Policy Focus

CLASSIFYING EVIL

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and Policy toward
Rogue Regimes

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RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

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From 1981 to 1982, Professor Tanter served on the National Security Council staff and was personal representative of the secretary of defense to the 1983–1984 arms control talks held in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna. Currently, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Professor Tanter received a Ph.D. from Indiana University and has taught at Northwestern, Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The recipient of a Fulbright scholarship to the University of Amsterdam, he has served as a fellow at both the Hoover Institution and the Woodrow Wilson International Center. As scholar-in-residence at the American embassy in Tokyo, Professor Tanter lectured on petroleum interruption scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. At Michigan, he teaches courses on the Arab-Israeli conflict, international security affairs, and ballistic missile defense.

Professor Tanter's recent publications include the book *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation* (St. Martin's, 1999), which examines Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea, as well as freelance terrorists and proliferators who operate in a borderless world of failed states such as Afghanistan.

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Executive Summary

Language matters in international policymaking, and terms such as "rogue," "outlaw," and "hostile" can help mobilize democratic publics against states that actively attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), proliferate long-range missiles, and sponsor international terrorism. For President George W. Bush, the attacks of September 11, 2001, reinforced the threat emanating from rogue states on all fronts. By using such rhetoric, the president has alerted the American public and the international community to the dangers posed by a class of countries constituting what he calls an "axis of evil." Such language also highlights the manner in which these regimes collude with each other and with terrorists.

Accordingly, the Bush administration has regularly employed provocative language to justify measures such as missile defense and to recruit allies in the war against terrorism and proliferation. This represents a return to the ideologically charged tone that characterized the first terms of Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. Indeed, Bush administration officials continue to assert Washington's right to launch preemptive strikes against rogue states. By targeting such states, they argue, the United States enhances prospects for regional security, democracy within the Arab world, and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Simply put, rogue regime change paves the way for democratic peace.

In particular, the administration's joint emphasis on terrorism and proliferation has focused international attention on Baghdad. Iraq has a clear proliferation record, and its history of using WMD has led to concern over the possibility that Saddam Husayn could become more active and effective in working with terrorists. Indeed, the use of American civilian aircraft as weapons on September 11 suggests that terrorists are willing to use any delivery system available to them to attack the United States. Because it is difficult to deter or even defend against assaults by such individuals, the Bush administration has settled on a policy of deterring, coercing, and perhaps toppling terrorist-harboring regimes, with special attention paid to those rogue states that

may soon develop (or that already possess) the capability to launch ballistic missiles at the United States.

Anticipating the Bush administration's concern about the conjunction of terrorism and proliferation, Congress expanded the definition of terrorism in 1994 to include efforts by any individual, group, or non–nuclear weapons state to acquire certain nuclear materials or to develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device.[1] Indeed, treating terrorism and proliferation as related threats makes excellent sense for U.S. policymakers. Consider Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. All possess ballistic missiles and pursue WMD; they also have a history of sponsoring international terrorism and colluding with one another. Given these and other factors, it is reasonable to argue that such regimes constitute a collective threat.

The main advantage of emphasizing the commonality of threats posed by rogue states is the consequent mobilization of public opinion behind tough methods such as coercive diplomacy or brute force. Some argue that grouping dissimilar states together by using "rogue regime" terminology interferes with engagement when the latter is warranted for a particular state. Although such arguments appear at the margin, the Bush administration has demonstrated remarkable consensus regarding the rogue state problem. Because the Bush approach toward outlaw states builds on previous presidential doctrines, it has benefited from continuity of purpose and wider public understanding of the relevant concepts. Reinforced by ideologically charged language, the Bush Doctrine's ambitious goals call for rolling back, rather than simply deterring, nations that engage in proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism, eventually replacing them with peaceful democracies.

Because of the significant benefits and minimal costs of employing terms such as "rogue state," the Bush administration should continue its use of this rhetoric. Moreover, given the collusion between rogue states in the proliferation of missiles and WMD, the United States should work to strengthen international arms control measures such as the Missile Technology Control Regime. Finally, in light of the links among international terror-

ist groups and their relationship to rogue states, the Bush admin-
istration should intensify its strategic approach to the war against
terrorism, continuing to avoid a narrow focus on al-Qaeda alone.

Note

1. *Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994,* Part B, sec. 221(a); Title II, *Om-
   nibus Export Administration Act of 1994.*

Introduction

A s the national security bureaucracy prepared over the course of 2002 for war with Iraq, another war of sorts broke out in Washington over whether President George W. Bush should continue to rhetorically group certain countries together under provocative labels such as "axis of evil" and "rogue regime." Some policymakers advocated less confrontational language, arguing that the "axis of evil" countries—which the president identified as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in his 2002 State of the Union address—did not belong in the same category because Washington actually treated each one differently (i.e., confrontation with Iraq, a hands-off approach for Iran, and a diplomatic "squeeze" for North Korea).[1] According to this argument, the fact that certain regimes have engaged in similar behavior—namely, state-sponsored terrorism and proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—does not mean that they should be grouped together under the same label, especially if doing so would require Washington to take a similar policy approach with each.

In contrast, those officials who advocated placing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in the same rhetorical category argued that the anticipated advantages of doing so (e.g., mobilizing democratic publics and coercing adversaries) were worth the potential costs (e.g., foreclosing rapprochement even when it was possible and desirable). This argument was reinforced by further assaults against U.S. interests following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

The chapters that follow elucidate the various reasons why Washington should continue using the confrontational language employed by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address and elsewhere. Chapter 1 outlines the evolu-

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tion of the Bush administration's rhetoric, demonstrating that, in spite of the debate surrounding terms such as "axis of evil," the president and his advisors are nevertheless united in their recognition of the collective threat posed by rogue states. Chapter 2 outlines the debate over classification itself, providing historical context to arguments in favor of using strategically provocative language and illustrating how policies underlying the rhetorical categorization of "rogue states" can facilitate democratic change in the Middle East. Chapter 3 analyzes the specific ways in which rogue regimes collude, focusing on terrorism sponsorship as well as the proliferation of missile technology and WMD.

Overall, rogue collusion is a key determinant of U.S. threat perception; the more rogue regimes cooperate, the more reason there is to fear them. As the remainder of this Policy Focus illustrates, Washington should respond to rogue collusion by adopting a strategic approach to these regimes, grouping them together when possible and treating them with different approaches when necessary.

Note

1. David Sanger, "Three Enemy Targets Require Three Different Strategies," *New York Times,* December 15, 2002.

Chapter 1

Broad Bush Administration Consensus

A lthough much attention has been focused on the differences
among key actors in the administration of President George
W. Bush, his cabinet has demonstrated broad consensus on the
issue of "rogue states." Even within this underlying consensus,
however, members of the administration have taken different ap-
proaches in describing states such as Iran and Iraq. Specifically,
the president, national security advisor, and civilian leadership
seem comfortable with the thesis that these and similar countries
have enough negative qualities in common to warrant being pub-
licly categorized as "rogue states," while the secretary of state and
vice president are characterized by their less frequent use of such
language. Nevertheless, all members of the administration use
synonyms that categorize certain nations in less-than-flattering
terms (for example, "rogue regime," "outlaw state," "sick nation,"
and so forth, hereinafter collectively described as "rogue state
language"). In other words, differences in emphasis among indi-
viduals should not mask the underlying conceptual framework
on rogue states shared by the administration as a whole.

The president's focus on the common problems posed by a group
of hostile regimes predates his 2002 State of the Union address and
its famous use of the phrase "axis of evil." During his 2000 presiden-
tial campaign, his first press conference as president, and his initial
speech before Congress, Bush used the term "rogue" to describe
regimes that proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), im-
plying that he was comfortable with the "rogue state" concept and
that he viewed proliferation as a central element in the term's defi-
nition. As National Security Council spokeswoman Mary Ellen
Countryman said in February 2001, "The president thinks ['rogue

regimes' is] a term that means something to people. It's pretty clear what it means."[1]

Condoleezza Rice: Rogues and Outlaws

The president's confident use of rogue state language may derive from the fact that his national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, uses such terminology as well. For example, during the 2000 campaign, Rice stated that Bush "is a proponent of early deployment of missile defenses to meet the threat that is emerging and growing from rogue states."[2] She also anticipated what many have called the "Bush Doctrine," that is, a willingness to take preemptive action against states or entities that threaten U.S. security, when she wrote that the next administration must "deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction."[3]

Moreover, in her 2000 Republican National Convention speech, Rice stated, "George W. Bush will never allow America and our allies to be blackmailed. And make no mistake about it, blackmail is what the outlaw states seeking long-range ballistic missiles have in mind."[4] Previously, she had used rogue state language to validate the Bush campaign's assertion that a U.S. ballistic missile defense system would not be directed toward China or Russia:

> I want to be very clear that [Bush] . . . believes that [missile defense] . . . is clearly not aimed at the Russians, because . . . the threat now is different. We're talking about unauthorized launch, we're talking about rogue states, and I think he would hope to convince Russia that peaceful states have nothing to fear from ballistic missile defense.[5]

In this and other instances, Rice clearly divides the world into peaceful states and rogue regimes.[6]

Colin Powell: 'Sick' Nations

For the most part, Secretary of State Colin Powell has signed on to the Bush administration's application of the rogue state concept. Yet, many speculate that he is less ideologically motivated

and less of a hardliner than other members of the administration. If Powell does indeed wish to dilute the administration's rogue state language, however, he would be well advised to obtain something of diplomatic value in return for using less provocative rhetoric.

