitly with Israel. Indeed, many Islamic personalities prominent in the territories were associated with the Jordanian-financed Awqaf, the religious endowments that supervised the functioning of mosques and other Islamic institutions throughout the West Bank. As such, they were more often than not instruments for traditionalism and conservatism.

To the Israelis, busily combating the pre-intifada diplomatic gains of Palestinian nationalism on the international level and the guerilla threat internally, Islam appeared as part of the solution, not part of the problem. Support for Islam - or at least indifference to its growth - was viewed as coming at the expense of the more feared nationalist groups. As a result, successive Israeli officials readily gave permission for the construction of new mosques and for the registration of Islamic charitable organizations as legally functioning public associations.

In the West Bank, the Israelis acquiesced in the activities of the Awqaf. In Gaza, where there is an unofficial Egyptian connection,

not an official Jordanian link, a more uncharted path was followed. There, the Israelis acquiesced in the formation of new, locally administered Islamic organizations such as Mujamma, which boasts of thousands of members and has built a virtually complete extra-governmental infrastructure of religious, medical, educational and social institutions throughout Gaza. Indeed, it is said to control over 40 percent of Gaza mosques. Moreover, the Israelis permitted vast numbers of new mosques to be built, increasing the number of mosques in Gaza by 140 percent.

In addition to Israeli acquiescence, at least two other factors were handmaidens to the expansion of Islamic organizations throughout the West Bank and Gaza - Islamic successes on the regional level and PLO failures. Indeed, one of the consistent characteristics of the Palestinian Islamic movement is that its status has often been dependent on the changing destinies of outside forces. Only during the 1988 uprising has the Palestinian Islamic movement for the first time in a half century begun to assume a vibrancy and existence of its own.

• *The rise of Khomeini and the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran* found fertile ground among many Palestinians. The successes of Islam could be viewed by them in sharp relief to the bitter differences among Arab potentates and within the PLO occasioned by the Camp David accords, the lack of an Arab military option and the spiraling civil strife in Lebanon. As an al-Bireh Muslim Brother told al-Fajr in 1984, "after the decline of the military solution for the Palestinian cause in the late 1970s, Muslim Brothers found the environment suitable for preaching Islam as a political and ideological alternative to the national forces."¹³

In 1978, for example, the Islamic Bloc won just 3 percent of the vote in Bir Zeit University's student body elections. One year later, after the Shah's demise, the Islamics garnered 43 percent of the vote, eclipsing even Fatah's youth wing, Shabibah. Indeed, the fact that Yasser Arafat openly embraced the Khomeini revolution eased the way for the Islamic groups to make inroads inside the universities. When the Islamic revolution itself soured in the eyes of many Sunni Arabs, there was a commensurate decline in the appeal of Islamic groups in the territories. The same university election

tallies point to a tapering off for the Islamic blocs throughout the early 1980s. But soon thereafter the perceived victory of South Lebanese Muslims in driving out the Americans, and then the Israelis, replaced the Iranians as a model for Islamic political activism. Politics in the territories reflected this mood shift as well.

• *The fluctuations in the political fortunes of Yasser Arafat and the PLO were felt among local Palestinians too.* External events – the PLO's ability to confront the Israelis in the summer of 1982; Arafat's expulsion from Lebanon in 1983; his return to center stage of Arab politics via the Amman meeting of the Palestine National Council in November 1984; the signing of the Amman accord in February 1985; the closure of Fatah's Amman offices and the Jordan-PLO cold war that followed the accord's suspension in February 1986 – all had an impact on support for and opposition to the PLO inside the territories.

In addition, there have been other signs of growing adherence to Islamic tenets, on the one hand, and greater receptivity to Islamic political activism, on the other. For example, a 1984 survey of Palestinian social behavior "confirmed the existence of an Islamic revivalist trend in the West Bank and Gaza, a trend which increasingly manifests itself in the politicization of Islam and support for the [Muslim] Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations."¹⁴

