

Why War? Why Now? Assessing Iranian Intentions and Capabilities

by [Matthew Levitt \(/experts/matthew-levitt\)](/experts/matthew-levitt)

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



[Matthew Levitt \(/experts/matthew-levitt\)](/experts/matthew-levitt)

Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Senior Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute.



Articles & Testimony

Israeli and American intelligence reached different conclusions while looking at the same information, so understanding what Jerusalem and Tehran were thinking before the war is crucial to forecasting what could come next.

Even as debates swirl over early assessments of the damage inflicted upon Iran’s nuclear facilities, a more fundamental question remains: Why did Israel, and then the United States, decide to attack Iran now, even as U.S.-Iranian negotiations sputtered along?

As intelligence agencies collect information, more accurate assessments of the results of the U.S. military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities will come to light over time. President Donald Trump was quick to assert that the U.S. strikes caused “[total obliteration \(https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-conflict-us-trump-06-25-25-intl-hnk\)](https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-conflict-us-trump-06-25-25-intl-hnk),” while a [leaked report \(https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/24/politics/intel-assessment-us-strikes-iran-nuclear-sites\)](https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/24/politics/intel-assessment-us-strikes-iran-nuclear-sites) from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed—with low confidence—that the U.S. bombing campaign only set the Iranian nuclear program back by a matter of months. Both [American \(https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/statement-from-director-john-ratcliffe-about-intelligence-on-irans-nuclear-program/\)](https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/statement-from-director-john-ratcliffe-about-intelligence-on-irans-nuclear-program/) and [Israeli \(https://x.com/Levitt_Matt/status/1937971794746409030\)](https://x.com/Levitt_Matt/status/1937971794746409030) officials soon followed with much more optimistic assessments of the damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. “When possible,” CIA Director John Ratcliffe [pledged \(https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/statement-from-director-john-ratcliffe-about-intelligence-on-irans-nuclear-program/\)](https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/statement-from-director-john-ratcliffe-about-intelligence-on-irans-nuclear-program/), the U.S. intelligence community will “provide updates and information to the American public, given the national importance of this matter and in every attempt to provide transparency.”

Meanwhile, the underlying question about why Israel and the United States entered this war remains. Fundamentally, that debate surrounds the state of Iran’s nuclear program before the strikes, its nuclear weaponization program in particular, and its ballistic missile program. When asked last week about the U.S. Intelligence Community’s [assessment \(https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2025/4059-ata-opening-statement-as-prepared\)](https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2025/4059-ata-opening-statement-as-prepared) that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon,” a conclusion Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard presented to Congress in March, Trump [replied \(https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=a81e0ea825ae4443a1fb795a3fcf18dd\)](https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=a81e0ea825ae4443a1fb795a3fcf18dd), “I don’t care what she said,” adding, “I think they were very close to having one.”

But the discussion of Iran’s capabilities largely misses the mark when presented as a debate over the relative strength of any one piece of evidence or another. The crux of the matter is not about the facts themselves, but how they are interpreted. Threat

assessments come down to this: threats are a product of the combination of an adversary's intent and capabilities. Based on the same data, policymakers may come to very different conclusions about the seriousness or immediacy of a given threat depending on how they assess the adversary's intent, its capability, or both.

This likely explains how Israeli and American intelligence analysts reached different conclusions while looking at the same information. Israel concluded that Iran's intent to secure a nuclear weapon intensified over the past year as its proxy forces around the region took hit after hit. Israel also saw its own window of opportunity closing as Iran hurried to rebuild its ballistic missile stockpile. This understanding of how Israel viewed Iran's capabilities and intentions sheds light on Israel's war aims and what could come next.

Nuclear Enrichment

Iran maintains (<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-nuclear-weapons-have-no-place-its-nuclear-doctrine-2024-04-22/>) that its nuclear enrichment program "only serves peaceful purposes." But according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has engaged in secret activities involving undeclared nuclear materials at three locations, leading the IAEA's board of governors to **declare** (<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3v6w2qr12o>) on June 12 that Iran was in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years.

