Turkey

In October 2019, the U.S. troop withdrawal and subsequent Turkish invasion of northern Syria upended Kurdish plans in the region. But a year later, the major Syrian Kurdish rivals—the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC)—are coming together after a lengthy estrangement. This past June, representatives from the

Israel’s normalization agreement with the United Arab Emirates may enable Gulf oil to make up for any break in Azerbaijani supplies, though this option could harm its ties with Baku and Turkey.

Much of the commentary surrounding the deal has focused on what it portends for the Palestinian issue and other Israeli relationships, but it may say just as much about the four rival factions that have crystallized in the region since 2011.

Publicly committing to a ceasefire is a positive development, but many details still need to be resolved with active U.S. support, especially security arrangements in central Libya and the speedy resumption of oil exports.

Putin set a trap for Erdogan long ago, and because the Turkish leader woke up too late to his predicament, he now has little leverage in the unequal bilateral relationship.

Even if acute diplomatic differences are resolved, low natural gas prices will have a cooling effect on regional energy initiatives.

Turkey’s president seems focused on cementing his legacy and boosting his popularity with voters, but the move is more likely to damage the country’s international brand.

Deeper Turkish engagement with the Syrian Kurds would be helpful, but any such talks need to be linked with ongoing efforts to contain the Islamic State and advance the UN’s broader Geneva process.

President Erdogan’s ever-tightening circle of policy influencers has lagged behind on proposing innovative solutions to the pandemic, giving other politicians an opening to become the main drivers of national change.