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**BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND IDEOLOGY:
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN,
1989-1994**

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For Salwa.

PREFACE

Much has been written about the possibility of “Islamic government” in the Middle East and the larger Muslim world. But what would such government be like in practice? That crucial question lies at the heart of this paper.

Today, Islamists¹—those who believe that Islam must govern all aspects of public and private life—already hold power in Iran and Sudan, having achieved it through revolution and coup respectively. However, for a variety of reasons, neither of these can adequately serve as a paradigm of “Islamic government.” Indeed, such is the diversity of Islam in general and Islamism in particular that it is misleading to speak of paradigmatic cases at all. Iran and Sudan are countries whose politics are shaped chiefly by their specific circumstances—history, geography, demography, religious peculiarities and leadership personalities—and less, if at all, by any general characteristics of Islamism. Neither serves as a model of broader Islamist aspiration.

The movement of Islamist political parties into mainstream political life in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia has been less intensively documented than the cases whereby Islamism has achieved power through violent or revolutionary means. Nevertheless, this process is taking place, even under the most unlikely of

¹ “Islamism” is used here to describe the phenomenon that has been variously labelled as “Islamic fundamentalism,” “Islamic revivalism,” and so on; an “Islamist” is one who adheres to Islamism. While the term “Islam” denotes the religious tenets of a faith, “Islamism” denotes a political ideology that holds that all areas of life must be regulated by reference to Islam or at least one interpretation of it. Islamism has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement established in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 and the Jamaat al-Islami movement established on the Indian subcontinent by Abul-Ala Maududi in 1941. See John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.120. The terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” may confuse non-specialists, leading them to believe that Islamism and Islam are identical. However, whether or not Islamism is “authentically” Islamic is a question beyond the scope of this paper.

circumstances. For example, Hezbollah operates as a legal political party, holding more seats than any other in the Lebanese parliament; similarly, elements of Hamas have indicated a willingness to participate in some forms of elections for the Palestinian National Authority, even as it opposed the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles.

If Islamists reach power in the future, it is more likely to be through ballots than bullets. In this scenario, a country undergoing a process of democratization would elect Islamists to share power, at least initially, with the existing regime and/or other opposition groups. Islamist movements from the Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan have shown that they are willing (perhaps even eager) to participate in such a process and that they can generate the support necessary to play a major role in popular representative politics.

Given these considerations, there is surely much to be learned from a study of the Islamist experience in Jordan. Islamists have, after all, held cabinet posts in Jordan and a plurality of seats in two successive parliaments. If Jordan's MB has produced no thinker to match the influence of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyed Qutb, it has achieved practical political successes that have long eluded its counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world. By participating in democratization, making its views freely known, and maintaining a popular base of support, the Jordanian Islamist movement has developed without the constraint of constant state interference.

This is not to suggest that Jordan is the paradigmatic case; far from it, since in the diversity of the Islamist world no case is a useful paradigm. Every country, every situation, is different and the role of an Islamist group in a given Muslim society must be examined within its own specific context. Research of this sort should therefore aim to produce case studies, not models.

This study focuses on the statements and actions of members of the MB and the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which effectively serves as the MB's parliamentary wing. These are the most powerful Islamist groups in Jordan, and the overlap between them is so great that they may, for practical purposes, be considered one and the same organization. There are more extreme Islamist groups in Jordan, such as the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party), but these enjoy extremely limited support and are unlikely ever to play a part in mainstream political life.²

The study covers a five-year period beginning with the elections of November 1989 and ending with the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty in October 1994.

² The Hizb al-Tahrir is by no means exclusively Jordanian; comparable Islamist groups who call for the restoration of the caliphate can be found throughout the Muslim world. For a specific account of the Hizb al-Tahrir in Jordan, see N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 97-98.

The question at the center of this research is whether the policies espoused by Jordan's Islamists are motivated primarily by ideology or pragmatism. Neither term is employed here with positive or negative connotations. In this context, "ideological" positions are those held as a matter of dogma; they are impervious to change regardless of circumstances or consequences. Conversely, "pragmatic" positions are those dictated more by considerations of practical consequences than by theory or dogma; they are therefore flexible and sensitive to circumstance—that is, vulnerable to the dynamic of politics.

Sabah El-Said

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), represent the most powerful political movement in Jordan today. Their statements and actions over the past five years—in government and in opposition—offer insight into how the Islamists might conduct domestic and foreign affairs if they come to power.

A key determinant in Islamist policymaking is the degree to which dedication to ideology predominates over pragmatism. The indicators of ideologically driven policy are organizational unity, consistency over time, and congruence between rhetoric and action. An assessment of the degree of pragmatism displayed on five core topics—government and domestic politics, foreign policy (including the Arab-Israeli peace process), economics, women, and minorities—indicates the extent to which a possible Islamist government might be willing to compromise on certain issues.

An analysis of official statements and actions over the past five years indicates that the MB and the IAF have demonstrated the greatest pragmatism regarding government and domestic politics, while their positions on the Arab-Israeli peace process and women's role in society have been driven by strict ideology and are the least flexible and pragmatic.

Domestic Politics: Alliances with non-Islamist parties and candidates—including Christians—and periodic policy shifts on issues such as the compatibility of Islam and democracy and Islamist participation in the cabinet underscore a tendency within the MB toward flexibility on domestic issues. This flexibility appears to indicate tactical moderation within the ultimate objective of complete Islamization of Jordanian society. In fact, the Islamists viewed fluctuating support in the elections in 1989 and 1993 as strategic lessons suggesting what to do similarly or differently next time.

Economics: The principal determinants of Islamist economic policy in Jordan are ideological. The MB and IAF blame all Jordanian economic problems on the corruption and greed ascribed to the ruling

elite and advocate banking system reform and institutionalized *zakat* (alms) as mechanisms to cure financial woes. An emphasis on social justice and rejection of both non-Jordanian institutions and external interference in Jordanian life remain consistent throughout Islamist policy. The only exception is assistance from and cooperation among Arab nations. MB and IAF leaders, however, espouse only vague and internally inconsistent economic policies and proposals; for example, when MB ministers served in government, they did not press for scuttling Jordan's tough economic reform program. Their policy pronouncements are ideologically driven but their record of action indicates more pragmatism.

Women: The MB and IAF are guided by narrow, strict approaches to gender issues. While they affirm the formal equality of men and women "within the limits set by Islam," Islamists made no secret of their advocacy of gender segregation in their 1989 election platform. The single-minded pursuit of separation between the sexes by the Islamists in Jordan suggests that their ideas are shaped by ideology and are not amenable to pragmatic considerations.

Minorities: Islamists call for accommodating non-Muslims but also for combating foreign institutions and influences. The MB and IAF have given no indication that, should they come to power, the restrictive *dhimmi* status for the country's minorities would not be revived. Islamists take a pragmatic view of *sharia*-mandated criminal punishments. Jordanian Islamist leaders have said that cutting off the hand of a thief, for example, in accordance with Islamic law cannot be implemented until the standard of living is raised for the poor. In practice, the MB has demonstrated an ability to change its tack with regard to minorities.

Foreign Policy: MB members have never held responsibility for or played a role in Jordanian foreign policy making; when they served in cabinet, they held only domestic portfolios. An overall review of MB and IAF statements on a number of foreign policy issues—e.g., the Gulf War and relations with the United States—reveals that they are driven by a mixture of pragmatism and ideology. For example, the MB initially criticized Iraq for invading Kuwait and sided with the Kuwaitis, but the build-up of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia triggered strident support for Iraq. The most prominent issue in which Jordanian Islamists have been clear and consistent is their total opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. On this issue, there has been no suggestion of compromise or flexibility.

Despite their ideological origin, Jordanian Islamists have had to become adept at the politics of compromise in order to proceed toward their ultimate goal of the complete Islamization of society. Still, Jordan's Islamists remain inflexible on two key issues: their opposition to any peace with Israel and their attitudes toward women's role in society.

I INTRODUCTION

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the oldest, largest and best organized Islamist group in Jordan. It was founded in 1945; King Abdallah himself patronized the opening of its general offices.¹ When political parties were dissolved in 1957, the MB was exempted, as it was deemed a charitable and social organization. Jordan's MB certainly has those functions: it runs charitable foundations such as the Islamic Center Charitable Association, which established the Islamic Hospital; educational institutions in Amman and Zarqa; and alms committees in refugee camps and villages.² Nevertheless, there has always been a significant political dimension to its work.

Muslim Brothers took part in the parliamentary elections of 1962 and 1967.³ The MB continued to operate legally after the dissolution of parliament in 1967 and, when the government announced plans to hold elections in 1989⁴—the first full parliamentary elections since the June 1967 war—the MB was well-prepared to participate, unlike any other organization.⁵ MB candidates running under the banner of the “Islamic Movement” won twenty-one out of eighty seats in these elections, with thirteen other Islamist candidates sympathetic to the MB also winning seats.⁶ By a significant margin, they constituted the

¹ 'Awni Obaidi, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine, 1945-1970* (Jordan, 1991), p. 41; see also Hani Hourani, Taleb Awad, Hamed Dabbas and Sa'eda Kilani, *Islamic Action Front Party (IAF)* (Jordan: al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Centre, 1993), p. 9.

² *Al-Shira'*, interview with Ziad Abu Ghanimah, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, pp. 25-27.

³ For an analysis of the MB to the late 1980s, see *al-Shira'*, interview with S. Suways, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 22.

⁴ For a concise account of democratization and elections in Jordan, see Kathrine Rath, “The Process of Democratization in Jordan,” *Middle Eastern Studies* (July 1994): pp. 530-57.

⁵ The organizational and parliamentary strength of the MB had been anticipated by observers. See, for example, Robert Satloff, “*They Cannot Stop Our Tongues*”: *Islamic Activism in Jordan*, Policy Paper Number 5 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1986).

⁶ Kamel Abu-Jaber and Schirin Fathi, “The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections,”

largest bloc in Jordan's lower parliamentary chamber, the House of Representatives.

Reflecting the MB's parliamentary strength, a Muslim Brother was elected speaker of the House and held the post for most of the four-year parliamentary session. This was an unprecedented development. Even more noteworthy was the fact that Prime Minister Mudar Badran invited Islamist leaders to join his government in late 1990/early 1991, offering them seven ministries: Education, Health, Justice, Social Development, Islamic Endowments and Affairs, Transport and Communications, and Agriculture.¹ The portfolios in question were accepted by five Muslim Brothers—respectively, Abdallah Akayilah, Adnan Jaljouli, Majed Khalifa, Yusuf al-Azm, and Ibrahim al-Kilani—and two independent Islamists—respectively, Jamal Saraireh and Muhammad al-Alawinah.

The Islamists' triumph was short-lived, however. Following the Gulf War and against the background of increasing momentum toward an Arab-Israeli peace conference, the Badran cabinet was dissolved in July 1991² and no Muslim Brother has since held a ministerial post.

The Islamic Action Front (IAF) was formed in 1992 as a way for the MB to avoid strict regulations mandated by a new election law promulgated by the government. Although the IAF claims to have no administrative or financial links with the MB, its membership is drawn almost exclusively from the Muslim Brothers. Despite initial statements to the effect that the IAF would be a front for Islamists of all hues, it has been so completely dominated by the MB that it has in effect served as the MB's political wing.³ Thus the MB did not put forward candidates for the 1993 elections; the IAF ran in its stead. It secured sixteen out of eighty seats, while independent Islamists won six seats.⁴ From a thirty-four-strong bloc elected in 1989, Islamists account for only twenty-two deputies in the current parliament.

This decrease was due in part to Jordan's new "one man, one vote" electoral system, in part to more cohesive voting by the kingdom's tribes, and in part to the legacy of the Islamists' disappointing performance while in power in 1991. This has been perceived as a setback for the Islamists, although they remain a powerful bloc in parliament and continue to do well in elections for professional and student representative bodies.⁵

Orient 31 (1990): p. 81.

¹ Michael Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Democratising States: A Look At Jordan and Yemen," *Middle East Policy* 2, no. 2 (1993): pp. 16-27.

² Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance With The Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori, ed. *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis* (Chicago: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), p. 106.

³ Hourani et al., *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 17-19; see also Ra'ef Nijem's comments on the MB's domination of the IAF in *Jordan Times*, May 20-21, 1993.

⁴ *Jordan Times*, November 9, 1993, p. 1.

⁵ See, for example, *Mideast Mirror (MEM)*, May 18, 1990; *al-Ribat*, October 27, 1992, in

In addition, they are likely to remain influential in the future, given that their supporters are young (on average nineteen to twenty-four years old), well qualified (post-high school education is the norm), and working (either employed or self-employed).¹

In August 1994, the separation of the IAF and the MB was officially announced and Abd al-Majid Thuneibat, the newly-elected controller general of the MB, resigned his seat on the IAF's governing consultative council (Majlis al-Shura).² Some observers suggest that this indicates that the MB will in the future concentrate exclusively on charitable and social work, leaving political activity to the IAF.³

To assess Islamist policies in Jordan, this study focuses on the five key areas most salient to a general inquiry into the possible nature of "Islamic government." For each of these areas, the Islamists' basic position is outlined; evaluated for a congruence between rhetoric and action, for the extent of unity throughout the organization, and consistency over time; and finally graded as to whether ideology or pragmatism predominates. The five areas of inquiry are as follows:

What is the Islamist view of domestic politics? How do Islamists view the role of government and what kind of political arrangements do they advocate? Where do Islamists stand in the "democracy and Islam" debate? How might they be expected to act on the domestic scene should they achieve power?

What is the Islamist view of foreign policy? What has been the Islamist approach to the peace process, to the Palestine question and to Israel? How do they view the West? What did they do during the Gulf War? In inter-Muslim affairs, do they seek a unified Islamic super-state or do they accept the existence of nation-states? What characterizes their thinking on other foreign policy questions and how might they act on the international scene should they achieve power?

What are Islamist economics? What economic model, if any, do they advocate? What have they said about Jordan's economic policies over the past five years?

JPRS-NEA, December 8, 1992, p. 19; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, December 1, 1992, in *ibid.*, p. 20; *Jordan Times*, December 2, 1992, in *FBIS-NES*, December 4, 1992, p. 41.

¹ Profile drawn from an opinion poll conducted in 1993 by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, reported in *MEM*, April 5, 1993, p. 13.

² *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, August 5, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 10, 1994, p. 52. The Majlis al-Shura is a 120-member consultative council, that draws up party policy, deals with budgetary questions and elects the IAF's Executive Bureau. See also Hourani et al., *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 40-50.

³ See *al-Dustur*, August 8, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 10, 1994, p. 53. This view is seconded by Hourani et al., *Islamic Action Front Party*, pp. 17-19.

What is the Islamist view of women? Do they believe that women have rights equal or similar to men? Do they advocate or oppose women's education and employment? Do they prescribe a particular form of dress for women? Under what circumstances do they advocate gender segregation?

What is the Islamist view of minorities? What would be the status of religious minorities in an Islamist Jordan? In terms of issues such as alcohol and *sharia*-mandated criminal punishments (*hudud*), what do the Islamists advocate as the rights and duties of religious minorities?

