PARTNER OR PARIAH?

ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL
IN SYRIA, LEBANON, AND JORDAN

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PREFACE

Over the past three years, the Middle East has witnessed the signing of three agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (the Declaration of Principles, the Cairo implementation accord, and the second-stage interim agreeement) and two agreements between Israel and Jordan (the Washington Declaration and subsequent treaty of peace). Together with the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and progress on the multilateral tracks, these diplomatic achievements undergird the hopeful architecture of Arab-Israeli peace.

Real peace, however, resonates between people, not just governments. It encompasses normal human relations like trade and tourism and is founded on a fundamental recognition of the basic rights and inherent legitimacy of all parties. Though diplomatic agreements are a necessary component of peace among formerly warring parties, they are not by themselves sufficient to ensure against a descent to war once again.

In this pathbreaking Policy Paper, Professor Hilal Khashan presents sobering data on public opinion in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan on the idea of making peace with Israel. His research highlights the wide gap between "rulers" and "ruled" in the Arab world and underscores the lingering animosity that characterizes a significant segment of Arab public opinion toward Israel.

For true peace to take hold, Prof. Khashan argues, it is essential that Arab leaders begin the process of re-education that is long-overdue in the Arab world—in schools, universities, and the media—so that future generations will not inherit current prejudices. Only then will economic cooperation have a chance to take root.

The Washington Institute is pleased to present the research of Prof. Khashan, a courageous scholar at the American University of Beirut, to provide much-needed context for the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process and to underscore the need for long-term efforts to ensure that the seeds of diplomatic achievements find fertile ground among the people of the Middle East.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Though a series of cataclysmic events over the last ten years—including the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War—compelled most Arab leaders to accept the reality of Israel's existence and the need to negotiate peace with it, they have until recently done very little to build popular support for peace or to prepare their citizens for its implications. As a result, there is a wide gap between official and popular views of the peace process and, in terms of political values and aspirations, a virtual divorce between the two.

With little influence over the policies adopted by their governments, most ordinary Arabs have grudgingly accepted the decision to negotiate peace agreements with Israel as a *fait accompli* that reflects the balance of power in the Middle East. A comparison of data from opinion polls conducted in 1993 and 1995 among selected segments of the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, and expatriate Palestinian populations indicates that the percentage of Levantine Arabs who support the peace process has increased significantly since 1993. Further analysis indicates that support for peace is particularly concentrated among Jordanian and Palestinian professionals living in Amman and Maronite Christians in Lebanon.

This change may be partially explained by Arab governments' efforts in recent years to inundate their citizens with references to peace with Israel. Yet, even as they acquiesce to reconciliation at the official level, many ordinary Arabs remain suspicious of Israel's motives and long-term intentions. They believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict has not ended but merely been transformed, and thus recent peace treaties are a temporary truce rather than an end to hostilities that have yet to run their course.

Moreover, most of the Arabs surveyed defiantly refuse to consider themselves personally bound by agreements they feel were made under duress. To the contrary, they consider themselves a bulwark against what they perceive as Israeli political, economic, and cultural hegemony. They oppose normalization with Israel and are not prepared to accept even modest forms of personal interaction with Israelis, such as encountering Israeli tourists in their country, vacationing or sending their children to study in Israel, or studying Hebrew or Jewish history.

This divergence between official and popular views has been exacerbated by an intense campaign being waged by Arab intellectual leaders—scholars, professionals, religious activists, and journalists—to influence the general public's view of Israel and the peace process. Arab politicians and media retain pejorative images of Israelis and attribute sinister motives to them. Arabs continually hear from their leaders and media that Israel threatens not only specific Arab countries but the Arab nation and Islam as a whole.

Consequently, Arab perceptions of Israel's long-term intentions in 1995 remained largely unchanged since the 1993 poll. Traditional clichés about Israeli military domination have been supplanted by concerns about economic hegemony. Statements and editorials in the Arab press often reveal a kind of economic "inferiority complex" *vis-à-vis* Israel, based on the view that the Arab states cannot match Israel's industrial and technological capabilities. In addition, poll respondents are not optimistic that Israel will provide its Arab neighbors with technology for their development or cooperate economically with them in good faith.

More than half of the 1995 poll respondents who oppose the peace process advocate terrorist attacks such as bus bombings as an alternative to negotiations. Among those promoting such violent tactics are the vast majority of highly religious Muslims. By contrast, most of the less religious respondents called for self-restraint—albeit as a temporary measure until Israel's military superiority diminishes and it can be defeated.

There is a noticeable increase in self-declared religiosity levels for Muslim respondents since 1993. More importantly, there appears to be a direct relationship between the intensity of respondents' religious beliefs and their opposition to peace with (and general bellicosity toward) Israel. Highly religious Muslims—both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist—are the primary opponents of the peace process among the surveyed segments of Levantine Arab societies. The result is a polarization of Arab opinion into two camps based on degree of religious fervor—one tending toward "rejectionism" and the other toward "moderation."

Whereas a plurality of fundamentalist Muslims says it would participate in armed attacks on Israel, only a minuscule percentage of highly religious but non-fundamentalist Muslims who say they would engage in such operations. Most say they would simply ignore Israel and boycott its products. These responses suggest that extremism and violence are not inherent in Islam, but rather result from combining it with certain political beliefs. However, though the two groups differ on their willingness to *personally* participate in attacks on Israelis, they are both largely supportive of terrorist attacks on Israelis by others.

Despite the Arab world's increased exposure to Israeli politicians, military officers, academics, and celebrities via television news programs, familiarity does not seem to reduce hostility toward Israel among either fundamentalist or non-fundamentalist Muslims. In general, the data suggest that intense Islamic religiosity is not an absolute barrier to Arab-Israeli peace, but that fundamentalism—with its direct political goals—almost certainly is. To ensure their own survival, Arab ruling elites must weaken the appeal of fundamentalist groups by broadening participation in national politics to accommodate as many social forces as possible and introducing liberalization and accountability. At the same time, they must begin a process of re-education that deemphasizes dogma, exposes students to differing opinions, acknowledges and accepts religious diversity, and promotes tolerance.

INTRODUCTION

The Arab-Israeli conflict is generally considered a political and military confrontation between Israel and neighboring Arab countries. Negotiations and agreements between the two sides therefore tend to concentrate on official matters such as diplomatic recognition, security measures, and other formal aspects of interstate relations.

In contrast, ordinary citizens—particularly on the Arab side—are usually treated as passive subjects and their acquiescence to the process and outcome of peace negotiations is taken for granted.[1] This trend is particularly puzzling when one considers the oft-stated views of both Israeli and Arab officials that "real" peace is made between peoples and not governments.

Unlike their Israeli counterparts, Arab citizens have demonstrated little ability to influence their governments' decisionmaking processes. Recent global political and economic changes, however, have begun to infiltrate the political environment of the Arab world. The existing political systems in the region are increasingly being called into question and Arab governments are gradually confronting domestic issues related to political representation, participation, and legitimacy.

In that context, this Policy Paper seeks to examine popular Arab views on matters related to peace and normalization with Israel. The objective is not merely to gauge the level of popular Arab support for (or opposition to) peace, but to assess the reasons for these views and thereby to determine the likelihood of greater support for peace in the future.

The analysis is based on polling data gathered by the author for three previous publications on this topic: "Are the Arabs Ready for Peace with Israel?" (*Middle East Quarterly* 1, no. 1, 1994); "Polling Arab Views on the Conflict with Israel—The Levant: Yes to Treaties, No to Normalization" (*Middle East Quarterly* 2, no. 2, 1995); and "The Views of Lebanese Professionals on the Issue of Economic Normalization with Israel" (*East-West Review*, no. 6, 1995).

In addition, this study expands upon the previous analysis by incorporating data from two more recent public opinion polls on the views of Jordanian professionals on economic normalization with Israel and the reactions of highly religious Levantine Muslim Arabs to various aspects of the peace process with Israel. These additional data permit further exploration of two hypotheses derived from the previous polls: (1) that there is a perceptual gap between the Arab ruling elite who largely support "real" peace with Israel and the Arab public who do not, and (2) that

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[1] A notable exception is David Pollock, *The Arab Street? Public Opinion in the Arab World* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).

popular opposition to peace is articulated primarily by fundamentalist—as opposed to merely highly religious—Muslims and that therefore the future of Arab-Israeli relations may to a great extent be determined by the strength of Islamic fundamentalism.

It should be noted, however, that the methods used to collect the data cited in this study inherently limit its utility as a basis for gauging public opinion in the Arab world. (The research methodologies used to conduct all of the polls are explained in the Appendix.) The small size of the quota samples, the selective sub-groups from which these samples were taken (i.e., students and professionals), and the fact that polling was conducted in only three countries make it difficult to draw conclusions.

I EVOLVING ARAB VIEWS OF PEACE

The last ten years witnessed a number of events that until recently were considered nearly inconceivable. In addition to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the communist bloc, and the creation of the Arab-Atlantic coalition that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War (to name but a few), the nearly century-long Arab-Israeli conflict finally appears to be drawing to a close as well. The intense confrontation between Arabs and Jews that has been a key characteristic of the contemporary Middle East may be at last coming to a conclusion. Israel has signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, reached three interim accords with the Palestinians and is engaged in formal negotiations with the Syrians which, if successfully concluded, should yield similar agreements with Lebanon and the Persian Gulf states.

In many ways, the depth of the Arabs' anti-Israel hostility, which kept the conflict raging so many years, was a function of how long it took the Jewish state to move from an idea to a reality. The path from the birth of modern Zionism in the last decade of the nineteenth century to the historic diplomatic achievements some 100 years later has been bloody and torturous. Had Israel been able to declare its independence within a few years of Lord Balfour's famous 1917 declaration, the negative Arab reaction to it might have been relatively mild; though Arab nationalism had emerged prior to the Balfour Declaration, it was an anti-Turkish rather than anti-Zionist movement. In fact, Zionists were invited to attend as observers the proceedings of the first pan-Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913.[1]

It was instead the post-World War I resurgence of European colonialism that frustrated the aspirations of Arab nationalism and transformed it into a highly xenophobic and anti-Western movement.[2] Palestine became an arena of anti-colonial confrontation and Arab-Jewish relations were among the earliest casualties. The Arabs perceived Israel's creation not as a solution to the so-called "Jewish Question" but as yet another Western victory in a modern colonialist crusade. This perception ushered in the modern Arab-Israeli conflict.

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[1] H. I. Katibah, *The New Spirit in Arab Lands* (New York: published privately, 1940), 49-50. The Faisal-Weizmann correspondence of 1919, in which Emir Faisal accepted the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, is also cited as evidence that some Arabs did not consider Zionist aims in Palestine as clashing with the objectives of Arab nationalism, which at that time was tolerant and secular. Najib 'Azuri, a staunch Syrian advocate of Arab nationalism, warned as early as 1905 of an eventual clash between Arabs and Zionists, but his views were not shared by other Arab nationalists.

[2] For a good discussion of the evolution of Arab nationalism, see Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).

FROM INTRANSIGENCE TO COMPROMISE

For nineteen years after Israel's creation, the Arabs refused to admit even to themselves the reality of its existence. In 1965, they bitterly denounced Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for even suggesting the possibility of peace with Israel. It took the massive shock of the June 1967 Six Day War to finally force them to concede (albeit grudgingly) Israel's powerful presence.

Within months of issuing the famous "three no's" resolution (no negotiations with, no recognition of, and no reconciliation with Israel) at the September 1967 Arab League summit conference in Khartoum, the governments of Egypt and Jordan accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242, which implicitly acknowledged Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders. This shift in declared policy marked the first step in the long and painful march toward peace.

Resolution 242 also prompted the first international effort to achieve peace in the Middle East. Swedish Ambassador to Moscow Gunnar Jarring was dispatched to the region to mediate between Arabs and Israelis. His four-year mission ended in failure, as did related talks among the American, British, French, and Soviet foreign ministers. The Arabs found it difficult to shift from belligerence to rapprochement (Syria and the Palestinian organizations had rejected Resolution 242 outright) and the Israelis were not enthusiastic about relinquishing the tremendous strategic gains they had achieved in the Six Day War.

The first genuine opportunity to achieve peace emerged as a result of the October 1973 War. Although Israel ultimately prevailed on the battlefield, the leaders of Egypt and Syria told their people that Arab forces had achieved a victory by destroying the myth of the invincible Israeli army. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat instructed the media to refer to him as "the hero of the crossing" of the Suez Canal; Syrian President Hafez al-Assad preferred a more inclusive moniker, "hero of *Tishrin* [October]."