To be sure, Powell hedges his bets. During his first months in office, he avoided the phrase "states of concern," a term employed by his predecessor, Madeleine Albright. He did use similar language at times, however, as when he stated that Iran's actions were "of deep concern to the United States and to the American people."[7] Powell has argued that the use of "rogue" overgeneralizes the threat posed by certain countries and hence precludes differentiation when necessary.[8] Yet, when questioned in August 2001 about his reluctance to use rogue state language, he answered that he reserved the right to use such language in the future.[9] Moreover, during remarks made at the World Economic Forum shortly after the president's 2002 State of the Union address, Powell defended Bush's rhetoric: "We must not step back from the challenge presented by rogue regimes, evil regimes, as the president put it."[10]

Indeed, Powell has used related terms to describe problem countries. For instance, in criticizing Russia for signing a deal to supply advanced weapons to Iran, he argued that it is not wise to invest in regimes that do not follow "international standards of behavior."[11] His 2000 Republican National Convention speech also contained harsh rhetoric about such states: "The sick nations that still pursue the fool's gold of tyranny and weapons of mass destruction will soon find themselves left behind in the dustbin of history."[12]

Donald Rumsfeld: Proliferators and Rogues

In contrast to Powell's "sick" label, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has implied that the leaders of problem states are rational enough to be deterred. For example, during his January 2001 Senate confirmation hearings, he was asked whether such leaders were irrational and, if so, whether such irrationality justified an American missile shield as an insurance policy in the event that deterrence failed. Rumsfeld replied,

> I've met with Saddam Husayn and I met with the elder Asad as Middle East envoy and these people are intelligent, they're survivors, they're tough. They don't think like we do, and goodness knows they don't behave like we do with respect to their neighbors or their own people. But they're not erratic.[13]

He further stated that he was not enamored of the phrase "rogue state" because it left the impression that the regime in question is like "a rogue elephant, careening off a wall blindly."[14]

Rumsfeld was similarly disinclined to use rogue state language in the Rumsfeld Commission report, a 1998 assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In fact, the report uses the phrase "rogue state" only once: "It is possible that Iraq has hidden some material from U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection, or that it could acquire fissile material abroad (e.g., from another 'rogue' state)."[15] More recently, however, he has actively used such language to explain why the United States needs to develop missile defense capabilities:

> Imagine what might happen if a rogue state were to demonstrate the capability to strike U.S. or European populations with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give this state the power to hold us hostage. . . . This scenario leaves us with three choices in the face of aggression: acquiesce and allow the rogue to invade its neighbors; oppose it and put Western population centers at risk; or pre-empt its action. . . . The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that—defenses. They will threaten no one, save those who would seek to threaten us with ballistic missile attack. They are certainly no threat to Russia. The purpose of missile defense is to protect against a limited number of missiles of increasing range and sophistication from rogue states—not against the thousands of missiles in Russia's arsenal.[16]

Both Rumsfeld and his deputy secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, have described the world as a "dangerous and untidy" place. More specifically, in categorizing the threats to the United States, Wolfowitz has contrasted the peaceful, developed, globalization-oriented world with those regions characterized by "ethnic conflict, regional thugs, failed states, terrorists, and the proliferation of

missiles and weapons of mass destruction."[17] Wolfowitz's "regional thugs" are the equivalent of Powell's "sick nations" and President Bush's "rogue regimes."

Richard Cheney: Problem States

Despite attempts to categorize him as a right-wing ideologue, Vice President Richard Cheney has been more reluctant than President Bush to use terms such as "rogue" or "evil" state. More illustrative of Cheney's approach are his remarks on two television programs broadcast on March 4, 2001. When asked on one about the nature of the threat from Iran, Cheney replied that Washington is "concerned" that Tehran has been seeking WMD and ballistic missiles.[18] On the other, Cheney responded in part to a question about the threat of Iran developing nuclear capabilities by stating, "As a general proposition, the United States needs to have a policy that applies widely around the world and that discourages proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[19]

These two interviews provided the vice president with ample opportunity to use rogue state language. Although he chose to avoid it, belying the pundits' characterization of him as the Bush administration ideologue, Cheney has readily defended the president's use of such terminology. Shortly after the 2002 State of the Union address, he asserted that most Americans are reassured by a president who describes Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil."[20]

Continuity with the Clinton Approach

The Bush administration did not inaugurate the use of rogue state language; rather, it picked up the terminology from the Clinton administration. Some have suggested that this terminology reflected the hardline approach of Warren Christopher, the secretary of state in the first Clinton administration. Yet, the concept of rogue states informed the second Clinton administration in many ways as well, including its supposedly more nuanced secretary of state, Madeleine Albright.

For example, during remarks made on September 30, 1997, Albright outlined four classes of nations: industrialized democ-

racies that adhere to international rules; transitional countries attempting to join the democracies; failed states being assisted by the international community; and rogue states whose behavior runs counter to international standards of conduct. According to her, rogues were "the worst problem" because they were bent on destroying the international system. She also pointed to Iran as "a prime example" of a rogue state: "Iran is a supporter of terrorism. Iran tries to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and in some form or another, on a very frequent basis, undermines the Middle East peace process."[21]

Yet, Albright stepped on her own threat message by eventually concluding that Iran is only a state of "great concern."[22] Although she used the term "rogue state" in describing Iran during most of her tenure as secretary of state, she reversed course during her last year in office when she began to fashion a policy of engagement with both Iran and North Korea.[23] Toward this end, she sent a memorandum to all State Department employees in June 2000 barring the use of the phrase "rogue states" and mandating that nations that sponsor terrorism and seek WMD be referred to as "states of concern."[24]

This shift suggested a downgrading of the outlaw threat in favor of a more subdued diplomatic approach. Although Albright provided criteria for including regimes in the new "states of concern" category, the phrase begged the question: About which states was Albright not concerned? Subsequently, such language was not taken seriously, even becoming a source of public ridicule.[25] Nor was Albright's change consistently adopted across the Clinton administration. Her State Department memo was for internal use; it was not an interagency directive. In fact, Defense Secretary William Cohen used "rogue states" in remarks made four days after Albright issued her memo: "There is continued disagreement over the urgency that the United States feels in terms of the nature of the threat coming from rogue states and how it should be addressed."[26]

Notes

1. Jonathan Wright, "Bush Brings 'Rogues' Back into Vogue," Reuters, March 5, 2001.

2. Condoleezza Rice, foreign policy advisor to Governor George W. Bush, interview by Wolf Blitzer, *Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,* Cable News Network, June 4, 2000.

3. Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January–February 2000), pp. 45–62.

4. Condoleezza Rice, speech before the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, August 1, 2000. Transcript available online (www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/ricetext080100.htm).

5. Condoleezza Rice (with Richard Cheney and Richard Armitage), discussion of Governor George W. Bush's speech on defense policy, The Citadel, Charleston, S.C., September 23, 1999 (transcript available from Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.). Compare Rice's statement with that of President Bill Clinton's national security advisor, Sandy Berger: "[T]he [national missile defense] systems that we're looking at are directed at rogue states . . . [and] terrorists who might have missiles. . . . Russia's own generals say they can overwhelm this system, and therefore it should not be a threat to their deterrence" (remarks made at a White House briefing on November 18, 1999).

6. The Bush administration is not alone in using rogue state language to justify measures such as missile defense development. When George Robertson, secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), visited Moscow in April 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin offered to share the S-300—a defense system that uses missiles to shoot down incoming rockets—with the European members of NATO as a protective shield against attack from what he termed "rogue states." To be sure, this offer was primarily an attempt to divide Washington from its European allies, as Putin excluded the United States from the missile plan. See Jim Hoagland, "Putin's Rocket Challenge," *Washington Post,* March 18, 2001; available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18254-2001Mar17.html.

    Putin's offer was also characterized by two noteworthy ironies. First, in identifying states that pose a potential missile threat to European NATO countries and Russia, he named Iran alongside Iraq, Pakistan, and North Korea, even though Tehran's missile program has benefited from the work of Russian scientists. Second, Putin's threat list was quite similar to President Bush's "axis of evil." Clearly, in analyzing threats, Putin focused not on a regime's location, ideology, or alignment with Moscow but on many of the same factors that led Bush to group together Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis."

7. Colin Powell, remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2001. Transcript available online (www.state.gov/secretary/index.cfm?docid=1373).