Taken together, these five areas provide a fairly detailed picture of the Islamist world view and thus a reasonably accurate impression of what Islamists in mainstream Jordanian political life wish to achieve and how they might pursue their goals.¹ Answers to these questions therefore form the outline of a picture of "Islamic government" and provide some indications as to what such government might actually look like in practice.

¹ It is worth pointing out that Islamist thinking on these issues is by no means definitive of broader Islamic thought in Jordan. See, for example, the series of studies carried out in these areas by the Aal al-Bait Foundation (The Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Research, Amman).

II GOVERNMENT AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The core scripture of Islam contains little guidance on political institutions and organization. Indeed, of the Qur'an's 6,000 verses, only eighty deal with legal issues in any sense and these are mainly to do with family and inheritance law; the Qur'an prescribes only four punishments and one procedural rule for proving debts.¹ Only ten verses deal with matters of government.² Despite the existence of a codified *sunna*,³ historical precedent does not fill in the gaps because political arrangements in Muslim countries have varied throughout history and across geography. Muslim political history has traditionally been less concerned with how a leadership is selected than with whether that leadership safeguards the faith and practice of Islam.⁴ In any event, tradition, being various, favors no single means by which to choose a leadership or any overriding criterion for determining its composition.⁵ In terms of concrete precedent, whether scriptural or practical, "Islamic government" is therefore something of a chimera.⁶

This is the background against which the MB and other Islamist groups operate. Although MB candidates ran in the 1989 Jordanian elections on the platform "Islam is the Solution,"⁷ Islam prescribes no particular solution to the question of how human political affairs should be organized. The essential ambiguity of the scripture, the

¹ Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi, "Religious Law and Political Law in Islam," (paper presented to the Europe of Religions International Conference, Vienna, 1994).

² Sadiq al-Mahdi, "Islam: Society and Change," in John Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 233.

³ The practices and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

⁴ See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 68-70.

⁵ A discussion of various Muslim notions of leadership, accompanied by a survey of some of the options and ways in which Muslim leaders have been removed from office, can be found in Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1992), chap. 2.

⁶ For a discussion of what "Islamic government" might refer to, see Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); and P. J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁷ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NEJ*, October 27, 1989, p. 26. See Appendix I.

diversity of post-Muhammadan political history, and Islam's multiplicity of spokesmen together ensure that this is the case.¹

There is no shortage of comment, both by and about Islamists, as to what "Islamic government" might actually mean in terms of political practices and institutions. This is in essence the debate on the "compatibility" of democracy and Islam.² The debate asks whether Islamists who gain power would willingly relinquish it. In the Jordanian context, the question might be posed thus: if the MB achieved a majority in parliament and real legislative authority, would it subject itself to a re-election process and accept the vicissitudes of popular mandate, or would it seek to avoid this by, for example, rewriting the constitution (as foreshadowed by Algerian Islamist leader Abbas Madani's formulation "one man, one vote, one time")?

One can easily adduce verbal evidence lending credence to either model. For example, contrast these two statements by MB representatives:

- 1) If the majority doesn't agree, then let it be Islam is democratic and thus nothing can or will be enforced.³
- 2) If we have a choice between democracy and dictatorship, we choose democracy. But if it's between Islam and democracy, we choose Islam.⁴

In the first statement, MB parliamentarian Abd al-Monim Abu-Zant portrays Islam and democracy as entirely compatible and indeed complementary systems. In the second statement, however, his MB colleague, Ahmed Nofal, postulates a fundamental tension between Islam and democracy and implies the need to choose between the two. The two statements thus illustrate a broad conceptual divergence in the political world view of Jordan's Islamists.

These two statements define the spectrum of the MB's political thought in Jordan. Islamist spokesmen frequently return to one of these two bases. This is not a question of division within the ranks of the MB (although there is a basic split that will be examined below), for even individual Islamists have simultaneously maintained these two quite different positions. For example, contrast the assumptions that underlie this statement by one Islamist in a single interview:

As for the multiparty system and its introduction to the Jordanian economy, I believe that man was born free, and that a sign of his

¹ For a more complete exposition of this argument, see James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

² "Compatibility" is in quotation marks because it can be argued that a political system and a religious faith are two different types of entity and therefore cannot be said to be "compatible" or otherwise.

³ Abd al-Monim Abu-Zant, quoted in *Jordan Times*, November 16-17, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 17, 1989, p. 23.

⁴ Ahmed Nofal, quoted in *Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1993, p. A10.

intellectual maturity is to give him the right to choose. . . . If freedom and multiparties are meant to reveal the truth, then they are unobjectionable and an urgent need. However, if they are meant to be, as in most countries of the world, 'parties just for the sake of having parties,' and for highlighting a certain character, then I think this is selfishness conflicting with the teachings of Islam.¹

In the first sentence, man's freedom of choice is described as unlimited and must therefore include the right to form and vote for political institutions such as parties; the sentence does not admit any restriction on such institutions. By the end of the statement, however, only certain political parties are held to be in harmony with Islam; a clear restriction on freedom of choice is thus held to be Islamic.

It is possible to continue this exercise *ad infinitum*; it is also possible to weight the findings so that one pole appears dominant over the other. But to insist that one tendency must have precedence over the other in an "either/or" competition would be to impose fixed categories of thought on a fluid reality. In theoretical terms at least, this particular debate appears to be open and unresolved. This is most probably because there is in fact no specific accepted model of politics sought by the MB in Jordan.

A recent interview with MB Controller-General Abd al-Majid Thuneibat is illuminating in this respect. Commenting on the MB's position on democracy and violence, he said:

At the present time, we renounce violence as a way of change from any source. We have tried such means. The MB in Syria has tried it. The result was displacement and woes. It has been tried in other countries. We have learned a great deal from that. . . . Therefore, we call for political pluralism, power sharing, and women's right to vote and to be elected.²

This statement goes to the heart of the matter. The MB's position is depicted by its leader as fundamentally pragmatic and capable of change based on experience and circumstance. A willingness to adopt the prevailing forms of discourse in the interest of effecting gradual societal change is the philosophical basis of the MB's political program. This accounts for the diversity of statements available on this issue and is entirely in keeping with the particular nature of the MB movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a gradualist movement seeking to change society from within.³ The Islamists' 1989 election program describes its agenda as: "Reforming the Muslim, then the Muslim

¹ Muhammad al-Alawinah, quoted in *Sawt al-Sha'b*, November 19, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 21, 1989, p. 41.

² *Al-Shuruq*, August 25-31, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 30, 1994, p. 42.

³ For a more detailed account of the MB movement in general, see Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

family, then the Muslim people, then the Muslim government.”¹ This gradualist, albeit total, approach with its long-term perspective lends itself more readily to the politics of accommodation than does the approach of more extreme Islamist groups such as the radical Liberation Party.

At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the MB’s strategic objective—to do whatever it can within the law to attain political power. It seeks political power because it believes this will help it to achieve the over-riding, long-term goal of “Islamizing” Jordanian society. Any model of political organization that can serve as a vehicle toward this greater goal is therefore acceptable; the particular form of politics—authoritarian, democratic, totalitarian—is not of any great concern.

Consequently, the MB can and does use various forms of political discourse to describe its positions. There is no commitment to any particular model of politics or any particular institutional procedure. In the Islamist world view, politics is of interest only insofar as it allows or encourages Muslims to protect or practice their faith.²

The practical record of Islamists in Jordanian political life bears out this proposition. Islamists are sometimes depicted as ideologically intransigent or bent on resisting democratic forms and practices. However, in seeking to “Islamize” Jordanian society, the MB has sought political power and to that end has in fact proved to be a pragmatic player of the political game of parliamentary democracy.

Islamists were the most adept manipulators of the electoral system in the 1989 elections. The voting system then in place allowed electors to vote for as many candidates as there were parliamentary seats in a given voting district. Certain districts also had seats reserved for representatives of Jordan’s minorities, the Christian and Circassian communities.³

Under this system, the well-organized MB was able to form electoral alliances with Christians to defeat communist and left-wing candidates. In the third voting district of Amman, for example, MB candidates supported Fakhri Kawar, a Christian, in order to defeat Communist Party General Secretary Ya’qub Ziyadin. In return, Christians boosted the votes gained by MB candidates.⁴

Such alliances were not confined to elections alone; the MB carried the same pattern into its parliamentary life. Thus, in exchange for Islamist support at election time, their allies regularly abstained or absented themselves from controversial voting sessions in the House or even helped to build a majority vote for Islamists on issues of particular

¹ *Al-Ra’y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 18. See Appendix I.

² For a more complete exposition of this argument, see Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

³ For a detailed analysis of the electoral law and system, see Abu-Jaber and Fathi, “The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections,” pp. 72-74.

⁴ “Jordan Votes the Islamic Ticket,” *The Nation*, December 25, 1989, pp. 786-90.

importance to them.¹ However, the fact that Islamists formed electoral alliances with Christians to defeat leftists does not mean that the MB was implacably opposed to dealing with leftists. As MB leader and Speaker of the Parliament Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat said:

It is true that our religion is against any atheist thought but we would not oppose the formation of and coexistence with other parties, including the Communists.²

Despite their powerful showing in the 1989 elections, Islamists initially held no cabinet posts. One commentator has suggested that this was because the MB deputies at first overplayed their hand—by demanding too much, they ended up with nothing.³ Similarly, in the first contest for speaker of the House, the MB's choice was defeated. The MB quickly learned from this experience, however, as Arabiyyat was elected speaker in November 1990.⁴

Arabiyyat's election over incumbent Suleiman Arar was the first substantial triumph of a broad-based parliamentary bloc forged by the MB and represents a significant turning point in the MB's parliamentary history. Despite sometimes deep ideological differences, Christians, traditionalists, independents, and liberals all supported Arabiyyat in return for Islamist support in other contests. Thus, independent Islamist Atef Btoush stayed out of the contest for the speakership and was in return elected to one of the two deputy speaker posts with MB support. The other deputy speakership went uncontested to a Christian from Arabiyyat's home district of Balqa who had won a seat reserved for Balqa's Christian minority with MB support. Two traditionalists not normally associated with the Islamists were elected assistants to the speaker; they had also voted for Arabiyyat in the speakership contest.⁵ The importance of the MB's coalition with several independent Arab nationalist deputies has also been noted.⁶ In forging and maintaining this parliamentary bloc—Arabiyyat was later re-elected speaker—the MB demonstrated increasing pragmatism and skill in playing the parliamentary game and a willingness to make trade-offs and compromises with potential allies.

Jordan's Islamists have also proven willing to forge alliances over specific issues seen as transcending questions of ideology. For example, since the inauguration of the current phase of the Arab-Israeli peace process in Madrid in 1991, the Islamists have found themselves in the unlikely position of making common cause against peace with parties

¹ *Jordan Times*, November 10, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, November 12, 1993, p. 49.

² *Jordan Times*, January 30, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, February 1, 1990, p. 37.

³ Laurie Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis Policy," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (December 1991): pp. 1-46.

⁴ *MEM*, November 19, 1990, pp. 20-21.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Jordan Times*, November 18, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, November 19, 1990, p. 28.

that have traditionally been anathemas to them, such as the Jordanian Ba'ath and Communist parties.¹ Likewise, during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, Islamists, nationalists, and leftists agreed to form a "National Front" to oppose the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. The MB was willing to coordinate and cooperate with all groups regardless of ideology.²

The MB has not only proven willing and able to make unlikely alliances, but has also displayed considerable sensitivity to public opinion and a readiness to change its policies accordingly. This is strong evidence for the pragmatic nature of the MB regarding domestic political arrangements. The best example of this pragmatism is to be found in the MB's approach to the Gulf crisis which, although strictly a foreign policy issue, will be examined in this section and not in the section on foreign policy.

In early statements, the MB opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and expressed solidarity with the Kuwaiti people. This position was predictable, partly because of the MB movement's historically poor relations with the secular Iraqi Ba'ath Party and partly because of its good relations with the Gulf states.

However, according to an MB spokesman, the arrival of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia provoked a policy shift: "Regardless of our opinion of Saddam Hussein, King Fahd's invitation of American troops to the Holy Land was utterly unacceptable."³ This reflected the dominant sentiment of the movement as well as Jordanian popular opinion in general. Once they had started to ride the pro-Iraqi wave that swept over the Jordanian street, the Islamists became the most strident supporters of Iraq. Using powerful Islamic imagery and symbolism, they presented the conflict in stark terms as a religious war.⁴

In turning away from even Saudi Arabia, traditionally a strong supporter, the MB demonstrated an ability to go against conventional patterns, to sense popular domestic priorities and to work with them. With the defeat of Iraq, and the onset of Jordanian popular disillusionment with the Iraqi government and all that had been associated with it, the MB lost a significant portion of its domestic support.⁵

A measure of the MB's ability to respond to this change of popular mood is provided by its reaction to the movement of Iraqi troops toward the Kuwaiti border in October 1994. On this occasion, the MB criticized the Iraqi leadership for "creating a state of insecurity and instability in the region."⁶ Such a statement would have been unthinkable in the cauldron of the Gulf crisis.

¹ *Jordan Times*, July 27, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, July 27, 1994, p. 51.

² *Jordan Times*, August 20, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, August 29, 1990, p. 38.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Economist*, April 13, 1991, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Agence France Presse, October 13, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, October 14, 1994, p. 42.

These policy shifts illustrate that calculations of domestic support are of transcendent importance to the MB and that it is capable of following a popular lead rather than imposing an agenda or a perspective upon the public. To this extent, there is evidence that the MB is able and willing to participate in a constitutional parliamentary system.

Some might argue that these alliances and policy shifts represent only the maneuvers of a power-hungry political force. But there is further evidence of pragmatism among the Islamists in Jordan. As an opposition movement, they have never disregarded the constitution and laws that form the environment within which they operate. For example, the MB and the IAF clearly reject violence as a means of domestic political change,¹ and their spokesmen are always outspoken in denouncing such violence.² (This does not necessarily extend to condemnation of violence in other areas such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.) Likewise, the MB and IAF frequently couch criticism of the Jordanian government in a critique of its democratic credentials.³

The reactions of Islamist leaders to what was perceived as an election defeat in 1993 are also instructive. Rather than denouncing the democratization process or demanding fresh elections, they reacted calmly. Ishaq al-Farhan, secretary-general of the IAF, said the failure would be assessed and lessons learned from mistakes made.⁴ Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Khalifah, then controller-general of the MB, added:

There is no doubt that internal mistakes made during the election process were behind the decrease in the number of seats won by the MB. . . . We are about to study these mistakes and evaluate the results so that future generations may learn lessons, God willing.⁵

This attitude—"we'll have to do better next time"—indicates the movement is pragmatically inclined to learn from the electoral experience and adapt its message and organization accordingly. This suggests not a movement ideologically committed to gaining and never relinquishing exclusive control of power, but one that can accommodate, adapt to and function within a constitutional environment.

¹ See, for example, the interview with Ishaq al-Farhan in *al-Ribat*, October 13, 1992, in *FBIS-NES*, December 16, 1992, pp. 24-26; See also the interview with Abd al-Majid Thuneibat in "Hussein's Opponents Lower Tone," in *Washington Jewish Week*, September 29, 1994.