Nearly 70 percent of those polled classified themselves as either "strongly" or "moderately" religious. Clearly foreshadowing the demographics of the uprising, refugee camp residents were more religious than city dwellers, Gazans more than West Bankers. Significantly, poll data revealed that "the revivalist trend was most evident among the youth and the college-educated," with those in the 25-30 year-old age group nine times more likely than those more than 50 years old to be praying more frequently today than in the past. Moreover, two-thirds of those polled were found to "be susceptible to accepting or supporting Islamic alternatives advocated by Islamic fundamentalist groups." Polling in 1986 produced similar results, with almost three-fifths of the population saying they preferred that any independent Palestinian state be based on either Islamic law (26.5 percent) or Arab nationalism and Islam (29.6 percent).¹⁵

At the onset of the uprising the external environment was conducive to the Islamic trend. As the Amman Arab League summit underscored, Arafat was at the nadir of his influence in the larger Arab world and the closure of Fatah offices in Amman had sorely circumscribed Fatah activity in the territories. Moreover, Islamic forces in both Egypt and Lebanon appeared insurgent. In the former, they were progressively gaining support among the Egyptian masses and had emerged as the principal voice of opposition to the Mubarak regime. In the latter, they held their ground against Syria's efforts to gain hegemony over Lebanon and appeared to be the sole Lebanese community neither the Israelis nor the Syrians were able – or even willing – to tackle and subdue.

HAMAS AND THE UPRISING

When the uprising began, however, the Muslim Brothers, as an organization, found themselves outside the circle of activity. Though they had scored significant gains among the Palestinians, their politics were mostly intra-Palestinian. While their strategic vision permitted no room in the Middle East for the Zionists, their immediate goals were oriented more toward strengthening Islamic orthodoxy and combatting apostasy than toward confronting the Zionists directly.

In that light they have traditionally been much less willing to deal with Fatah inside the territories than Islamic Jihad. Ibrahim Yazuri, for example, operational leader of the Mujamma in Gaza, has built a strong reputation for confronting the nationalists rather than the Israelis. He has championed attacks on Gaza's leftist-led Red Crescent Society and against other Fatah institutions and personalities in the Strip. Khalil al-Qoka, the now-deported leader of Gaza's Islamic society, has been quoted as saying that by its agreement to the concept of an international peace conference, the PLO had "closed the door for the coming generations to continue the struggle for the liberation of Palestine." Therefore, he refused to deal with the PLO.¹⁶

When the uprising started, however, the Muslim Brothers found themselves outflanked and outgunned by Islamic Jihad. Its religious credentials beyond question, Islamic Jihad was taking the battle directly to the Israelis. Almost overnight the ideology of the Muslim Brothers was rendered out-

moded; expanding the realm of Islamic observance no longer demanded a gradualist approach to the conflict with Zionism. By the end of December, when it was clear that the rioting in Gaza and the West Bank had created something profoundly novel in modern Palestinian history, the Brothers seemed to have realized that they could no longer be spectators in the battle against Israel.

Their response was to form Hamas, or – to be more precise – to issue leaflets under Hamas' name. Such precision is called for because Hamas does not appear to have an independent organizational structure of its own. It is not at all clear that there are "members" of Hamas, as opposed to the Muslim Brothers whose focus had turned from promoting Islamic observance among their fellow Palestinians to fomenting anti-Israel activity. Because it has to shirk its tainted associations with Arab regimes and Israeli authorities, Hamas' rhetoric is even more inflammatory than the "unified leadership's" and Islamic Jihad's. Hamas, after all, has to prove itself in a way that they don't.

In their leaflets issued periodically since early January, Jews are described as "brothers of monkeys, prophet murderers, blood suckers and warmongers" (January 12). Whereas PLO radio beseeched Friday prayer-goers with slogans like "We sacrifice our blood and souls for Palestine," Hamas urged them to chant "Death to the occupiers" (February 23). Whereas statements of "the unified leadership" supported the PLO leadership's call for an international peace conference to authorize the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas vilified the American "conspiracy" in league with "Arab kings, presidents and rulers" to "abort the Islamic uprising" under the "vile slogans of 'land for peace' and the umbrella of the 'international conference'" (March 4). For Hamas no "peace process," as such, exists. "To our people and to the world we declare our stand on peace ... 'no' to peace with the Zionist entity ... Where is there justice with them still possessing one inch on the coast of Haifa and Acre?" (March 14).