For the Arabs, fantasizing about victory was another necessary step to break through the psychological barrier and make the transition from war to peace. The 1973 War allowed Arabs to view peace from a position of strength (whether real or illusory) and construct a rationalization for pursuing "peace with dignity." Thus, the Arab states (except Syria) agreed to participate in the December 1973 Geneva peace conference less than two months after the end of the war.

THE ABANDONMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

After an initial plenary session, however, the conference adjourned into a bilateral framework that suited Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's preference for incrementalism in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Though "comprehensive peace" remained the strategic objective, Kissinger

recognized that the depth of mutual hostility and the complexity of competing claims required a "step-by-step" approach to Middle East negotiations. Shlomo Avineri observes that Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy"

> grew out of the realization that previous attempts at comprehensive solutions—Jarring's mission, the Rogers Plan and others—must have failed because of structural, and not accidental, reasons; that the complexities of the Middle Eastern conflict may defy any attempt at an overall solution . . .[3]

The difficulty in achieving a comprehensive settlement was exacerbated by long-standing divisions among the Arab states themselves, which not only prevented them from coordinating their efforts but also consumed substantial energy and resources. Syria's objectives in the 1973 war against Israel differed sharply from those of Egypt, and it is therefore not surprising that the two countries had very different objectives in seeking peace. Sadat's decision to engage in unilateral peace talks with Israel in 1977 resulted from his conviction that the Arabs would never agree on a unified course of action. His abandonment of comprehensive peace efforts led to the resolution of the least complicated component of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the bilateral 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel.

Although it would be another fifteen years before the next Arab-Israeli peace agreement was reached, Camp David established the model for Middle Eastern conflict resolution. No matter how the Syrians may describe their negotiations with Israel, the eventual outcome—whenever it occurs—will complete a multi-stage process of complex bilateral agreements. Indeed, days before ending Jordan's official "state of war" with Israel, King Hussein acknowledged this reality in his response to Syrian complaints that he had not coordinated peace moves toward Israel with Damascus:

> Coordination cannot be one-sided. We have tried to make this coordination a basis [of relations] among all Arab parties concerned in the Middle East peace process. [But] Egypt has chosen its path. The Palestinians are tackling their own affairs by themselves. Why shouldn't Jordan tackle its own affairs, especially when there is a chance to restore its land?[4]

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union dramatically altered not only the international balance of power but the strategic equation of the Middle East as well. These events, compounded by the outcome of the Gulf War, fundamentally changed the dynamic of

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[3] Shlomo Avineri, "Peacemaking: The Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 1 (1978): 52.
[4] *Middle East Reporter* 73, no. 791, July 16, 1994.

the Arab-Israeli conflict and made Arab leaders' continued adherence to unyielding positions suicidal; with Israel's global patron dominant on the world stage, peace with Israel became a virtual necessity for the political survival of their regimes.[5]

The origins of the current phase of the Arab-Israeli peace process grew out of the preparations for the Gulf War, when President Bush promised to address the issue of peace immediately after the liberation of Kuwait. Faced with the Bush administration's determination to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and awed by the crippling punishment Iraq had suffered at the hands of the U.S.-led military coalition, Arab leaders chose to ride out the storm of peace rather than attempting to resist it.

Thus, among Arab leaders and intellectuals, the peace process begun in Madrid reflects a sense of defeat and resignation rather than an opportunity to finally achieve a just settlement of their claims. As Syrian writer Ahmad Hamada saw it,

> the Americans tried to convince the Arabs that *all* of them had been defeated [in the Gulf War], not just the Iraqi regime. In his first shuttle trip to the region during the preparations for convening the Madrid [peace] conference, former Secretary of State James Baker told some Arab officials that there were winners and losers [in the war] and that the Arabs must be prepared to pay the price [of defeat] from now on.[6]

Syrian President Assad seemed to confirm these views when he promised his countrymen that he would strive "to minimize the concessions dictated by an essentially weak Arab position."[7]

THE SCHISM BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND POPULAR VIEWS

Though Arab leaders may have felt compelled to cooperate with U.S. efforts to achieve peace, the Arab public does not. In terms of political values and aspirations, many observers see a virtual divorce between the two. A number of Arab intellectuals have observed that the Arab masses feel degraded by Western military and economic supremacy as exemplified by the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War and Israel's continued presence in the region.[8] "There is a rage at the bottom of Arab dignity," says Lebanese

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[5] On the eve of signing the peace treaty with Israel, for example, King Hussein told Jordanian army officers that the kingdom faced the possibility of disintegration "if he did not forge ahead in bold peace steps with Israel." See *Middle East Reporter* 73, no. 790, July 9, 1994.

[6] *Al-Thawra*, April 27, 1995.

[7] *Al-Nahar*, September 12, 1995.

[8] Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi scholar living in the United States, is one of the few Arab intellectuals who take the opposite view. Makiya contends that the consequences of the Gulf War prompted a wave of tolerance in the Arab world that offered new opportunities to re-examine "Arab-Muslim tradition." See Makiya, "Toleration and the New Arab Politics," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 93-94.

journalist and Arab nationalist Rajih Khury. "Patience hides deep-seated frustration and in the collective Arab conscience there is anger, resentment, and subjugation . . . . A violent explosion should not be ruled out."[9] American scholar Graham Fuller also noted a mood of defeat and despair in the Arab world and remarked that it

> manifests itself as a mindset of helplessness . . . . [Arabs] feel themselves deprived of control over their own destinies, coerced by both external and internal forces. Imperialist intervention has come from abroad, while at home authoritarian regimes tend to be oppressive and harsh . . . . [They are] the passive object of arbitrarily imposed external and internal forces . . .[10]

Nivine Mustafa argues that these events put "the Arab nation . . . in a situation of duress"[11] and thus renders any agreements their leaders make with Israel illegitimate and non-binding. Mustafa invokes the Koran to support her claim: "But he who is driven by necessity, neither craving nor transgressing, commits no sin."[12] Palestinian-American academic Edward Said predicts that such coercion will result in a "cold" peace in which the Arabs will suffer "continuous subjugation and . . . degradation."[13]

With little influence over the policies adopted by their leaders, many Arabs defiantly refuse to consider themselves bound by them. This is particularly true of peace agreements with Israel. One Arab newspaper proclaimed that Israel shall remain "our enemy even if Arab regimes sign peace treaties with her."[14] Another described the peace process as an "illegitimate newborn without a chance of acceptance or even survival."[15]

Constantine Zurayk, a widely respected Arab historian and intellectual, explains that "the Arab-Zionist conflict will not end because it rages between two contradictory rights, truths, and nations."[16] Similarly, a political meeting organized by leading Egyptian actors issued a statement describing the political and cultural outlooks of Egypt and Israel as not only different but decisively contradictory and thus bound to collide.[17]

Another prevalent theme in anti-peace rhetoric is that Israel seeks advantage and dominance rather than peace. Syrian journalist Ali Dibo writes that "Israel does not seek peace as much as it wants to maintain her strategic nuclear might to impose surrender on the Arabs."[18] Egyptian

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[9] *Al-Nahar*, May 22, 1995.
[10] Graham E. Fuller, "Respecting Regional Realities," *Foreign Policy*, no. 82 (Spring 1991): 39–40.
[11] Nivine A. Mustafa, "Al-Mashru' Al-Sharq Al-Awsati w'al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi," *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, no. 193 (March 1995): 18.
[12] Ibid. Mustafa quotes Surat Al-Baqara, verse 173.
[13] *Al-Hayat*, October 12, 1994.
[14] *Al-Nahar*, August 23, 1994.
[15] *Al-Mawaqif*, no. 109 (December 1994): 26.
[16] *Al-Safir*, May 19, 1994.
[17] *Al-Ba'th*, February 14, 1995.
[18] *Al-Thawra*, April 26, 1995 .

journalist Muna Yassin concurs, claiming that "the Israeli leadership is already thinking about the forthcoming war."[19]

(These two schools of thought are not limited to the masses. Tunisia's Minister of Culture, Salih al-Bakari, said that "even if mundane political and economic issues are resolved, the civilizational conflict [between Israel and the Arabs] will continue."[20] Likewise, Syrian Minister of Information Muhammad Salman echoed popular suspicion of Israeli motives, saying that "Israelis negotiate occupation, not withdrawal; their conditions and propositions cannot lead to peace. These are negotiations for war."[21])

Modern Arab political values are the product of a millennium of Islamic cultural and religious influences followed by nearly two centuries of Western ideological penetration. Though the resulting ideologies, pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism, offer different rationales for rejecting peace, their conclusions are basically the same. Muslim fundamentalists cite Islam as a justification for reversing the status quo; Western-oriented Arabs try to revive now-defunct Arab nationalism. Yet both are equally opposed to peace with Israel and seek nothing less than its destruction.

Fundamentalist Farah Musa, for example, argues that "reconciliation [with Israel] cannot occur if Palestine remains a Jewish state. . . . peace means the return of the Jews to where they originally came from."[22] Similarly, Jordanian Christian lawyer Muhiba Haddadin filed a lawsuit in the Jordanian Supreme Court demanding the abrogation of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, on the grounds that it is "unconstitutional because it concedes Arab land in Palestine, which is part of the Arab nation . . . and the people who signed [it] are not authorized to concede Arab land."[23]

Arab nationalists such as Walid Khalidi also dismiss the peace process as a capitulation to triumphant Zionism. They differ only in believing the Arabs cannot avoid making significant concessions because of their powerlessness.[24] Though weakened, Arab nationalists remain an important agent of political socialization in the Arab world—and enhance their own importance—by reinforcing the views of the fundamentalists.

One reason for the divergence between official and popular views may be that Arab leaders had until recently done very little to win popular support for the cause of peace. Speaking in early 1995, Jordanian Minister of Culture Samir Habashneh acknowledged and seemed to concede the division, saying that individual Jordanians could decide whether they wanted to "interact with Israelis or not. . . . The peace treaty [is] obligatory to the government, but not to associations and people."[25]

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[19] *Al-Sha'b,* January 3, 1995.
[20] *Al-Sayyad,* no. 2635, May 5, 1995.
[21] *Al-Muharrir,* April 17, 1995.
[22] Farah Musa, *Al-Salam al-Musallah bain al-'Arab wa Israel: Salamullah am Salamunnas* (Beirut: Dar al-Wasila, 1994), 10.
[23] *Middle East Arab Reporter* 128, no. 4104, April 21, 1995.
[24] Remarks at a public lecture at the American University of Beirut, February 1, 1995.
[25] *Middle East Reporter* 76, no. 831, April 29, 1995.

II POPULAR VIEWS OF PEACE IN THREE SOCIETIES

Stunned by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States' resultant status as the only global superpower, Arab rulers recognized that their conflict with Israel could not be sustained much longer. They concluded that it would be less costly for them to proceed with the peace process than to stay out of it. It is not clear, however, that the Arab public has made a similar shift on the issue; nor is it clear that a new tolerance of Israel is spreading in the Arab world.

The extent of these various views can be ascertained by comparing data from public opinion polls conducted among selected segments of the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, and expatriate Palestinian populations in 1993, late 1994, and early 1995, augmented by interpretive cultural contexts such as media reports. Although the media (particularly in the Arab world) do not necessarily reflect popular views and should therefore not be used exclusively to gauge them, they can provide insights into the meaning and context of popular attitudes reflected in polls—particularly among the more literate and politically aware segments of the populations that comprise the survey sample.

Analysis of the polling data indicates several important trends. First, and most optimistically, the data in Table 1 (see next page) indicate that the overall percentage of Levantine Arabs who support peace talks increased significantly from 1993. The marked reduction in the number of those who do not have a firm opinion implies that Arabs have largely overcome their initial shock at formal peace talks with Israel.

This change may be partially explained by Arab governments' efforts in recent years to inundate their citizens with references to peace with Israel. Even in Syria, where state-controlled media barrage the population with strident anti-Israeli rhetoric, talk of a just and comprehensive peace is now common. In addition, new communications technology has increased the Arab populace's exposure to Israeli officials discussing the prospects of peace with Arab counterparts, which in turn has probably increased the Arabs' degree of familiarity with Israeli views and perhaps enhanced their readiness to support a negotiated settlement with Israel.