8. General Colin Powell, interview by the author, New York, March 9, 2000. Powell has also stated, "I find the term 'rogue' unsatisfying. It's a short-

hand which oversimplifies complex and diverse nations and issues." General Colin Powell, letter to the author, March 14, 2000.

9. Speechwriter for Secretary of State Colin Powell, telephone interview with the author, August 6, 2001.

10. Todd Purdum and David Sanger, "Two Top Officials Offer Stern Talk on U.S. Policy," *New York Times,* February 2, 2002.

11. "Powell Cautions Russia on Iran Deal," *New York Times,* March 14, 2001.

12. General Colin Powell, speech before the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, July 31, 2000. Transcript available online (www.npr.org/ news/national/election2000/conventions/speech.powell.html). Interestingly, the term "sick nations" suggests that Washington would be unable to rely on deterrent threats and would have to employ brute force in the event that such nations continued to pursue this "fool's gold."

    Some would argue that a "sick" leader cannot be deterred—that a head of state with little or no sense of rationality can hardly make the complex cost-benefit calculations necessary to conclude that threatening to attack the United States is too risky. To be deterred, an actor must at least have "bounded rationality" (in short, bounded rationality implies that an actor is constrained by limits such as cognitive capacity, prior beliefs, and misperceptions). Although the term "sick" might imply curability, the negative context in which Powell uses it here suggests that he perceives the leaders in question to be low on the scale of rationality. For an explication of the distinction between comprehensive and bounded rationality, see Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decisionmaking: Israel's Security Choices, 1967* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1980).

13. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing on the Nomination of Donald Rumsfeld for Secretary of Defense,* 107th Cong., 1st sess., January 11, 2001.

14. Rumsfeld's belief in the rationality of leaders such as Saddam Husayn stands in contrast to the views of at least one diplomat who has negotiated with Iraq—Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM, who called Saddam the "preeminent crazy person in that area." Richard Butler, remarks made on the program *On the Edge with Paula Zahn,* Fox Television News, October 16, 2000. See also Richard Butler, *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security* (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), pp. 53, 76.

15. *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress,* submitted July 15, 1998. Available online (www.fas.org/irp/threat/ bm-threat.htm).

16. Donald Rumsfeld, "Toward 21st-Century Deterrence," *Wall Street Journal,* June 27, 2001. Available online (www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/ feature.html?id=95000715).

17. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing on the Nomination of Paul Wolfowitz for Deputy Secretary of Defense,* 107th Cong., 1st sess., February 27, 2001.

18. Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks made on the program *Face the Nation,* Central Broadcasting System, March 4, 2001.

19. Vice President Richard Cheney, interview by Wolf Blitzer, *Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,* Cable News Network, March 4, 2001.

20. "Cheney Defends 'Axis of Evil' Label," Associated Press, February 18, 2002.

21. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, September 30, 1997; transcript available online (http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970930.html) (hereinafter Albright CFR remarks). See also her remarks on the television program *The Today Show,* National Broadcasting Company, October 1, 1997; transcript available online (http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/971001.html).

22. Albright CFR remarks.

23. "Engagement" in this context describes the use of incentives and other foreign policy tools to induce governments to change their behavior. See Richard Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, introduction to *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, July 2000).

24. Richard Boucher, spokesman, U.S. Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing," June 19, 2000. Available online (http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000619db.html).

25. For example, the television program *The West Wing* (National Broadcasting Company) lampooned Albright's proposed change soon after it was announced.

26. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, remarks made during a joint press conference with Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev, Moscow, June 13, 2000. Transcript available online (www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/t06152000_t613jmod.html).

Chapter 2

A Commonality of Threats

Whatever the legacy of the Clinton administration regarding the rogue issue, President George W. Bush was somewhat cautious about how he described problem states during his first months in office. He used both "rogue nations" and a less provocative term favored by his diplomats, "least responsible states," to characterize regimes that support terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, he has used "rogue state" more often, even adding "hostile regime" to his repertoire of descriptors.

Some have argued that the use of these general categories exaggerates commonalities and understates differences between states that seek WMD and sponsor terrorism. Indeed, an active debate has arisen over whether such categories are appropriate. One side holds that the benefits of categorizing certain regimes as rogues outweigh the potential costs—an argument consistent with both the Bush Doctrine and this author's own views.[1] The other side holds that the disadvantages of this classification trump its advantages. What, in fact, are the benefits and costs of considering "rogue state" and "hostile regime" as general categories?

Advantages of Emphasizing the Common Threat

In the wake of September 11, the advantages of employing rogue state language far outweigh the disadvantages. The principal benefit of using such terminology is the consequent political mobilization of government bureaucracies and the American people against the regimes in question, which in turn serves to obstruct policies of unwarranted and premature accommodation. In principle, rogue state language might delay engagement when it is timely and warranted; yet, in the post–September 11 world,

such terminology serves to reinforce the credibility of U.S. threats implicit in the Bush Doctrine.

Rogue state language can also facilitate the diplomatic mobilization of alliance partners and the coercion of adversaries. To be sure, before the September 11 attacks, the use of such terms was unwelcome within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Following these attacks, however, U.S. allies became more willing to accept Washington's use of confrontational language as a bargaining lever with states that engage in proliferation and harbor terrorist organizations.

Indeed, such language may become part of a tacit bargaining strategy between the United States and designated regimes, as one element within a dual approach of engagement and containment. Engagement proceeds via reciprocal inducements, while containment proceeds by way of threats. If Washington's only goal vis-à-vis countries such as Iran were engagement, then rogue state language might indeed become a hindrance. With the added goal of containment, however, the use of such language can facilitate the bargaining process.

Many of those who prefer to refrain from employing rogue state language assume that a policy of reciprocal concessions can on its own advance U.S. interests. They envisage a proposal-counterproposal sequence that benefits all parties. In contrast, those who embrace the rogue state concept generally prefer that Washington influence designated countries by using pressures such as economic sanctions.[2] They emphasize that informal bargaining with such countries requires a healthy dose of threat alongside promises of rewards, the latter to be given only after appropriate changes become evident in the behavior of the regimes in question. In this view, the use of the rogue label is a crucial part of the bargaining process, that is, the label should not be surrendered without a corresponding concession.

From this perspective, it was unwise of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright to end the use of rogue state language unilaterally; instead, she should have insisted on a quid pro quo for this action. Likewise, if Secretary of State Colin Powell were to forswear the use of such language without reciprocity, he would lose one of the diplomatic levers in the U.S. national security tool kit.

Another important rationale for the use of rogue state language is that such ideologically charged rhetoric buttresses President Bush's foreign policy approach. When he classifies regimes under a single category, he emphasizes unacceptable state behaviors such as acquiring WMD and missile technology. Moreover, placing countries such as Iran and Iraq under the same label allows Washington to pursue its aim of containing rogue states as a whole while treating each separately when differences warrant.

Contextualizing the Debate over Classification

Those who argue against using rogue state language claim that it lumps dissimilar countries together, hinders diplomatic flexibility, and irritates U.S. allies. According to Robert Litwak, a leading proponent of this school, grouping disparate countries together obscures understanding and distorts the policymaking process. In his book *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy,* Litwak states that his purpose is not to advance a particular policy but rather to focus on a key premise for policy analysis—the assertion that rogue states constitute a distinct class in the post–Cold War world.[3] Specifically, Litwak asserts that the use of rogue state language is politically selective and constrains U.S. policymakers from adapting to changing conditions. As an alternative approach, he suggests "differentiated containment" tailored to specific situations within individual states. Rogue state language, he argues, implies a containment-engagement dichotomy rather than the more nuanced approach of differentiated containment. As one critic has pointed out, however, Litwak's own case studies on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea persuasively demonstrate that U.S. policies toward rogue regimes do in fact "vary considerably to take account of differing circumstances."[4]

In addition to Litwak, leaders in the move away from provocative language in general and dual containment in particular include two former national security advisors and a former assistant secretary of state.[5] These and others who reject rogue state language make an implicit argument for a "balance of power" approach, which requires flexibility on the part of an administration to shift support from one side to another in light of changing circumstances. Although this approach is in line with the prin-

ciple "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," it can be more diffi-
cult to pursue when the enemy of one's enemy is an enemy as
well.

Consider the case of Iran and Iraq. Because these two states
are adversaries, a balancing approach would seem to be an effec-
tive means of playing each against the other; in order to deter
Tehran, Washington could make use of Baghdad, and vice versa.
Indeed, a sequence of alternating alignments is at the core of the
balance-of-power approach. One of the assumptions underlying this
approach is that the nation attempting to impose balance should
keep its options open regarding the possibility of political relations
with one or both of the sides; rogue state language might inhibit
such flexibility. At times, the balancer may also intervene to prevent
regional actors from dominating or opt for a broader regional bal-
ance, as evidenced by U.S. support for Turkey and Saudi Arabia in
order to offset both Iran and Iraq.