After nine months of operating on an ad hoc basis, a 40-page covenant detailing Hamas' political philosophy and strategy appeared in mid-August. More than just a compilation of the rhetoric of the groups' previously issued pamphlets, the covenant is

a clear and cohesive document representing the world view of many Islamic activists in the territories – namely, that the challenge for Palestinians now is to escalate the battle against the Zionists, not to find ways to transform the intifada into a political process in order to coexist with Israel. At a time when the PLO hierarchy is under pressure from some West Bankers to moderate the thrust of its own covenant by formally accepting the concept of a two-state solution, Hamas' document is a forceful reminder that any moderation of the traditional refusal to countenance a Jewish state in Palestine will be met with swift and sure opposition.

As the Hamas charter states, "No one is allowed to compromise on this land or to give up any part of this land. No king, no president, not any Arab state, not all of them together and not any organization – whether Palestinian or Arabic – has the right to speak for the coming Islamic generations until the resurrection."

While its rhetoric is maximalist, Hamas' tactics are primarily passive. It seems that the leaders of Hamas realize they cannot compete with either Islamic Jihad or the PFLP in taking the battle directly to the Israelis either in terms of high-intensity acts of individual violence or even mass outbursts of rioting. They also seem to realize that while most Palestinians identify with the uprising, only a relative handful are ready to engage in violence or terrorism.

Therefore, rather than urge such direct confrontations, Hamas' leaflets usually call for boycotts of Israeli goods, tax payments and licensing. A favorite tactic is to call for comprehensive strikes, sometimes on the same day that the "unified leadership" has called for strikes as well. In so doing, Hamas hopes to claim for itself the success of the strike. Hamas has even tried to one-up the "unified leadership," calling for full-day strikes when the "unified leadership" has slated only partial strikes. In August, Hamas went one step further, issuing a strike call completely independent of the "unified leadership" on the anniversary of the 1969 attempt by a deranged Australian to blow up the Al Aqsa mosque. These attempts at testing the receptivity of the population to their own strikes have been steadily growing more successful and their success has been registered not only in Gaza, but even in the West Bank.

In addition, while the external PLO and the "unified leadership" have jockeyed over the appropriate level of demands that can be made on the populace's daily lives, Hamas has periodically evinced greater empathy for Palestinians' day-to-day concerns. For example, when the "unified leadership" called for a comprehensive strike to protest Jerusalem Unification Day in late June, Hamas issued a leaflet saying that students in Gaza should be permitted to continue with their Egyptian matriculation examinations, lest they forfeit an entire year's academic work.

It is extremely difficult to gauge Hamas' success. Palestinian and Israeli analysts agree that Hamas has made considerable headway in gaining adherents, whereas the Muslim Brothers, per se, have been relatively dormant over the course of the uprising. What that means in operative terms is decidedly unclear. With no particular political program other than "just say no" to the Zionists and the "capitulationist Arabs," it is Hamas' plan to claim victory in the popularity contest with other Palestinian groups by standing firmly on the political margin, espousing orthodox rejectionism. Now that there is a ferment inside Palestinian politics about how - and whether - to transform the destructive power of the intifada into a constructive political initiative, Hamas takes on a relevance which it did not enjoy in the days when throwing stones was the extent of Palestinian political activity.

In the larger picture, though, the emergence of such a trend marks an important change in West Bank and Gaza politics. For the first time in decades, the Muslims of Palestine are speaking the language of action, not just piety. As the Hamas covenant states, "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem, but through jihad. All the rest is literally a waste of time." Those words clearly echo the mid-June statement of the General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers: "The Palestinian people have proved to us all that the right way to liberate Palestine is jihad and jihad alone."

From the pulpits of mosques throughout the territories (with the apparent approval of Jordanian awqaf supervisors), preachers are imploring their congregants to intensify the struggle against the Zionists. Islamic weddings, funerals and Friday prayers are

the sites of organizational meetings for virtually all streams of Palestinian organizations. In short, among the mass of Palestinian Muslims there has been a blurring of the political and the religious during the past ten months. As Muhammad Siyam, rector of Gaza's Islamic University said: "Nationalists are becoming more religious; the Muslims are becoming more concerned with the nation. There is a gradual alliance."¹⁷

ISLAMIC FATAH

Such blurring between the political and the religious has found its most important home inside Fatah, the largest and most influential Palestinian nationalist organization. Inside the territories Fatah is a mirror of the external PLO - an umbrella under which there is room for almost all streams of Palestinian nationalist activity.