Despite these changes, however, most Arabs perceive peace talks and subsequent agreements as *faits accompli* that reflect the balance of power. Thus, they accept it under duress rather than embracing and trying to advance the cause of peace. Moreover, opinions on the various aspects of peace differ dramatically among respondents of different religious affiliations, nationalities, and levels of religiosity, and indeed reflect the political variety of the Arab world.

TABLE 1

SUPPORT FOR PEACE TALKS IN THREE ARAB SOCIETIES

LEBANESE (ALL IN BEIRUT)   OTHER ARABS (ALL PROFESSIONALS)

	Shi'a				Sunni				Maronite		Syria		Jordan	Palestinians			
	Students		Professionals		Students		Professionals		Students	Profs.	Damascus		Amman	Beirut		Amman	
	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	(1994 only)		1993	1994	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994
Yes	47%	56%	49%	60%	29%	44%	37%	48%	78%	82%	28%	45%	66%	23%	17%	26%	63%
No	43%	39%	44%	36%	59%	51%	58%	48%	15%	14%	54%	49%	32%	59%	78%	51%	32%
Unsure	9%	5%	7%	4%	11%	5%	5%	4%	7%	4%	18%	6%	2%	18%	6%	23%	4%
Sample	(150)	(125)	(100)	(85)	(150)	(125)	(100)	(85)	(125)	(85)	(100)	(245)	(150)	(100)	(90)	(150)	(90)

Religion. In the 1993 poll, Lebanese Shi'a stood out (among an all-Muslim sample) as the religious sub-group that is most supportive of peace with Israel. Though this may at first seem strange, considering that the Shi'a in southern Lebanon are responsible for most of the anti-Israeli military operations, they also bear the brunt of Israeli retaliation—which may prompt many of them to support the idea of peace with Israel.

The 1994 study indicated a 10 percent increase in Shi'i support for peace since the 1993 study. More significantly (at least in statistical terms), the Shi'a have been joined in this trend by Lebanese Maronite Christians as well as Jordanian and Palestinian Muslim professionals living in Amman. These other groups would seem to have even stronger motives for supporting peace—particularly the Lebanese Maronites, who believe that peace with Israel could result in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, and the revival of their leading role in the country's affairs. Support for peace among the largely Muslim Syrian professional class, though still less than 50 percent, has also grown appreciably since mid-1993.

Nationality. Jordanians and Palestinians living in Amman rank considerably ahead of the other Muslim Arabs surveyed in their support for the peace talks with Israel. This is most likely because the PLO and Jordan have already signed peace agreements with Israel and thus the idea of peace talks is no longer an issue. In addition, many residents of Jordan hope that peace will invigorate their country's economy.

Although the Jordanian media indicated that the majority of the kingdom's citizens supported (or at least accepted) the peace agreement with Israel when it was signed (just before some of the data for this study were collected),[1] within a year the media began to report widespread public disaffection with the agreement. This deterioration evidently alarmed King Hussein, who initiated a campaign to invigorate Jordanian support for peace.[2] In contrast to their relatives in Amman, Palestinians in Beirut stand out in their opposition to the peace talks. They are the only group among those surveyed whose support for the peace talks has decreased since the 1993 study. Palestinians in Lebanon feel abandoned by the PLO, ignored by Israel, and unwanted by the Lebanese.

Meanwhile, Syrian President Assad's efforts to prepare his people for peace appear to be paying off. Support for the peace talks among Syrian professionals has increased 17 percentage points since the 1993 study—a significant achievement in such a short period of time. Syrian newspapers never miss an opportunity to remind their readers that the government has made a "strategic decision" to join the peace process, provided that it leads to a dignified solution. Placards and posters along highways and in city centers all over Syria display such peace slogans as "We fight honorably, we negotiate honorably, and we make peace honorably."

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[1] *Al-Wasat,* September 12, 1994.
[2] *The Middle East Reporter* 76, no. 831, April 29, 1995.

The change in attitudes is also noteworthy given the fact that Assad and members of his government still criticize the peace process. Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, for example, branded the Israel-Jordan peace agreement "a peaceful aggression against the Arabs" that "should be looked upon as an Israeli action to control the resources of the Arab world."[3] Assad himself reportedly said in a private meeting that "Israel seeks humiliating and insulting agreements . . . . I shall not attach my name to an agreement that brings disgrace to my country . . . . The Israelis want more [Arab] land . . . . They want to impose restrictions on inter-Arab cooperation in favor of special ties with Israel."[4]

Table 2 (see below) reports self-declared religiosity levels for Muslim respondents in specific Arab populations and indicates a noticeable increase in intensity from 1993. At that time, higher religiosity meant increased opposition to peace, particularly in areas where Muslim fundamentalist groups were conducting military attacks against Israel.

TABLE 2

SELF-DECLARED RELIGIOSITY LEVELS OF CERTAIN ARAB POPULATIONS[5]

LEBANESE

	SHI'A				SUNNI			
	Students		Professionals		Students		Professionals	
	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994
High	33%	35%	25%	32%	41%	47%	37%	46%
Medium	27%	41%	26%	38%	45%	44%	41%	44%
Low	40%	24%	49%	31%	15%	9%	22%	11%
Sample	150	125	100	85	150	125	100	85

OTHER ARABS (ALL PROFESSIONALS)

	JORDANIANS	SYRIANS		PALESTINIANS			
	in Amman	in Damascus		in Beirut		in Amman	
	(1994 only)	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994
High	38%	38%	46%	34%	41%	35%	41%
Medium	51%	46%	45%	48%	48%	49%	46%
Low	11%	16%	9%	18%	11%	16%	13%
Sample	150	150	245	100	90	150	90

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[3] *Al-Safir,* December 8, 1994.
[4] *Al-Diyar,* January 11, 1995.
[5] See the research methodologies in the Appendix (p. 49) for a detailed description of the six questions on personal Islamic practice that were used to categorize respondents as having either high, medium, or low levels of "religiosity."

Religiosity.[6] Analyzing the trends from both the 1993 and 1994 surveys, there appears to be a growing connection between the degree of Islamic fervor and negative attitudes toward Israel—particularly at the highly religious end of the spectrum.

Another way of looking at this important phenomenon is to focus on the trend among "moderately religious" respondents, who account for roughly half of the samples in most of the national and occupational categories polled. Between the 1993 and 1994 surveys, the views of these Muslims shifted substantially in favor of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Thus, it is apparently evolving political developments—rather than unchanging religious convictions—that largely determine their attitudes toward this key international issue.

Other 1994 surveys indicate that at least one-third of the overall urban public in Jordan and nearly two-thirds in Lebanon describe the Arab-Israeli conflict as "national" rather than "religious" in nature.[7] The pragmatism this engenders may be similar to that encountered in surveys among Arab Muslims in the Persian Gulf, where the public predominantly characterized peace talks with Israel as at least "somewhat un-Islamic" but nonetheless gave those talks some lukewarm support.

Equally striking is the absence of a pro-peace shift among the minority of highly religious Levantine Muslims in most of the demographic groups surveyed. Despite the historic achievements in recent years, they are hardly less opposed to peace talks in late 1994 than they were in mid-1993. For these intensely religious Muslims, a particular interpretation of Islamic injunctions against peace with Israel apparently endures despite other, temporal considerations. At the opposite pole, "less religious" Muslims generally supported peace talks with Israel at least as far back as mid-1993, even before a pragmatic trend took hold among some of their co-religionists. For this least pious segment, one might argue, a certain brand of politics takes precedence over religion, not the other way around.

This pattern has intensified recently. Table 3 (see next page) indicates that as recently as early 1995, highly religious Muslims—both fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists—are the primary opponents of the peace process among the surveyed segments of three Levantine Arab societies. Depending on the demographic category, large majorities (between 72 percent and 83 percent) of highly religious respondents oppose peace, as compared to a total of 38 percent for moderately religious and irreligious Muslims and 15 percent for Lebanese Maronite Christians.

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[6] In addition to the questions used to determine levels of religiosity, respondents in the three religiosity categories were then further differentiated by their answers to other questions on topics such as the acceptability of peace talks with Israel.

[7] David Pollock and Elaine El Assal, eds., *In the Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics, and Each Other* (Washington, DC: U.S. Information Agency, 1995), 7-13.

TABLE 3

DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

1993

<──── DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY ────>

Support Peace Talks	HIGH			MEDIUM			LOW			Sample Size
	Yes	No	Unsure	Yes	No	Unsure	Yes	No	Unsure	
Lebanese Shi'a Students (in Beirut)	—	100%	—	50%	37%	12%	85%	—	15%	150
Lebanese Shi'a Professionals (in Beirut)	—	100%	—	38%	54%	8%	80%	10%	10%	100
Lebanese Sunni Students (in Beirut)	11%	82%	7%	31%	54%	15%	73%	14%	14%	150
Lebanese Sunni Professionals (in Beirut)	14%	86%	—	34%	56%	10%	82%	14%	5%	100
Syrian Professionals (in Damascus)	9%	79%	12%	29%	49%	22%	71%	8%	21%	150
Syrian Laborers (in Beirut)*	28%	41%	31%	68%	29%	2%	60%	7%	33%	100
Palestinian Professionals (in Beirut)	9%	82%	9%	21%	58%	21%	56%	17%	28%	100
Palestinian Professionals (in Amman)	2%	93%	5%	22%	42%	36%	71%	12%	17%	150

* Not repeated in 1994 sample.

1994

<---------- DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY ---------->

Support Peace Talks	HIGH			MEDIUM			LOW			Sample Size
	Yes	No	Unsure	Yes	No	Unsure	Yes	No	Unsure	
Lebanese Shi'a Students (in Beirut)	5%	89%	7%	82%	14%	4%	87%	10%	3%	125
Lebanese Shi'a Professionals (in Beirut)	15%	74%	11%	75%	25%	—	88%	12%	—	85
Lebanese Sunni Students (in Beirut)	12%	85%	3%	71%	22%	7%	82%	18%	—	125
Lebanese Sunni Professionals (in Beirut)	18%	77%	5%	68%	30%	3%	100%	—	—	85
Syrian Professionals (in Damascus)	18%	79%	4%	67%	25%	7%	73%	14%	14%	245
Jordanian Professionals (in Amman)*	14%	81%	5%	97%	3%	—	100%	—	—	150
Palestinian Professionals (in Beirut)	5%	86%	8%	14%	81%	5%	70%	30%	—	90
Palestinian Professionals (in Amman)	22%	73%	5%	90%	5%	5%	100%	—	—	90

* Sample not included in 1993 poll.

Though the percentage of highly religious Lebanese Shi'a and Palestinian professionals hostile to peace with Israel has declined slightly, there is increasingly a direct relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and opposition to peace and general bellicosity toward Israel. The result is a polarization of Arab opinion into two camps based on degree of religious fervor—one tending toward "rejectionism" and the other toward "moderation."

Due primarily to fundamentalist opposition to governments that negotiate peace with Israel, even respondents who support the peace process have little faith in its durability. Both groups share a general suspicion of Israeli intentions and fear of Israeli economic hegemony and are therefore resistant to personal interaction and other forms of normalization with Israel. This tendency is in part the result of a general anti-peace campaign by Arab intellectuals and other non-officials leaders.

THE FEASIBILITY OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL

In the past two years, opposition to peace with Israel has lessened somewhat in key segments of Levantine Arab society. The basic logic underlying Arabs' perceptions of the prospects for peace, however—particularly among its opponents—remains largely unchanged.

Opposition to Peace. Table 4 (see below and on opposite page) indicates that more than half of those opposed to the current peace process advocated as an alternative confronting Israel through suicidal "human bomb" attacks like those carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad. Among those promoting such violent tactics are the vast majority of highly religious Muslims, even though *kamikaze* attacks have never been part of mainstream Islamic tradition.

TABLE 4

ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF FEASIBILITY OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL[8]

Question 1: *If you do not support peace talks, what do you suggest as an alternative?*

1993 Respondents' Answers	1993	1994	1994 Respondents' Answers
Immediate military confrontation	75%	55%	Suicide attacks
Maintain status quo	25%	8%	Border skirmishes
		37%	Self-restraint
(Sample size)	(642)	(483)	

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[8]   The sample groups for Table 4 (and Table 5 on p. 20) are the same as those in Tables 1-3 and are described in detail in the Appendix, pp. 49-50.