Indeed, Iran's aspirations to become a regional hegemon have
been kept in check by a rough balance of power maintained with
Iraq. Traditionally, Baghdad could count on the support of its
Arab neighbors in any conflict involving Arabs and Persians.[6] Yet,
U.S. policy under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W.
Bush followed the British tradition of preventing the emergence
of any hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf capable of control-
ling the production and pricing policies of the oil-producing
states. Hence, Washington alternated its tacit support of Iran and
Iraq so that neither could dominate the Gulf. Even within this
balance-of-power approach, however, Reagan chose to use ideo-
logically charged language to describe certain countries,
demonstrating that it is possible to pursue such an approach while
employing value-laden terminology such as "rogue regime."

Reagan's successor continued the policy of balancing between
Iran and Iraq. For example, prior to the Gulf War, the Bush ad-
ministration leaned toward Baghdad by allowing the sale of
dual-use equipment to Iraq, removing it from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of international terrorism,[7] providing it with import
subsidies,[8] and encouraging it to play a positive role in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. In slanting U.S. policy toward Iraq, however,
Bush ignored Saddam Husayn's egregious human rights viola-

tions; in the end, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated the general failure of the balancing policy.

This malfunction contributed to the adoption of the "dual-containment" approach by the first Clinton administration,[9] that is, containing Iran and Iraq simultaneously without necessarily making use of their mutual hostility.[10] Even within this approach, however, the Clinton government sought to tailor its policies to each country individually, treating the two regimes as separate threats.[11] The administration's use of provocative rogue state language, which signaled an ideological approach whose rigidity contrasted sharply with the flexibility of the balancing approach, facilitated the shift to dual containment.

A Cold War Perspective

The current Bush administration has expanded Washington's use of rogue state language, largely in order to justify missile defense and to mobilize democratic allies and friendly states in the war on terrorism. This approach is in many ways a return to the ideologically charged language of Ronald Reagan and the Cold War idiom of anticommunism. Instead of the Soviet threat, however, the main danger to the West now emanates from rogue nations seeking to acquire WMD and to sponsor or give safe harbor to international terrorists. Although the Soviet WMD threat to the United States was orders of magnitude greater than that currently posed by rogue states, the latter peril may be the more dangerous; rogue leaders might not be as deterrable as the Soviets were.

In contrast to the policies of President Reagan and the current administration, the doctrines enunciated by Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Jimmy Carter stressed deterrence and prevention. In 1957, for example, Eisenhower enunciated his pledge of military and economic assistance to anticommunist governments. In 1980, Carter presented what became known as the Carter Doctrine, namely, that any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The defensive nature of the Eisenhower and Carter approaches stands in contrast to Reagan's approach and, to a lesser

extent, that of President Harry Truman. In 1947, Truman enunciated what became known as the Truman Doctrine. In order to confront the communist threat in the eastern Mediterranean emanating from both Europe and the Middle East, he called on Congress to provide economic and military aid to Greece (threatened by a communist insurrection) and Turkey (endangered by Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean). The Reagan Doctrine, which emphasized remedy and cure, constituted a more dynamic alternative to the static containment approach of previous presidents, pledging economic and political support for insurgent movements in an effort to roll back Marxism (e.g., providing aid to anticommunist "freedom fighters" in countries such as Afghanistan). According to this doctrine, Moscow had to be convinced that Washington would not break faith with those attempting to counter Soviet aggression.

Like the Reagan Doctrine, the current administration's approach—buttressed as it is by rogue state language—stands for cure as much as deterrence. President Bush's "cure" consists of actively confronting—even preempting—nations and entities that engage in proliferation and sponsor terrorism, as opposed to relying solely on deterrence.

Failed and Penetrated States

In using rogue state language to call for regime change in Baghdad, President Bush has pledged to create a new dynamic in the Middle East. Yet, failed states or those whose regimes have have been penetrated by terrorist or nonstate elements (e.g., Somalia, Afghanistan) seem to stand in the way of such progress. In fact, considerable debate has arisen within the Bush administration regarding how to prioritize such states vis-à-vis rogue states. Many of the former provide safe harbor to international terrorists, while the latter often sponsor or collude with such terrorists.

One approach in this debate focuses on confronting threats from groups operating from within states that have serious difficulties maintaining internal order (e.g., Sudan, Yemen). The same approach would prioritize friendly nations that need assistance in rooting out terrorist cells (e.g., the Philippines, Indonesia). In many ways, such states are easy candidates for U.S. attention in

the war on terror, posing the challenge of reinforcing state power rather than confronting hostile regimes.

Yet, the temptation to focus on these easy candidates obscures the difficulties inherent in attempting to win the war on terror by targeting only small states. One alternative approach—taking on large rogue nations and hostile regimes like Iraq—offers a more cost-effective strategy than targeting the many failed or penetrated states that host terrorist organizations. Regime change in Baghdad—perhaps followed by domino-like regime changes in other rogue capitals—is more likely to "dry up the swamp" and produce a coercive effect than taking action against a host of smaller states.

Rogue States and Democratic Peace

By focusing on regime change in rogue states while deemphasizing the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process," President Bush has also implied that peace within historic Palestine is unlikely to occur until the Gulf's rogue regimes fall. After all, rogue states fan the flames of conflict by supporting organizations that promote suicide attacks against Israel and by supplying arms to the Palestinian Authority (PA), contrary to the principles of the Oslo accords, which spell out the beginnings of peaceful accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians.

Consider the January 3, 2002, Israeli seizure of the *Karine-A*, a ship covertly transporting fifty tons of arms from Iran to the PA. This incident presented the Bush administration with a major potential target in the war on terror: Tehran. As the president argued in his 2002 State of the Union address, "Iran aggressively pursues [WMD] and exports terror." By seeking WMD, regimes such as Iran's "pose a growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."[12]

In addition to sending arms to the PA, Iran has secretly shipped weapons to Lebanese Hizballah via Syria. Moreover, in June 2002, Tehran hosted a terrorism summit attended by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and some 160 officials from Iran and 23 other countries. Such actions by rogue states feed the

violence on the ground—inflaming Palestinian hostility, endangering Israeli security, and impeding progress toward a peace accord.

In general, the Bush approach to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been characterized by a "peace through democracy" strategy. This strategy is supported by the widely acknowledged fact that democracies are less likely to fight other democracies. Just as the current conglomeration of rogue states pose a common threat to U.S. interests, the existence of more democratic states in the Middle East would likely mean more peace in the region.

In the short run, however, democratic reforms—such as regular elections in the PA—are more likely to aid opponents of peace with Israel. And even if democracy gradually moderated Palestinian views, it would not be sufficient to maintain quiet, given the presence of neighbors like the mullahs in Tehran and Saddam Husayn in Baghdad. Although Palestinian violence against Israel would occur even in the absence of rogue neighbors, this violence is clearly magnified by the provision of arms and political support.

Regime change in Iraq would do much to advance the twin goals of a democratic Palestine and a secure Israel. In fact, toppling rogue regimes such as Saddam's may be a necessary condition for achieving those aims, as Israel is more likely to fulfill its security goals alongside a democratic Palestine that is not pressured into violence by rogue regimes and nonstate actors.

Notes

1. See Raymond Tanter, *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation,* rev. ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

2. Specifically, financial sanctions affect areas such as private investment, government trade credits, and economic and military assistance, while trade sanctions restrict exports and imports.

3. Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

4. Philip Zelikow, review of *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War,* by Robert S. Litwak, *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 5 (September–October 2000), p. 139.

5. "[D]ual containment cannot provide a sustainable basis for U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. A more nuanced and differentiated approach to the

region is in order, one in tune with America's longer-term interests."
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (May–June 1997), pp. 20–30.
See also *Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq* (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), by the same authors.

6. Paul Jabber, "Introduction: Western Interests and Gulf Stability," in *Great
    Power Interests in the Persian Gulf,* ed. Paul Jabber et al. (New York: Council
    on Foreign Relations, 1989).

7. Countries placed on this list are subject to the following types of U.S. government sanctions: "1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales; 2. Controls
    over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list
    country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; 3. Prohibitions on economic assistance; and 4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial
    and other restrictions." U.S. Department of State, "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," in *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington, D.C.:
    U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2002); available online
    (www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10249.htm).

8. On January 17, 1990, President George H. W. Bush voided a prohibition
    against providing Baghdad with Export-Import Bank financing. In doing
    so, he paved the way for Iraq to acquire equipment that it could not otherwise afford. Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White
    House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York: Bantam, 1993), p. 157.

9. See Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2
    (March–April 1994), pp. 48–51; Martin Indyk, "Special Report: Clinton
    Administration Policy toward the Middle East," *PolicyWatch* no. 84 (The
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 21, 1993); Anthony
    Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, *Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996).

10. Anthony Lake, the assistant to President Bill Clinton on national security
    affairs, described the logic of dual containment as follows: "The Clinton
    Administration's strategy toward Iran and Iraq began with the assumption that both regimes pursued policies hostile to American interests. The
    Administration rejected the Reagan-Bush policy of building up one to
    counter the other, in favor of a policy of dual containment." Lake, "Confronting Backlash States." See also F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of
    Dual Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March–April 1994), p. 60.