Fatah's strength lies in its appeal to nationalism of all forms and its differing approaches to confronting Zionism. For example, there is a place in Fatah both for terrorists who blow up civilian passenger busses and for supporters of peaceful coexistence with Israel and a two-state solution. Therein lies its Achilles heel as well. By trying to be all things to all people it is unclear what an allegiance to Fatah really means. In the words of one Palestinian analyst, "Fatah is everyone, but Fatah is no one."

In recent years Fatah has accurately sensed the pulse of many Palestinians and has reached out to the growing Islamic trend. For the terrorist element inside Fatah, Islamic Jihad and its sympathizers have provided a ready reservoir of activists, and there has been cooperation between Fatah and Islamic Jihad in terrorist acts inside Israel and the territories since at least 1983. One year ago al-Fajr reported that the head of Fatah's Force 17 had "expressed interest in recruiting" Islamic fundamentalists and that there have been "agreements between Fatah and Islamic Jihad for military training."¹⁸ Fatah has recruited Islamic Jihadis in the territories and Amman and has provided weapons, money, tactical support and training at PLO bases throughout the Middle East. As an Israeli military official said two months before the outbreak of the uprising, "Fatah and Islamic Jihad are working together. One has the techniques and the other has the religious extremists

who are willing to die for their cause. This cooperation is very different than before and very, very dangerous."¹⁹

On a symbolic level, Fatah has made several appeals to the Islamic trend. These include personnel moves, such as the appointment of Shaykh Abdul Hamid as-Sa'ih to chairmanship of the Palestine National Council and Yassir Arafat's mid-December 1988 naming of an Islamic affairs advisor, as well as rhetorical shifts, such as the disappearance of "secularism" from official Fatah declarations and the emphasis on *jihad*, religious holy war, as opposed to the agnostic *kifah* or *nidal*. Prior to his assassination in April 1988 Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), a former Muslim Brother and Yasser Arafat's operational link to the territories, had traditionally played an important role in building relations between Fatah and the religious trend.

But overshadowing these tactical moves is the more fundamental mood change inside the territories. There, where it matters most, Fatah leaders and activists have begun to manifest a basic receptivity to the Islamic movement in a way they had never done before. Such a shift is not the result of a change in the philosophy of Fatah loyalists but the product of a clear reading of the political tea leaves - Islamic activists are in the insurgence.

Typical of Fatah's renewed sensitivity to the Islamic trend is the following statement to an Israeli interviewer by one of the top aides to Faysal Hussein, reputed to be the highest ranking Fatah official in the West Bank. "We want to feel free," said Rida Isma'il, chief of public relations at Hussein's Arab Studies Center. "For most of us, it is emotionally difficult to accept rule under those of a different religion. This feeling has become a strong factor. Among faithful Muslims, it is no longer conceivable to be dominated by non-Muslims."²⁰

While there is surely an Islamic strain in Fatah's pedigree, just a few years ago it would have been completely out of character for a mainstream Fatah activist to define the conflict with Israel in such fundamentally religious terms. At the very least, this construction is an affront to the approximately 10 percent of Palestinians who are Christian, many of whom have toiled at the nationalist effort far longer than the Islamics.

Fatah's receptivity to the Islamic movement has struck a responsive chord in return. Whether it is because of the practical benefits association which Fatah offers or because of the political appeal of being "on the inside" of the largest and most powerful Palestinian organization, Islamic activist leaders have been speaking more kindly of Fatah, and the PLO in general, throughout much of the past year. Prior to the uprising, for example, Shaykh Yassin - former Gazan Islamic Jihad leader and now spiritual guide to Hamas - sharply criticized the PLO for refusing to adopt Islam as an ideology and likened Fatah members to "Muslims who drink wine and eat pork."²¹

Two months into the uprising, however, Shaykh Yassin was quick to dismiss the differences between the Islamics and the nationalists. "The occupation has united the entire Palestinian people and I welcome this," he said. "All Palestinians are Muslim and all Muslims believe in God. The occupier must be ousted first and then we will solve the problems between us," he told an Israeli interviewer in January.²² And even with the stinging rebuke of PLO strategy found in the Hamas charter, that document still spoke warmly of the PLO as "the father, the brother, the relative and the friend ... [who] shares the same homeland, the same pain, the same fate and the same enemy."