Question 2: *If you support peace talks, do you believe a peace agreement will endure?*

	1993	1994
Yes	12%	35%
No	88%	65%
(Sample size)	(358)	(722)

Question 2a: *If a peace agreement will not endure, which of these forces might sabotage it?*

	1993	1994
Islamic fundamentalism	70%	62%
Israeli radicalism	13%	15%
Both	17%	23%
(Sample size)	(315)	(467)

Question 2b: *What are your reasons for supporting a peace agreement with Israel?*

1993/94 Respondents' Answers	1993	1994	
To recover some occupied land	15%	2%	
To block Israeli aggression	25%	10%	
We have no other alternative	28%	25%	
Gives us time to reorganize	32%	35%	Additional 1994 Answers
		14%	For regional prosperity
		14%	For the sake of peace
(Sample size)	(358)	(722)	

Question 2c: *Would you continue to support peace if Israel became weaker?*

	1993	1994
Yes	5%	32%
No	92%	65%
Unsure	3%	3%
(Sample size)	(341)	(713)

By contrast, most of the less-religious respondents called for self-restraint. A small minority support low-intensity skirmishes and limited cross-border attacks on Israeli settlements, such as those conducted by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. None of the Lebanese Maronite Christians who are opposed to peace sanctions violence.

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT

Support for self-restraint by more than one-third of respondents opposed to peace should not necessarily be interpreted as a transition

from belligerence to submission. Deep inside the Arab collective consciousness dwells the belief that Israel is ultimately doomed. Thus, advocates consider self-restraint a temporary, tactical measure—simply maintaining a low profile until Israel's military superiority diminishes and it can be confronted and defeated. Nizar Qabbani, one of the most revered modern Arab poets, expressed this view a decade ago:

> Our men shall strike [at Israel] unexpectedly,
> They shall come with thunderstorms . . . and rain,
> Wearing the Prophet's cloak . . . or Umar's sword,
> What's between you [Israelis] and us [Arabs] doesn't end in a year,
> Nor five, nor ten, nor 1,000 years . . .
> We shall eventually encounter you in Tel Aviv . . .
> You are besieged by grudge and hate . . .[9]

The Arab media often remind their audience that, despite a series of peace agreements recognizing the status quo, Muslims reversed the Crusaders' 1099 conquest of Jerusalem in less than a century.

> Crusader rule in our land was [once] viewed as eternal. They changed the contours of the land, built castles, erected monuments, and expanded the boundaries of their kingdoms. . . . Only their ruins remain as a testament to their failure. . . . This so-called peace [between Arabs and Israelis]. . . . will not last because it negates the logic of life and historical probabilities.[10]

Hamad al-Farhan, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian parliament (and former minister-without-portfolio), echoed those themes. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, he said,

> is not an urgent matter . . . . The present condition of the Arab world necessitates [merely] containing this danger. First, by freezing steps toward recognition, reconciliation, and interaction [with Israel]. . . . The final solution is the destruction of Israel, once and for all, when the [Arab] nation forms.[11]

Similarly, Egyptian journalist and former presidential advisor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal exhorts Arabs not to despair. "I tell you honestly that I am not pessimistic about the [prospect of a] new era" of peace with Israel, he writes. "If it comes it will pass quickly, because geographic and historical realities will reassert themselves."[12]

Endurance of Peace. Even Arabs who support peace with Israel have serious doubts about the prospects for its durability. Only 35 percent of pro-peace respondents in the 1994 poll believe it will endure. Although this is a significant increase from 12 percent in 1993, it does not signal a

[9] Nizar Qabbani, *Al-A'mal Al-Siyasiyya al-Kamila,* vol. 3 (Beirut: Manshurat Nizar Qabbani, 1986), 167-98.

[10] *Al-Nahar,* August 21, 1993. See also Radio Lebanon, August 16, 1993.

[11] *Al-Manabir,* no. 77, April-May 1995.

[12] Muhammad H. Haykal, *Al-Salam al-Muhasar baina Haqai'q al-Lahza wa Haqai'q at-Tarikh* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filistiniya, 1994), 40.

general shift in Arab public opinion. Bivariate analysis indicates that the additional support comes from two population groups that were not polled in the 1993 survey and were added to the more recent study.

These two groups, Jordanians and Lebanese Maronite Christians, feel themselves increasingly vulnerable to Palestinian and Muslim political aspirations, respectively, and they therefore have a vested interest in seeing the peace process succeed. In contrast, there is no increased faith among Syrians, Palestinians, and Lebanese Muslims in the viability of peace.

The distribution of responses in Question 4 would seem to suggest that the reasons for supporting peace have changed since the previous study. In 1993, not a single respondent saw peace as an end in itself or believed that it would lead to regional prosperity; in 1994, 14 percent of respondents held each of these opinions. Further analysis, however, indicates that the vast majority of this combined 28 percent is either Maronite or Jordanian. (The number of Palestinians from Amman who concur with these two views is too small to represent a new trend.)

In the 1993 study, only 5 percent of respondents said they would continue to support peace even if Israel were somehow weakened, but 32 percent say they would do so now. Again, though this is an impressive increase, nearly all of those who answered in the affirmative are Jordanians or Lebanese Maronite Christians, along with a smattering of Palestinians from Amman. Interestingly, none of the Muslims in these groups is highly religious.

Palestinians living in Amman who express a lasting commitment to peace may do so because they realize that the Arab states would never allow them to take advantage of Israeli weakness. In contrast, none of the Palestinians living in Beirut who support peace says they would do so if Israel became weak. This outlook may reflect their feeling of exclusion from the peace process; Palestinians in Lebanon do not expect to reap any benefits from the peace process and thus lack a motive to support it. The minority who say they *do* support peace may do so out of a sense of resignation.

ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS

Arab suspicions about Israelis (and Jews in general) are deeply rooted. Arabs continuously hear from their leaders and media that Israel threatens not only specific countries but the Arab nation or Islam as a whole. The comments of Syrian columnist Khayri Hama exemplify this view: "The conflict with the Zionist enemy has never been a border issue nor an interstate conflict but rather a total confrontation concerning the survival of our nationalism . . . against threats posed by the Israeli entity."[13]

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[13] *Al-Ba'th,* July 26, 1994.

Arab perceptions of Israel's long-term intentions, as expressed in the 1994 poll, were largely the same as those in 1993. Table 5 (see below) indicates that the disproportionate size and strength of the Israeli economy (relative to those of its Arab neighbors) remain a key worry. Respondents' other clichéd concerns include the establishment of "Greater Israel," the creation of puppet regimes in neighboring countries, and the instigation or manipulation of inter-Arab conflicts.

<div align="center">TABLE 5</div>

<div align="center">**ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS**</div>

| | Order of Choices | | | | | | |
| | First | | Second | | Third | | Weighted |
Perceived Intentions	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	Scores[14]
Economic dominance	32%	32%	33%	36%	13%	16%	52/54
To control water sources	26%	24%	16%	17%	25%	10%	40/36
Incite inter-Arab conflict	12%	10%	12%	9%	32%	10%	26/16
Create puppet regimes	15%	9%	21%	6%	14%	28%	29/19
Establish "Greater Israel"	16%	12%	18%	20%	17%	25%	29/28
Genuine peace (1994)	—	13%	—	12%	—	11%	—/22
Sample size	960	1,202	914	1,188	849	1,152	

The minority of respondents who believe that Israel is genuinely interested in peace represents a departure from otherwise pessimistic perceived motivations, but not necessarily a positive development among Arabs as a whole. Analysis of the data indicates that those holding this view are primarily Jordanians and Lebanese Maronites.

Although the Arab media have begun to accept peace as a political necessity, they retain pejorative images of Israelis and attribute sinister motives to them. For example, news reports and commentaries accusing an Israeli *mafia* of selling arms to Palestinians in Gaza and Nablus to start a civil war in the self-rule areas circulate widely among the Arab public.[15] The Arab media also dedicate special attention to Israel's status as the only nuclear power in the region—the common conclusion being that Israel wants these weapons to dominate the Arab world.[16]

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[14] The weighted scores are determined by combining the values of the first, second, and third choices, with first choices assigned twice as much weight as second choices and four times as much weight as third choices.

[15] *Nida' al-Watan,* April 27, 1995.

[16] See, for example, *Al-Ahram,* January 3, 1995.

In a column entitled "They Do Not Want Peace" in a Jordanian newspaper, Salih al-Qallab expressed popular suspicion of Israel's reasons for seeking peace:

> There was hope when the peace process began that Israel had abandoned its previous concepts and objectives and that it wanted to become part of this region . . . . It has now been proven that Israel has agreed to take part in this process [only] . . . to reap the fruits of her previous victories against the Arabs. She hopes to bring the region to its knees and achieve under the cover of peace what she could not in wars.[17]

This pessimistic view of the peace process is not limited to the media. In'am Ra'd, secretary of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist party, said that Israel would dominate the "new Middle East" both economically and militarily.[18] Similarly, the inaugural National Conference for Opposing Normalization (held in Beirut on January 28, 1995) concluded that Israel seeks territorial expansion rather than regional cooperation and dismissed the peace process as "a new [form of] Zionist war in which Israel makes token gestures of goodwill so that it can achieve substantial gains."[19] And Lebanon's Sunni Grand Mufti declared that Israel is "a vicious enemy . . . aiming to destroying our faith, culture, and identity."[20]

In an atmosphere of constant anti-Israeli socialization, the Arab public tends to assess Israeli intentions negatively and finds it very difficult to form positive impressions of Israel's intentions.

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[17] *Al-Dustur*, May 18, 1995.

[18] *Sabah al-Khair*, no. 827-28, March-April 1995.

[19] *Al-Manabir*, no. 77, April-May 1995. Even Arab countries already at peace with Israel do not always exhibit wholehearted enthusiasm. In an April 1995 interview in *Al-Safir*, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa conceded that Egypt and Israel were in conflict over several issues. Despite their disagreements, he said, "We should not talk about war, but about peace. The topic of war should be deleted from the dictionary for now." Note that Moussa said "for now" rather than "forever."

[20] *Al-Mustaqbal Television*, March 2, 1995. Some believe Israel is confronting Islam on behalf of the West. See, for example, *al-Mawaqif*, no. 159, December 1994.

III WILLINGNESS TO INTERACT WITH ISRAELIS

Until a few years ago, the Arab world was preoccupied with confronting Israel. Concepts such as Syria's strategic parity with Israel and Iraq's nonconventional deterrence capability commanded the attention of the Arab public; interaction with Israelis was simply unthinkable.[1] Despite the historic diplomatic achievements of the past three years, the responses to Question 1 in Table 6 (see below) suggests that this reluctance to normalize on a "people-to-people" basis has not changed greatly; even now, and even among those who support peace, most respondents are not prepared to accept even modest forms of interaction with Israelis.

TABLE 6

WILLINGNESS TO INTERACT WITH ISRAELIS AFTER MAKING PEACE[2]

Question 1: *What is your reaction to seeing Israeli visitors in your country?*

	1994	1993
Anger	56%	50%
Sadness	12%	32%
Indifference	27%	14%
Positiveness	5%	3%

Question 2: *Would you be willing to spend your vacation in Israel?*

Yes	31%
No	59%
Unsure	10%

Question 3: *Would you attend a career development course in Israel?*

Yes	19%
No	72%
Unsure	9%

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[1] Symptomatic of this was an incident during the Israeli occupation of Beirut in September 1982 in which three Israeli soldiers strolling through one of the city's fashionable shopping districts were gunned down by armed civilians; residents recall the event not as a military engagement but as a signal to Israeli "sightseers" that they were unwelcome.

[2] The sample sizes in Question 1, the only open-ended question in Table 6 and the only question asked in both 1993 and 1994, were 992 in 1993 and 1,196 in 1994. Questions 2-7 are from the late 1994 survey only and had effective sample sizes of approximately 1,200.

Question 4: *Would you consider sending your children to study in Israel?*

Yes	4%
No	93%
Unsure	4%

Question 5: *Would you be interested in learning about aspects of life in Israel?*

Yes	12%
No	82%
Unsure	6%

Question 6: *Would you be willing to learn Hebrew?*

Yes	20%
No	71%
Unsure	9%

Question 7: *Would you be willing to consider Jewish history from an Israeli perspective?*

Yes	3%
No	94%
Unsure	4%

Accepting Israeli Visitors. As of late 1994, only 5 percent of a sample of Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, and expatriate Palestinian professionals and students expressed a "positive" reaction to the prospect of seeing Israelis in their country. (Even among the smaller subgroup of respondents who support peace with Israel, enthusiasm for Israeli visitors rises to a mere 9 percent.)