11. Despite this explicit effort to fashion policies that took differences between the two states into account, critics claimed that dual containment
    failed. The most serious charge brought by these critics was that the policy
    pushed Iran and Iraq into a de facto political alignment against the United
    States. Such a rogue state alliance would indeed have been contrary to
    the goals of U.S. policy, which were to isolate Iran and Iraq not only from
    the rest of the world but also from each other. Fortunately, Tehran and
    Baghdad have been kept apart by their mutual enmity as well as by local

forces (e.g., their competition for the allegiance of the Kurds along the borders of both countries).

12. A transcript of the address is available online (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html).

Chapter 3

Rogue Collusion

A key standard for determining whether rogue states consti-
tute a distinct class of threats is the extent to which they co-
operate with each other in ways detrimental to the United States
and its allies. Such cooperation creates a synergistic effect that
does more harm than any one rogue state could on its own. The
higher their level of collusion, the more threatening rogue states
become, and the greater the need to focus on them in "Phase II"
of the post–September 11 war on terror and proliferation.

President George W. Bush's use of the term "axis of evil" in
his 2002 State of the Union address brought to mind the Axis
powers of World War II as well as President Ronald Reagan's de-
scription of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Since that
address, many have criticized President Bush for unjustifiably com-
paring Iran, Iraq, and North Korea to the historical Axis powers.
According to this argument, his analogy breaks down because
the countries that he named have neither the same convergence
of goals nor the same degree of cooperation as the Axis powers
of the mid-twentieth century.

In reality, the World War II Axis regimes had formal pacts
with one another but exhibited little coordination. Even the co-
operation between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini was strained,
more akin to the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Joseph Stalin than to the close and warm ties between Roosevelt
and Winston Churchill. In light of these facts, it is not unreason-
able to compare the modern-day "axis of evil" countries with their
historical equivalents. For example, in the area of arms sales, Iran
has been at least as close to North Korea as Germany was to Ja-
pan during World War II.

The longstanding enmity between Iran and Iraq and the geo-
graphical complications of placing North Korea in the same axis

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with two Middle Eastern states have also led many to discount the notion of grouping together the three states. Indeed, some commentators have likened the president's axis of evil to an unlikely triad of comic book villains. Yet, the regimes of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are, in fact, "evil" because of the manner in which they treat their people. These states constitute an axis by virtue of their shared worldview and aligning interests in terrorism and proliferation—witness their complementary roles in the missile trade and their collective contempt for and abuse of international authorities such as the United Nations (UN). More specifically, North Korea sells Nodong and Scud missiles to Iran, and all three regimes acquire and proliferate Russian and Chinese missile technology. In addition to missile proliferation, the three nations promote the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to unstable rogue states in outlying regions.

Following a historical overview of alignments between "radical regimes" in the Middle East, the sections below examine ongoing collusion between the following pairs: Iran and Iraq; Iran and North Korea; Iraq and Syria; Iran and Syria; Iran and Libya; and Iran and various subnational groups.[1] Highlighting Iran among these dyads runs counter to the tendency of analysts who downplay Tehran's role in proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism, usually under the mistaken assumption that focusing on these activities will harm Washington's prospects for engaging Tehran.

Radical Cooperation in the Middle East

In order to provide perspective on present-day rogue collusion, it is instructive to revisit the 1980s and examine linkages among Middle Eastern countries that at the time constituted a "league of radical states."[2] Specifically, one can compare the perceived historical threat that radical Middle Eastern states have posed to the United States and Israel with the current threat posed by such regimes.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the threat perceptions of Egypt and Israel converged. President Anwar Sadat and General Ariel Sharon (at the time an Israeli cabinet minister) found common ground in their belief that radical regimes in the Middle

East were a threat to both of their nations. In the wake of military confrontations between Egypt and Libya in the Western Desert, Sadat asked President Jimmy Carter to cooperate with him against Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. Sadat wanted to develop a preponderance of power to deter and confront Libyan aggression. Yet, Washington refrained from engaging Cairo in coordinated military planning against Tripoli.

Such hesitance led Sadat to believe that Carter lacked the determination to stand up to Qadhafi. This perception cast a shadow on the credibility of America's commitment to Egypt, particularly as Cairo began to feel threatened by the possibility of a concert of radical Arab states that included Libya. Following Libya's invasion of Chad, Sadat felt that Sudan would be Qadhafi's next target; he further suspected that Soviet assistance might eventually embolden Libya to target Egypt.

Like Sadat, Sharon was concerned about the radical threat posed by Libya, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. As early as 1981, he believed that such regimes had developed a political-military strategy for the liquidation of Israel, a strategy that involved working in concert; taking advantage of the diplomatic cover provided by Soviet political support; conducting a military buildup via Soviet arms transfers; and using oil as a lever via rich, moderate Persian Gulf states. Moreover, Sharon viewed the Palestine Liberation Organization as one of several elements in a Soviet strategy to foster subversion against moderate Arab regimes (e.g., Egypt) while bolstering fanatical regimes (e.g., Libya).[3] According to Sharon, Soviet goals included the following:

- obtaining sea-control capability in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea;
- penetrating key countries in the Middle East and the Gulf via Afghanistan, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria;
- outflanking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from the east (via Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) and south (by aligning with Libya, Syria, and Algeria); and
- gaining control over critical African states via Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and the Congo-Brazzaville.

Sharon defined these areas of Soviet interest as "the strategic hinterland of Israel."[4]

Indeed, by the early 1980s, Iran, Syria, and Libya constituted an informal league of radical states. Tehran had upgraded its links to Damascus and Tripoli in order to acquire additional military supplies during the Iran-Iraq War, and many moderate Arab regimes felt that these radicals were set on destabilizing the region. In general, Iranian radicals were pursuing a regional strategy with three phases: create an Islamic revolution, starting in Tehran; subvert Arab regimes, beginning with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states; and spread the Islamic revolution to Turkey, Pakistan, and the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent and the Nile Valley.

Iran and Iraq

Past hostilities and ongoing tension between Iran and Iraq have not precluded the two regimes from limited cooperation in their roles as rogue states. For example, joint oil smuggling efforts with Iran have earned Saddam Husayn and his elder son, Uday, millions of dollars each year. Small tankers and barges ship oil from the Basra refinery in Iraq down the Shatt al-Arab waterway to ports in Iran, where it sells for hard currency. By staying near Iran's coastline, within Iranian territorial waters, such shipments avoid U.S. naval patrols in the Persian Gulf searching for smugglers, sanctions-busters, and terrorists fleeing Afghanistan and other areas targeted in the U.S.-led war on terror.

According to many Iraqi merchants, Iran's Revolutionary Guards are responsible for patrolling Iran's Gulf shoreline, seizing ships loaded with smuggled Iraqi oil when ties between the two nations are strained and ignoring these ships as ties improve. In exchange for Tehran's willingness to overlook the smuggling of Iraqi oil in Iranian waters, Baghdad at one point offered to increase the volume of trade with Iran (for example, by importing greater quantities of Iranian goods). Baghdad also pledged to pay more than the five-dollar fee that Tehran typically charged for each ton of Iraqi oil allowed safe passage through Iranian territorial waters.[5]

Such cooperation between Iran and Iraq may be partly attributed to Russia. For example, in 2000, Tehran reportedly

pledged that Russian planes bound for Baghdad would be authorized to use Iranian airspace. Further evidence of Moscow's intermediary role can be found in reports by Iraqi opposition groups suggesting that Baghdad smuggles Russian radar and missile equipment into Iraq via Iran.[6]

The prospect of betraying opposition groups might provide additional incentive for Iranian-Iraqi cooperation. Traditionally, Baghdad has supported the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq, allowing it to base its tanks, heavy guns, and helicopter gunships on Iraqi soil and to launch frequent attacks against Iran. Correspondingly, Tehran has hosted the Badr Brigades, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and other armed Iraqi Shi'i opposition groups, allowing them to conduct cross-border raids into southern Iraq since the failed 1991 U.S.-inspired uprising there. Although Tehran and Baghdad could agree to betray these insurgents, a mutual deal of that sort is unlikely any time soon, as both states are still quite suspicious of each other.[7] During April 2001, for example, Iraq accused Iran of firing fifty-six Scud missiles at Mujahedin-e Khalq camps inside Iraq.[8]

As the drums of war were sounding in the Gulf at the close of 2002, Baghdad launched a charm offensive in an effort to delay or avert U.S. military intervention. In addition to wooing several Arab Gulf states and Turkey, Iraq sought to strengthen its relations with Iran. At the same time, however, Tehran seemed to be curtailing its limited cooperation with Baghdad. Specifically, Iran closed its waterways to vessels attempting to smuggle oil from Iraq, an act that tightened the embargo on Iraqi trade not specifically authorized by the UN.[9] Indeed, the United States may already have indicated its tacit acceptance of Iran's role as a temporary balance against Iraq; in 2001, Washington granted a special waiver to the opposition Iraqi National Congress allowing the group to use U.S. funding for its office in Tehran despite U.S. sanctions against the Iranian regime.