Iran had failed "to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the agency with full and timely co-operation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran," the IAEA board **said** (<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3v6w2qr12o>).

This followed an IAEA report, released in late May, which determined that Iran had **amassed** (<https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-uranium-weapons-grade-nuclear-deal-talks-trump-khamenei-watchdog-rcna210113>) 900.8 pounds of 60 percent enriched uranium. Aside from the fact that further enriching to 90 percent, or weapons-grade uranium, is a quick technical process, the real news was that this represented a nearly **50 percent increase** (<https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-uranium-weapons-grade-nuclear-deal-talks-trump-khamenei-watchdog-rcna210113>) compared to the 605.8 pounds **reported** (<https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/iran-accelerates-production-of-near-weapons-grade-uranium-iaea-says-as-tensions-with-us-ratchet-up/>) in February. In other words, in a few months Iran quickly enriched an additional 294.9 pounds of 60 percent uranium. If further enriched to 90 percent, this amount would be enough to **produce** (<https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-has-further-increased-production-of-near-weapons-grade-uranium-un-watchdog-says/>) nine nuclear weapons.

U.S. and European officials have expressed similar concerns about Iran's nuclear enrichment activities. On June 10, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee, Gen. Michael "Erik" Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, **described** (https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/uscentcom_posture_statement_2025.pdf) how Iran's "stockpiles of enriched uranium continue to accumulate in facilities across [Iran] under the guise of a civilian nuclear program."

On June 18, several days into the Israel-Iran war, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, along with the High Representative of the European Union, expressed their concerns about Iran's nuclear program in a phone conversation with the Iranian foreign minister. Iran's nuclear program, they **noted** (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-ministers-foreign-affairs-france-germany-and-united-kingdom-together-high-representative_en), "largely exceeds any credible civilian purpose." In May, the DIA **assessed** (<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12106>) that Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon in "probably less than one week."

In other words, there was consensus around Iran's capabilities when it came to enrichment. There was debate, however, on Iran's capability and intent when it came to weaponization.

Nuclear Weaponization

"We do not believe in nuclear weapons," Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran's deputy foreign minister, **told CNN** (<https://x.com/amanpour/status/1935426834369495427>) on June 21. "Nuclear weapons have no place in our defensive doctrine." But other Iranian officials, including Ali-Akbar Salehi, the former head of Iran's nuclear agency, have **signaled** (<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402123916>) that Iran is getting closer to building a nuclear weapon. Salehi **said** (<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402123916>) in a February interview that Iran had all the necessary components and know-how to do so.

It's an assessment shared by international nuclear experts. In April, ahead of another round of talks with Iranian leaders, Rafael Grossi, the head of the IAEA, **warned (<https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250417-iran-not-far-nuclear-bomb-iaea-chief-warns-ahead-critical-talks-grossi>)** that Iran was “not far” from possessing a nuclear bomb. “It’s like a puzzle,” he explained. “They have the pieces, and one day they could eventually put them together.” Israeli intelligence officials believed that day was fast approaching as a result of an Iranian decision to fast-track both its nuclear enrichment and weaponization programs.

Testifying in March before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Gabbard **provided (<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2025/4059-ata-opening-statement-as-prepared>)** the U.S. Intelligence Community assessment that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamanei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003,” which had been the U.S. assessment for some time. (Hours before U.S. bombers struck Iranian nuclear sites, Gabbard issued an update saying Iran could produce nuclear weapons “**within weeks (<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c056zqn6vvyo>)**.” Her change of position came after Trump publicly said she was wrong.)

Fundamentally, the debate came down to two issues. First, how critical was Khamanei’s authorization to weaponize if the program was moving in that direction and a weapon could quickly be produced once given the greenlight? And second, Israel’s conclusion that Iran intended to sprint toward nuclear weaponization as its network of proxy forces fell apart around the region. According to the Israelis, time was now of the essence for Iran.