Anecdotal evidence illustrates the poll results. In one case, Israeli tourists "annoyed guests at a wedding party by participating in dancing, narrowly avoiding a fist fight."[3] According to another report, a famous Syrian singer refused to appear on stage at a Jordanian hotel after finding out that Israeli tourists were in the audience. According to a newspaper account of the incident, the Arab members of the audience "received the singer's decision with applause and supported his patriotic anti-Israeli stance" and the hotel management asked the Israelis to leave.[4]

There are of course many reported individual instances of cordial interaction at the official level and sometimes in technical or commercial areas. But stories of even casual friendships or cultural exchange are as rare in the Arab media as they are common in Israel.

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[3] *Al-Nahar,* November 17, 1994.
[4] *Al-Majd,* December 26, 1994.

Vacationing in Israel. Nearly one-third of those polled said they would be willing to visit Israel on vacation. This surprisingly large proportion is explained by the reasons respondents gave for such proposed travel: to see Palestine (47 percent), to visit religious sites (38 percent), and to attend family reunions (15 percent). Not a single respondent mentioned anything about interacting with Israelis.

Arab opposition politicians, intellectuals, union leaders, and religious figures warn Arabs against visiting Israel. Egyptian Coptic leader Pope Shenuda, for example, warned his followers against visiting Jerusalem as long as it remains under Israeli jurisdiction. The negative reaction to news reports that some 5,000 Egyptian Copts visited the holy city during Easter 1994 was so intense that some visitors went to Cairo's Coptic cathedral to apologize.[5] An embarrassed Pope Shenuda said a few days later that the visitors to Jerusalem had mostly been Protestants and Catholics, and that Orthodox Copts rarely go to Jerusalem.[6]

Studying in Israel. More than 80 percent of respondents said they would not visit Israel for professional training or send their children to college in Israel, even in fields in which Israeli institutions compare favorably with (and cost significantly less than) those in the West. Those who indicated a willingness to do so were either Maronites or less religious Muslims; not a single highly or moderately religious Muslim responded in the affirmative.

Learning about Israel. Only a small minority of respondents expressed interest in familiarizing themselves with aspects of life in Israel, and several of them told interviewers that their motivation for doing so would be to "know the enemy."

Learning Hebrew. Twenty percent of those surveyed said they would be willing to learn Hebrew. Of this group, 40 percent (8 percent of all respondents) said they would do so in order to strengthen peace; 20 percent said they would do so in order to fend off possible Israeli schemes. A Lebanese newspaper reported that many Jordanians had enrolled in Hebrew-language courses since the conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel. They include waiters, journalists, travel agents, businessmen, border guards, intelligence officers, and others likely to come in direct contact with Israelis. The report went on to say, however, that learning Hebrew does not necessarily indicate a positive state of mind toward Israel:

> It is not true that everyone studying Hebrew is doing it out of favorable disposition to Israel. . . . A bearded Palestinian refugee and father of eight children said that "although I am studying Hebrew, I shall resist normalization with all my might. . . . The Jews shall remain my enemy until Judgment Day." Leftists and Islamists who oppose peace with Israel, including all forms of normalization, stress that studying Hebrew in an academic way does not contradict their belief that the State of Israel has no right to exist.[7]

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[5] *Al-Hayat,* April 28, 1995.
[6] *Al-Safir,* May 4, 1995.
[7] *Al-Nahar,* November 25, 1994.

Learning Jewish History. Though respondents may grudgingly accept the necessity of making peace with Israel, they are far less willing to look at Jewish history from an Israeli perspective—in other words, to reexamine and possibly revise entrenched perceptions about Israel and Jews in general, particularly if it required questioning core values associated with the origins of the conflict. This reflects a deliberate choice by most Arabs (including those who profess to support peace) to shun any form of interaction with Israelis.

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT

The idea of normalization has haunted Arab society even before the 1991 Madrid conference made peace a realistic prospect. As global changes accelerated the peace process, many Arabs began to draw a distinction between peace and normalization, claiming that official reconciliation did not necessarily require social interaction. Many Arabs perceive the diplomatic peace process as an act of *force majeure*, but believe they can resist normalization at the individual and societal levels. Not only do they not feel bound by their governments' policies, but they also consider themselves the bulwark against what they perceive as Israeli political, economic, and—increasingly—cultural hegemony.

Lebanese Arab nationalist Zahiya Qaddura, for example, advocates the introduction of a comprehensive Arab plan "for fighting normalization and for defeating the [Israeli] cultural invasion that will overwhelm all aspects of our lives."[8] Similarly, Ahmad Sidqi ad-Dajani, secretary general of the Union of Arab Authors, exhorts Arabs "to employ Arab culture in opposing agreements engineered by the [Israeli] racists."[9]

Arab professional associations have imposed sanctions on members who dare to even talk about normalization. The Union of Syrian Writers froze the membership of Adonis, a well-known Syrian poet, for "supporting normalization with the Zionist enemy."[10] Similarly, a resolution by the League of Jordanian Writers threatened to ostracize any Jordanian or other member of the Arab *intelligentsia* who takes a positive stand on normalization. It also voted to prohibit participation by Israeli scholars, irrespective of their political orientation or views, in any League activities held in Jordan.[11]

Arab media have also played a role in trying to mobilize public opinion against the peace process through an anti-Israeli campaign, the emphasis of which has also shifted from opposition to formal peace to resistance to all manner of practical interaction with Israelis. The major Egyptian

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[8]   *Al-Liwa'*, January 6, 1995.
[9]   *Al-Manabir*, no. 76, November 2, 1994.
[10] *Al-Shira'*, no. 666, February 6, 1995.
[11] Umar Shabana, "Fi Ma'rakat al-Tatbi' wa Muqawamatuhu: al-Muthaqqfun fil-Urdunn bayn al-rafd wal-Qubul al-Mutahafit," *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filistiniya* (Summer 1994): 161.

magazine *Roz al-Yusuf*, for example, outlined its official policy on interaction with Israelis:

> *Roz al-Yusuf* magazine has a clear and steady position concerning any effort to build bridges of public contacts between Egypt and Israel. The time has not come for this. . . . It would not be harmful if the time does not come at all.[12]

Resistance to social normalization is not limited to artists and intellectuals. Fundamentalist Muslims also view their struggle against Israel in cultural as well as military terms. Hezbollah spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, for example, opined that "Koran-based Islamic culture . . . may be one of the active ingredients in consolidating the already strong barriers against Israeli expansion in the region and in producing a new reality in the future."[13] In the same spirit, the head of Al-Azhar University, Egypt's leading Islamic institution, refused to receive Israeli President Ezer Weizman during the latter's first official visit to Cairo.[14]

This kind of broad social pressure sometimes causes those who endorse the peace process to recant. One of the best examples of this was Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, who issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) in December 1994 that legitimized "establishing lasting or temporary peace with Israel."[15] This aroused a firestorm of protest from fundamentalists and leftists that led the mufti to issue a "reinterpretation" of his previous statement, which he claimed was "warranted by Arab weaknesses." He went on to say that "peace with the Jews does not require liking them" and that "as soon as the Muslims acquire the means to reverse the situation, they must fight the Jews who occupy Muslim lands."[16]

Thus, even as moderate Arab governments champion peace with Israel, Arab intellectual leaders—scholars, professionals, religious activists, and journalists—are conducting an intense campaign to influence the general public's view of peace. In the end, the Arab masses listen to both sides. They accept peace in the short term (and reject normalization) with an eye toward possible geostrategic shifts in the future.

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[12] *Roz al-Yusuf*, no. 3488, April 17, 1995.
[13] Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Ab'ad Itifaq Ghaza-Ariha lil-Waqi' al-Filistini wal-'Arabi wal-Islami," *Qira'at Siyasiya* (Winter 1994): 89.
[14] *Al-Nahar*, December 20, 1994.
[15] *Al-Safir*, December 23, 1994. Ibn Baz based the *fatwa* on the Koran (Surat al-Anfal, verse 61): "But if thine enemy incline toward peace, do thou [also] incline toward peace and trust in God."
[16] *Al-Safir*, January 20, 1995.

IV VIEWS OF ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION

In the long term, peace agreements between political elites may not achieve much by themselves unless they are accompanied by behavioral changes that involve the peoples of the formerly belligerent countries. A considerable body of academic analysis supports the idea that the durability of peace is perhaps best enhanced by mutually rewarding economic transactions. Jacob Reuveny, for example, writes that

> A peace treaty is a legal document reflecting an accord reached at a definite period. Since peace is essentially a process, the nature of the relations that evolve as a result of the peace treaty are a crucial part for any peace process. Positive economic results may consolidate the peace process whereas negative economic consequences may have a disruptive effect.[1]

Providing the rationale for an early and important study on economics and Middle East peacemaking, Armand Hammer argued that "equitable and mutually beneficial economic relations can bind nations together . . . [thereby] providing [them] with compelling reasons to avoid war."[2] Similarly, Nadav Halevi believes that free trade between Arabs and Israelis will stimulate sectoral cooperation and benefit all participant countries.[3]

King Hussein is the only Arab head of state thus far to enthusiastically embrace full economic normalization with Israel, based on the notion that it would bring prosperity to his resource-poor country, which is saddled with a foreign debt of nearly $8 billion.[4] This view initially drew limited support from Jordan's conservative society. One prominent Jordanian publication, for example, echoed the king's statements, hailing the successes of the "land-for-peace" equation and welcoming the establishment of a new Middle Eastern order that includes security as well as new political, economic, and social relationships.[5]

Though the Jordanian government went to considerable lengths to convince reluctant citizens to embrace the normalization process, mounting public frustration over the seeming lack of a "peace dividend" led officials to "acknowledge [that] it will take time for benefits to appear."[6] Yet some Jordanian professionals seem to be deliberately

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[1] Jacob Reuveny, "The Political Economy of a Middle Eastern Peace," *International Problems* 20 (Spring-Fall 1981): 181.
[2] Armand Hammer, "Introduction," in *Economic Cooperation and Middle East Peace*, Meir Merhav, ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), xi.
[3] Nadav Halevi, "Economic Implications of Peace," in Stanley Fischer et al, ed., *The Economics of Middle East Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
[4] *Middle East Reporter* 76, no. 831, April 29, 1995.
[5] *Al-Aswaq*, February 15, 1995.
[6] *Middle East Reporter* 76, no. 831, April 29, 1995.

avoiding potential economic benefits from peace, indicating that their resistance to normalization is motivated more by political than financial concerns. The Jordanian dentists association, for example, has prohibited its members from treating Israeli patients (except in emergencies) and threatened severe punitive measures against violators.[7]

Although other Arab leaders have shown far less enthusiasm for formal peace with Israel than King Hussein, they are nonetheless widely believed to be interested in peace for the economic benefits. Syria, however, seems wary of the potential effects of trade and investment with Israel and has used its government-controlled media to highlight the supposed negative aspects of economic normalization. One Syrian newspaper, for example, reported that Jordanian businesses

> file daily more than 100 complaints against Israeli tourists. The behavior of Israeli tourists differs from that of all other tourists. Most Israeli tourists come in the morning and return in the evening without spending a penny. Those who venture by staying overnight bring their food and drinks with them. Upon checking out, they take with them expensive hotel items (tableware, portraits, rugs, blankets).[8]

The same paper quoted former Egyptian Minister of Defense General Muhammad Fawzi's criticism of the notion of a Middle Eastern market as potentially "harmful to the Arabs on all accounts [because] Israel intends to dominate the region's economies."[9]

In fact, many Arab statements and editorials on economic issues reveal a belief that Israel is interested in peace only as part of a comprehensive regional strategy designed to "keep Iraq isolated and Lebanon condemned by the United States. . . . [and] attempt to obtain as much oil money as possible from the Gulf states while preventing the ascendance of Lebanon and delaying the development of Syria."[10] These statements often also express a kind of economic "inferiority complex" *vis-à-vis* Israel, based on the view that the Arab states cannot match Israel's industrial and technological capabilities. According to Lebanese journalist Nabil Khury,

> We are about to enter into a new type of conflict with Israel that will probably determine Arab destiny for the next century. The war will have economic, financial, industrial, commercial, and cultural dimensions. Even before it starts, [we know that] it will be an uneven war. We lost in our previous military confrontations with Israel . . . [and] it appears that we will also lose in the forthcoming economic war.[11]

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[7] *Al-Hayat*, April 25, 1995. For a full discussion of Jordanian professional associations' reluctance to embrace normalization, see Steven A. Cook, *Jordan-Israel Peace, Year One: Laying the Foundation* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995).

