Great Power Competition

Washington still has good cards to play in terms of Iran’s destabilizing activities, the U.S. security umbrella over Gulf energy supplies, and Arab public opinion toward China and America.

The long timeframes and commercial calculations involved in such a transition have left Washington and other capitals more reliant on OPEC+ decisionmaking than they would like.

Although Biden may not see Russia as his top priority, Moscow’s proxy military activities in the Mediterranean are directly aimed at diluting Washington’s leverage in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.

Institute scholars share their insights into how the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rapid fall of the country to the Taliban will affect the American strategic position across the Middle East and our relationships with allies, partners, and adversaries

Moscow has repeatedly played actors off each other to secure its own interests and keep the Assad regime in power.

Despite its consistent rhetoric toward Moscow, the administration has not yet demonstrated its strategic understanding that ceding too much operating space to Russia will hurt U.S. efforts to confront China.

If Washington continues to deprioritize the Middle East, Russia will accelerate its convergence with Iran and essentially determine Syria’s future, which could result in a more explicit and dangerous nexus between these actors.

Wishful thinking aside, Moscow will continue to push solely for its own interests in these discussions, which for the foreseeable future means empowering Assad.

To expand its strategic influence on the Mediterranean, Moscow is exploiting Beirut and Hezbollah’s crisis at a time when the West seems uncertain about how much to intervene.