CIA director John Ratcliffe **argued (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/18/iran-war-trump-hegseth-gabbard/>)** in a June 17 closed-door Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing that because Iran had enriched so much uranium to 60 percent so quickly, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s assessment that the Khamanei had not officially given the order to build a bomb was of limited utility. “It’s like saying a football team marched 99 yards down the field, got to the one-yard line and, oh, they don’t have the intention to score.” He was not alone in this assessment.

On June 10, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Kurilla similarly referred to the “**looming threat (https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/uscentcom_posture_statement_2025.pdf)**” of Iranian nuclear armament. Khamanei had not made the final decision to produce a nuclear weapon, he noted, but Iran stood so close to the finish line that if the Supreme Leader decided to sprint to a nuclear weapon, Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium—some 25 kilograms—for up to ten nuclear weapons in three weeks.

According to Israeli intelligence, Iran had begun this sprint toward a weapon and would soon reach “**the point of no return (<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/information-on-the-iranian-nuclear-project/>)**.” Not only had the Iranians fast-tracked their enrichment process, as documented by the IAEA, but they did so in “**decentralized and fortified (<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/information-on-the-iranian-nuclear-project/>)** enrichment compounds in underground facilities...enabling the regime to obtain a nuclear weapon within a short period of time.” According to Israeli intelligence, the Iranian regime made a **decision to “fly” (<https://x.com/DavidMakovsky/status/1935821243028258981>)** toward a nuclear weapon capability to compensate for the loss of Hezbollah leadership and missiles last fall.

“In recent years, and more so since the beginning of the [October 7] war, concrete progress has been identified in the Iranian regime’s efforts to produce weapons components adapted for a nuclear bomb,” a June 13 statement from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) **said (<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/information-on-the-iranian-nuclear-project/>)**. According to Israel, Iran had “a secret plan for the technological advancement of all parts of the development of a nuclear weapon.” The IDF said “senior nuclear scientists in Iran have been working to secretly develop all components needed for developing a nuclear weapon,” which is why Israel targeted at least 14 key Iranian scientists when it launched its bombing campaign.

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Trump and others in a February 4 Oval Office meeting, the Israelis **shared (<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/us/politics/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-talks.html>)** this intelligence assessment. American officials took the information seriously enough that by mid-February the U.S. military, in coordination with its Israeli counterparts, **drafted (<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/us/politics/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-talks.html>)** three main options to take out Iran’s nuclear sites, from providing Israel refueling and intelligence support, to launching joint Israeli-American strikes, to a U.S.-led mission involving American bombers and Israel playing a supportive role.

In a follow-up White House meeting in April, Netanyahu asked Trump for American bunker-buster bombs to hit the Fordow nuclear facility but was turned down. U.S. officials pressed hard for Israel to hold off on any strikes, hoping that diplomacy could still play a role in halting Iran's nuclear program. Still, Israeli planning continued—in part due to intelligence that Iran had already repaired [damage \(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production\)](https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) Israel inflicted on its ballistic missile production capacity and was [rapidly re-building \(https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/us/politics/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-talks.html\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/us/politics/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-talks.html) its arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Ballistic Missiles

Although Iran had about 2,500 ballistic missiles going into this war, Israeli intelligence [estimated \(https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936084157819498839\)](https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936084157819498839) Iran planned to produce an arsenal of some 8,000 ballistic missiles within two years. Contrary to early reports that Israeli airstrikes in October [“crippled \(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production\)”](https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) Iran's ballistic missile production, Israeli intelligence [determined \(https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-20/ty-article/.premium/alarms-signs-spurred-israel-to-bomb-iran-and-its-arab-neighbors-to-cheer-it-on/00000197-8ca9-d16b-aff-ecfb09370000?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email&utm_content=author-alert&utm_campaign=Amos+Harel&utm_term=20250620-18:07&its=1750432159576\)](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-20/ty-article/.premium/alarms-signs-spurred-israel-to-bomb-iran-and-its-arab-neighbors-to-cheer-it-on/00000197-8ca9-d16b-aff-ecfb09370000?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email&utm_content=author-alert&utm_campaign=Amos+Harel&utm_term=20250620-18:07&its=1750432159576) that Iran quickly resumed rapid ballistic missile production. This fast-tracked program to quickly build an arsenal of thousands of ballistic missiles, along with Iran's sprint toward nuclear weaponization, led to Israel's decision to attack in June.

