

# What the New Gaza Administrative Committee Needs to Succeed

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Feb 5, 2026

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Brief Analysis

**The NCAG's viability will depend on producing quick, tangible deliverables, so the Trump administration, the Board of Peace, and the High Representative should stand ready to provide the requisite support on staving off Hamas and PA obstructionism and cutting through Israeli red tape.**

Last month's establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza—the name given to the “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” mandated under President Trump's [twenty-point peace plan \(https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803\(2025\)\)](https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025))—marks an important step in the transition to postwar stabilization efforts. The Trump plan envisions the NCAG as the only entity tasked with implementing governance in Gaza. And in addition to the typical challenges faced by similar transition authorities, it will face challenges specific to the Palestinian context, whether related to operational obstacles, political delegitimization efforts by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or the need to secure efficient, responsive cooperation from Israel.

The NCAG's credibility will hinge on its ability to surmount these challenges and promptly provide tangible deliverables to the people of Gaza. In the immediate term, the Board of Peace—the U.S.-led entity that will [oversee the entire transition process \(https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/01/statement-on-president-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/\)](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/01/statement-on-president-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/), including the NCAG's activities—should focus on providing the political space the committee needs to operate, as well as the tools it needs to make an impact on the lives of Gazans and establish credibility. If the NCAG fails, it would jeopardize the entire twenty-point plan.

## A Good First Impression Is Critical

According to the twenty-point plan, the NCAG is tasked with “the day-to-day running of public services,” essentially putting it in control of efforts to restore Gaza's governance structures and implement early recovery

and rehabilitation of the war-ravaged territory. If it succeeds in these tasks, it will be well-positioned to play a key role once the reconstruction phase begins.

The NCAG might also emerge as the de facto address for security matters inside Gaza, since all current signs indicate that the International Stabilization Force envisaged in the twenty-point plan will not be able or willing to take an operational role in disarming Hamas. Although the committee does not have an explicit security mandate, it will have control over the “vetted Palestinian police forces” described in Trump’s original plan, giving it an expanded security role by default. (These and other security issues will be covered more fully in a separate PolicyWatch.)

As it tackles these tall tasks, the NCAG will have a relatively short window to gain—or lose—credibility. The people of Gaza are eager to embrace any entity that can concretely change their living conditions and chart a path toward normality after two years of devastating war. Quick, demonstrable results will boost the NCAG’s legitimacy and give it momentum. Conversely, if its early operations stall, the committee will lose public trust and become more vulnerable to political attacks—something that Hamas and the PA will seize on to delegitimize and disempower it in their favor.

## Domestic Challenges

**W**hile the NCAG is “technocratic and apolitical” by design, it operates in a highly political environment and will therefore have political vulnerabilities. Publicly, Hamas and the PA have welcomed its creation, in part to avoid clashing with President Trump and the regional coalition he built around the twenty-point plan. Yet both organizations stand to lose if the NCAG succeeds. Despite its claims to the contrary, Hamas still wants to maintain political control over Gaza, and a successful NCAG would undermine that goal—especially if the committee winds up assuming a greater security role. For its part, the PA is worried that success may transform the NCAG from a “temporary, transitional” entity into a recognized and trusted international interlocutor for future phases.

The PA and Hamas also have the means to complicate the NCAG’s operations. For one, armed Hamas members can threaten the personal security of committee personnel. Moreover, the NCAG will have to rely in part on the existing Gaza bureaucracy to implement its policies and decisions. Although part of the committee’s job is to oust known Hamas members from these structures, sympathizers might hold onto their posts, giving the terrorist group continued access to influence (and intimidate) other bureaucrats. Similarly, the PA has a number of legal and regulatory tools it can use to undermine the NCAG’s operations. Hamas and the PA are also likely to engage in direct or proxy messaging campaigns aimed at delegitimizing the NCAG.

## The Israeli Factor

**W**ithout a commitment from Jerusalem to facilitate the NCAG’s work, the committee cannot succeed, since Israel controls the movement of funds, materials, and people into and out of Gaza. This commitment has to come from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu himself, in order to set the tone for the Israeli bureaucracy to constructively engage with the NCAG. The bureaucracy will also need to change its modus operandi regarding Gaza’s needs.