Iran and North Korea

Arms-for-cash links between Iran and North Korea benefit both countries at the expense of the United States and its allies. North Korea is a primary proliferator of missile technology, extending its reach globally, and Iran's missile programs rely heavily on North

Korean systems.[10] By selling missiles to Iran, the regime in Pyongyang lowers the cost of its own missile production efforts and obtains cash to ward off imminent bankruptcy. Given the millions of dollars worth of bartered goods, services, and hard currency that Pyongyang receives in exchange for its missile deliveries, the regime continues to market such technology in order to support the insolvent North Korean economy.[11]

For its part, Iran obtains technology with which to bring all of the Middle East and much of Western Europe into its missile envelope. According to the Pentagon, North Korea has provided hundreds of Scud missiles to Iran, an assessment confirmed by the Congressional Research Service: "The core of Iran's current missile force consists of 200–300 North Korean–supplied Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, with ranges of 320 km and 500 km respectively."[12] Similarly, in April 2001, a state-run research center in South Korea noted that Pyongyang had exported at least 540 missiles to Iran and other Middle Eastern nations since 1985.[13] North Korea is also marketing a new Nodong missile with a 1,000-kilometer range.

In addition to direct arms purchases from North Korea, Tehran may attempt to mimic some of Pyongyang's behavior regarding its ballistic-missile and nuclear programs. As Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet noted in 2001:

> Iran has one of the largest and most capable ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Its public statements suggest that it plans to develop longer-range rockets for use in a space-launch program, but Tehran could follow the North Korean pattern and test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States in the next few years.[14]

In 1994, the Clinton administration negotiated a framework accord with North Korea promising to supply heavy-fuel oil for its power plants while Japan and South Korea built two light-water reactors for the regime. In exchange, Pyongyang agreed to suspend its nuclear weapons program. Although intended as a contribution to nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula, the accord may have had the opposite effect by encouraging "other rogue states to initiate nuclear weapons programs to generate a comparable buyout."[15] Indeed, Iran might eventually demand

similar terms from the United States for ending its own Russian-supported nuclear program.

Iraq and Syria

Given the possibility that Syria could play a key role in Arab-Israeli peace talks, Damascus has tended to escape the rogue label. Although Damascus is not as "roguish" as Baghdad, Syria has nevertheless given Washington ample reason to regard it as a threatening regime. Syria possesses large-scale conventional military forces, harbors terrorists in Damascus, supports Hizballah in Lebanon, procures WMD and missile technology, and colludes with Iran and Iraq.

Though longstanding adversaries, Iraq and Syria accelerated their budding reconciliation in May 2001 when Syrian prime minister Mohammad Mustapha Miro visited Baghdad, echoing Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan's January 2000 visit to Damascus. Such reciprocal visits are a clear sign of détente between the two countries: Miro is only the second high-ranking Arab official to visit Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War.[16]

Ha'aretz defense editor Ze'ev Schiff has noted that Damascus may have violated the UN arms embargo against Iraq by transporting weapons and military equipment delivered to Syrian ports into Iraq via trucks and rail routes.[17] Because both countries have Soviet arms in common, Syria can overtly import replacement parts, ostensibly for its own use, then covertly send some of them to Iraq, with Baghdad footing the bill for the entire package. Such a relationship could reenergize the Iraqi and Syrian militaries, both of which have been in a state of severe decline. Iraq may have provided similar assistance to Damascus by permitting an Iranian arms shipment bound for Syria to pass through Iraq.[18] In fact, Baghdad and Damascus have both established a series of shell companies for weapons purchases.

The most likely motivation for the significant increase in Iraqi-Syrian arms cooperation is the U.S. commitment to overthrow the regime in Baghdad. Damascus, however, has another important incentive for such activity: Syria desperately needs Iraqi cash in order to offset its own severe economic crisis and to pay for

military supplies from Russia and North Korea. For example, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

> During the second half of 2001, Damascus continued to receive help from abroad on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant missile program has [depended] and will continue to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance—primarily from North Korean entities and Russian firms. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles.[19]

Military coordination between Baghdad and Damascus is also gradually increasing. Given the strong political antipathy between the governing Iraqi and Syrian wings of the Ba'ath Party, this trend may initially seem puzzling. One possible explanation is the halt to negotiations between Israel and Syria, which has created an opening for Baghdad to woo Damascus with a pledge of military support in the event of war with Israel. In January 2001, Saddam Husayn's youngest son, Qusay, visited Syria in order to discuss such support. As a result, cooperation between the Iraqi and Syrian armies has apparently reached a level not witnessed since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Baghdad sent Iraqi expeditionary divisions to assist Damascus. Qusay and his Syrian interlocutors reportedly "agreed to set up a joint command and control center, with two Iraqi armored divisions—the Republican Guards and the 10th Armored Division—primed to cross into Syria should the Israelis attack across the Golan Heights."[20]

In addition to growing military cooperation, Iraq and Syria have expanded their bilateral economic ties. To the degree that economic links foreshadow improved diplomatic relations, it is particularly noteworthy that the two countries signed an agreement on January 31, 2001, to establish a free trade zone.[21] Iraq's goal is to break out from under the UN sanctions regime. Toward this end, Baghdad signed a trade accord with Egypt as well, in addition to pursuing such agreements with several other countries. For its part, Syria is now allowing its citizens to make business trips to Iraq, provided such travel is not prevented on the Iraqi

side of the border. Damascus has also allowed Baghdad to open a trade center and airline office in Syria and to reintroduce train service for passengers and freight between Mosul, Iraq, and Aleppo, Syria. Moreover, Syrian seaports are now permitted to receive Iraqi imports of foreign goods, which are then forwarded to Iraq via trucks.[22]

Perhaps the most important economic link between Iraq and Syria, however, is the 1,300-kilometer pipeline that transports oil from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the Syrian port of Banyas. Although the pipeline had been inoperative for twenty years due to the Iran-Iraq War, it was reactivated in late 2000—a major strategic move on Syria's part. At the time, both Baghdad and Damascus asserted that Syria was simply testing the pipeline. In December 2000 alone, however, Syria exported 32,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d), its highest export rate in years.[23] In subsequent months, 120,000 b/d flowed through the pipeline—far more than would be necessary for testing, according to industry analysts.

International sanctions prohibit Iraq from exporting any of its oil except under UN auspices, which mandate that money from oil sales be used solely for purchase of items such as food, medicine, and other humanitarian essentials for the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, in 2001, oil tankers made regular calls at Banyas to load large quantities of crude from the newly reopened pipeline. Given the fact that "Syria's oil industry is at best stagnant,"[24] one could safely conclude that this spike in exports was due to Iraqi, not Syrian, oil.

Indeed, Baghdad and Damascus have managed to bypass the UN restrictions on Iraqi oil sales through their unmonitored pipeline. As one analyst noted in January 2001,

> If fully repaired, the pipeline might handle 800,000 b/d, though Syria may limit the volume to the 200,000 b/d its refineries can use—thereby permitting Syria to export 200,000 b/d more of its own oil, while still claiming (correctly) that it is not exporting Iraqi oil. Even 200,000 b/d is worth $1.8 billion a year (at $25/barrel)—money Syria and Iraq could split, allowing each to buy more arms.[25]

According to another analyst, by February 2001, Syria was "reportedly paying $12 a barrel to Iraq, less than half the price in Europe. The remainder, estimated at about $15 per barrel, remains in Damascus. On a yearly basis, this would yield around $1.5 [billion] for Iraq and about $2 [billion] for Syria."[26]

After February 2001, exports from the pipeline—and the revenue they brought directly to Saddam above the authorized UN levels—indeed reportedly increased from some 120,000 b/d to about 200,000 b/d, even in the wake of Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 26 visit to Damascus.[27] Following this visit, Powell stated that Syrian president Bashar al-Asad had pledged to cooperate with a new U.S. approach of "smart sanctions" against Iraq—sanctions that would target the regime yet minimize pain to the civilian population. Despite this promise, Iraq soon thereafter contracted to sell $1 billion worth of oil to Syria at $19 per barrel—about $9 per barrel below world prices. By September 2002, some analysts estimated that the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline was earning "each country around $1.1 billion per year."[28] At one point, Damascus had considered building "another oil pipeline destined to expand the illegal shipment of Iraqi crude," but the regime eventually shelved these plans.[29]

Overall, then, Iraq and Syria have several strategic grounds for collusion. Iraq needs an outlet to smuggle oil outside of the confines of the UN oil-for-food program. Syria has fulfilled this need, providing a cover for unmonitored oil exports, uncontrolled imports, and illicit Iraqi arms shipments.[30]

Iran and Syria

Unlike the roller coaster–style relationship between Iraq and Syria, relations between Iran and Syria have been consistently good over the last several decades. Generally, there is no love lost between Persians and Arabs. Yet, Iran and Syria have forged strategic ties, in part because of their mutual antipathy toward Iraq.[31] Their mutual support for Palestinian terrorist groups has also contributed to a harmonization of Iranian and Syrian views (though each regime offers such support according to its own strategic considerations).