[8] *Tishrin*, April 23, 1995. Though it is quite possible that some Israeli tourists behave this way, it is equally true that tourists of all nationalities, including Arabs, violate standard rules of behavior.

[9] Ibid., April 25, 1995. Gen. Fawzi dismissed as naive campaigns by some Arab governments to impose normalization on their citizens, who he said would resist such efforts.

[10] *Al-Mu'ashir*, no. 212, 1993-94.

[11] *Al-Nahar*, April 29, 1995.

Lebanese journalists and politicians of all denominations evince considerable apprehension about the effects of economic normalization with Israel. Economist and former Lebanese prime minister Salim al-Huss, for example, believes that peace will enhance Israel's role as the Middle East's economic superpower and deal a severe blow to Lebanon's economic future.[12] Munir al-Hajj, vice president of the Christian Maronite Phalange party, is concerned that Israel and the Arab states will conclude peace before Lebanon is able to rebuild its war-devastated economy.[13]

Elie al-Firzli, deputy speaker of the Lebanese parliament, warned that Israel will not allow Lebanon to recover its pre-civil war role as the center of finance, trade, and services in the Arab world.[14] An editorial in a leading Beirut newspaper claimed that normalization will herald "an Israeli economic invasion,"[15] and another newspaper disclosed supposed details of an Israeli grand design to dominate the Arab economies.[16]

SUPPORT FOR NORMALIZATION BY CLASS AND RELIGION

One way to investigate whether these views permeate Arab societies is to query professionals, who are potentially more likely than other segments of the Arab public to interact economically with Israelis. Table 7 (see below) indicates that only one-third of Lebanese surveyed in November 1993 and one-fifth of Jordanian respondents polled in March 1995 support the idea of normalizing economic relations with Israel.

TABLE 7

SUPPORT AMONG LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN PROFESSIONALS FOR ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL[17]

Question: *What is your position on economic relations with Israel?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
Strongly support	8%	8%
Support	27%	10%
Uncertain	11%	12%
Oppose	27%	30%
Strongly oppose	28%	41%

[12] *Al-Diyar*, October 4, 1993.
[13] *Al-Diyar*, October 11, 1993.
[14] *Al-Nahar*, October 7, 1993.
[15] *Al-Safir*, October 11, 1993.
[16] *Al-Sha'b*, October 12, 1993. Perhaps most fatalistic was a Lebanese businessman's prediction that "economic normalization [will be] a horrible experience. I do not see a single positive element in it. Normalization will destroy [among other things] the promising future of tourism in Lebanon." See *Al-Shira'*, October 11, 1993.
[17] Total sample size is 660 (410 Lebanese and 250 Jordanians).

Table 8 (see below) reveals that Christian respondents in both countries are significantly more willing than Muslims to support economic normalization with Israel. There are several likely explanations for this. First, though Christian Arabs have hardly detached themselves from the Arab-Israeli conflict, it can be argued that their level of emotional involvement does not match that of their Muslim brethren. Moreover, the political marginalization of the Christian community in Jordan, sectarian conflict in Lebanon, and the fact that Lebanon's Muslims have historically borne the brunt of Israeli military retaliation, may have led many Christians to identify with the Israelis as another minority group facing Muslim Arabs and thus see normalization as an opportunity to break the bonds of societal isolation. In addition, Islamic teachings, which cover temporal as well as spiritual matters, may promote adherents' negative perceptions of Jews.

TABLE 8

RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION[18]

	LEBANESE (1993)		JORDANIANS (1995)	
	Muslims	Christians	Muslims	Christians
Strongly support	7%	8%	3%	24%
Support	18%	39%	7%	22%
Uncertain	10%	13%	13%	12%
Oppose	28%	25%	29%	30%
Strongly oppose	36%	15%	48%	12%

RELATIVE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION

Many Lebanese recognize that the modern economic infrastructure of the Persian Gulf states—funded by massive oil revenues—has neutralized Lebanon's historical comparative advantage in export services[19] and its once pre-eminent role in regional banking, education, and other services. As a result, there is a general mood of resignation to Lebanon's relegation to the economic periphery of the Middle East. Along the same lines, the majority of Lebanese respondents felt that Israel would benefit more from normalization because its versatile economy has more to offer Arab countries than they can offer Israel.

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[18] Sample size is 233 Lebanese Muslims and 175 Lebanese Christians polled in November 1993, and 200 Jordanian Muslims and 50 Jordanian Christians surveyed in March 1995. With such small subsamples, the results should be considered suggestive rather than statistically definitive.

[19] Amer Bisat and Muhammad L. Hammour, "Economic Prospects for a Postwar Lebanon," in Fischer *et al*, ed., *The Economics of Middle East Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

Table 9 (see below) indicates that nearly 80 percent of Lebanese professionals polled in November 1993 feel that Israel would benefit more than Lebanon from economic interaction. This figure contrasts sharply with the mere 5 percent who anticipate that Lebanon could actually gain more than Israel and the 12 percent who believe that the two countries would derive roughly equal benefits.

TABLE 9

PERCEPTIONS OF BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION[20]

Question: *Who would benefit from economic relations between Israel and Lebanon/Jordan?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
Both would benefit equally	12%	12%
We would benefit more	5%	3%
Israel would benefit more	78%	67%
Only Israel would benefit	3%	8%
Unsure	1%	9%

Jordanian professionals polled in March 1995 are almost identical to those of their Lebanese counterparts. Although the Jordanian polling data were collected more than two years after the Lebanese survey (and six months after Jordan's formal peace with Israel), the similarity supports the conventional wisdom that the views of Levantine Arabs on this matter are very close. The influx of Israeli tourists into Jordan is only just beginning to benefit Jordan's tourist sector. Though Jordanians admit that many of their tourist facilities are inadequate,[21] they complain about disappointing profits and improper behavior from Israeli tourists.

ABILITY TO COMPETE WITH THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

Yusuf Shibl, a Lebanese academic whose writings concentrate on the economic dimensions of peace, is of the opinion that the economic gap between Israel and Lebanon is so great that the latter stands no chance whatsoever of competing with the former. He notes that Israeli industrial output, which alone contributed $15 billion (or 25 percent) to the country's gross national product (GNP) in 1992, is at least four times that of Lebanon's entire GNP.[22]

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[20] Sample size is 407 Lebanese (November 1993) and 249 Jordanians (March 1995).

[21] *Al-Dustur*, February 11, 1995.

[22] Yusuf Shibl, "Al-Sina'a al-Lubnaniya wa Tahadiyat al-Salam" ("Lebanese Industry and the Challenges of Peace"), paper delivered at a conference of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists in Beit Meri, Lebanon, October 13-15, 1993.

Similarly, a Lebanese newspaper asserted that Jordan not only cannot compete with Israel, it cannot even *interact* with it economically because there is no market for sophisticated Israeli products in Jordan and because basic Jordanian products do not meet Israeli standards.[23]

Table 10 (see below) indicates that almost none of the respondents believes their country can compete with Israel in most economic areas. One-third of Lebanese professionals surveyed in November 1993 said they consider Lebanon capable of competing with Israel in *some* economic areas, but the majority (two-thirds) believe it can compete only in very few areas. Jordanians polled in March 1995 were even less likely than Lebanese to believe that their economy is capable of competing with Israel's.

TABLE 10

PERCEIVED ABILITY TO COMPETE WITH THE ISRAELI ECONOMY[24]

Question 1: *In how many economic sectors can your country compete with Israel?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
Many	1%	4%
Some	34%	21%
Very few	65%	75%

Question 2: *What is your country's strongest potential area of competition with Israel?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
Tourism	28%	13%
Services	19%	—
Banking	18%	—
Agriculture	10%	27%
Trade	9%	5%
Light industry	8%	12%
Transportation	6%	20%
Cheap labor	3%	23%

More than 80 percent of Lebanese respondents feel Lebanon can best compete with Israel in service-related or financial sectors. Haim Ben-Shahar's conclusions about the nature of the Lebanese economy support these responses. He considers the Lebanese economy, which specializes in finance and trade, the most highly service-oriented in the Middle East.[25] In

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[23] *Al-Safir*, November 7, 1994.
[24] Sample size is 405 Lebanese (Question 1) and 393 Lebanese (Question 2) surveyed in November 1993 and 250 Jordanians (Question 1) and 238 Jordanians (Question 2) polled in March 1995.
[25] Haim Ben-Shahar, "Peace or Animosity: Economic Development Options for the Middle East," in Meir Merhav, ed., *Economic Cooperation and Middle East Peace* (London: Weidenfeld

contrast, Jordanians consider transportation and cheap labor as their country's major assets.

These findings are inconsistent, however, with the message that leaders in both Lebanon and Jordan seem to be trying to instill in the minds of their peoples (probably in preparation for the challenges of the post-peace period)—that they can compete with Israel. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, for example, seems quite confident that Lebanon enjoys a competitive advantage over Israel in many economic areas.[26] He appears to be relying on the expansion of Lebanon's economic role in a forthcoming regional market. Economists such as Amer Bisat and Muhammad Hammour share Hariri's optimism:

> The scale of the regional economy compared to what it was before 1973 is such that . . . a small, peripheral Lebanese economy may do as well in the future as it did before the [civil] war as the regional economic hub. . . . [T]here are good reasons to believe that light manufacturing will account for a bigger share of GDP than before the war.[27]

Peace is also widely expected to increase substantially the Middle East's share of world tourism, which dropped from 2.5 percent in 1981 to 1.6 percent in 1991.[28] Israeli economist Gil Feiler supports this assessment, arguing that Lebanon "retains the potential of being the greatest tourist destination in the Middle East for the Arab world, as well as being a major attraction for Western tourists."[29]

ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE ECONOMICALLY

Arab intellectuals occasionally argue that a test of Israel's intentions toward them should be based on its willingness to provide them with technology and cooperate with them in good faith. Table 11 (see next page) indicates that the Lebanese and Jordanian professionals surveyed are not optimistic that Israel would provide them with much technology for their economic development.

A mere 3 percent of Lebanese and 7 percent of Jordanian respondents believe that Israel will satisfy Arab technological needs, and that less than one-quarter of all respondents believe that even some of their technological needs will be met. The majority view is that Israel will provide the Arabs with only token technology.

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and Nicolson, 1989).

[26] *The Eight O'Clock News*, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, December 13, 1993.

[27] Bisat and Hammour, *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, 173.

[28] Gil Feiler, "Cooperation in Tourism in the Middle East," in *Middle East Regional Cooperation: Prospects and Problems*, proceedings of a conference held in Cairo from March 29-31, 1993 by the National Center for Middle East Studies and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 158.

[29] Ibid.

TABLE 11

ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH ARABS[30]

Question 1: *How much development technology will Israel transfer to the Arabs after peace?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
All the technology needed	3%	7%
Some needed technology	28%	16%
Only token technology	69%	76%

Question 2: *How much economic cooperation will Israel provide?*

	Lebanese	Jordanians
Maximum cooperation	4%	10%
Satisfactory cooperation	19%	23%
Manipulation	30%	28%
Maximum manipulation	46%	39%

These responses correspond to Arab views such as those expressed by Lebanese economist and former cabinet member Elias Saba, who theorizes that the 1973 war convinced Israelis that military superiority and control of Arab lands were no longer sufficient to guarantee their security. As a result, Saba writes, Israel "wants to augment her military superiority with economic hegemony. . . . [and] has ambitions beyond its claims about the desire to live in peace among the Arabs."[31] An editorial in a leading pan-Arab newspaper, though couched in less strident language, reveals a similar view:

> There is no doubt that Israel will withhold technology from the Arabs. Israel's technological superiority provides her with power and the ability to play a dominant role in the Middle East. It is only normal that Israel will endeavor to maintain her technological edge.[32]

Only a minority of those polled expect Israel to cooperate in good faith with its Arab neighbors. Most respondents expect Israel to use manipulative tactics in its economic dealings with the Arabs. Jordanian Minister of Trade Ali Abu al-Raghib, for example, echoed some of these sentiments when he charged that Israel "wants to penetrate neighboring markets without giving access to its own."[33]

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[30] Sample size is 408 Lebanese (Question 1) and 409 Lebanese (Question 2) surveyed in November 1993 and 246 Jordanians (Question 1) and 250 Jordanians (Question 2) polled in March 1995.