Although Israeli security considerations remain paramount, successful civil efforts will play a vital role in fostering Gaza security in the long term. To create the necessary conditions for the NCAG to fulfill its most urgent tasks in a timely manner, Israel needs to adopt a responsive, expeditious approach to matters such as vetting new authorities in Gaza, enabling the delivery of crucial materials, and facilitating the movement of official personnel. In contrast, a cumbersome, bureaucratic approach will make it impossible for the committee to operate effectively, opening the door to a Hamas resurgence and general instability.

Early indications are not reassuring. Last month, for example, the NCAG’s chairman was reportedly delayed (<https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-technocratic-panel-meets-for-first-time-as-officials-fear-its-hobbled->

**from-get-go/**) for six hours at the Allenby Bridge while en route to the committee's inaugural meeting in Cairo. A few such incidents can be chalked up to early bureaucratic inertia, but if they become a pattern, they will severely hamper the NCAG's ability to succeed.

## Help Me Help You

**A**t the end of the day, even if these external challenges are allayed, the NCAG's own adherence to principles of good governance will be the most important factor in determining its success. First and foremost, the committee must strictly abide by its "technocratic, apolitical" mandate and avoid getting embroiled in political disputes. Its recent decision to adopt a logo **identical to the PA's** (<https://www.albawaba.com/news/netanyahu-palestinian-technocratic-1621419>) is a case in point—such incidents divert attention and political capital from its core mission. The committee must also avoid trying to address issues that go beyond its capacity or current mandate, including reconstruction or Hamas disarmament.

Indeed, the NCAG already has enough on its plate. Its first priority is to stabilize the humanitarian situation in the so-called "red zone"—the parts of Gaza from which Israeli forces have withdrawn and where the vast majority of Gazans live. There are many pressing needs in this zone that can be immediately addressed in ways that generate employment or otherwise make an immediate impact on people's lives, positioning the NCAG as a credible governing body in the process. For example, the committee could focus on starting the process of restoring humanitarian and services infrastructure in the water, power, sanitation, health, and education sectors.

## Policy Recommendations

**A**s a fledgling technocratic body, the NCAG lacks the tools to address some of the political and diplomatic challenges awaiting it. Hence, the all-important tasks of rallying regional and international support for the committee and engaging Israel will fall to the High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov—an effective and experienced diplomat. The High Representative will be the day-to-day interface between the Board of Peace and regional and local stakeholders, who will no doubt seek to determine right away how empowered he is and whether he has the direct backing of President Trump. His ability to demonstrate such support will set the terms of his future engagement with these stakeholders and signal whether he can create the conditions for NCAG success.

In particular, the Board of Peace should ask the High Representative to make clear that Hamas and the PA must not take actions that undermine the NCAG's operations. Of course, there are limits to how much outside actors can influence the political behavior of Hamas and the PA, and this will certainly be true with regard to their messaging campaigns and indirect influence on Gaza bureaucrats serving under the NCAG. Yet the High Representative and other officials will have tools for minimizing the damage done by spoilers, such as closely monitoring their activities, calling them out when they engage in obstructionism, and using regional states to amplify this message—specifically, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt (for Hamas), and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt (for the PA).

As for Israel, the first order of business is to make sure it adopts an approach that facilitates rather than obstructs the NCAG's operations. This is a political decision that only President Trump can secure from Prime Minister Netanyahu. The main operational challenge will be overcoming the slow grind of Israeli bureaucracy and securing efficient responses to the NCAG's daily requests. Jerusalem should therefore name an empowered point person to serve as Israel's liaison for all matters affecting the committee's operations.

Ultimately, however, nothing succeeds like success. This will primarily hinge on the NCAG's own competence and performance, though the Board of Peace can help amplify both of these metrics. As phase two of the Trump plan proceeds, a number of positive developments will hopefully arise that improve conditions for the people of Gaza. Where appropriate and credible, the NCAG should be given at least partial credit for such developments in order to boost its legitimacy and facilitate its follow-on operations.

Enabling the committee to succeed will require substantial effort and political capital from all stakeholders. Daunting as this may be, officials should keep in mind that failure would only create a vacuum that Hamas would inevitably fill. This would be severely detrimental not only to Palestinian and Israeli interests, but also to President Trump's peace plan and its core principle of preventing a terrorist group like Hamas from retaining any role in the future governance of Gaza.

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