Yuri Gripas/Reuters Secretary of Defense Robert Gates with Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the Pentagon on Thursday.
Updated, Sept. 18, 2:30 p.m. | Paul A. Goble, a longtime analyst of the countries in the former Soviet orbit, assesses Moscow’s response to Mr. Obama’s missile defense strategy.
President Obama announced on Thursday that he will scrap the Bush administration’s plans for a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and instead deploy a redesigned system intended to intercept shorter-range Iranian missiles. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the new system would put defenses in place seven years earlier than the Bush plan, which has strained relations with Russia.
What are the consequences of President Obama’s decision? Will the alternative — deploying smaller missiles, at first aboard ships and later elsewhere in Europe or in Turkey — work?
- Soner Cagaptay, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- David J. Kramer, former assistant secretary of state
- Andrew Kuchins, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Lisbeth Gronlund, Union of Concerned Scientists
- Nile Gardiner, Heritage Foundation
- Sharon Weinberger, author, “Imaginary Weapons”
- A. Wess Mitchell, Center for European Policy Analysis
- Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Paul A. Goble, Windows on Eurasia
The Silver Lining in Turkey
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
The Obama administration’s decision to scrap missile defense sites in Eastern Europe against long-range Iranian missiles has a silver lining: a chance to boost U.S.-Turkish ties and counter short-range Iranian missiles at the same time.
Washington has already announced that it will position short-range missile interceptors around the Mediterranean, and Turkey is a possible location for this system. Together with news earlier this week that the United States will sell Ankara Patriot missiles worth $ 7.8 billion that can be used against short-range Iranian missiles, this is welcome news for U.S. steps toward Iran, as well as for U.S.-Turkish ties, which took a nose dive after the Iraq war.
A Serious Mistake
David J. Kramer is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He was assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor as well as deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the George W. Bush administration.
While not surprised by President Obama’s decision, I’m nonetheless very disappointed and think it’s a serious mistake.
Leaders in Moscow, by comparison, must feel victorious. Coming days before Obama meets Dmitri Medvedev in New York and Pittsburgh , the decision clearly seems timed to remove from the U.S.-Russian agenda an issue that the Russians didn’t like — namely, that we were working with Poland and the Czech Republic on missile defense.
Why undo agreements with two governments that already agreed to host a land-based system?
I assume the administration felt that without taking such a decision, a post-START arms control agreement might have been blocked due to Russia’s linkage of the two issues. The administration may also be under the illusion that this decision will bring Russia on board with us in pressuring Iran. I doubt that will work, especially since the Russians have rejected such an approach.
I dare say this is a betrayal of the Poles and Czechs, who went to bat for the U.S. when the Bush administration pressed them to assume the responsibility for hosting 10 interceptor missiles and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. It’s also caving to Russian pressure and will encourage leaders in Moscow to engage in more loud complaining and bully tactics (such as threatening Iskander missiles against the Poles and Czechs) because such behavior gets desired results.
Responding to New Conditions
Andrew Kuchins is a senior fellow and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The Obama administration’s decision will make the Russian leadership squirm about their intransigence to imposing further economic sanctions on Iran.
There is no direct quid pro quo on this. But certainly this decision undercuts the prevailing skepticism in Moscow that the Obama administration is not serious about reviewing some Bush administration policies that the Russians deeply opposed. Whether the Russian position on Iran will move, in part because of this decision, remains to be seen.
A strategy combining sea-based and land-based elements may well be more effective than the Bush plan.
In my view, the key factors driving the Obama administration to seek improved relations with Russia in order of priority, are 1) Iran; 2) Afghanistan; and 3) Nuclear security/arms control.
The administration will be criticized by many here and abroad for making a major concession to the Russians without getting something in exchange. I see it differently.
It’s been clear for some time that the Obama team was not enthusiastic about the proposed missile defense with deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland. At the end of the day, a decision like this emerges from complex calculations of domestic and foreign politics, the murky world of intelligence threat assessments, and developments in technical capabilities to address them.
Consider the Technical Realities
Lisbeth Gronlund is a senior scientist and the co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Mass.
President Obama’s decision to not deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic is an example of sound science in policy making. As stated in a July letter from leading scientists to the president, “This system has not been proven and does not merit deployment. It would offer little or no defensive capability, even in principle.”
While Russian concerns about the deployment were based on an exaggerated view of the system’s capabilities against its nuclear arsenal, the potential deployment was a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. Now, with Russia’s cooperation, the United States will be in a better position to pursue the only effective defense against potential Iranian nuclear-armed long-range missiles: diplomacy.
With Russia’s cooperation, the U.S. will now be in a better position to pursue the only effective defense: diplomacy.
Equally important, President Obama’s decision could help reduce a far more significant — and existing — nuclear danger to the United States. Both the United States and Russia still keep more than 1,000 missile-based warheads on high alert, opening the door to an accidental or unauthorized launch of large numbers of these weapons. This is the only threat that could destroy the United States as a functioning society. By improving U.S.-Russian relations, this decision will make it easier for the two nations to negotiate far deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals and to implement measures to reduce the alert status of their nuclear missiles.
The Wrong Signal to Europe
Nile Gardiner is director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation.
The Obama administration decision to pull out of its deal with Poland and the Czech Republic to establish third-site missile defense installations sends completely the wrong signal. Indeed, it represents a surrender by Washington to Russian bullying and intimidation.
The Obama decision is likely to strengthen anti-American sentiment in many countries that are traditional U.S. allies.