² See, for example, the comments of Abdallah Akayilah in *MEM*, February 10, 1994, p. 17; and Abd al-Rahman Khalifah in *al-Sabil*, March 8-14, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, March 10, 1994, p. 27 on the "Amman sex cinema bombings."

³ See, for example, *al-Ra'y*, August 9, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, August 10, 1993, p. 29; and *al-Dustur*, June 1, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, June 2, 1994, p. 50; see also *MEM*, October 24, 1994, pp. 9-10.

⁴ PETRA (Jordan News Agency), November 10, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, November 12, 1993, p. 49.

⁵ *Akhir Khabar*, December 5-6, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, December 8, 1993, p. 38.

This is not to assert that the MB would act calmly and rationally should it actually gain power or face the prospect of losing it, but merely to suggest again that it will do whatever best serves the greater goal of “Islamizing” Jordanian society.

Of course, it can be argued that the Islamists’ pragmatism is a function of the prevailing political situation in Jordan. The Political Parties Law of 1992 under which the IAF was formed requires political parties in Jordan to operate within the constitution, to respect the supremacy of the law, and to abide by the principle of political pluralism.¹ Political parties, even the IAF, presently lack the popular support necessary to mount a serious challenge to the status quo as enshrined in such laws, in the constitution, and in the National Charter.² Under the existing system, Islamists have no option but to operate within a constitutional environment.

It would indeed be wrong to assume that just as the revolutionary route to power produces a revolutionary Islamist movement, the constitutional route necessarily leads to a more constitutionally-minded Islamist movement. However, the specific environment is an important influence on the way that political organizations evolve, and this is certainly true of the MB in Jordan.

The rationale for the MB’s pragmatism on domestic political arrangements—in this case, local political circumstances—is less important than the mere fact that the organization is pragmatic at all. Operating within the parameters set by Jordan’s democratization process, the MB has adopted both parliamentary discourse and practice. When a figure as prominent as Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat speaks of the need to enhance and institutionalize the concept of parliamentary dialogue and pluralism,³ the experience of participation in parliamentary life and cabinet-level power has clearly influenced the MB’s views of what might be appropriate domestic political arrangements for Jordan.

It is worth pointing out that there are divisions within the Islamist movement on these questions. As IAF leader Ishaq al-Farhan accurately noted: “Ideology and pragmatism are sometimes not compatible.”⁴

There are two basic approaches. The majority view, as outlined above, can be characterized as pragmatic. Those who follow this approach are willing to deal with the government and other political groupings and aim to bring about social change by influencing policy from within the system. They are adept at using the politics of negotiation and compromise to achieve long-term objectives. The alternative approach is more ideological and confrontational; but since

¹ A text of the law can be found in *al-Ra’i*, August 21, 1992, in *FBIS-NES*, August 26, 1992, p. 31.

² See the Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1952, as amended; and the Jordanian National Charter, 1992.

³ *Jordan Times*, April 9, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, April 9, 1991, p. 50.

⁴ *Jordan Times*, December 27, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, December 27, 1993, p. 42.

the MB in Jordan was established, the pragmatic “doves” have enjoyed ascendance over the ideological “hawks.”¹

The first contemporary manifestation of the split between pragmatists and ideologues occurred in late 1990 over the issue of MB participation in the cabinet. One faction, largely of East Bank origin, pressed for the MB to participate in the government; a group dominated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin argued that the MB would be most effective in opposition.² This split became visible when several Islamist parliamentarians walked out of a meeting convened to discuss the issue.³

The debate was apparently won by the doves, as seven leading Islamist deputies accepted cabinet posts shortly thereafter. The more ideologically-inclined Islamists viewed those deputies as power-seekers tainted by the experience of ministerial office. There is no evidence to suggest that this view has changed; indeed, there are Islamists who disagree with the presence of MB deputies in parliament altogether.⁴ Thus, although the doves won a short-term victory on the issue of participation, the division remains.

Similar divisions have split the IAF. In the lead-up to the 1993 elections, the government’s introduction of a “one man, one vote” electoral system generated some controversy. The IAF, which was thought likely to lose support as a result, opposed the change but was divided on how best to deal with it. On the one hand, the largely East Bank doves, including IAF leaders Ishaq al-Farhan and Abdallah Akayilah, favored a non-confrontational approach and participation in the elections on the specified terms, even if it resulted in only a token Islamist representation in parliament. The hawks, again predominantly Jordanians of Palestinian origin such as Hammam Said and Muhammad Abu-Faris, insisted on an all-out confrontation so as to whip up support for their opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process.⁵

In the end, the IAF decided by an 85 percent vote of its Majlis al-Shura to participate in the elections under the “one man, one vote” legislation—another significant victory for the doves.⁶ In subsequent elections, the doves have consolidated their sizable majorities in both the Majlis al-Shura⁷ and the IAF’s Executive Bureau.⁸

Although these internal divisions underscore the lack of organizational unity and conformity, the clear majority of the MB favor

¹ *Jordan Times*, January 31, 1994.

² *MEM*, November 30, 1990, pp. 11-12.

³ *MEM*, December 14, 1990, pp. 12-13.

⁴ *Al-Majd*, August 29, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 30, 1994, p. 43.

⁵ *MEM*, June 29, 1993, p. 20.

⁶ *MEM*, August 27, 1993, p. 14.

⁷ *Jordan Times*, December 27, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, December 27, 1993, p. 42.

⁸ *Jordan Times*, January 1, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, January 5, 1994, p. 36. The Executive Bureau has seventeen members. It is charged with the daily administration of party affairs such as membership, meetings and so on, and implementing the Majlis al-Shura’s decisions. See also Hourani et al., *Islamic Action Front*, pp. 51-56.

a pragmatic approach on questions of domestic political arrangements. On these issues, there is congruence between rhetoric and action; and although pragmatism by its nature requires flexibility and thus undermines consistency, the majority of the MB has adopted consistently pragmatic stands.

III FOREIGN POLICY

By all accounts, the most important foreign policy issue in Jordan over the past five years has been the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli peace process. On this issue, there is no shortage of documentation on the Islamist position.

The Islamic Movement's 1989 election program clearly outlines the MB's entirely ideological position on the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict:

The Islamic Movement believes that the liberation of all Palestine is the most important sacred duty. . . . The land of Palestine is an Islamic land and it belongs to the Muslims until the end of the world. It is forbidden to concede one inch, regardless of any justifications and pressures.¹

It is interesting to note that while many other statements in the program receive Qur'anic support, this one does not. This stance entails a complete rejection of the existence of Israel and any moves to make peace with Israel; indeed, the program calls for action to eradicate Israel:

Front-line states must be considered forward positions from which to liberate Palestine. Their populations must be mobilized for *jihad* in preparation for the hour of attack and liberation.²

These positions have been echoed again and again by MB leaders. As parliamentary speaker Arabiyyat has said, "*Jihad* is the only way to restore our rights in Palestine, from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea."³ These leaders have compensated for the lack of a scriptural basis for their rejectionist position. According to Ziad Abu-Ghanimah:

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p.25.

³ Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, quoted in *al-Dustur*, May 14, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, May 16, 1990, p. 19.

We believe that the Prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, promised us that Jordan will be the land where the forces will be amassed to liberate Palestine. In a confirmed Prophetic tradition, the Prophet said: "You will fight the Jews. You will be east of the river and they will be west of the river. You will kill them and the stone and the tree will say: 'O Muslim, servant of God, there is a Jew behind me. Kill him.'"¹

The MB's rejection of peace is thus not based only on the belief that the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust,² but also on an ideologically-based rejection of Jews altogether. The MB sees the Arab-Israeli conflict as part of a much larger historical process:

In our book, opposition is based on the fact that our conflict with the Jews did not begin in 1948 when the enemy state was established. The conflict began when the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, emigrated to Medina. The Prophet concluded treaties with the Jews, which they violated. So our conflict is one of culture and existence, and not a conflict over borders.³

A conflict over borders can be resolved by negotiation and compromise; a conflict of culture and existence cannot. There is no room for ambiguity, no gray area, when dealing with an existential conflict. It is therefore not surprising that on the peace process, at least in terms of rhetoric, there is none of the pragmatism that has characterized the Islamists' approach to domestic politics.

In line with these ideological views, the Islamists have taken consistent stands against every step on the road to peace in the Middle East. After the Gulf War, the MB viewed with alarm international moves toward the convening of an Arab-Israeli peace conference. The Islamists' withdrawal from the cabinet in July 1991 was at least strongly influenced by their refusal to be part of any government willing to countenance peace talks with Israel.⁴ As the Middle East peace conference opened in Madrid in October 1991, the MB declared a "day of mourning" and affirmed its opposition to any negotiation with Israel.⁵

¹ Ziad Abu-Ghanimah, quoted in *al-Shira'*, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 22.

² The belief that the land of Palestine is an Arab and Muslim land and must entirely remain so indicates the importance of nationalist sentiment. In this, the MB's ideology mirrors that of Hamas. See A. Nüsse, "The Ideology of Hamas: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalist Thought on the Jews, Israel and Islam," in Ronald Nettle, ed. *Studies in Muslim-Jewish Relations*, Number 1 (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993), chap. 8.

³ Abd al-Majid Thuneibat, quoted in *al-Bilad*, August 10, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 10, 1994, p. 51.

⁴ See Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance With The Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori, ed. *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*.

⁵ *Jordan Times*, October 31, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, November 5, 1991, pp. 53; see also *al-*

On the Palestinian-Israeli track, the MB has rejected and denounced the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel and their Declaration of Principles.¹ Indeed, some Muslim Brothers reject the PLO's authority to negotiate at all.² With the implementation of the Oslo accords, the MB has taken an even stronger position, describing Hamas as fighting "a Zionist-concocted conspiracy executed by the Palestinian National Authority."³

On the Jordanian-Israeli track, the MB has criticized and denounced all meetings, negotiations and agreements, including the Common Agenda,⁴ the Washington Declaration,⁵ and finally the peace treaty.⁶

It is worth noting that there was a shift in emphasis from the 1989 campaign statement between the opening of the process at Madrid and the signing of the treaty at Aqaba in October 1994. Criticism of progress during the negotiations on the Jordanian-Israeli track tended to be couched more in terms of Jordan's rights and interests rather than the broader "Islamic" arguments of rejection brought to bear on the Palestinian-Israeli track. The MB's statement on the Washington Declaration, for example, was a detailed critique of the document on its own terms; the statement identified and lambasted perceived changes in Jordan's negotiating policy and concluded that it would not lead to a comprehensive solution.⁷

However, with the signing of the peace treaty, the IAF and MB began again to employ the full range of Islamic symbolism and imagery.⁸ In this context, it is important to note that the IAF does not consider itself or anyone else, either now or in the future, to be bound by the peace treaty, contending that the agreement is "detached from the people's spirit [and thus] binding only to its signatories."⁹

In terms of rhetoric at least, the MB entirely and unequivocally rejects Israel and peace with Israel on ideological grounds. It is extremely difficult to imagine a reversal of this policy in the near future, given that this is the one area above all others in which the Islamist identity as an opposition has been formed.

In terms of action against the peace process, the Islamists have been constrained by circumstance. The Jordanian government has been clearly committed to the pursuit of peace and the Jordanian opposition has largely confined its critique to fiery words. However, sit-

Ribat, November 5, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, December 30, 1991, p. 22.

¹ *Sawt al-Sha'b*, September 3, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, September 7, 1993, p. 66.

² *Jordan Times*, September 4, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, September 7, 1993, p. 66.

³ *Jordan Times*, August 30, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 31, 1994, p. 41.

⁴ See, for example, *al-Dustur*, October 6, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, October 7, 1993, p. 40.

⁵ See, for example, *Jordan Times*, July 24, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, July 25, 1994, p. 65.

⁶ See, for example, *MEM*, October 18, 1994, pp. 13-14.

⁷ *Al-Sabil*, June 28, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, June 29, 1994, p. 32.

⁸ *Al-Sabil*, October 18-24, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, October 18, 1994, p. 51.

⁹ *Ibid.*

ins and demonstrations against peace were staged in 1994, and rallies were held despite government proscription.¹

Some analysts believe the Islamists made “a stand for history” by ensuring that their position was clear while avoiding a direct confrontation with the government. According to this analysis, if peace should fail for any reason or if the Jordanian people should become disillusioned with peace, the Islamists will at little cost be well-placed to capitalize on their consistent opposition to peace.²

In the meantime, the IAF has vowed to resist the peace treaty by “all possible means.”³ However, it is fully aware of the Jordanian government’s commitment to peace and in 1995 Islamist parliamentary strength and popular support are somewhat diminished from the high of 1990-91. As Jordan enters the post-peace period, Islamists hold twenty-two out of eighty parliamentary seats, having commanded 27 percent of votes cast in the 1993 elections.

Although these figures indicate considerable grassroots support, the Islamists hardly have a popular mandate. They are clearly in opposition, lacking cabinet posts, and no longer hold the speakership. Indeed, as the peace treaty was about to be signed, Saad Hayel Srour, an advocate of peace, was elected to that post.⁴ A significant indicator of the IAF’s strength in parliament is that, in this contest, the IAF backed not a candidate from its own ranks but an independent Islamist. Presumably no candidate from the IAF would have commanded the votes of the independents and others necessary to secure the post—a far cry from the days when Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat’s re-election as speaker was a matter of course.

Against this background, the Islamists’ options for practical action against peace are limited, at least for the time being. Violence is unlikely. Asked how the MB would react to the sight of Israeli tourists in Amman, Abd al-Majid Thuneibat said: “We will not stop them. We will not use violence against them because it is not legal.”⁵ This is consistent with the MB’s traditional rejection of violence inside Jordan. However, the MB is likely to do everything to keep peace as frigid as possible. An indication of this is the *fatwa*⁶ issued by another prominent Islamist that those who “buy the goods of the Jews or deal in them or market them or engage in any form of industrial, tourist or agricultural cooperation . . . have betrayed God and his messenger and the faithful.”⁷

¹ Radio Jordan Network, July 25, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, July 26, 1994, p. 40.

² *Jordan Times*, July 26, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, July 26, 1994, p. 40.

³ *MEM*, October 18, 1994, pp. 13-14.

⁴ *MEM*, October 24, 1994, pp. 9-10.

⁵ John Snyder, “Hussein’s Opponents Lower Tone,” *Washington Jewish Week*, September 29, 1994.

⁶ A *fatwa* is a religious opinion and not, as it is often misidentified, a death sentence.

⁷ Ibrahim al-Kilani, quoted in “Hussein’s Opponents Lower Tone,” *Washington Jewish Week*, September 29, 1994.

There are of course divisions within the ranks of Jordan's Islamists over how to react to the coming of peace. In this context, hawks have argued that Islamist deputies should withdraw from the parliament so that the MB will not contribute to legitimizing Jordanian-Israeli reconciliation. The doves believe that participation in the political process remains the MB's most effective strategy, as it would allow them and other political forces sharing their rejection of peace with Israel to place legislative obstacles in the path of normalization.¹ Just as doves have dominated other debates within the MB, so are they likely to prevail on this issue.

