Peace Process

The UAE’s deal with Israel may render Egypt a junior partner in future peace diplomacy, aggravating its existing frustration over years of financial dependence on the small Gulf state and a string of foreign policy setbacks.

It shows the Palestinians that their longstanding paradigm for isolating Israel has failed, partly due to converging regional interests, and partly because it was based on incorrect assumptions.

Like all good policy decisions, the deal emerged from the enlightened self-interest of the key parties, but the stakes are not as high as with Israel’s previous two Arab peace treaties.

Years of burgeoning trade and quiet U.S. diplomacy helped lay the groundwork for a move that is only partly focused on improving the bilateral relationship.

Arab countries that have official relations with Israel are more effective at advancing Palestinian interests, and now Abu Dhabi has joined their ranks.

Unilateral Israeli annexation would be a mistake, but a one-state solution or an unconditional declaration of Palestinian statehood would just compound the error.

Netanyahu is treating the Trump plan like a buffet where he can choose only the parts he likes.

King Abdullah's 1950 annexation of “Arab Palestine” shows that a bold leader can play his advantages well, redraw the map, gain some recognition, and still leave only regrets.

Recently, much attention has focused on Israel’s drift away from a two-state solution and toward annexation of the West Bank. But hard data shows that the Palestinian public has also clearly moved away from the classic compromise peace deal with its neighbors. When the Trump peace plan was announced in