During the 1980s, when Iran was on the losing end of the Iran-Iraq War, Damascus extended its support to Tehran at great

political risk from the Arab street. Iran reciprocated, asking Damascus to repay only $500 million of a $1 billion line of credit established to finance Iranian oil sales to Syria during this period.[32]

Since the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran and Damascus have colluded to serve one another's economic, military, and diplomatic interests. Joint ventures between the two countries include counterfeiting, terrorism, trade in missile technology, and railway construction.

With regard to counterfeiting, a July 1992 report by the U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare exposed a scheme by Tehran and Damascus to forge and launder U.S. currency. According to Representative Bill McCollum, the purpose of the plot formed by the two regimes was to "alleviate their financial difficulties and pursue economic warfare against the West."[33]

In the realm of international terrorism, Iran and Syria have facilitated Hizballah's violent activities by permitting regular arms transfers between Tehran and Damascus. Specifically, a Boeing 747 makes biweekly flights between the two capitals, often loaded with armaments bound for Hizballah. Using these weapons, the group conducts military operations from southern Lebanon against northern Israel and against the small Israeli military deployment in the Shebaa Farms area (a disputed region recognized by the UN as Syrian territory). Such flights epitomize more than twenty years of collusion along the route from Tehran to Damascus and back. Additionally, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—the two most prominent Palestinian terrorist groups, responsible for numerous suicide bombings in Israel—openly operate political offices in Damascus, where they consort with Iranian officials.

Iran and Syria are also partners in their respective quests for ballistic missile capability. The U.S. Department of Defense has found that Syria produced many of its Scud-B and Scud-C missiles with the help of Iran and North Korea. In addition to acquiring arms from both each other and Pyongyang, Tehran and Damascus have each purchased missile technology from China and Russia.[34]

Such mutual participation in the missile trade is not only opportunistic but also indicates a convergence of Iranian and

Syrian strategic worldviews. Tehran and Damascus have long shared similar goals—to counterbalance Israel and buttress the Middle East against American influence while keeping their mutual adversary, Iraq, at arms length. For example, in December 2000, Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani issued a warning that, in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria, Iran would retaliate in an "astounding and unexpected" way, which implies a nonconventional response.[35] This statement becomes even more significant when coupled with a specific threat issued a year later by a so-called moderate Iranian—former president and current Expediency Council chairman Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a Jerusalem Day sermon on December 14, 2001, Rafsanjani spoke of the possibility that the world of Islam could one day acquire the weapons currently in Israel's possession (i.e., nuclear weapons); he went on to assert that the use of a nuclear bomb against Israel would completely annihilate the country, whereas such weapons would only damage the world of Islam.[36]

Iran and Libya

Although Iran wavers between conflict and cooperation with neighbors such as Iraq, Tehran and Tripoli consistently collude in the missile trade. For example, according to U.S. intelligence, Iranian missile technicians began installing equipment in Libya in late 2000 in order to facilitate Tripoli's production of advanced Scud missiles. The technicians were "provided by the Shahid Hemmet Industrial Group, a major component of Iran's government-run ballistic missile program."[37]

Such cooperation is particularly troubling in light of the fact that Iran regularly acquires missile technology from North Korea. Indeed, the CIA has expressed concern about the great potential for "secondary proliferation" from countries with maturing ballistic missile programs (e.g., Iran) to countries that import most of their missile technology (e.g., Libya).[38] Moreover, a January 2001 Pentagon report on arms proliferation stated that Libya is upgrading its missile force, obtaining parts from Serbia and India and seeking to acquire or build North Korea's 625-mile-range Nodong-1 missile. The report concluded, "Should Libya succeed with its effort to purchase or perhaps develop such a mis-

sile, the missile could threaten Egypt, Israel, NATO countries in southern Europe and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean region."[39]

During much of the 1990s, UN sanctions on Libya—imposed in response to the regime's suspected involvement in the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland—constrained Tripoli's ability to obtain the technologies it needed for a liquid-fueled rocket program and production of solid-propellant tactical rockets and missiles. In April 1999, however, as Libya began to cooperate in the trial of the bombing suspects, the UN suspended its sanctions.[40]

Some consider the "Lockerbie model" an example of successful multilateral sanctions combined with an effective use of the criminal justice system. As one analyst stated, "This model was successful because it limited Libya's access to the international petroleum markets—indispensable to its economic vitality and political stability—and allowed the United States to coordinate its efforts with the European position."[41] Once the UN sanctions were lifted, Libya experienced unprecedented economic growth and political stability, especially in contrast to the economic difficulties and unrest of the 1990s. According to an analyst writing in March 2001, "Oil income is now slightly higher and foreign investment is flowing in, and the gross domestic product was up 6.5 percent in 2000."[42] The lifting of sanctions, however, also provided a shot in the arm to the Libyan missile program as Tripoli succeeded in purchasing materials for its missile and rocket programs from other rogue states.

Despite Libya's record as a proliferator, former assistant secretary of state Robert Pelletreau has advocated a new direction for U.S. policy toward the country once Tripoli fully resolves its dispute with the families of those killed in the Lockerbie bombing. Such a policy would be based more on engagement with Libya and less on sanctions, "smart" or otherwise.[43] Yet, fewer sanctions on Libya would mean additional wealth, which might allow Tripoli to accelerate its acquisitions in the covert missile market. In other words, when considering whether to maintain or suspend sanctions against a rogue state, the international community should assume that the regime in question would use excess funds for proliferation. In the case of Libya, prosecuting

low-level intelligence officials for the Lockerbie bombing hardly justifies the removal of multilateral sanctions—a move that would enhance Tripoli's discretionary buying power and its ability to collude with missile-technology suppliers such as Iran and North Korea.

Iran and Subnational Groups

Given the Bush administration's emphasis on terrorist organizations and the regimes that sponsor them, it is important to examine subnational actors alongside rogue states. Such groups act as contractors when state sponsors desire plausible deniability for their terrorist operations. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Tehran has colluded with subnational groups in various ways, from harboring al-Qaeda fugitives[44] to sponsoring terrorist operations against Israel, against Jews in other countries, and even against Iranian citizens abroad. Iran has provided particularly extensive support to groups such as Hizballah in southern Lebanon and Hamas and PIJ in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, during the mid-1990s, Israeli intelligence officials estimated that Iran provided 10–20 percent of the roughly $70 million in donations that Hamas received annually from its supporters around the world.[45]

Indeed, hatred of Israel is a critical component of both the Iranian regime's foreign policy and its domestic legitimacy. For example, Tehran deployed a force of Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon shortly after the 1979 revolution, and portions of this force have remained there, training "Islamic warriors" near Baalbek.[46] Similarly, after Palestinian violence erupted in September 2000, Tehran assigned Hizballah's international operations commander to assist Hamas and PIJ.[47]

Such collusion has not gone unnoticed by others in the region. During a January 1, 2002, meeting with President Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly accused Iran of sponsoring seventeen attempts to launch rockets and mortars at Israel from Jordanian soil; his evidence came from "[d]etained Hizballah, Hamas, and PIJ terrorists [who] had admitted to having been trained, armed, and financed by Iranian instructors at Hizballah camps in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley."[48] A similar trend was seen in

the March 27, 2002, "Passover massacre" suicide bombing in Netanya, for which Hamas relied on the guidance of a Hizballah expert to build extra-potent explosives.[49]

Another example of Tehran's collusion with subnational entities is the previously mentioned *Karine-A* affair, in which Iran covertly attempted to ship fifty tons of arms to the Palestinian Authority. At first, the Department of State was hesitant to label the incident "collusion." Eventually, though, Washington came around to this interpretation due to overwhelming evidence.[50] Given these and other activities, it is easy to see why Iran could be regarded as providing an archetypal model of rogue collusion.

Notes

1. As outlined in the previous paragraph, Washington has ample cause to include North Korea in an "axis of evil" alongside Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless, there is not enough documentation of specific transactions between Baghdad and Pyongyang to merit a separate subsection illustrating Iraqi–North Korean collusion, aside from unconfirmed reports of missile and technology exchanges (see, for example, William Safire, "Saddam's Sudan?" *New York Times,* March 23, 2000; available online at www.nytimes.com/library/opinion/safire/032300safi.html) and speculation that the Scud missiles found in a Yemen-bound North Korean vessel in December 2002 were actually intended for Iraq. My thanks to Katherine Weitz, research assistant at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, for her help in clarifying this issue.

2. The following overview of the threat posed by radical Middle Eastern regimes during the 1980s draws on Raymond Tanter, "Libya: Contain or Embrace," chap. 4 in *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation,* rev. ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

3. Ariel Sharon, speech prepared for a conference at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, December 14, 1981 (transcript distributed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service on December 18, 1981) (hereinafter Sharon Tel Aviv speech). See also Raymond Tanter, *Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), pp. 56–58.