In addition to a split along the lines of regional origin, there is a generational split. Younger Muslim Brothers have recently begun to voice discontent over the MB leadership's relative moderation on the issue of peace.² In the post-peace era, this division can be expected to widen. The more hawkish Islamists may seek to undermine peace more actively than the doves, but no Muslim Brother welcomes the peace treaty. The divisions are over how, not whether, to resist it.

The key challenge for the MB is therefore to balance three factors: the need to appeal to Jordanian public opinion, the constraints on its actions imposed by a government and a popular majority that is committed to peace,³ and its own deep ideological rejection of Israel. Its response to this challenge, more than any other, will determine the MB's future in Jordan.

However, many other foreign policy issues have exercised the minds of the MB. Relations with the "West"—often used as a synonym for the United States and Western Europe, although the former Communist bloc is also sometimes included under this rubric—are a central element of the foreign policy picture. Islamist movements are sometimes depicted as being ideologically set against the Western world in general and the United States in particular. In contrast to its fixed position on Israel however, the MB has taken varying positions on this issue.

In the lead-up to the Gulf crisis, the MB urged Arab consumers and importers to boycott U.S. products because it deemed America "the number one enemy of the Arab people."⁴ During the crisis, the MB became a fervent opponent of the United States and its deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia.⁵ At that time, MB leaders went as far as to call

¹ *Al-Majd*, August 8, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 10, 1994, p. 51.

² *Al-Majd*, August 29, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 30, 1994, p. 43.

³ Although popular opinion in the Arab world is notoriously difficult to gauge on such issues, as argued in David Pollock, "*The Arab Street? Public Opinion In The Arab World*, Policy Paper No. 32 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), it is measurable. The evidence suggested a high level of support for peace with Israel on the Jordanian street, particularly toward the end of the study period. See, for example, the opinion poll on the Washington Declaration in *Jordan Times*, August 25, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 26, 1994, pp. 47-48.

⁴ Agence France Presse, July 11, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, July 12, 1990, p. 27.

⁵ The MB's changing policies during the Gulf crisis are detailed in the section on domestic politics in this paper.

for attacks on American interests in Arab areas.¹ In the wake of the Gulf War, the MB refused even to meet with a U.S. delegation that visited Jordan because it said that “criminal America and the messengers of its schemes are unwelcome.”²

However, IAF officials headed by Ishaq al-Farhan did meet with then U.S. Ambassador Roger Harrison only two years later in May 1993.³ Jordanian opponents of the MB denounced the meeting as hypocritical. More interestingly, there was also censure from within the Islamist movement itself. One of the IAF’s more stridently anti-American personalities claimed that Harrison’s visit to the headquarters of the IAF was not planned in advance, but was the result of “trickery.” However, MB leaders’ assertions that the visit was made at the ambassador’s official request undercut such claims.⁴

Thus, despite earlier claims that they would never deal with the United States or American representatives, the IAF and thus the MB have in fact done so. In this they display an ability to change with the times, evincing an awareness of global geopolitical realities and not an irrational, immutable, and ideologically-based rejection of “the Great Satan.”⁵

But it is worth noting that the IAF was absent from the first session of Jordan’s parliament to be addressed by an American president. All sixteen IAF deputies boycotted President Clinton’s address in the wake of the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. The deputies said their boycott was:

. . . in protest against the American administration’s biased positions against the causes of the Arabs and the Muslims in Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and others; its hostile positions on the Islamic movement, its incitement against it, and its support for the tyrannical regimes confronting it in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and others; and the American role in imposing capitulation treaties and normalization policies on the Arab nation in the service of the usurping Zionist enemy.⁶

This statement sheds some light on the broad foreign policy orientations of Jordan’s Islamists. Interesting parallels can be drawn between the contemporary MB’s foreign policy outlook and that of Arab radicals in the 1950s and 1960s.⁷ The MB and IAF issue

¹ *Al-Ra’y*, September 30, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, October 2, 1990, p. 47; see also *Jordan Times*, February 25, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, February 26, 1991, p. 32.

² *Al-Ribat*, April 9, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, April 23, 1991, p. 27.

³ *Jordan Times*, May 19, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, May 20, 1993, pp. 23-24.

⁴ *Shihan*, May 22-28, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, May 25, 1993, pp. 46-47.

⁵ For a rich deconstruction of the view of Islamists as crude West-haters, see Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

⁶ *MEM*, October 24, 1994, pp. 9-10.

⁷ For a trenchant critical overview of these perspectives, see Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

statements of solidarity with parties that have attracted criticism from “the West” and that regularly denounce “U.S. crusader-Zionist aggression.”

Thus they have expressed support for the FIS in Algeria,¹ “the Libyan people” in the context of sanctions over the Lockerbie bombing,² and North Korea on the issue of nuclear capability.³ The IAF opposed international action in Somalia⁴ and Haiti,⁵ and denounced Jordanian participation in the latter.⁶ However, the limitations of the MB’s status as an opposition group mean that these positions are confined to rhetoric.

Their connections with other Islamist groups are likewise limited. MB spokesmen characteristically describe the relationship between the Jordanian MB and other MB organizations throughout the Muslim world as fraternal but independent:

We consider every MB organization in any part of the world a fraternal organization. . . . Each of these organizations is independent of the others. It is exactly like a family with several sons, with each son having his own home and his method of work. But when any harm is suffered, all meet like a single family. We in Jordan have our independent decision-making but we feel that we are part of the big family called the Brotherhood group. There is coordination among all Islamic movements in all parts of the world, [including] Islamists in Turkey, Malaysia and Pakistan.⁷

Although there is coordination in terms of meetings, each national MB branch addresses the specific circumstances of its own national context within its own national framework. Granted, the Islamic Movement’s 1989 election program describes the Middle East’s present nation-states as weak and petty, compares them to the tribes of the pre-Islamic era,⁸ and calls for the eventual re-unification of the Arabs as a “prelude” to wider Muslim unity,⁹ but it is clear that this is at best an optimistic long-range plan.

Such calls are conventional rhetoric and are not backed up by any attempt at defining an operational program. The exclusive focus of Jordan’s MB is Jordan, and the work the MB feels must be done is

¹ *Al-Dustur*, January 16, 1992, in *FBIS-NES*, January 16, 1992, p. 37.

² *Al-Dustur*, April 22, 1992, in *FBIS-NES*, April 22, 1992, p. 41.

³ *Jordan Times*, March 30, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, March 30, 1994, p. 47.

⁴ *Al-Ra’y*, June 30, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, June 30, 1993, p. 35.

⁵ *Jordan Times*, September 19, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, September 19, 1994, p. 48.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Ziad Abu Ghanimah, quoted in *al-Shira’*, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 22.

⁸ *Al-Ra’y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, p. 25.

⁹ This contrasts with the philosophy developed by Sayyed Qutb that ultimately rejected the Arab unit of reference in favor of the Islamic unit. See Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

entirely to do with Jordan. This does not appear to include the abolition of Jordan as a country, the formation of an Islamic super-state, or the restoration of the caliphate, at least under foreseeable circumstances.¹ In this respect, as in many others, the MB is to be distinguished from more radical groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir, which call for the abolition of existing nation-states and a restoration of the caliphate.

Suggestions of a unified, cohesive, transnational Islamist movement would, therefore, seem ill-founded.² Despite occasional meetings with Iranian leaders³ and rumors of links with Iranian embassy officials in Amman,⁴ the relationship between the Arab Sunni Muslim Brothers of Jordan and the Shi'ite Islamists of Iran is not close. As Ziad Abu-Ghanimah has said, "The Islamic tide was present before the Iranian revolution. . . . Initially we supported the Iranian revolution. But now we have numerous reservations about it."⁵

However, the MB has expressed support for the main Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas.⁶ Muhammad Abu-Faris has asserted that:

The Hamas charter and some of its statements say that the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, is part of the universal MB. This means that Hamas abides by the MB's ideology and views in regard to the Palestine question, especially since it is an Islamic issue and it can be solved through *jihad*. In light of this, the MB must extend all kinds of material and moral aid, support and help it. . . . Hamas is part of the MB. . . . It is the MB's strike wing.⁷

It is worth noting that Abu-Faris is of Palestinian origin and more sympathetic toward Palestinian movements such as Hamas than many other Muslim Brothers. The available evidence unequivocally indicates shared origins and a high degree of moral support between the Jordanian MB and Hamas, but not operational links (i.e., financial, military and organizational). It is entirely possible, however, that the MB will seek to claim credit for Hamas and its perceived successes and

¹ Given, for example, a complete breakdown of the Middle East state system or other unforeseeable circumstances, the position might be different. However, on the Jordanian MB's present position, see *al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 18. On the question of broader Islamic or Islamist views of nation-states, see Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States*.

² See, for example, Yossef Bodansky and Vaughan S. Forrest, *The New Islamist International* (Washington, DC: The Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 1993).

³ See, for example, *Jordan Times*, February 9, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, February 11, 1991, p. 76; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, October 25, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, October 29, 1991, pp. 56-57.

⁴ Agence France Presse, February 3, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, February 4, 1994, p. 27.

⁵ Ziad Abu Ghanimah, quoted in *al-Shira'*, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 22.

⁶ *Al-Muharrir*, September 23, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, September 27, 1989, p. 37.

⁷ *Al-Rayah al-Islamiyah*, July 6, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, July 12, 1990, p. 27.

thereby gain credibility by association among the anti-peace constituency.

An example of this is the MB's statement on the Hamas operation that resulted in the abduction and death of Israeli soldier Nachshon Wachsman. The statement condemned the Palestinian self-rule authority "for its suspicious role in providing the Zionist enemy with information facilitating the discovery of the *mujahidin* in Bi'r Nabala," and promised that "the Jews will never have security or peace in our countries so long as we have heroes like those who were martyred in the Bi'r Nabala operation."¹ Clearly, the MB was not involved in this operation. However, a certain amount of "reflected glory" is attained by praising the operation in such impassioned and evocative language. This would seem to be the extent of the link between the MB and Hamas. In this area, then, there is dissonance between the MB's rhetoric and its actions.

Since they have never had any responsibility for or participation in its formulation or execution, it is hard to assess how Jordan's Islamists might act if they gained control of foreign policy. All the portfolios allotted to them in the 1991 government were related to domestic affairs. It is therefore impossible to extrapolate from their current "all-talk-and-no-action" approach a future scenario when their actions might be decisive.

In addition, the lack of a single, cohesive theme running through the MB's declared foreign policies makes it difficult to consider questions of unity and consistency. On some issues, notably the Gulf crisis, they have made surprising and pragmatic policy choices; on other issues, notably the peace process, their stand has been entirely ideological. It is most likely that Jordanian national interests would remain the chief determinant of foreign policy under an Islamist government as under any other. As Olivier Roy has argued, "It is the strategy of states, and not the existence of a mythical 'Islamist International' that explains the placement and movements of Islamists on the Middle East checkerboard."²

¹ *Al-Sabil*, October 18-24, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, October 18, 1994, p. 47.

² Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, p. 108.

IV ECONOMICS

Though Jordan's Islamists are quite outspoken on domestic and foreign politics, they have had comparatively little of substance to say on economic questions. The scant material that is available is both confused and confusing.

The Islamic movement's 1989 election program identified Jordan's major economic problems of the day—debt, currency devaluation, capital flight, inflation, rising prices, unemployment, and income disparities—as arising entirely from corruption and greed on the part of the ruling elite.¹ There is no apparent awareness of the structural factors behind the country's economic crisis of the late 1980s.²

In terms of remedies, the program called for a campaign against corruption³ but offered no detailed and coherent plan of action. The MB's proposed degree of state involvement in the economy, a key indicator of the kind of macroeconomic policy it would pursue, was similarly unclear. For example, the program made strong pleas for simultaneously developing the public sector, the private sector, and "the mixed sector." Its objective appears to have been total Jordanian self-sufficiency:

We call for changing our society's consumerist lifestyle and transforming it into a production-g geared society which will eat what it plants, wear what it manufactures, and defend the homeland with weapons made by its own sons.⁴

The specific actions it recommended toward this ambitious end, such as industrial and agricultural development, would require enormous governmental involvement; yet the MB also called for a

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 20.

² For a lucid analysis of these, see Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," *The Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXV, no. 1 (March 1992): 69-97.

³ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*

reduction in public expenditure.¹ This kind of contradiction is reflected elsewhere in the election platform. On the one hand the MB called on the state to create jobs and provide food, clothing, medical care, and transportation;² on the other hand, it called on the government to reject foreign aid.³ How Jordan, with its scarce resources, could afford a full welfare-state system was not addressed.

Rather, the imposition of *zakat* (Qur'anic charity/tax) is seen as the financial mechanism capable of curing all of Jordan's economic problems:

We call for imposing the *zakat* and spending it legally to close the gap between the wealthy and the poor. This will turn the entire society into a society of sufficiency and production and remove the social classes within a short period of time.⁴

MB spokesmen argued that the imposition of *zakat* "would make available a large amount of money. Some of this money will be used to help the needy, and the rest will be given to the treasury."⁵ However, it is unlikely that the imposition of *zakat* could bring about such changes, and even less likely that it could finance the kinds of projects that the MB apparently envisaged in its program.

In addition to *zakat*, the MB suggested another palliative for Jordan's economic problems, the reform of the banking system. As the election program stated:

We call for banning usury in all its forms because it is a negative and materialistic method of economic dealing that aims at making guaranteed profit without taking into consideration the consequences and the interests of the individuals and society and because it is a direct reason for the ongoing economic crisis.⁶

Exactly how the interest mechanism employed by the banking system helped to produce the economic crisis of the late 1980s is by no means clear.⁷

Despite such contradictions and lacunae, there are two consistent elements to the Islamists' economic policies. The first is an emphasis on the importance of social justice. As the election program proclaimed, "No individual is superior to another either financially or

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Interview with Ali al-Hawamidah in *al-Watan*, November 13, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 16, 1989, p. 47.

⁶ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 21.

⁷ For a discussion of the alternative mechanism usually proposed by Islamists—"Islamic banking," in which profit-sharing replaces interest—see Delwin A. Roy, "Islamic Banking," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 3 (July 1991): pp. 427-56.

in type, race, or origin.”¹ There is no doubt that this concern is genuine. The MB does organize and implement an extensive program of social and charitable work,² lending credibility to its assertions of egalitarianism. While it is often argued that Islam inclines toward capitalism, this committed egalitarianism and genuine concern for social justice can support rather different conclusions.³

The second consistent element is a rejection of the involvement of non-Jordanian institutions and actors in Jordanian life, which is decried as external interference. This is the economic equivalent of the broad foreign policy orientation identified above. For example, the IAF and other opposition parties issued a statement in August 1994 declaring that:

The current economic problems are the result of depending on loans and aid and implementing the programs of the World Bank. Jordan's huge indebtedness, economic crisis, poverty, unemployment, and foreign dependence provide sufficient evidence of what we are saying. . . .The policies of so-called openness and links with world capitalist markets, including the Zionist enemy, always undermine any efforts for agricultural and industrial production. These policies turn the countries that link their policies with these markets into a service market that is depleted economically. Such a policy, therefore, threatens our nascent industry and agriculture and transforms all our service facilities into fertile ground for hostile investments.⁴

There is apparently an exception to this rule of non-interference: assistance from and cooperation among Arab countries.⁵ Other Arab countries are nevertheless urged to have no dealings with the non-Arab world. The MB argues that these dealings have dire consequences, as can be seen from its assessment of the implications for Egypt of the Camp David agreements: “Social disintegration, internal crises, economic collapse, poverty, spread of malignant diseases, and other such things are all that has been achieved.”⁶

There is no recognition of any other reason—overpopulation, urbanization, bureaucratic malaise, corruption, terrorism—for the difficulties that Egypt is experiencing. Neither is there any indication of how Arab countries are supposed to build strong economies so they can assist one another if prohibited from dealing with the non-Arab world.