[31] Elias Saba, "Al-Watan al-'Arabi wa Tahaddiyat al-Taswiya," *Al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi*, no. 195 (May 1995): 8-9.

[32] *Al-Hayat*, February 28, 1992.

[33] *Middle East Reporter* 128, no. 4115, May 12, 1995.

These negative perceptions are more the product of stereotyping than of analytical evaluation. Nearly five decades of open hostility have prevented meaningful interaction and communication between Arabs and Israelis. In the absence of countervailing information, a mixture of reality and fantasy legitimized and sanctified the conflict. In the process, reasoning gave way to conspiratorial thinking that, in the minds of many Arabs, depicts Israelis as lacking ordinary human decency. This, combined with Arab perceptions of themselves as militarily and technologically inferior to Israel, will require Israel to display considerable understanding of the Arab psyche in the initial period of peace and undertake a tactful process of "wooing" the Arabs by dealing with them in an exemplary fashion.

V   RELIGIOSITY AND OPPOSITION TO PEACE

The Koran states that all aspects of life must be regulated according to the tenets of Islam. The difference between fundamentalist Muslims and their highly religious[1] but *non*-fundamentalist brethren is the former's belief that the state is responsible for regulating its citizens' public and private lives according to those tenets—and that governments that fail or refuse to do so are apostate regimes. In addition, fundamentalist Muslims are more inclined to actively seek the overthrow of such "illegitimate" governments and are often willing to use violence to do so.

The preceding polling data seem to indicate that Arabs' opposition to the peace process is directly related to their degree of religiosity. A more sophisticated understanding of this relationship, however, requires a comparison of the perceptions of fundamentalist Muslims to those of highly religious non-fundamentalist Muslims.[2]

Previous Political Affiliation. In Table 12 (see below), nearly three-quarters of highly religious non-fundamentalist Muslims reported no previous political affiliation, as compared to only one-third of fundamentalists. This would seem to indicate that fundamentalists are pre-disposed to political activism independent of their adherence to Islam.

TABLE 12

HIGHLY RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS' PREVIOUS POLITICAL AFFILIATION[3]

Question: *What was your previous political affiliation?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Communist party	8%	2%
Arab nationalist	24%	5%
Syrian Socialist Nationalist	6%	3%
Muslim fundamentalist	—	3%
PLO Fatah faction	12%	5%
Leftist Palestinian groups	15%	8%
None	35%	74%

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[1]   For the purposes of this study, highly religious Muslims were defined as those who attend dawn prayer at a mosque. See research methodologies in Appendix, p. 52.

[2]   See research methodologies in Appendix for an explanation of how highly-religious respondents were placed into each category and for a breakdown of the overall sample for Tables 12-16 by nationality and Muslim sect.

[3]   Sample size in Table 12 is 974 (500 fundamentalists and 474 non-fundamentalists).

The fact that only 3 percent of non-fundamentalist respondents reported a previous affiliation with a fundamentalist movement would seem to indicate that the attrition rate in such groups is negligible (unless departing members sharply reduce the intensity of their religiosity, which is unlikely). Conversely, the fact that the majority of fundamentalists with previous political affiliations were members of essentially leftist or nationalist movements may signal a reactionary trend in Arab social and political values. All of these movements, however, share a pronounced rejection of the Arab status quo and the possibility of peace with Israel.

Satisfaction with the Peace Process. In Table 13 (see below), both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist respondents were nearly unanimous in their dissatisfaction with Arab achievements in the peace process. More significant, however, were the sharp variances in their respective reasons for being dissatisfied. The fundamentalists' most frequent response was that Israel has no right to exist, which would seem to preclude the possibility of ever making peace with Israel.

TABLE 13

RELIGIOSITY AND SATISFACTION WITH THE PEACE PROCESS[4]

Question 1: *Are you satisfied with Arab achievements in the peace process?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Yes	—	7%
No	100%	85%
Unsure	—	8%

Question 2: *If you are not satisfied, what is the primary reason?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Conflict has not run its full course	7%	43%
Israel has no right to exist	44%	8%
Peace means Arab surrender	9%	21%
Peace hinders the spread of Islam	35%	5%
Arabs too weak to get honorable deal	6%	23%

One-third of fundamentalists were concerned that peace could hinder the growth of Islam in the Arab world and that secular Arab regimes would ally themselves with Israel to destroy Islamic political movements. Fundamentalists therefore want to preempt this possibility by sabotaging the peace agreements.[5]

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[4] Sample size in Question 1 is 1,000 (500 fundamentalists and 500 non-fundamentalists); in Question 2, it is 925 (500 fundamentalists and 425 non-fundamentalists).
[5] Nizar Abd al-Qadir, "Al-Amn al-Israili fi al-Bu'd al-Istratiji al-Jadid," *Al-Difa' al-Watani al-*

In contrast, many non-fundamentalists believe that peace is merely premature. Their most frequently cited reason was that the conflict with Israel has not run its full course. Approximately 20 percent of non-fundamentalists perceive the current peace process as capitulation compelled by Israeli strength and Arab weakness, and nearly as many are concerned that this will preclude reaching a good deal with Israel. These responses imply a belief that the Arabs might reach a better deal if peace were postponed until circumstances change in the future. By comparison, a mere 5 percent cite Islamic concerns.

Lebanon's non-fundamentalist Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, for example, has repeatedly condemned what it describes as Israeli expansionism and manipulation of Arabs, but has never advocated the destruction of Israel. Despite charging Israel with every conceivable act of evil, their reaction to the peace process is to call for improving the bargaining position of Arabs in the negotiations.[6]

Willingness to Give Peace a Chance. Governments conclude peace agreements, but people make them work. Table 14 (see below and on opposite page) indicates that the vast majority of fundamentalist and two-thirds of non-fundamentalist respondents are unwilling to give peace a chance. The considerable minority of non-fundamentalists who are unsure may indicate a lack of information as well as political indecision.

TABLE 14

RELIGIOSITY AND WILLINGNESS TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE[7]

Question 1: *Would you give peace with Israel time to prove its value?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Yes	5%	12%
No	90%	67%
Unsure	6%	21%

Most non-fundamentalists who are unwilling to give the peace process an opportunity to prove its value prefer to simply ignore Israel and boycott its products. Actively campaigning against peace—that is, mobilizing public opposition to peace and normalization—is almost equally popular among both groups. Jordanian fundamentalists, for example, have used

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Lubnani, no. 11 (January 1995): 71. Abd al-Qadir, commander of the Lebanese military academy, confirms the fears of fundamentalists, whose aggressiveness he says "may compel Arab leaders to coordinate their efforts with Israel's in order to stop the fundamentalist threat."

[6] See, for example, the contents of the association's magazine, *Manar al-Huda,* no. 29, March 1995.

[7] In Question 1, total sample size is 1,000 (split evenly); in Question 2, it is 752 (435 fundamentalists and 317 non-fundamentalists).

professional associations and labor unions to pull less-religious Jordanians into the anti-peace camp.[8]

Question 2: *If not, what would be your primary reaction to peace?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Ignore Israel and boycott its goods	12%	58%
Campaign actively against peace	22%	26%
Donate to anti-Israel activities	28%	13%
Join in military attacks on Israel	38%	3%

A plurality of fundamentalists, however, says it would participate in military activities against Israel, and slightly less than 30 percent would contribute to non-violent anti-Israel activities. These responses suggest that extremism and violence are not inherent in Islam, but rather result from mixing it with certain political beliefs; the percentage of highly religious non-fundamentalist Muslims who say they will engage in anti-Israel operations is minuscule.

Terrorist Attacks against Israelis. Although the two groups differ on their willingness to personally participate in attacks on Israelis, Table 15 (see below) indicates that they share largely similar views regarding terrorist attacks on Israelis by others. The killing of Israelis remains a source of redemption and pride for both groups, indicating that the state of belligerency is very much alive among highly religious Muslim Arabs, whether they are politicized or not.

TABLE 15

RELIGIOSITY AND REACTION TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ISRAELIS[9]

Question: *How do you feel when there is a terrorist attack against Israelis?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
Redeemed	70%	45%
Proud	30%	41%
Sorrow for human losses	—	2%
Need for a peace agreement	—	3%
No reaction	—	9%

Though terrorist attacks are a tactic intended to disrupt the peace negotiations (which the fundamentalists view as a charade by which Israel seeks to control the Middle East and impose its will on the Arabs), proponents of violence stress that their ultimate goal is the total elimination of Israel. A spokesman for Hamas, for example, defended the

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[8] *Middle East Reporter* 76, no. 831, April 29, 1995.
[9] Total sample size is 1,000 (split evenly).

suicide bombing of a civilian bus in Tel Aviv by emphasizing that "it is part of our religious duty to combat Zionism until it is eradicated."[10] Similarly, Hezbollah (Party of God) Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah assured new recruits that the party "is committed to fighting until [Israel] disappears from the map of the region."[11]

In addition, some fundamentalists go to the extreme of threatening to assassinate Muslim leaders who sign peace agreements with Israel. The Islamic Liberation (Tahrir) party, for example, an ultra-fundamentalist group active in Lebanon and Jordan, issued a statement denouncing the Israel-PLO peace process and vowing that Muslims "shall never forgive [PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's] horrendous treachery and he shall not escape punishment. His fate, as well as any Arab leader who may sign a peace treaty, shall be similar to that of Sadat."[12] Fundamentalists justify such threats against fellow Muslims by asserting that "Islam forbids peace with Israel."[13]

Reaction to Israelis on Television. The 1978 Egypt-Israel peace agreement increased the Arab public's exposure to Israeli political and military officials via television news programs (particularly in the Levant). The 1991 Gulf War greatly reinforced that development, and the current peace process has further accelerated the trend.

Table 16 (see below) seems to indicate that familiarity with Israelis does not reduce hostility toward them among either fundamentalist or non-fundamentalist Muslims. It is interesting to note, however, that the former—being politically more attentive—also seem more interested than the latter in what Israelis have to say about the peace process.

TABLE 16

RELIGIOSITY AND REACTION TO ISRAELIS ON TELEVISION[14]

Question 1: *What is your reaction to seeing Israeli officials on television?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
I boil with anger	28%	15%
They are my enemies	49%	43%
I ignore what they say	17%	35%
They are self-interested politicians	5%	5%
They are reasonable politicians	—	1%

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[10] *Al-Safir*, October 26, 1994.

[11] *Al-Hayat*, February 25, 1995.

[12] "Kalla lil-Salam Ma' al-'Aduw al-Suhyuni" ("No Peace with the Zionist Enemy"), leaflet distributed by the Islamic Liberation (Tahrir) party, May 4, 1994.

[13] *Al-Majd*, December 26, 1994.

[14] Sample size is 1,000 (split evenly).

Question 2: *What is your reaction to seeing ordinary Israelis on television discussing issues other than the Arab-Israeli conflict?*

	Fundamentalists	Non-Fundamentalists
I boil with anger	30%	27%
They are my enemies	34%	31%
I listen to what they say	5%	11%
I change the channel	9%	25%
I turn off the television	23%	6%

A significant proportion of respondents, particularly fundamentalists, say they become extremely angry when they see Israeli officials on television. This confirms the strength of the emotional dimension of the conflict and the difficulty in forming objective evaluations of Israelis—not even one fundamentalist respondent (and only 1 percent of non-fundamentalists) described Israeli officials as reasonable.

In addition to government officials, Israeli academics and celebrities occasionally appear on television programs in other countries that are subsequently broadcast on Arab stations. Even when these Israelis do not discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict, the responses to Question 2 indicate that they fare no better than politicians or military commanders. Anger and enmity are still the two most frequent reactions among both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist respondents, and the gap between the two groups is even more narrow in response to ordinary citizens than to government officials.

Roughly one-quarter of non-fundamentalists display a milder form of aversion to non-official Israelis by saying they simply change the channel; a nearly equal percentage of fundamentalists are so annoyed that they turn the television off completely. A small fraction of non-fundamentalists (and even a smaller percentage of fundamentalists) say they try to appreciate what the Israelis say.

The data suggest that even intense Islamic religiosity need not be an absolute barrier to Arab-Israeli peace, but that fundamentalism would almost certainly raise just such a barrier. The implications of these and other findings are particularly important because highly religious Muslims (both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist) constitute a large and probably growing segment of certain Arab societies.