It dramatically undercuts the trans-Atlantic relationship and will be seen as a betrayal by two of America’s closest allies in eastern and central Europe. The administration is undermining America’s strategic influence in Europe by cutting this deal with Moscow. The dangerous implication is all too clear: Washington is willing to sacrifice its friends and allies on the altar of political expediency.
The Russians will portray this decision as a huge victory for Vladimir Putin. By contrast, in many European capitals this decision will be received with dismay, and it’s likely to strengthen anti-American sentiment in many countries that are traditional U.S. allies.
This latest step by President Obama will raise fears in Europe that the United States will no longer stand up to Moscow. The abandonment of third-site missile defenses is appeasement of a major strategic competitor — one that will be emboldened now to flex its muscles further.
The System Is Far From Dead
Sharon Weinberger is a contributing writer for Wired’s Danger Room blog and the author of “Imaginary Weapons: A Journey Through the Pentagon’s Scientific Underworld.”
President Barack Obama’s decision to halt the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe marks a clear break with the previous administration’s vision of missile defense. But missile defense is far from dead.
The new plan promises continued work on a sea-based system that has performed admirably in testing.
The “Ground-based Midcourse Defense” system pushed by the Bush administration was neither the peace shield once envisioned by Ronald Reagan, nor the unmitigated failure its critics would claim. It is a mixed bag of developing technology that has proved reasonably successful during highly scripted tests. It has never been tested in an operationally realistic scenario.
Both supporters and opponents of missile defense have battled over the controversial technology with almost religious zeal. For the true believers, any system, no matter how flawed or expensive, is worth the investment if it offers even the remote possibility of deterring or defeating a potential aggressor. For skeptics, no test or technological breakthrough will ever overcome their objection to the political repercussions, or the seeming infeasibility of shooting down a bullet with a bullet.
Interceptors are still in place in Alaska and California, and the new plan promises continued work on a sea-based system that has performed admirably in testing. But the timing of the president’s announcement, which fell on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, was clumsy and unfortunate. Negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic dragged on for years, while Russia huffed and puffed (even though the interceptors were never a realistic threat to the Russian nuclear arsenal).
Increasing Regional Insecurity
A. Wess Mitchell is president of the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Washington-based policy institute dedicated to the study of Central Europe.
I see two serious flaws with the administration’s new ballistic missile defense plan. First, it seems to be based on the faulty assumption that unilateral U.S. concessions on ballistic missile defense today will inspire Russian assistance on Iran tomorrow. There are no indications to date that the Russians are willing or able to bring meaningful pressure to bear on Tehran. The Russians signaled recently that they do not intend to support additional sanctions. To the extent we had any leverage, we just gave it away.
Second, and most importantly, the administration appears to be overlooking the very real negative side effects that will arise in the Central and Eastern European security environment. With BMD gone, the small and midsized states in the region will only look for new forms of reassurance. Should Russia make a serious move against Ukraine, the regional insecurity complex could suddenly intensify to levels not seen since the cold war. The net effect will be to increase, rather than decrease, the possibility of regional friction points requiring U.S. attention. BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic, by providing the reassurance of a U.S. security presence, could have helped to head that problem off at the pass.
Getting Russia Onboard
Sharon Squassoni is a senior associate in the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The most immediate outcome of President Obama’s decision to replace the ground-based interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively, with Aegis-based missiles and x-band radars is to provide more breathing room for U.S. -Russian strategic arms control negotiations. The arms control negotiations need to produce agreement before December 2009, when the START treaty expires, and the Russians have continued to complain about George W. Bush’s decision last year to deploy ground-based missile defense systems in Europe.
The U.S. needs Russia’s undivided attention and cooperation to bring Iran back from the nuclear abyss.
This link to the arms talks may have been regrettable but unavoidable. Given that the administration was likely to overturn the Bush missile defense deployments anyway, it may be good timing in terms of getting the most mileage from this concession. If it is true that Iranian long-range missile development has been moving more slowly than forecasted — and there is no reason not to believe that, since their capabilities in this area have been overestimated for more than a decade — then deploying a more flexible system against short- and medium-range missiles on an earlier timeframe makes sense.
The issue then remains what options the U.S. and Europe will seek if or when the Iranians actually do deploy a longer range ballistic missile. Will it be a mobile ground-based interceptor, which Boeing floated this summer? Or will relations with Russia in the future prove to be less of an impediment to fixed-missile defense sites? Better yet, will the threat of an Iranian nuclear-tipped missile have faded from view?
The View From Moscow
Paul A. Goble, who was a State Department analyst on Soviet nationalities, is a member of the faculty of the Institute of World Politics. His site, Window on Eurasia, follows the former Soviet region.
Russian officials and mainstream media outlets are celebrating President Obama’s decision not to place missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic for now as a victory for Russia. But some Moscow commentators are expressing concerns about the limited nature of the decision and about what Russia may have traded away.
Indeed, even mainstream writers are pointedly suggesting that Moscow should not feel bound to respond positively unless Washington provides formal guarantees that it won’t reverse its decision. In fact, some Russian analysts say that what the U.S. has done is simply “good sense.”
Is Washington’s action “a pure concession” or has there been or will there be a deal in exchange?
While these skeptical comments do not necessarily define what the Russian government thinks or will do, they suggests that some in the Moscow hierarchy will demand even more concessions from Washington now that Mr. Obama has shown his willingness to take a step that many in Eastern Europe view as a betrayal.
Perhaps the clearest expression of such Russian thinking is provided by Aleksandr Khramchikhin, a senior official at the Moscow Institute of Political and Military Analysis, who argues that to understand where Washington is heading, Moscow must consider not only Mr. Obama’s missile defense decision but also on his decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama.
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