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 23.

² See, for example, the interview with Ziad Abu Ghanimah in *al-Shira'*, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 25.

³ The argument has been more elegantly examined by Elie Kedourie in “Crisis and Revolution in Modern Islam,” *Times of London Literary Supplement*, May 19-25, 1989, p. 551.

⁴ *Al-Ra'y*, August 19, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, August 19, 1994, p. 27.

⁵ See Ali al-Hawamidah's interview in *al-Watan*.

⁶ *Al-Sabil*, July 26, 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, July 27, 1994, p. 49.

The Islamists' vagueness and propensity for contradiction in the economic sphere did not go unnoticed within Jordan. While in opposition, they attacked any government policy that involved external actors (e.g., international donors or foreign banks).¹ However, once Muslim Brothers gained cabinet posts, their supporters expected them to bring about substantive economic improvements. When this failed to occur, political observers noted that the MB had lost support. At the time, this was said to be due to a popular perception that the MB was engaged in sloganeering and had neglected its pledges to ease economic problems.²

Jordan implemented an economic reform program under the guidance of the IMF during the study period. Despite their opposition to the involvement of international institutions such as the IMF in Jordanian economic affairs, the Islamist ministers did not mount any significant challenge to the reform program during their time in office. This compounded the perception of a lack of programmatic depth within the Islamist movement on economic issues.

By the 1993 elections, the IAF had not significantly refined its approach to these issues. Its campaign platform called for: "Continuation of subsidies for basic supplies; subsidies must not be removed under any pretext."³ There was no attempt to address the consequences of Jordan's economic reform program or to propose an alternative economic strategy. Again, the policy statement appeared to be informed more by an attempt at populism rather than by any clear or distinctively Islamist economic program or philosophy.

The absence of coherent and consistent economic policies makes it difficult to analyze questions of congruence, unity, and consistency, and to assess the MB's relative emphasis on pragmatism and ideology. Nevertheless, in view of the apparent lack of thought given to the consequences of the policies the Islamists espouse, the assumption must be that these policies are grounded more in ideological than in pragmatic considerations.

¹ See, for example, *Jordan Times*, June 28-29, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, June 29, 1990, p. 35.

² *Jordan Times*, April 4-5, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, April 5, 1991, p. 32.

³ IAF electoral advertisement, in *FBIS-NES*, October 19, 1993, p. 54.

V WOMEN

In the areas of domestic politics, foreign policy, and economics, Islamist policies are often comparable to those of other political movements such as leftists or Arab nationalists. It is on gender issues and on issues pertaining to minorities that Jordan's Islamists offer their most distinctive policies. It is therefore in these areas that the character of a possible "Islamic government" can best be discerned. This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers that the Islamists' overriding goal is to "Islamize" Jordanian society, and policy in these areas has profound implications and consequences for the nature of society and social life.

The MB takes a two-pronged approach to the role of women in Jordanian society. On the one hand, it affirms the formal equality of men and women. The Islamic movement's 1989 election program outlines a fairly comprehensive package of rights that it believes are held by "any male or female citizen."¹ The program explicitly affirmed "equal rights for both [men and women]."² On the other hand, the very next sentence seems to contradict this assertion:

The woman has the right to own property, work, and participate in developing the society within the limits set by Islam, on condition that this does not overwhelm the duty of the woman toward her home, husband, and children. Woman is man's partner.³

This kind of statement gives an indication of how an Islamist government might seek to regulate society. Similar insights might be gained from a brief examination of the role of women within the IAF.

There were eleven women on the IAF's founding committee but not one was elected to its first Majlis al-Shura in 1992. Despite statements by Ishaq al-Farhan on the importance of women's right to vote and compete in these elections, an attempt to set aside a certain

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NEJ*, October 27, 1989, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*

number of seats for women on the Majlis al-Shura was rejected.¹ A year later, Nawal al-Fa'uri became the first and only woman to be elected to the Majlis, and indeed to hold a high position in an Islamist organization in Jordan since the founding of the MB.² Women, therefore, play virtually no significant role in the leadership of Jordan's Islamist groups.

It is worth delving deeper into some of the practical issues that would face women in an Islamist Jordan. For example, the issue of "Islamic dress" for women is a perennial source of controversy. Muslim Brothers have denied that they seek to impose the veil, saying instead that they "only want women to dress decently at home, outside the home, and at work and not to be a source of temptation and seduction."³

This is a highly ambiguous statement, given that "at home, outside the home, and at work" is a totally comprehensive formulation. What it means for a woman to "dress decently" is not explicitly defined, but it is clear that certain restrictions on dress for women (and men too) are part of the Islamist package.

There is a considerable overlap between the issue of dress and that of gender mixing. In the Islamist world view both must be regulated in order to eliminate any possible sexual misconduct. As MB leader Abd al-Monim Abu-Zant said:

The issue of women playing up their charm is a flagrant encroachment on public rights. Misbehavior will occur whenever women display their charm or disgracefully mix with men. . . . Women's work is legal with the condition that she wear Islamic dress, that the work does not lead to seclusion with men. . . . We do not favor the mixing of the sexes in universities, schools, or colleges. We are for the separation of the sexes.⁴

The MB made no secret of its advocacy of gender segregation in its 1989 election program which called for "resisting coeducation at universities and community colleges, explaining its harmful effects and dangerous role in perverting the youth within the educational institutions."⁵

Almost immediately after its success in the November 1989 election, the MB's support for gender segregation was vividly demonstrated in the case of the "hairdressers ban." In May 1990, the Ministry of the Interior, apparently under pressure from Islamists,

¹ Hourani et al., *Islamic Action Front Party*, p. 45.

² *Jordan Times*, December 27, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, December 27, 1993, p. 42.

³ Ali al-Hawamidah, quoted on Radio Monte Carlo, November 12, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 13, 1989, p. 39.

⁴ Abd al-Monim Abu-Zant, quoted in *Sawt al-Sha'b*, November 14, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 16, 1989, p. 47.

⁵ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October, 27, 1989, p. 22.

issued a ban on male hairdressers working in women's beauty salons.¹ The decision was extremely controversial and was attacked as a violation of constitutional provisions stipulating equal rights for men and women. In the face of popular opposition, the ban was soon rescinded.²

However, when Muslim Brothers themselves attained cabinet posts in 1991, they sought at once to implement gender segregation wherever possible. Yusuf al-Azm, the Islamist minister of social development, decreed gender segregation at his ministry.³ The main showdown, though, was at the Ministry of Education, where an attempt was made to introduce segregation as a first step toward instituting it in schools.⁴

In May 1991, Minister of Education Abdallah Akayilah issued a controversial circular to the directors of his ministry demanding that only same sex parents (fathers for boys, mothers for girls) be allowed to visit their children's schools.⁵ However, Akayilah lost the education portfolio in a cabinet reshuffle two months later and the circular was not implemented.

Shortly before parliament was dissolved in 1993 in preparation for elections, a bill proposed by the MB to segregate the sexes at Jordan's schools and universities was defeated.⁶ Despite the hostility such proposals have aroused in secular Jordanian circles and the lack of success that they have enjoyed as a result, the MB remains committed to gender segregation. The fact that Jordan is in general a conservative and, in many areas, tribal society may play a part in shaping the MB's approach to questions concerning women.

In this area, there is congruence between the Islamists' rhetoric and action, apparent unity throughout the organization, and consistency over time. This single-minded pursuit of a goal irrespective of popular opinion on the matter strongly suggests that the MB's views on women's issues are shaped by ideology and are not informed by or amenable to pragmatic considerations.

¹ *Jordan Times*, May 15, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, May 18, 1990, p. 23.

² *Jordan Times*, May 19, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, May 25, 1990, p. 35.

³ *Jordan Times*, April 2, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, April 2, 1991, p. 25.

⁴ *Al-Shira'*, August 12, 1991, in *JPRS-NEA*, October 30, 1991, p. 22.

⁵ *Al-Ra'y*, May 9, 1991, in *FBIS-NES*, May 15, 1991, p. 26.

⁶ *Economist*, April 3, 1993, p. 43.

VI MINORITIES

The Islamic movement's 1989 election program states that "the application of Islam makes it incumbent upon Muslims to be good to those with whom they live in their state."¹ At the same time, however, it calls for:

. . . combating and banning all illegal means of profit, such as gambling. . . Banning alcoholic drinks—the manufacture, use, and dealing in alcohol. . . Resisting moral degeneration represented by bawdiness and use of makeup. . . Closing down dance halls, clubs, hotels, and others.²

These objectives are very broad and would indeed affect non-Muslims as well as Muslims in Jordan. To whom do Jordan's Islamists believe their world view ought to apply?

Despite the existence of divisions within its own ranks that may be broadly characterized as regional, the MB has always sought to transcend any possible divisions within Jordanian society and portray itself as a unifying force working for the good of a unified nation.³

Thus, MB spokesmen such as Yusuf al-Azm have dismissed allegations of sectarianism:

. . . non-Muslims are our partners on the march and companions on the journey. They have the same rights and duties as ourselves as long as they are sincere people working to develop the country.⁴

Similarly, Ibrahim al-Kilani has stated emphatically that "all Jordanians are Jordanians, with equal rights and equal participation regardless of their origins."⁵ And in a similar vein, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat has often

¹ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ See the section on domestic politics in this paper.

⁴ Yusuf al-Azm, quoted in *Sawt al-Sha'b*, November 18, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 20, 1989, p. 30.

⁵ Ibrahim al-Kilani, quoted in *Jordan Times*, October 30, 1993, in *FBIS-NES*, November

spoken of Jordan's national unity and rejected any regional, sectarian, or racial discrimination.¹ Awareness of the electoral power of Jordan's minorities—especially Christians, who constitute 4 percent of the population—may play a part in shaping this discourse of equality and tolerance, suggesting pragmatism.

However, there has not always been congruence between rhetoric and action in this area. A revealing anecdote comes from the annals of Jordan's parliamentary proceedings. There is a tradition in Jordan that the second oldest member of the parliament opens the annual proceedings. In 1990, this happened to be a Christian deputy, Issa Madanat. He opened his speech with the words "Brothers and Sisters," but was heckled by Islamists who demanded he start his speech with the traditional Islamic preface, "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate." On that occasion Madanat obliged,² but the incident does touch upon wider questions concerning the status of non-Muslims under Islamist rule.

The MB and IAF have given no indication that they would not seek to impose special non-Muslim *dhimmi* status upon the country's minorities should Islamists come to power in Jordan. According to the Qur'an, non-Muslims must pay *jizya* (poll tax) in return for protection from a Muslim ruler.³ Under this system, non-Muslims were designated *ahl al-Dhimma* ("the tolerated people") and, as Elie Kedourie explained, were:

. . . allowed to organize their own communal affairs under their own leaders who enjoyed wide judicial and administrative powers in respect of their communities, each of which was left free to follow its own (religious) law in matters of personal status and of inheritance. This is the well-known *millet* system.⁴

There is nothing in either the statements or actions of Jordan's Islamists to suggest that they would not take this traditional Muslim approach to the question of minority rights and obligations.

The varied history of the MB's attempts to ban alcohol in Jordan provides an instructive example of the way it has approached such questions. In 1989, the MB sought a total ban on the importation and manufacture of alcoholic beverages.⁵ Asked whether this would not encroach on some people's personal freedom, a spokesman for the MB said only that "anyone's freedom ends where others' freedom begins."⁶

1, 1993, p. 44.

¹ See, for example, *al-Dustur*, May 14, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, May 16, 1990, p. 19.

² *MEM*, November 19, 1990, p. 21.

³ *Qur'an*, XI:21.

⁴ Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 19. On the position of *dhimmi*s, see also P. J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State*, chap. 5.

⁵ *Al-Ra'y*, October 25, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, October 27, 1989, p. 23.

⁶ Abd al-Monim Abu-Zant, quoted in *Sawt al-Sha'b*, November 14, 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, November 16, 1989, p. 47.

However, legislation proposed by Islamist parliamentarians to ban alcohol completely in Jordan was defeated.¹

A year later, IAF deputies proposed a new law to ban all Muslims only from producing, importing and selling alcohol. This law would therefore have allowed Christians and other non-Muslims to engage in the alcohol trade² but was also unsuccessful.³

The MB thus demonstrated an ability to move from a maximalist position demanding the complete ban of alcohol in Jordan to a more pragmatic position demanding a ban for Muslims only. This can be seen as another example of the politics of accommodation in action. However, this should not obscure the fact that the MB's later, more pragmatic position leaves non-Muslims in the classic position of *dhimmis* under the *millet* system.

On the question of the *hudud*⁴ the MB has taken a pragmatic position. As Yusuf al-Azm has stated:

The application of Islamic *sharia* is one of our goals, but it should be achieved in a rational manner as stipulated by the *sharia* itself. Cutting off the hand of the thief, for example, should not be introduced in a society with poor and hungry people. The standard of living should be raised and poverty should be fought and eliminated first.⁵

Given the fact that *hudud* are not imposed in Jordan, this kind of qualification shows an awareness of the popular opposition that such punishments would attract and thus a willingness to accommodate to the dynamics of domestic Jordanian politics. In keeping with this pragmatic stance, Islamists have not proposed legislation to make *hudud* compulsory in Jordan.

It is also worth noting again that Islamists have made powerful and lasting electoral and political alliances with some Christians.⁶ It could be argued, following the Iranian example, that such alliances would be forgotten if the Islamists actually came to power. But, as noted above, the ability of Islamists to impose their will on specific, targeted groups is tightly constrained by the constitutional environment governing Jordan's democratization process; this includes the requirements of pluralism laid out in key documents such as the constitution, the National Charter, and the Political Parties Law.

These documents play a large part in shaping Jordan's social and political environment, which in turn helps to shape the MB movement. Although such considerations by no means determine the issue, they

¹ *Al-Dustur*, September 20, 1992, in JPRS-NEA, November 20, 1992, p. 22.

² *Jordan Times*, December 18, 1993.

³ *Jordan Times*, March 28, 1994, in FBIS-NES, March 28, 1994, p. 66.

⁴ *Sharia*-mandated criminal punishments.

⁵ Yusuf al-Azm, interviewed in *Sawt al-Sha'b*, November 18, 1989, in FBIS-NES, November 20, 1989, p. 30.

⁶ See the section on domestic politics in this paper.

make it less likely that Islamists could or even would try to impose their world view on minorities.