Yassin's statements raise foreboding possibilities. While each of the parties to this nationalist-Islamic "cohabitation" may hope to exploit the other for its own aims, it is not at all clear who is coopting whom. Fatah, for example, has been particularly active in West Bank mosques and there are a number of high-profile preachers who double as Fatah activists. Indeed, the resume of one such personality, interviewed for this article, shows him to be a former student leader at an historically nationalist West Bank university, Fatah activist and imam of his mosque. He may be indicative of a religious demarche to the nationalists, but the converse may equally be the case. As Shaykh Bassam Jarrar, a leader of the Islamic movement in Ramallah, said six months before the uprising, "The rise of Islam means that the PLO becomes more Islamic."²³

Over time the creeping Islamization of Fatah, a process fueled by the short-term need to expand the uprising's popular base and to maintain its momentum is sure to have

long-term implications and may well be the most deleterious aspect of the rise of Islam in Palestinian politics. The most extreme predictions envision the Islamics capturing the nationalist movement and reducing the political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to the level of a religious crusade. This nightmare scenario was summed up in the plea of one high-ranking, pro-Jordanian *Awqaf* official: "If the Israelis do not sit with King Hussein, then they will have to sit with Arafat. If not with Arafat, then with Khomeini." The Islamics have certainly not yet "captured" Fatah, but they have made themselves a force to be reckoned with.

ISLAM AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

A more accurate description of the emerging power of the Islamic trend is that it may be steadily acquiring a veto over the emerging political process. However, this is just beginning to be tested. Only in recent weeks has the ferment inside the Palestinian community begun to translate itself into political debate, giving rise to such open challenges to PLO authority as the Hamas covenant.

The first evidence of this came with the Abu Sharif episode. In late June 1988 Arafat's spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, issued a document which spoke for the first time of Palestinian coexistence with Israel. The statement was welcomed in the West, but provoked quite a different response in the territories. While prominent university intellectuals applauded the thrust of the document, Islamic activists across-the-board rejected it. Their rejection was not primarily based on Abu Sharif's suggestion of direct talks with Israel, which many Islamics would accept, believing it possible to negotiate Israel out of existence.

Rather, their rejection was based on their repudiation of the document's equation of Palestinian and Israeli national rights and, by extension, recognition of Israel's legitimate right to self-determination. The fact that the Abu Sharif initiative sparked great divisiveness even within Fatah, let alone the opposition it provoked from leftist nationalist groups, made it easier for the Islamic activists to oppose. In the end, given the dissension aroused by Abu Sharif's proposal, the leaflets of the "unified leadership" skirted the issue altogether.

King Hussein's decision in mid-summer to disengage from the West Bank and to step back from the peace process changed the local and regional dynamic and forced the PLO to consider a political initiative that few in the PLO had expected or planned. Since then, moderates inside the territories have openly argued for a redefinition of PLO objectives, namely to scrap the goal of destroying Israel and to call for a two-state solution. Inside the PLO hierarchy there is fierce pressure to take definitive political steps - such as declaring independence or a provisional government - or risk losing authority and suzerainty inside the territories. With politics - not just tactics - at the center stage of Palestinian debate, divisions between nationalists and Islamic organizations that had cooperated in the early months of the uprising have begun to surface, as evidenced by the publication of the Hamas covenant.

In this environment Islamic activists - especially those under the Fatah umbrella - are just beginning to be faced with a political challenge that will test their growing influence. It is on political issues that Islamic groups and nationalist groups diverge; leftist groups, fearful that Islam is en route to "capturing the intifada," have already begun to point out that Islam by itself provides no political program to realize Palestinian national aspirations other than steadfast orthodoxy to the concept of confrontation. Movement on political issues would test whether the appeal of Islam is deep as well as broad and would pit Islamic activists against various nationalist elements.

In the absence of this sort of political development, however, discussion among the constituent groups of the uprising has so far been limited to debates over tactics. Given the uprising's relatively long duration - far longer than anyone could have foreseen in December 1987 - it was only natural that some disputes would arise within the tactical intifada alliances.

Communists and some Fatah elements appeared to lobby for a more gradualist approach to the uprising, accenting internal organization and civil disobedience. Habash's Popular Front and radical Islamic groups seemed to be urging a violent escalation of the confrontation. In addition, there were complaints from some leftists that the Islamic trend was claiming too much

credit for the immediate success of the uprising and there were counter-complaints from Islamic activists that Fatah had not accorded them adequate credit for their contribution to the uprising.

