One of the hopes underlying the Obama Administration’s approach to the Iran nuclear negotiations has been that reaching a deal would moderate the behavior of the Iranian regime. . . . The structure of the nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), anticipates such an evolution in Iran. The restrictions it places on Iran begin phasing out in five years with the lifting of remaining limits on the export of arms to Iran, and sunset entirely in 10-15 years, after which Iran will face no restrictions on its nuclear fuel cycle or missile activities short of actually producing a nuclear weapon, which would violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which Iran is a party. Absent any plan to negotiate a follow-on accord or to strengthen American deterrence in the Middle East, the deal thus represents a gamble on the P5+1’s part that Iran will not desire a nuclear weapon in a decade’s time.
This, as critics had expected, has not occurred. The notion that Iran would evolve in large part rested on an erroneous understanding about the Iranian regime:
Despite characterizations in the West of Iranian political elites as either “moderate” or “hardline,” such labels are both oversimplified — the Iranian political landscape is as diverse and complicated as any other country’s — and often flat wrong. Wendy Sherman, who as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs acted as the lead American negotiator of the JCPOA, asserted recently that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, often categorized as the leader of a supposed “moderate” faction in Iran, “is not a moderate — he is a hardliner.”5 The “moderate” and “hardliner” labels are insidious, as they feed temptations by Western policymakers to divide Iranian officialdom into “good guys” and “bad guys” with respect to the West’s own worldview and interests.
There are divisions on domestic economic and political issues and matters of tactics, as Singh explains, but neither side is pro-Western or inclined to give up the regime’s nuclear ambitions or plans for regional hegemony. (“[So-called moderate President] Rouhani has vigorously defended Iran’s missile program and vowed to expand it in response to US sanctions threats, and has insisted that Iran feels free to buy and sell whatever arms it pleases, despite restrictions imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2231. He has also stressed that “President Assad must remain” in Syria, and has praised the Iranian military presence in both Syria and Iraq.”) Singh concludes that there is “not a clear difference between Rouhani and his domestic adversaries over Iran’s (or the United States’) rightful role in the region or its regional and national security policies, but rather a divide over the best way to achieve its foreign policy aims.” The implications should be clear for President Obama’s successor since engagement pays no dividends and arguably begets more concessions: “Given the strategic challenge that Iran poses to US interests in the Middle East — in its support for terrorism and subversive non-state actors, threat to freedom of commerce and navigation in regional waterways, pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and other destabilizing pursuits — the American approach to diplomacy with Iran cannot simply consist of a series of transactional engagements but should instead be nested in a broader strategy to counter the challenges posed by Iran and advance a stabilizing regional agenda.”