Thus, on issues affecting minorities, the MB has demonstrated an ability to change its tack, although its long-range goal is clear. While its focus has changed, its pursuit of reform through the law has been consistent over time. There has been some congruence between rhetoric and action, as demonstrated by the Islamists' perseverance in the face of strong opposition and repeated setbacks.

Evolutionary reform has also been a generally shared unifying objective, although the differences of approach that characterize the Islamists' views of domestic politics also apply in this closely related area. On minority issues, Islamists can be characterized as pragmatic in the short-term. However, the longer-term goal remains comprehensive change in order to "Islamize" Jordanian society and, because this goal is based on devotion to a doctrine rather than considerations of consequence, it is most accurate to ascribe the Islamists' policies in this field to a mixture of ideology and pragmatism.

VII CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, Jordanian Islamists have been both described and analyzed. The bulk of the study has been descriptive, outlining the policy orientations of Jordan's Islamists in a few key areas in order to paint a picture of what one might expect from an Islamist government. The analytical component has revolved around four questions posed in each of these areas: whether there has been congruence between rhetoric and action, unity throughout the organization, consistency over time, and whether the position in a given policy field has been based on ideology or pragmatism. In this concluding section, Jordan's Islamist movement will be examined by posing these four questions in a more general way, drawing on the descriptive research above.

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND ACTION

Taking into account particular circumstances, there has in general been congruence between the MB's rhetoric and its actions. That is to say, the MB has usually tried to implement its stated policies whenever possible.

In domestic politics, the MB's track record in practice has reflected its statements. In foreign policy, its ability to act has been constrained by its status as an opposition group; though it has tried to influence government policy in some areas, like the peace process, there is dissonance between rhetoric and action in others. In economics, its stated policies have lacked coherence and it is therefore difficult to assess whether there has been congruence between rhetoric and action. On issues concerning women, it has consistently sought to put its positions into practice despite encountering resistance from large parts of Jordanian society. On issues concerning minorities, there has been congruence between rhetoric and action in some areas and dissonance in others.

UNITY THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATION

Even within the mainstream Islamist movement in Jordan, which is but a small island in the extensive archipelago of contemporary Islamism, there is considerable diversity. Although there is basic unity within the MB and usually a clear "party line," there are divisions along regional (East Bankers versus Jordanians of Palestinian origin) and generational lines.

In domestic politics, there is a clear and significant division between "doves" and "hawks," which also applies to the issues concerning women and minorities. In foreign policy, the divisions are more tactical, although there is evidence of a substantive split on the issue of relations with the United States. In economics, the variety of approaches may account for the lack of coherent policy.

CONSISTENCY OVER TIME

It is impossible to address the question of consistency in general terms because the MB has displayed both an ability to change with the times on some issues and consistency over time on others.

In domestic politics, the experience of parliamentary and governmental power has strengthened the MB's ability to compromise, accommodate different points of view, and thus to change over time. On some foreign policy questions, such as those raised by the Gulf crisis and relations with the United States, the MB has changed its tack over time; on other issues, most notably the peace process, the MB has been consistent over time. It has also displayed consistency on economic and women's issues. By contrast, the MB has certainly changed its approach toward minorities, but it is unclear whether this signals a substantive shift.

IDEOLOGY VERSUS PRAGMATISM

It is clear that the MB holds complex and diverse views that cannot be characterized as exclusively ideological or pragmatic. Some of its policy stands are formed by ideological considerations, some by pragmatic considerations, and some by a mixture of both.

It has demonstrated considerable pragmatism on domestic politics. On some foreign policy questions, most notably the peace process, its stands have been entirely ideological and uncompromising. On other foreign policy issues, such as the Gulf War and relations with the United States, pragmatism has been the chief motivation. On economics, its stands appear to be more ideological than pragmatic. On issues concerning

women, its policies have been based on ideology. On issues concerning minorities, its policies have been a mixture of pragmatism and ideology.

CONCLUSION

Although it is currently the most influential political movement in Jordan, the MB is divided on many issues, sometimes incoherent, and often inconsistent. These problems stem largely from the lack of clear definitions; principally, the absence of any solid notion of what Islamic government should be and what it ought to properly do. This problem is present *ab initio* for all Islamist groups.

In the Jordanian context, it has meant that the MB has had to become adept at the politics of compromise, the essence of the democratic process. While it is an ideological organization in origin and some of its policies can be traced to that origin, in Jordan it has become a political force like any other, operating pragmatically within an imperfect world. But it is important to note the two areas where Jordan's Islamists have been most impervious to compromise—their opposition to peace with Israel and their attitudes toward women's role in society.

If Islamists achieve further success in the Middle East and Muslim world, they will certainly seek to implement a notion of "Islamic government." This study has set out to define what that might mean in practical terms by outlining analytical categories to illuminate the concerns and aspirations of Jordan's Islamists and by providing a framework for description.

This approach may be useful for a cross-national comparative study of Islamist groups and indeed all groups who view politics from a religious perspective. While the goals and means of different groups will vary according to their specific circumstances—the peace process is a more urgent concern of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood than the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front—case studies of various Islamist movements will be valuable in revealing the areas of difference and similarity. This technique of analyzing individual organizations can contribute to a deeper and richer knowledge of contemporary Islamism.

APPENDICES

- I ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ELECTION PROGRAM
Autumn 1989
- II REPORT ON IAF ELECTORAL ADVERTISEMENT
October 18, 1993
- III EXCERPTS FROM THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL CHARTER
December 1990

APPENDIX I

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ELECTION PROGRAM

Autumn 1989

Preamble

The Muslim Brotherhood group was established to liberate the Islamic world from foreign domination and to apply the Islamic *sharia*. In doing so, it has encountered fierce resistance from the enemies of Islam and their agents. The Muslim Brotherhood offered hundreds of martyrs as a price for that. However, it continued to fight the infidels, hypocrites, and the unjust with hand, tongue, and heart. The Muslim Brotherhood sponsored and defended several Muslim causes, especially the holy Palestine issue. It sent *mujahidin* and preachers in the thirties and forties to spread the call, enlighten the people, and mobilize them for the *jihād*.

The Muslim Brotherhood believes that Islam is the sole source of legislation and canonization. Its cry is: God is its objective and it seeks to please Him and abide by His rules; the Prophet is its leader and example: *jihād* is its course, and death for the sake of God is its most sublime wish. Its slogan is: Islam is the solution to all the nation's political, social, economic, and moral problems. Its course is: Reforming the Muslim, then the Muslim family, then the Muslim people, then the Muslim government which will apply God's *sharia*, demand what is right, and forbid what is wrong. Thus, it will meet the condition of righteousness, as God said: You are the best of peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God. [Qur'anic verse]

The group takes this opportunity to remind the brother Muslims in its election program that it considers its presence in parliament as a means to fulfill the nation's mission of power, might, and of applying God's *sharia* to uphold rights and spread justice and equality among all people regardless of race and creed. The group does not seek a false, high position, or influence, or any worldly gain. It only wants to be the voice of truth expressing the sufferings of the nation and seeking to achieve its hopes for a respectable life.

The group appeals to your strong faith, hearts, and minds to respond to God's words: Verily, this is My way, leading straight. Follow it. Follow not other paths. They will scatter you about from His great path. [Qur'anic verse]

Therefore, the group urges you to raise with it the slogan: Islam is the solution.

Elect the group which believes in this slogan, carries its banner, and fights for its sake.

Domestic Policy

Our domestic policy is based on God's *sharia* and on carrying out God's rules. God said: And this He commands: Judge thou between them by what God hath revealed, and follow not their vain desires. But beware of them lest they beguile thee from any of that teaching which God hath sent down to thee. [Qur'anic verse]

God also said: But no, by thy Lord, they can have no real faith, until they make thee judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance against thy decisions, but accept them with the fullest conviction. [Qur'anic verse]

We are confident that all the masses of our people would like very much to see Article II of the Jordanian Constitution, which stipulates that Islam is the religion of the state, applied fully in all aspects of their political, economic, military, financial, and educational life.

We believe that all the nations' crises and defeats stem from Islam's absence from our guidance and legislation. God said: Whosoever follows My guidance will not lose his way, nor fall in misery. But whosoever turns away from My message, verily for him is a life narrowed down. [Qur'anic verse]

We also believe that the application of Islam makes it incumbent upon Muslims to be good to those with whom they live in their state. God said: God forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for [your] faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them. For God loveth those who are just. [Qur'anic verse]

Moreover, we believe that our first and most important duty is to exert every effort to revise all existing laws and regulations in Jordan in order to make them conform fully to the Islamic *sharia*.

Public Liberties

We believe that securing public liberties is the duty of the state. It should guarantee the freedom of worship and religion for every citizen, and also political and scientific freedoms, the freedom of expression, press, movement, and travel, and man's freedom to work, security, and protection from arbitrary detention.

We also believe that it is the right of every Muslim citizen, and in fact his duty to advocate Islam throughout the country. All news media must be devoted to achieving this noble objective. Invite [all] to the way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching. [Qur'anic verse]

The Citizen's Dignity is a Divine Right that Must Be Safeguarded

God has honored Adam, breathed into him something of His spirit, and ordered His angels to prostrate themselves to him. So, the state must safeguard this honor. It also must safeguard his soul, honor, and

property, and must not discriminate between one man and another, for all human beings are equal. In this regard, we will seek to achieve the following:

1. To safeguard the citizens' dignity and the sanctity of their blood, property, and honor.
2. We will try to do our utmost to prevent any material or moral harm to any male or female citizen without just cause, and to resist all forms of torture against innocents, all of which Islam forbids.
3. To emphasize every male and female citizen's right to the freedom of thinking, expression, and religion, and that this right must not be confiscated under the cover of extraordinary laws, martial law, or emergency laws. We will call for the abrogation of all laws, regulations, and instructions that conflict with the citizen's freedom of religion, thinking, expression, and other freedoms.
4. To prevent the unjust detention or imprisonment of citizens, especially since the defendant is innocent until he is proven otherwise. This must be practiced by the competent authorities in words and deeds.
5. To try to secure opportunities of lawful earning for all citizens regardless of their opinions or beliefs.
6. To call for the freedom of movement and travel for every citizen inside and outside Jordan regardless of his affiliation and ideology.
7. To emphasize that the passport is the right of every male and female citizen. The passport must not be held and its issuance must not be hampered.
8. To fight bribery and favoritism, to apply justice in employment and promotions, and to punish anyone who takes bribes.
9. To emphasize the right of every citizen, man or woman, not to be detained or imprisoned without a just cause, and to stress his legal right to protest an arrest warrant through legitimate means. and without placing obstacles that would deprive him of this right.

Freedom of the Press

The press has a message which it cannot deliver unless it is free and protected from any pressure or influence from any side. To affirm the role and freedom of the press, we call for the following:

1. To review the press law and cancel any restrictions limiting the freedom of the press. We believe it is necessary to cancel the article giving the government the right to withdraw the license of any paper without presenting any reasons and without having its decision subjected to legal scrutiny.
2. Not to place any indiscriminate restrictions on new magazines and papers to be issued.

3. To safeguard the dignity of journalists, their freedom to perform their press duties, and their right to immunity guaranteeing them peace of mind in performing their journalistic duties, especially in exposing the negative points which harm the country and the citizen, whoever he may be, within the framework of belief in the word of honor and away from personal grudges.
4. To make employment opportunities available to those specializing in media and graduates of journalism colleges at universities.

Freedom of Formation of Trade Union Organizations

We believe in the need to establish trade union organizations, whether labor or professional unions, so that these organizations can carry out the dual role of serving the homeland and the citizen. They serve their members by raising their standard of living, enhancing their intellectual proficiency, and upgrading health care. They also serve the homeland since they are part of the homeland and the citizens.

We will also work to impose respect for the decisions adopted by the general assemblies of trade unions and professional organizations and to prevent their decisions from being dictated by others.

The Economic Situation

Jordan is experiencing a very difficult economic state of affairs which can only be overcome by collective efforts and sincere intentions.

We believe that the most important manifestations of the economic crisis in Jordan can be summed up in the following:

The heavy debt. It has reached approximately \$10 billion, and is the highest rate of indebtedness in the world when compared with population figures. We believe that the first duty of the nation's representatives is to persistently ask the executive authorities to submit correct, detailed statements explaining on which divisions these huge sums have been spent. This is to enable the people—who have every right to know—to find out how the loans were spent so that they may ask for accountability from the officials who are responsible for mortgaging the future of our sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons; call for the severe punishment of this criminal group so that we may learn the necessary lessons and not be deceived by these economic schemes in the future; and study ways to end this nightmarish indebtedness.

The drop in the dinar's value. The Jordanian people have suffered greatly from the sudden, sharp drop in the dinar's value. The group that is behind this drop is the only one that has benefited from it. Their wealth increased, as can be witnessed by the sleek cars, worth tens of thousands of dinars, that their teenage sons and daughters

drive, and by their villas, which cost millions. The representatives of the people are also duty-bound to seek clarifications from the executive authorities on the real reasons for the drop in the dinar's value and the misuse of foreign currencies and gold in the Central Bank, and to call for bringing those responsible to trial and inflict on them the just punishment they deserve, as well as to seek the means that would restore stability to the dinar, and thus return stability to the lives of the citizens in Jordan.

Smuggling billions of dollars abroad. Billions of dollars have been smuggled outside of the country. This in itself has been a principal cause for the drop in the dinar's value. The representatives of the nation must expose the group that was responsible for this, carry out an inventory of these billions and determine where they are deposited, and submit the necessary draft bills for returning this money and bringing those responsible for this crime to trial.

Inflation and price hikes. The economic situation in Jordan is going through a stage of inflation and increasing prices for various reasons. Some of these reasons are the greed of the monopolists and exploiters, who should be deterred without exception whether friend or relative. The just regulations should be applied to them all so that they will return to their senses. The representatives should find the necessary means to decrease prices so that low-income Jordanian citizens (who are the majority of Jordan's citizens) will be able to provide themselves and their families with sufficiency and dignity.

Unemployment. Unemployment has now spread among the Jordanian youth at an unprecedented level. One of the first duties of the representatives is to study this dangerous situation and work with the executive authority to find solutions to this problem. This requires delving into the heart of the matter and removing all the barriers that might stand in the way of a solution, because the results of unemployment are disastrous. Its simplest result is robbery, crime, and a decline in marriage and the society's growth. It also reflects on education and morals. "Poverty can hardly be distinguished from heresy."

The great disparity in the income of individuals. The major reasons for this disparity is the state of indiscipline which has spread among the morals of some people and the abundance of the slothful, unproductive groups which depend either on the government's jobs or illegal gains, bribes, or commissions. They exploit anything without thought or control and in the absence of the honest executive authority. If the necessary measures are not taken to curb unemployment, the result will be widespread hatred and grudges, which will be a reason for angry explosions in society.