4. Sharon Tel Aviv speech.

5. "Iraq Reportedly Offers Iran War Records in Bid to Improve Ties," *al-Hayat* (London), October 7, 2000.

6. "Iran Does Deal with Old Enemy Iraq to Help Baghdad Evade Air Embargo," Agence France Presse, October 3, 2000.

7. "Are Iraq and Iran on Course to 'Barter' Rebels?" *Mideast Mirror* (London), December 22, 2000; Frank Gardner, "Thaw in Iran-Iraq Relations Continues," British Broadcasting Company World Service, October 1, 2000.

8. "Iraq: Iran Blamed for Missile Attack," Reuters, April 19, 2001.

9. Michael R. Gordon and Neil Macfarquhar, "Iraq's Neighbors Seem to Be Ready to Support a War," *New York Times,* December 2, 2002.

10. Michael R. Gordon, "How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea," *New York Times,* March 6, 2001.

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," report, January 2001, pp. 9, 13 (updated). Available online (www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf).

12. Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 2001), p. 21 (updated). Available online (www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL30551.pdf).

13. "EU Says North Korea Won't Stop Arms Exports," Associated Press, May 4, 2001.

14. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2001 (hereinafter Tenet statement). Available online (www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html).

15. Henry Kissinger, "A Road through Seoul," *Washington Post,* March 6, 2001.

16. The other is Jordanian prime minister Ali Abu Ragheb, who visited during November 2000.

17. Specifically, "The Syrian weapons purchases for transfer to Iraq include refurbished T-55 tank engines and other replacement parts for T-72s, from Bulgaria and Belarus; military trucks from Russia; antiaircraft cannon from the Czech Republic. Ukraine and other countries have sold 80 engines for MiG 29s, as well as radar systems for those planes. In addition, spare parts have been bought by Syria and sent on to Iraq for MiG 21s, 23s and 25s. Syria has also passed on equipment from Hungary and Serbia to Iraq." Ze'ev Schiff, "Syria Buys Arms for Iraq in Eastern Europe," *Ha'aretz,* July 15, 2002.

18. Ibid.

19. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2001.* Available online (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm).

20. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Iraq Plots Anti-Israel Alliance," *Sunday Times* (London), January 28, 2001.

21. Syrian newspapers estimate current annual trade between Iraq and Syria at $500 million, and the two nations hope that this figure will soon reach $1 billion. Razzuq al-Ghawi, "Damascus Lifts All Restrictions on Syrian Citizens' Travel to Iraq," *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), January 5, 2001. See also "Syria, Iraq Sign Agreement for Free Trade Zone," Agence France Presse, January 31, 2001. Similarly, Iraqi trade minister Mohammad Mahdi Saleh stated that the volume of trade between Iraq and Syria reached about

$700 million in 2001 and could increase to $1 billion by the end of 2002. "Syria, Iraq: Trade to Exceed One Billion Dollars in 2001," *Monday Morning* (Beirut), July 10, 2001, cited in Matthew Levitt, *Targeting Terror: U.S. Policy toward Middle Eastern State Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post–September 11* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 54.

22. al-Ghawi, "Damascus Lifts All Restrictions."

23. Patrick Clawson, "Can Iraq Reconstitute the Arab Eastern Front against Israel?" *PolicyWatch* no. 509 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2001).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. David Rudge, "Iraq-Syria Pipeline Said Reactivated in Violation of Sanctions," *Jerusalem Post*, February 27, 2001.

27. Jim Hoagland, "While Bush Debates, Saddam Threatens," *Washington Post*, May 3, 2001. See also Alan Sipress and Colum Lynch, "U.S. Avoids Confronting Syrians on Iraqi Oil," *Washington Post*, February 14, 2002.

28. Levitt, *Targeting Terror*, p. 54.

29. *Middle East Policy Survey*, November 26, 2001.

30. Patrick Clawson, "Powell to the Middle East: Assessing the Key Elements of Iraq Policy," *PolicyWatch* no. 518 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 20, 2001).

31. See Bruce Jentleson, "Introduction: 'The Enemy of My Enemy . . .'" in *With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), pp. 15–30.

32. "Iran Says Syria Repays $500m in Debt," Reuters, November 13, 2000. Available online (http://arabia.com/article/0,1690,Business%7C33302,00.html).

33. M. C. Jaspersen, "Iran, Syria Accused of Counterfeiting U.S. Dollars," United States Information Agency, July 1, 1992. Available online (www.fas.org/news/iran/1992/920701-233652.htm).

34. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response.*

35. "Iran Threatens 'Astounding' Retaliation If Israel Attacks Syria or Lebanon," Associated Press, December 30, 2000.

36. Middle East Media Research Institute, "Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a Nuclear Bomb against Israel," Special Dispatch Series 325 (January 3, 2002). Available online (www.memri.de/uebersetzungen_analysen/laender/iran/iran_nuclear_03_01_02.html).

37. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Iran Helps Libya," *Washington Times*, February 2, 2001.

38. Tenet statement.

39. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, p. 47. In 2000, Tripoli did in fact purchase approximately fifty North Korean

Nodong-1 missiles for $7 million apiece. "EU Says North Korea Won't Stop Arms Exports," Associated Press, May 4, 2001.

40. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response,* p. 45.

41. Ray Takeyh, "Special Policy Forum Report—Libya after Lockerbie: Internal Dynamics and U.S. Policy," *PolicyWatch* no. 526 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 16, 2001).

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran provided safe haven to dozens of al-Qaeda personnel, including two senior members who headed the group's military committee. Levitt, *Targeting Terror,* pp. 62–63. Tehran also supports Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda–affiliated group, by allowing it to operate back and forth between Iran and Iraq. Baghdad, for its part, is suspected of providing support to Ansar as well; one analyst has even called the group "northern Iraq's al-Qaeda." Jonathan Schanzer, "Ansar al-Islam: Iraq's al-Qaeda Connection," *PolicyWatch* no. 699 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2003). Such allegations, if proven, could lend credence to the Bush administration's efforts to link Saddam Husayn and Osama bin Laden.

45. James Phillips, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Iran," *Heritage Foundation Committee Brief* no. 24 (March 29, 1996).

46. Elaine Sciolino, "Middle East Maneuvering: Palestinians Fight, But Iraq and Iran May Be the Winners," *New York Times,* November 5, 2000.

47. Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the Terror Web: Al-Qaeda Is Not the Only Element," *PolicyWatch* no. 671 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2002).

48. Levitt, *Targeting Terror,* p. 64.

49. Levitt, "Untangling the Terror Web."

50. Levitt, *Targeting Terror,* pp. 23, 25.

Conclusion

Collectively, rogue states present several distinct challenges to U.S. policymakers, each requiring a clear response from Washington. In particular, the Bush administration must confront the problem of proliferation, widen the scope of its war on terror, and be consistent in its use of rogue state language.

First, given the collusion between rogue regimes in the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the administration should seek to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) so that it can be applied more effectively to rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.[1] Specifically, the administration should initiate another round of MTCR talks to address missile proliferation as it relates to the nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry that various rogue regimes either already possess or are looking to acquire.

The administration should also work to close loopholes in the 1963 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that allow rogue states to develop nuclear arms under the guise of importing nuclear technology for peaceful uses. For example, several such states have been able to engage in "legal" nuclear proliferation simply by disclosing facilities used in their peaceful nuclear programs and allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect those facilities. By working together, rogue regimes might exploit such loopholes more effectively than any one of them could in isolation.

Second, in light of the links between various international terrorist groups on the one hand, and between these groups and state sponsors such as Iran on the other, the administration should intensify its strategic approach to the war on terror. As a terrorist organization with global reach, al-Qaeda should remain a key target, but it should not become the sole focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Because of the growth of regional ter-

rorist organizations that coordinate with al-Qaeda without necessarily being subservient to its leadership, the campaign against terrorism must remain inclusive. In this regard, the president demonstrated appropriate concern about the Iranian-Arab terror coalition in his 2002 State of the Union address, which highlighted the collusion between rogue regimes and terrorists.

Finally, given the great advantages and minimal disadvantages of employing ideologically charged language, the Bush administration should continue its use of terminology such as "rogue regime." In the aforementioned State of the Union address, the president grouped Iran, Iraq, and North Korea within an "axis of evil" and clearly reiterated his classification of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah as terrorist organizations. Other members of the Bush administration should utilize rogue state language in their efforts to mobilize democratic publics against the dangers posed by rogue regimes and the deadly terrorist groups and nonstate elements with which they collude.

Note

1. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States established the MTCR on April 16, 1987. On May 24, 1996, the United States imposed missile sanctions on various Iranian and North Korean entities for trading proscribed items. In June of that year, Washington initiated a meeting in Paris to discuss actions that MTCR members might take, individually and collectively, to address specific concerns regarding missile proliferation in the Middle East, particularly with respect to Iran and Iraq.

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