In late May al-Quds radio hinted at internal bickering when it reported on "some obstacles and gaps emerging here and there and...some signs of confusion and difficulties of fully accomplishing some of the slogans of the uprising."²⁴ By early July it was clear from al-Quds radio that conflict over the role of Islamic groups in the uprising was at the heart of the bickering: "... the masses of our people have begun to feel the beginnings of a split action. In whose interest are media campaigns launched against the struggling Islamic trends and organizations in Palestine...? Why open fire on the Islamic trends and for whose sake?"²⁵

But, with divisive political issues only beginning to make themselves felt in the Palestinian arena, bickering on the operational level has been fairly easy to control. In the words of Haydar Abdul Shafi, Gaza Red Crescent chief and celebrated opponent of the Islamic movement, "there are differences among various groups, but at worst they are working at parallel aims, not against each other."²⁶

In the absence of a political process, the Islamic trends in general, and Islamic Fatah

in particular, can continue to expand their popular base. This expansion will be in preparation for the day when the confrontation against Zionism leaves the organizational phase and clearly enters the world of political maneuvering between (and among) Palestinians and Israelis. Their goal is to gain such firm footing under the Fatah umbrella that the weight of their presence would militate against having a pitched battle over what sort of political process to pursue with the Israelis. As Shaykh Bassam Jarrar has said, "after the PLO reaches a stalemate regarding political solutions, the PLO will then make an alliance with the Islamic groups."²⁷

Such an alliance, if it comes to pass, cannot help but be less likely than the existing alignment of Palestinian groups to reach a peaceful accommodation with Israel. So far, Islamic activism has not yet "captured" the uprising and Islamic groups do not dictate the uprising's daily course. At the same time, the path of greater integration of Islamic activism and Palestinian nationalism faces very few obstacles. The longer this evolution of an Islamic/nationalist entente continues, and the greater the role of Islamic activists in the daily confrontation against Israeli rule, the more difficult it will be in the future to create a political process outside the shadow of the Islamic activists' strategic vision of a "Zionist-free" Palestine.

ENDNOTES

¹ *al-Fajr*, in English, August 23, 1987 • ² *Jerusalem Post International*, November 21, 1987 • ³ *al-Fajr*, in English, August 23, 1987 • ⁴ *al-Fajr*, in English, August 23, 1987 • ⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, November 12, 1987 • ⁶ *al-Fajr*, in English, July 27, 1984 • ⁷ *al-Fajr*, in English, September 6, 1987 • ⁸ *al-Fajr*, in English, August 23, 1987 • ⁹ *Ma'ariv*, January 14, 1988; cited in FBIS, January 15, 1988 • ¹⁰ *al-Fajr*, in English, July 19, 1987 • ¹¹ *al-Fajr*, in English, July 19, 1987 • ¹² *al-Fajr*, in English, June 29, 1984 • ¹³ Muhammad Shadid, "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly*, April 1988 • ¹⁴ Muhammad Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1988 • ¹⁵ *al-Fajr*, in English, September 6, 1987. University elections have

the sole exception to the Muslim Brothers' unwillingness to cooperate with Fatah. On occasion, Islamic Blocs have joined hands with conservative Fatah elements, but only to combat electoral challenges from the Communists and the pro-Habash/pro-Hawatimeh groups. • ¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, November 12, 1987 • ¹⁷ *al-Fajr*, in English, September 6, 1987 • ¹⁸ *Washington Post*, October 20, 1987 • ¹⁹ *Koteret Rashit*, March 23, 1988; cited in JPRS, June 2, 1988 • ²⁰ *al-Fajr*, in English, September 6, 1987 • ²¹ *Ma'ariv*, January 14, 1988; cited in FBIS, January 15, 1988 • ²² *al-Fajr*, in English, July 19, 1987 • ²³ *Jerusalem Domestic Service*, June 24, 1988; cited in FBIS, June 24, 1988 • ²⁴ May 28, 1988; cited in FBIS, June 1, 1988 • ²⁵ July 7, 1988; cited in FBIS, July 11, 1988 • ²⁶ Private interview, June 1988 • ²⁷ *al-Fajr*, in English, July 19, 1987