To be able to work toward improving the economic situation in Jordan, the following measures are necessary:

First: The Economic Sectors and Investment

- We call for developing the public sector, reforming it on new grounds, and purifying it from corrupt thieves and lazy sloths.
- We call for developing the mixed sector by building confidence between the investors and the government so that the government will benefit from the citizen's efforts and resources and, in turn, he will benefit from its support and services.
- We call for protecting private property and encouraging private investments.
- We call for organizing importation, exportation, and industry within a balanced and well-researched national plan.
- We call for protecting local production and not resorting to importation, except on the most limited scale possible and only if a local alternative is not available.
- We call for stopping the squandering of currency on banned or undesirable goods, which are detrimental to the health and waste time such as alcohol, cigarettes, decoration materials, and similar luxuries.
- We call for changing our society's consumerist lifestyle and transforming it into a production-gear society which will eat what it plants, wear what it manufactures, and defend the homeland with weapons made by its own sons.
- We work toward developing the spirit of belonging and self-respect.
- We call for increasing reliance on ourselves and our sons' experiences, and for stopping the use of foreign experts who deplete our finances and attempt to stultify the sons of the nation and ruin its economy.

Second: Agriculture

- We will work to reclaim and plant all agricultural lands, give the wasteland to those who cultivate it, and benefit from the modern methods of fertilization and irrigation.
- We will work to develop pastures and forests to increase animal wealth, enhance the country, improve the climate, and protect the environment
- We will work to develop water and energy resources, exploit them in a good manner, and make them available to people at reasonable prices. "People are partners in three things—water, grass, and fire."
- We call for linking the agricultural sector with the industrial sector to benefit from the good seasons and to overcome the distribution problems plaguing some agricultural produce.

Third: Industry

- We call for developing light and medium industry and encouraging the handicraft, cottage, and vocational industries to increase the individual's income, meet the nation's needs, and establish the infrastructure of the developing industry.
- We call for coordination among the Arab and Islamic countries to develop heavy industry, including a weapons industry.

Fourth: The Tax System

- We call for reviewing the tax system to achieve equality between the wealthy and the poor and for distributing tax revenues among the governorates fairly.
- We work to end the wasted taxes resulting from appeasement, negligence of presenting accounts, forgery, and presenting false and misleading statements.

Fifth: The *Zakat* [alms] and Sources of Income

- We call for imposing the *zakat* and spend it legally to close the gap between the wealthy and poor. This will turn the entire society into a society of sufficiency and production and remove the social classes within a short period of time.

Sixth: The Monetary and Banking System

- We call for banning usury in all its forms because it is a negative and materialistic method of economic dealing that aims at making guaranteed profit without taking into consideration the consequences and the interests of the individuals and society and because it is a direct reason for the ongoing economic crisis.
- We call for refraining from outside borrowing, regardless of the circumstances, and for working effectively to repay the accumulated debts of this country by activating the nation; strengthening its affiliation to its sons; canceling unproductive projects; stopping unproductive and destructive activities such as festivals, celebrations, and the circus; annulling some unnecessary institutions; and planning our expenditures.
- We call for combating and curbing inflation and returning to the principle of backing our currency with gold in order to avoid the decline in the value of the dinar and the negative external effects on it.
- We work to fight unemployment and make available new job opportunities inside and outside the country.

Seventh: Squandering, Extravagance and Forbidden Gains

- We call for combating extravagance and all forms of squandering and luxury, applying the principle of interdiction on the money of

spendthrifts, and dealing with this money in accordance with the provisions of the true *sharia*.

- We will work to annul all privileges that were acquired as a result of exploiting responsibility and positions and to take into account all persons who have accumulated huge wealth illegally.
- We call for combating and banning all illegal means of profit, such as gambling, monopoly, amassment of gold, silver, and currencies, as well as illegal deals. We also call for placing matters in their proper places.
- We call for cutting public expenditures, abolishing the unnecessary establishments, and combating underemployment.
- We call for drafting a law on illegal gains to bring to account any person suspected of compiling a fortune illegally or through exploiting his post or job.

Eighth: Natural Resources

- We call for continued digging for natural resources and for activating these operations by relying on local, Arab, and Islamic expertise.
- We call for promoting work techniques and providing trained and effective local cadres to pursue operations of exploration and detection.
- We call for rationalized and proper exploitation of the discovered resources, such as phosphate, cement, potash, glass sand, water, oil, gas, and other resources in order to maintain them for as long as possible.
- We call for exploiting the available conventional and new sources of energy such as oil, gas, solar energy, wind energy, and water resources. We call for reducing the wasted energy as a result of extravagance and costly festivals.

The Educational and Academic Situation

We believe that the educational and academic situation in our country has been experiencing many successive crises. The educational and administrative apparatuses as well as curricula and teachers are facing many crises. This necessitates huge efforts by us in this regard. We will work for the following:

- Stressing compulsory education at all levels.
- The educational policy should be based on the solid ground of faith in Almighty God, raising generations on the nation's great religion of Islam, and maintaining the nation's glorious language.
- Stressing equal opportunities in the educational field for everyone without exception.

- Expanding university education and directing it toward meeting the needs of the society and developing it.
- Focusing on the Arab-Islamic character and its integration through analyzing its components. Elements should be added to the curricula to contribute toward rebuilding of this character.
- Looking for means of finance to education and considering this one of the society's major tasks.
- Avoiding education by rote and adopting modern educational techniques based on encouraging research and exploration, developing students' leadership skills, and focusing on the freedom of education.
- Establishing a link between schools and society so that the school takes part in building and developing the local community.
- Giving special attention to basic education and concentrating on basic education courses.
- Highlighting the teaching profession's ethics, valuing the teacher's work in a manner befitting his position, and improving his standard of living.
- Expanding the range of private schools with supervision of the quality of education and wages of teachers.
- Increasing opportunities for higher education at Jordanian community colleges and universities to reduce the citizens' burden and save hard currency.
- Revising the curricula and textbooks in various subjects by removing all that is contrary to Islamic tenets and focusing on the noble Islamic values.
- Providing the opportunity for efficient and honest persons to assume leadership positions in the ministries of education and higher education.
- Supplying the school libraries with important religious and reference books to acquaint the students with the nation's cultural heritage throughout its long history, and to give the students the opportunity of reviewing the writings of modern Islamic authors.
- Resisting coeducation at universities and community colleges, explaining its harmful effects and dangerous role in perverting the youths within the educational institutions.
- Reviving the scientific and educational heritage filling libraries in the east and the west because we are more responsible than others for preserving this heritage. Thus, our generation and those seeking knowledge in the entire world will be able to benefit from it.
- Conducting scientific research on the basis of our religion in a manner leading to progress and prosperity, and to discovering the secrets of nature, the universe, and the signs of Almighty God. Soon will we show them our signs in the farthest regions of the earth, and in

their own souls, until it becomes manifest to them that this is the truth [Qur'anic verse]. Therefore, we will work toward encouraging scientific research and opening its horizons to our generation, enabling our nation to assume a proper position among other nations in the fields of science and scientific research.

The Condition of the Media

An examination of our media will indicate that in our country, the mass media such as television, broadcasting, newspapers and magazines follow a line different from that of Islamic law and ethics. They transmit many programs that are contrary to Islamic moral codes such as showing films and theatricals which constitute an open violation of the Islamic law's spirit, display nearly nude pictures, and peddle numerous taboo products. All this leaves a negative impact on the generation and it requires immediate action to reform the media. We believe that the media can be reformed through many ways, most important of which are:

1. Choosing efficient men to assume responsibility for media organs. Efficiency means two things: first, honesty and piety; and second, proper scientific qualifications.
2. Establishing programs that are useful to people in this life and in the hereafter.
3. Forming committees to direct the mass media in accordance with Islamic law and ethics.
4. Forming committees to monitor all that is published, approving what is held as useful, and banning what is believed to be harmful.
5. Preventing advertisements in television, radio, and the press which highlight all sacrilegious things.
6. Cleansing the radio and television programs of all perverse items, lewd and notorious songs, and sacrilegious dancing, and imposing tight restrictions on showing foreign films, particularly American pictures that highlight and praise violence, adultery, and degeneration.
7. Banning the publication of pornographic materials or lecherous dancing advertisements.
8. Banning any book that slanders Islam, the Prophet, peace be upon him, or his associates, or misrepresents historical facts, and banning any other foreign publications showing nude pictures.

The Social Situation

To elevate our society to the standard of our aspirations of loftiness and high quality, we affirm that the rules for reforming our society should be based on the following:

1. Declaring brotherhood among the people, because no individual is superior to another either financially or in type, race, or origin. All

human beings belong to Adam, and Adam is from the earth. This principle has been fully implemented for fourteen centuries under Islam. Under materialistic culture, humanity still suffers from racial discrimination in the United States, Africa, and others of God's vast countries.

2. Developing both men and women and announcing equal rights for both. The woman has the right to own property, work, and participate in developing the society within the limits set by Islam, on condition that this does not overwhelm the duty of the woman toward her home, husband, and children. Woman is man's partner as God's Prophet, God's peace and blessings be upon him, said. Almighty God says: The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: They enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil [Qur'anic verse].

3. Protecting and taking care of childhood in upbringing, nutritional care, mental and physical education, and educational guidance. Banning the exploitation of children in types of work that might harm them and forbidding their employment before they reach the legal age.

4. Taking care of orphans, providing them with guardianship, bringing them up properly as though they were living in their parents' homes so that they will not suffer from bad effects, which might reflect on them and on society.

5. Encouraging marriage, supporting it, and overcoming all that might stand in its way, such as financial or other obstacles.

6. Protecting the family and providing it with care and attention. Islam established the family system on sound bases. It provides guidance toward good choices, portrays the best methods for bonds, defines rights and duties, deals with the problems of married life, and finally draws up a moderate standard free of excesses.

7. Providing people with the basic essentials such as food, clothing, medication, electricity, and transportation which has become an insoluble problem and must necessarily be dealt with by setting a comprehensive program for it.

8. Providing medical care for citizens and putting an end to the spread of disease by eradicating its natural and moral roots, and giving priority to this issue on the reform ladder. According to God's doctrine, warding off sources of corruption is more important than reaping benefits, along with maintaining freedom of choice in medical care and treatment.

9. Every citizen has the right to a home he can find shelter in, food, marriage, and security in the cases of old age, inability to work, or accumulation of debt. Social security, according to Islam, is a duty which the state must perform and from which the citizen receives his right.

10. Providing work to all those capable. Work is right and honorable whenever possible. God's Prophet, David, used to live off the products of his labor.

11. Eradicating illiteracy and ending it in accordance with a researched plan defining the time period, the sufficient budget, and all means of implementation to rid the country of illiteracy.

12. Declaring war on corruption in all its forms and establishing laws that deter the corrupt and guarantee the protection of society from corruption by taking the following measures:

- Combating the means for moral deviation and punishing the committers of sin.
- Combating gambling in all its forms, including games, lottery, competitions, and other types, since they are considered illegal gains condemned by Islam.
- Combating drugs ruthlessly and increasing the punishment for smuggling, trading, or using them.
- Banning alcoholic drinks—the manufacture, use, and dealing in alcohol.
- Resisting moral degeneration represented by bawdiness and use of makeup.
- Closing down dance halls, clubs, hotels, and others.

The Military Situation

Our Islamic Arab nation, which is facing plots and intrigues, has one option only: that is, to become a militant nation. We are a militant nation in nature, and our responsibility is to achieve rights and promote the word of God in obedience of God's order: "Go ye forth, whether equipped lightly or heavily, and strive and carry out *jihad*, with your goods and your persons, in the cause of God." [Qur'anic verse]

In light of this distinguished characteristic of our nation, particularly the continuous *jihad* to achieve the rights and to prevent injustice, we believe that our military policy should be based on the following:

1. The need for preparing and mobilizing the nation for *jihad* under all circumstances and in all fields in obedience of God's saying: "Against them, make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know, shall be repaid by you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly." [Qur'anic verses]

2. We call for adopting the principle of *jihad* and opening the path for the sons of the nation to defend the Islamic countries and advocate the call for Islam. We focus on the need for opening the doors of *jihad* to liberate Palestine. This requires the opening of all fronts adjacent to

Palestine to anyone who seeks *jihād* on the blessed soil of Palestine from all over the Islamic homeland.

3. We call for supporting the *jihād* of our people in Palestine with all potentials and capabilities and for providing their blessed *intifadah* with all military methods that can help them develop their *jihād* into an armed confrontation with the Zionist enemy. And this must be backed by Arab and Islamic readiness to enter the major battle against the Zionist enemy—the battle that will certainly come to confirm the good news of the leader of the *mujahidin* of Muhammad, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him. Al-Bukhari quoted ‘Abdallah Ibn-’Umar as saying: “I heard the messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, saying: ‘The Jews will fight you and you will hold sway over them.’ He then said, ‘O Muslim, hold a stone, there is a Jew behind me, kill him.’”

4. We call for Arab and Islamic cooperation to develop military industries that will break the monopoly of the foreign countries that harbor evil toward our nation.

5. We reiterate the Islamic principle affirming that weapons alone do not decide the battle; but that this weapon must be carried by a chaste, courageous, solid arm of the believer who grew up in the Islamic school of *jihād* and learned from the holy Qur’an.

6. We call for supporting our armed forces with their needs of modern weapons and ammunition and for spreading the spirit of *jihād* among their ranks.

The Palestine Question

According to the Islamic *sharia*, Palestine is a blessed and sacred land where there is the al-Aqsa mosque, the third holy mosque, in which a prayer equals 500 prayers in other mosques, except the mosques of Mecca and al-Medina. The al-Aqsa mosque is the place where the messenger of God made his midnight journey. The companions of the Prophet liberated this mosque from the filth of polytheism, and the Muslims under Salah al-Din liberated it from the crusaders. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the mosque fell under British and then Jewish occupation, so the Muslims in Palestine and the Arab countries stood up to resist the two occupations and offered thousands of martyrs to defend the sacred land.

However, the conspiracies were stronger than the efforts of the honest men, and Palestine is still under the occupation, calling for help. Our concept of tackling and solving the Palestine question stems from the following bases:

- The land of Palestine is an Islamic land and it belongs to the Muslims until the end of the world. It is forbidden to concede one inch, regardless of any justifications and pressures.

- The Zionist entity in Palestine is a usurper whose existence will vanish, no matter how long it takes; it is an alien entity that represents a dangerous civilization that opposes Islamic civilization. This Zionist entity was established by colonialist plots that are linked with the interests of major countries led by the United States and Britain.
- The overall *jihad* is the only path to liberate Palestine from the Zionist invaders and those behind them. And the Islamic peoples are the backers of the Muslim Palestinian people; and the Islamic territories, particularly the territories of the confrontation states, are the bases of this *jihad*.
- The Islamic movement believes that the liberation of all Palestine is the most important sacred duty.

The Position Toward Recent Developments

We believe that all peace initiatives—be they American, Zionist, Arab, or Palestinian—will face devastating failure because these initiatives are far from the true aspirations of the Islamic nation and its inalienable rights to the land of Islamic Palestine and because they embody a self-deception in understanding the Zionist movement's real objectives.