VI CONCLUSIONS

In many ways, the long and seemingly intractable conflict between Israel and the Arab states is finally abating as the logic of coexistence replaces thoughts of war. Arab governments increasingly recognize that belligerency has not succeeded in achieving often unrealistic goals, which are gradually being modified to address pressing domestic problems such as malfunctioning economies, political opposition (primarily from Islamic fundamentalists), and regime stability.

Though the accomplishments of the last few years represent a genuine breakthrough in the cycle of violence and mistrust between Arabs and Israelis, the future of relations between the two groups must yet overcome formidable challenges if it is to realize these unprecedented opportunities. Simply put, further progress in the peace process is urgently needed.

Most Arab leaders still may not perceive peace as a long-term strategic choice, but rather as an accommodation to world conditions. Though Israel's military superiority, endemic inter-Arab divisions, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have forced them to accept the reality of Israel's existence and the need to negotiate peace with it, they have done very little to prepare their people for the implications of peace beyond its formal requirements.

The need for resocialization is confirmed by the sobering results of three years of research on popular attitudes toward peace with Israel among Lebanese, Syrians, Jordanians, and expatriate Palestinians. These ordinary Arab citizens show little understanding of the implications of peace or appreciation of its possible benefits. To many, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not ending as much as being transformed. They view peace as surrender, continue to see Israel as illegitimate, believe the conflict has yet to run its course and consider peace with Israel as a truce rather than a genuine end to hostilities.

Though they grudgingly accept their leaders' decisions to end the state of war with Israel, the vast majority are opposed to normalizing relations with it. They abhor the thought of personal interaction with Israelis and are only slightly less averse to conducting business with them. Most are suspicious of Israel's economic objectives and see it as a rising economic superpower that will dwarf the Arab economies and transform them into economic satellites.

DEFUSING THE ISLAMIST THREAT

Though resistance to personal and economic interaction with Israelis may ultimately prove detrimental to the peace process, the more

immediate challenge comes from highly religious (and particularly fundamentalist) Muslims who refuse to accept Israel as a political reality, are unmoved by official Arab recognition of it, and vow to continue their struggle against Israel until it is eradicated.

Popular support for these views has arguably been enhanced by the response from pro-peace Arab regimes, which have used their traditional monopoly on political power to repress Islamist opposition movements. Thus, the future of Arab-Israeli relations may hinge less on formal peace agreements than on the strength of these fundamentalist groups. If they succeed in gaining power in their respective countries, they will revive dormant hopes for renewing the confrontation with Israel.

One way to weaken these groups is for Arab governments to accommodate as many social forces as possible in the political system. Though power sharing in the absence of institutionalized forms of governance is admittedly problematic, Arab ruling elites should realize that their political survival hinges upon tolerating pluralism.

Arab governments are fragile because they lack popular legitimacy. Thus, peace at the official level—though significant—is not sufficient. Until Arab regimes legitimize themselves by broadening the base of national politics and introducing liberalization and accountability, they could continue to lose ground to Islamic fundamentalists.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC INTERACTION

Peace treaties cannot survive in a political vacuum; they become viable only when ordinary people accept them and immerse themselves in their implementation. Entrenched beliefs supersede formal agreements unless the latter are augmented by political, economic, and cultural interaction. Historical experience indicates that previous peace treaties that were not cemented with comprehensive economic ties often give way to renewed conflict. The last 500 years saw the conclusion and abrogation of some 8,000 peace treaties. The peace that has characterized Europe and Asia since World War II proves the case: it has endured and indeed expanded largely due to the introduction of massive economic programs among the former belligerents.

The Middle East peace agreements call for similar links of interstate economic activity in which Israel will likely assume a significant role. Economic transactions, however, require recognition and resolution of mutual sources of hesitation and apprehension. Careful and conscientious economic planning will go a long way toward assuaging the concerns of skeptical Arab minds. Extensive economic linkages between Arabs and Israelis will make the cost of military confrontation prohibitive to all parties.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

As the remaining superpower and the chief intermediary in the Middle East peace process, the United States will undoubtedly continue to play an active role in its sustenance and consolidation. Moreover, it stands as an example of an ethnically and racially diverse country that functions well as a multicultural society.

One useful way to bolster the peace process is for the numerous private American research institutions conducting studies on conflict resolution to apply their vast political and academic experience to promoting cooperation among Arabs and Israelis. This would include sponsoring programs on peace education, encouraging academic institutions in the region to establish degree-granting peace-education programs in their curricula, and holding conferences in the region as well as in Europe and the United States.

Popular Arab views on peace and normalization with Israel result more from stereotyping and emotion than realism and critical evaluation. American officials and academics should urge Arab regimes to be more forthright with their own populations about the benefits of peace while at the same time discarding flawed policies that nurture religious radicalism and other anti-peace protest movements.

Public and private American institutions can provide similar assistance with educational reform and liberalization of the mass media. Arab educational systems need reform in areas such as teacher training, program evaluation, and textbook development. Emphasis must shift from rote learning to analysis. Textbooks must acknowledge and accept religious diversity, promote tolerance, deemphasize dogma, and expose students to differing opinions.

Similarly, the Arab media must be encouraged to discuss and debate the merits of peace. As it stands now, many Arab journalists and scholars are either afraid or unable to find a medium to express favorable views. Sponsorship of new publications that commit themselves to the cause of peace would help to introduce a new, iconoclastic approach to the treatment of Arab-Israeli affairs.

APPENDIX

RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

CHAPTERS II AND III (TABLES 1-6)

1993 Study on Arab Readiness for Peace with Israel

The opinions reported in this study represented those of 1,000 Muslim respondents (500 Lebanese, 250 Syrians, and 250 Palestinians) interviewed during the period from March 10 to July 5, 1993. The sample included eight subgroups, six selected on the basis of quota sampling (necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not possible) and two selected randomly.

The six quota subgroups included 200 Lebanese professionals (divided equally between Sunnis and Shi'a), 100 Syrian laborers working in Beirut, 150 Syrian professionals residing in Damascus, and 250 Palestinian professionals (of whom 100 live in Beirut and the remainder in Amman). The two random subgroups made up of Lebanese Sunni and Shi'i college students (150 in each subgroup) were selected from two private academic institutions: the Beirut University College and the American University of Beirut. The low proportion of women in the study (150 respondents, 55 percent of whom were Lebanese college students) reflects their small professional role in the Arab world.

Non-response rates came to 4 percent for Lebanese participants, 6 percent for Palestinian participants, and 12 percent for Syrian participants. Fifteen highly trained graduate students at the American University of Beirut collected the data.

The author and graduate students developed the research instrument collaboratively. Included in the questionnaire were eight items that operationalize the three components of Arab reactions to the peace process with Israel (the specific wording of these items appears in the text of the study). A pretest of thirty-five interviewees provided results that helped rewrite vague questions and omit leading questions. Two standard reliability checks were applied (internal consistency test and response bias test) to the data; all inconsistent responses were deleted from the analysis.

In addition, the intensity of religiosity was measured (as an independent variable) by six queries on (1) reading of the Koran, (2) praying, (3) fasting during Ramadan, (4) offering contributions to the needy, (5) involvement in public religious events, and (6) participation in private religious teaching sessions.

1994 Follow-up Study on Arab Readiness for Peace with Israel

The opinions reported in this study represent 1,205 respondents questioned between October 15, 1994, and January 6, 1995. Of these, 995 were Muslims and 210 Maronite Christians. The respondents were broken down by nationality according to the following distribution: 630 Lebanese, 245 Syrians, 180 Palestinians, and 150 Jordanians. Nonresponses rates came to 5 percent for Lebanese, 6 percent for Palestinians, 8 percent for Jordanians, and 9 percent for Syrians.

The sample includes ten subgroups, seven selected on the basis of quota sampling (necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not possible) and three selected randomly. The seven quota subgroups include 255 Lebanese professionals (divided equally among Sunnis, Shi'a, and Maronites), 245 Syrian professionals residing in Damascus, and 180 Palestinian professionals (divided equally between residents in Beirut and Amman). Unlike the earlier survey, Syrian laborers were replaced by Jordanian professionals and Lebanese Maronite professionals and college students.

The three random subgroups made up of Lebanese Sunni, Shi'i, and Maronite college students (125 respondents for each subgroup) were selected from two private academic institutions: the Lebanese-American University (formerly Beirut University College) in West Beirut and Notre Dame University in East Beirut. The low proportion of women in the study (185 respondents, 59 percent of whom are Lebanese college students) is an indication of the small professional role they play in the Arab world.

Twenty-five highly trained students (17 of them graduate students) at the American University of Beirut collected the data. In addition to the questions asked in the earlier survey, they asked seven new questions pertaining to interaction with Israelis (see Table 6). The new questions were discussed at length with the group of field workers until their format was agreed upon by the entire group. It was deemed unnecessary to pretest the instrument since this had already been done in the previous study. The same reliability measures applied to the previous study were used in the present one.

CHAPTER IV (TABLES 7-11)

1993 Study on Lebanese Professionals'
Views on Economic Normalization

The data, which were collected in November 1993, came from a stratified random sample of 410 Lebanese professionals. The sampling frame included 32,000 professionals from twenty-five occupations. The information was provided by the Lebanese Institute of Documentation and Research. The occupations were subsequently grouped into five categories for reasons of data manageability: banking, manufacturing, services, commerce, and politics. The sample comprised 234 Muslims and 176 Christians, broken down according to the following percentage distribution by sect: 32.8 percent Sunnis, 23.3 percent Maronites, 14.7 percent Shi'a, 12.7 percent Orthodox, 9.6 percent Druze, and 6.9 percent Catholics. Women constituted only 5 percent of the sample size, which can be attributed to their weak representation in Lebanon's professional occupations. The rate of non-responses was lower than 5 percent of all attempted interviews.

The research instrument was developed by the author in collaboration with his students in a graduate seminar on research design and methodology. It included three background questions (age, religion, occupation) and six questions related to different aspects of economic normalization. The instrument was pretested before formal administration. The nineteen participants in the seminar administered the instrument after they were thoroughly trained on standard interviewing techniques. All interviews took place in metropolitan Beirut, where most (and particularly influential) Lebanese professionals reside. Conventional reliability checks were applied to the data to ensure their consistency, non-bias, and congruence with reality; the results attested to high reliability levels.

1995 Study of Jordanian Professionals'
Views on Economic Normalization

This study is a replication of a previous one on Lebanese professionals' views on economic normalization with Israel. The sample includes 250 Jordanian respondents (no attempt was made to classify respondents by national origin such as Jordanian versus Palestinian). Christians constituted 20 percent (probably somewhat over-represented) of the respondents, and women 8 percent. Respondents were selected on the basis of quota sampling. The data were collected during March 1995 by six well-trained college students. The non-completion rate was about 10 percent of all interviews attempted. Reliability checks verified the accuracy of the responses.

CHAPTER V (TABLES 12-16)

1995 Study of Highly Religious Muslims' Views on Peace

This study is based on a quota sample of 1,000 highly religious Muslim respondents from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The all-male sample is divided equally between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist respondents according to the following breakdown: 600 Lebanese divided equally between Sunnis and Shi'a (who are in turn divided equally between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists); 200 Jordanians divided equally between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists; 100 fundamentalist Palestinians from 'Ain al-Hilwa refugee camp in southern Lebanon; and 100 non-fundamentalists from Damascus.

The data were collected between the months of February and April 1995 by 25 well-trained interviewers, in an atmosphere of strict confidentiality. Non-fundamentalists were located and interviewed in mosques after the dawn prayer. Only highly religious Muslims arise this early to go to mosques to perform this important religious duty. Fundamentalist respondents were approached with assistance from their movements. Interviews took place in movements' offices. Non-response rates were 14 percent for fundamentalists and 6 percent for non-fundamentalists.

The research instrument included eight questions for operationalizing respondents' views on four peace-related issues: (1) satisfaction with the current drive for peace, (2) willingness to give peace a chance, (3) reaction to suicide attacks against Israelis, and (4) affective evaluation of Israelis. The instrument also included one background question to identify whether respondents had a previous political affiliation. The instrument was pretested (by conducting forty interviews) for vague or leading questions. The consistency test was used to ensure the reliability of the data. The instrument was designed in consultation with four Muslim clerics, two fundamentalists, and two non-fundamentalists.

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