- There is no use in hoping for anything from the U.S. stand, which is largely identical to the Jewish stand. Therefore, the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue is a waste of time and aims to cool the heat of the inevitable confrontation with the enemies of Islam in Palestine.
- All UN resolutions—particularly Resolutions 181, 242, and 338—which call for any concession of the Islamic land in Palestine are, by the standard of right and justice and from an Islamic perspective, rejected and considered null and void.
- The international conference is an enormous trick and a cloak under which the Arab regimes might concede large parts of the land of Palestine, approve conciliation with the Zionist enemy and the consequent normalization, and allow the enemies of God to have power in the Muslims' land.
- Negotiating with the Zionist enemy, which usurps the Muslims' land, to concede the Muslims' land and right is rejected by Islamic *sharia* and anyone who calls for this or moves in that direction is a sinner.
- Shamir's elections plan must be fiercely resisted because it constitutes a clear means to divert attention from the *intifadah* in order to besiege and destroy it. Any other liquidatory plan or initiative, which falls in the trend that has the same objective as that of Shamir's plan, must be confronted, even if these initiatives carry Arab names.
- Supporting the blessed *intifadah* and entrenching and developing it so that it can constitute the beginning of the road toward launching

the continuous jihad to liberate the entire Palestinian soil. We will not tire of this even if it takes many long decades. In this, we follow the example of the Muslim *mujahidin* throughout Islamic history. This calls for massing all Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic resources under the banner of Islam.

- Transcending verbal support to tangible support on official and popular levels by adjusting the situations in the Arab and Islamic states so that they come as close as possible to the situation in which the Muslim people in Palestine live—*jihad*, arrests, starvation, injuries, and martyrdom—so that these states will form a single body: if an organ is hurt, all the other organs will help it recover.

- Front-line states must be considered forward positions from which to liberate Palestine. Their populations must be mobilized for jihad in preparation for the hour of attack and liberation.

On Arab, Islamic, and Foreign Policy

On Arab policy, we believe that in pre-Islamic times, Arabs were warring tribes which raided each other. Some of them were agents for the Persians, others for the Romans. Islam then came and united them under the banner of Islam, and they became leaders of the caravan after they had been trailing behind it. They continued to lead it for many centuries.

At the beginning of the 20th century, they became weak, petty states, and until today they have remained fragmented.

We say that the nation should never continue to be trapped in the quagmires of fragmentation and division, while it has the fundamentals necessary for unity. It has the unity of belief, language, geography, and history. It also has the unity of objectives, hopes, and pains, and the unity of the dangers which threaten it. Integration and coordination in distributing its agricultural and oil wealth will help unite it under the banner of Islam in the same way it became united during the time of the Prophet, may God's blessings be upon him and his followers.

We will seek to achieve the unity of the Arab peoples in one nation under the banner of Islam through the following means:

1. Emphasizing loyalty and affiliation to the creed of monotheism.
2. Fighting all racist movements advocating the division of this nation.
3. Fighting sectarianism, regionalism, and bigotry that lead to the separation and disintegration of the nation.
4. Introducing unified Islamic educational curricula.
5. Facilitating travel and movement of people in the Arab countries by lifting the imposed restrictions, which deepen divisions and harm unity.
6. Acting toward the establishment of a common Arab market as a nucleus of an Islamic market.

7. Concluding cooperation agreements among the Arab countries.
8. Supporting *jihad* movements in the Arab world.

On Islamic Policy

We believe that Islam unified the various races—Arabs and non-Arabs—in one nation. All races contributed to the building of the Islamic state, and this nation had continued to be united and live happily for several centuries.

However, internal and external factors emerged and tore the Islamic nation into various peoples and nationalities. These divisions deepened in the 20th century, resulting in various problems.

The correct method of solving the problems of this nation is through its unity under the banner of the great Islam. This is the cure for all its illnesses and the fortified barrier in the face of all enemy conspiracies, protecting the nation from the rancor of colonialism, crusaders, Zionism, and from atheism and promiscuity.

It is not appropriate for a nation that Almighty God from above seven heavens described as one nation—“Verily, this brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood, and I am your Lord and cherisher; therefore, serve me (and no other)” [Qur’anic verse]—to continue to sink in the quagmire of divisions and fragmentation, especially in a world where only large, strong forces can have influence. Europe, in a few years, will virtually become one homeland and one nation.

The nation of Islam has all the constituents and causes of unity. How long will it continue to be divided?

We deeply believe that Arab unity is the first step: indeed, the strong foundations on which comprehensive Islamic unity should be based. We call upon all sincere people to work toward the unity of the Arab nation within a united Arab homeland as a prelude for uniting the Islamic nation in a unified Islamic homeland able to face the giants of the East and the West as equals.

We will seek to achieve the following:

1. Promoting Islamic bonds among Muslims.
2. Propagating the Arabic language.
3. Encouraging cultural, commercial, technical, administrative, and military exchange.
4. Facilitating procedures of movement and travel throughout the Islamic world.
5. Fighting racist and ethnic movements that divide Muslims.
6. Uniting educational curricula or bringing them closer.
7. Deepening loyalty and affiliation to the creed of monotheism and the need to apply the Islamic *sharia*.
8. Supporting *jihad* movements in the Islamic world.
9. Recognizing the *mujahidin* state in Afghanistan.

On Foreign Policy

We believe that the East and West have helped in building the state of the Jews on the blessed land of Palestine. We also believe that they drained the Islamic world's wealth through a number of evil colonialist methods. Our nation must therefore work seriously and actively to break free of the cultural, economic, social, political, and military hegemony of those states. Our nation must also determine its relations with the states in the world in light of Islam's rules and instructions. We will endeavor to achieve the following:

1. To make people in our country aware of the nature of these states, expose their hostile, malicious methods, and warn the nation of their dangers.
2. To boycott the states which support or ally themselves with the state of the Jews—economically, politically, and culturally.
3. To stop supplying oil to the states which collaborate with the Jews.
4. To strengthen relations with the states that cooperate with us for the benefit of Muslim issues.
5. To support all liberation movements in the Islamic world and to support those subjected to injustice, whoever they may be.
6. To endeavor seriously for Jordan's recognition of the *mujahidin* state in Afghanistan.
7. To support different Islamic issues, both materially and morally.
8. To make the nation aware of the danger posed by the missionary, communist, and Freemasonry movements and their clubs by publishing leaflets, books, and articles in newspapers and magazines throughout the world in more than one language and in more than one state.

Conclusion

Brother and sister voters: This is our election program, which we adhere to and present to the people, pledging before Almighty God to exert our utmost efforts to implement it. We hope that it will receive the confidence of every male and female voter in our blessed country.

Brother and sister voters: Voting is a trust that must be delivered fully to those who are worthy of it. Voting is a testimony that must be made, and it is forbidden to conceal it. Almighty God has said: Faithfully discharge His trust, and let Him fear His Lord. Conceal not evidence; for, whoever conceals it, his heart is tainted with sin. [Qur'anic verse]

Testimony must be made rightfully without appeasement to any relative or those who have personal interest. Almighty God has said: Ye who believe, stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin. [Qur'anic verse]

The voter is required to choose the candidate who has faith, knowledge, and experience and who is courageous and fears no one but God. If good candidates are more than the required number, voters must choose the best, irrespective of relationship, personal interest, or tribal considerations. The Prophet has said: Anyone who makes another govern while, among Muslims, there are those who are better, then he will have betrayed God, His Prophet, and the believers.

Brother and sister voters: We are certain that you cling to this religion and take guidance from it. Adopt this slogan with us: Islam is the solution. God has said: O ye who believe, give your response to God and His apostle when he calleth you to that which will give you life. [Qur'anic verse].

Let us all choose the candidates of the Islamic call which raise this slogan and present this program. God is our guide to the right path.

Source: FBIS-NES, October 27, 1989, pp. 18-27.

APPENDIX II

REPORT ON IAF ELECTORAL ADVERTISEMENT

October 18, 1993

Amman's three main Arabic daily newspapers—*al-Dustur*, *Sawt al-Sha'b*, and *al-Ra'y*—on October 18 published a half-page boxed electoral advertisement by the Islamic Action Front [IAF]. The advertisement calls for the election of thirty-six IAF candidates from seventeen constituencies in Jordan's November 8 parliamentary election. The advertisement displays an individual photo of each candidate, identified by caption. The IAF slogan "Yes, Islam is the Solution," flanks both sides of the advertisement.

The following IAF electoral platform positions appear at the bottom of the advertisement:

- Applying Islamic *sharia* in society;
- Fortifying the citizen against corruption and cultural invasion;
- Countering normalization with the Zionist enemy;
- Opposing policies seeking reconciliation with the Zionist enemy;
- Continuation of subsidies for basic supplies; subsidies must not be removed under any pretext;
- Working to abolish and amend certain articles of the Constitution to bolster democratization.

Source: FBIS-NES, October 19, 1993, p. 54.

APPENDIX III

EXCERPTS FROM THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL CHARTER *December 1990*

CHAPTER TWO **STATE GOVERNED BY LAW AND POLITICAL PLURALISM**

First: The State of Law and Political Pluralism

1. The State of Law is a democratic state committed to the principle of the supremacy of the law and derives its legitimacy, authority and effectiveness from the free will of the people and all authorities within it are committed to providing legal, judicial and administrative guarantees to protect the rights, integrity and basic freedoms of the individual which rules were laid down by Islam and confirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all other international covenants and treaties promulgated by the United Nations in this regard.

2. The Jordanian State is a State of Law in the modern sense of a democratic state. It is a state for all citizens regardless of any differences of opinion or any pluralism of approach. It derives its strength from an actual and declared application of the principles of equality, justice and equal opportunities and from the provision of practical means enabling the Jordanian people to participate in the decisions affecting their lives and their affairs in such a manner as to achieve peace of mind, security, faith in the future, genuine concern for the institutions of the state and pride in belonging therein.

Second: Basic Pillars of a State of Law

1. Adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities in all their actions, within a framework of priority of the right.

2. Adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law, within a framework of comprehensive review by an independent judiciary.

3. Adherence, in the exercise of democracy, to the principles and requisites of social justice.

4. Ensuring that laws in general and laws pertaining to political parties, elections and publications in particular are dedicated to safeguarding the citizens' basic rights and public freedoms.

5. Adoption of the democratic dialogue as the basis of expressing the views, free from any form of coercion or intellectual terrorism, at all official and public levels.

6. Adherence by all government institutions, in the exercise of their duties and services to the public and entities to the principle of complete equality. Said institutions, whether civil or military, should not be exploited by any group, party or faction for political or party purposes, without prejudice to the rights of citizens to organize themselves politically, provided that all of the above is considered as a basic condition for the success of the democratic system.

In order to strengthen the above pillars and to bolster the democratic structure of the Jordanian state and society, it is imperative to work on ensuring the following:

1. Establish, through a special law, an autonomous body to be called the Complaints Bureau to exercise administrative inspection and review the performance of the administration and the actions of individuals therein. The Bureau shall report to Parliament and the Council of Ministers in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws and decrees without prejudice to the independence or jurisdiction of the judiciary.

2. Establish, through a special law, an autonomous body to update and develop legislation based on studies and research conducted for that purpose. This body shall report to Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

3. Establish a Constitutional Court with the following jurisdiction:

a. Interpret the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution in matters referred to it by the Council of Ministers

b. Decide on matters referred to it by the courts with regard to constitutional issues arising from cases entertained before these courts.

c. Decide on disputes and challenges pertaining to the constitutionality of laws and decrees which are brought before it by interested parties.

In all of the aforementioned instances, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court shall be limited to deciding on the constitutional aspect. Decisions by the Court shall be final and binding on all state bodies and individuals.

4. Amalgamate legislation pertaining to state of emergency and state of extreme emergency sanctioned by the Constitution into one law which would make decisions by the Council of Ministers declaring either state of emergency or specifying its duration subject to approval by Parliament and would in all cases place all administrative decisions taken by virtue of this legislation subject to review by the High Court of Justice.

5. Restore to Parliament the legislative powers of the Council of Ministers stipulated in Articles 114 and 120 of the Constitution in

connection with decrees of public works, public purchases and civil service.

6. Subject the budgets of public corporations to parliamentary approval. The budget of mixed companies where public equity amounts to 50 percent or more shall be subject to subsequent parliamentary review.

7. Take steps to introduce constitutional amendments deemed necessary to meet development needs and to repeal provisions in the Constitution which have lost their *raison d'être*.

Third: Guarantees of the Democratic Approach

The most important guarantees of the democratic approach and achievement of political pluralism are the adherence to the following principles:

1. Respecting the fundamentals of democratic action by organized political groups and parties in their general conduct since it constitutes a guarantee to justice and stability.

2. Strengthening the traits of tolerance and objectivity, respect for the beliefs of others and groups in the exercise of political and party affairs, avoiding narrow personal conflicts and the slander of individuals and entities.

3. Guaranteeing the basic freedoms of all citizens in such a manner as to protect the structure of a democratic society, preserve the rights of individuals and ensure full freedom of expression and its declaration with complete liberty within the limits of the Constitution.

4. Attaining equality, justice and equal opportunities for all citizens, male and female, without discrimination.

5. Preserving the civilian and democratic character of the state, and regarding any attempt to abolish or undermine this character as invalid *ab initio* as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and the pluralist principle and its perception.

Fourth: Principles and Limitations Governing the Establishment of Parties

1. Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and belong to political parties and groupings provided that their objectives are legitimate, their methods are peaceful and their statutes do not violate the provisions of the Constitution. Laws regulating the operation of parties should not include any provisions which overtly or implicitly call for abrogating the constitutional right to establish political parties.

2. Political and party work in Jordan is based on the principle of pluralism of thought, opinion and organization and on securing the requisites of democratic competition and its legitimate means.

3. A party must announce and declare its statutes and internal

regulations which specify its aims, financial resources and political, economic, social and cultural platforms.

4. The judiciary is solely empowered to decide on any infringement pertaining to the application of the parties law.

5. Political parties shall, in their internal workings as well as in their programs, approaches, actions and public and party activities, adhere to the following principles:

a. Parties must employ democratic methods in their internal workings, choice of leadership, and in the exercise of their activities within a framework of democratic dialogue and free competition among the political parties. The same shall apply to relations and dealings by any party with other political parties and groupings as well as with popular and constitutional institutions in a spirit of mutual respect for opposing views.

b. There shall be no structural or financial affiliation by the leadership or members of any party with any non-Jordanian. Also, no activities by any party or grouping shall be conducted upon instructions or directions from any foreign state or body. Taking into consideration what is stated in this paragraph and all principles and limitations governing the organization of parties, any provisions in the statute, internal regulations or programs of any licensed Jordanian party serving Palestine, Arab unity or Islamic solidarity shall be regarded as a national Jordanian undertaking.

c. Any party in government or participating therein shall adhere to the principles of equality and equal opportunities for all citizens and must regard ability and qualifications as basic criteria for any appointment to public office.

d. In the matter of financial revenues, all parties shall rely on local, recognized, declared and specified Jordanian resources. These shall be subject to financial audit and legal review in the manner prescribed by law.

e. In matters of organization, activities and orientation, all parties shall refrain from organizing or recruiting for party purposes within the ranks of the Jordanian armed forces and security departments or establishing military or paramilitary groups of any description whatsoever.

f. All parties whatever their form of organization shall maintain premises with known and declared addresses. Parties shall not use state, public, charitable or religious institutions or bodies for the benefit of any party or grouping. Nor shall they involve any such institutions in any political or factional conflicts.

Source: Government of Jordan.

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