In recent months, snippets of information emerged about Iran's efforts to quickly repair and pick up the pace of its ballistic missile production. Austrian intelligence [reported \(https://www.foxnews.com/world/explosive-new-intelligence-report-reveals-irans-nuclear-weapons-program-still-active\)](https://www.foxnews.com/world/explosive-new-intelligence-report-reveals-irans-nuclear-weapons-program-still-active) in May that Iranian nuclear weapons development was “well advanced” and “Iran possesses a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads over long distances.” German intelligence [reported \(https://www.iranintl.com/en/202506199970\)](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202506199970) in June that Iranian “procurement activities in Germany in the area of Iranian missile technology/missile programs remain high—and are on the rise.”

Russia and China are believed to have helped Iran fast track its missile programs in recent months. U.S. and several European countries expressed concern about Iran's push to further develop its space program, with Russian assistance. Iran's efforts include a Cape Canaveral-style [launch facility \(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-04-18/russia-helps-iran-space-program-thrive-despite-us-sanctions\)](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-04-18/russia-helps-iran-space-program-thrive-despite-us-sanctions) in Chabahar. Earlier this year, the DIA [assessed \(https://news.usni.org/2025/06/18/report-to-congress-on-irans-ballistic-missile-programs\)](https://news.usni.org/2025/06/18/report-to-congress-on-irans-ballistic-missile-programs) that Iran's space launch vehicle program could be used to “develop a military-viable ICBM” within the next decade. Iran reportedly [picked up the pace \(https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-blows-to-proxies-iran-advances-space-program-with-russian-assistance/\)](https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-blows-to-proxies-iran-advances-space-program-with-russian-assistance/) of this program too after Israeli operations significantly degraded its proxies. Earlier this month, a U.S. Treasury Department [report \(https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf\)](https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf) highlighted the concerns of U.S. officials “that the [Iranian] regime could use its nascent space program to shorten the timeline for Iran's development of ICBMs.” The EU [designated \(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402698\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402698) Iranian General Ali Jafarabadi, commander of the IRGC's Aerospace Force Space Division, for his role in this endeavor.

After Israel [targeted \(https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-israel-hit-iran-missile-fuel-mixing-facilities-researchers-2024-10-26/\)](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-israel-hit-iran-missile-fuel-mixing-facilities-researchers-2024-10-26/) the planetary mixers Iran uses to produce solid fuel for long-range ballistic missiles in October, Iran [ordered \(https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAHq-oQ8GLAI9bvc6ZF3n3CkQ8lgF39rNe8NdCaPAX5P9_JwFu83QlO5yl8RaGXs%3D&gaa_ts=68582da7&gaa_sig=xrlcN0r5KOgME2-UkfaE349yAgT6kgwhW-w166BNdt6AkvUyrEiyuqGFrV9S9VRMjMf2UE3VoaxFcJ3Kz0YI4Ig%3D%3D\)](https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAHq-oQ8GLAI9bvc6ZF3n3CkQ8lgF39rNe8NdCaPAX5P9_JwFu83QlO5yl8RaGXs%3D&gaa_ts=68582da7&gaa_sig=xrlcN0r5KOgME2-UkfaE349yAgT6kgwhW-w166BNdt6AkvUyrEiyuqGFrV9S9VRMjMf2UE3VoaxFcJ3Kz0YI4Ig%3D%3D) thousands of tons of ingredients necessary to build ballistic missiles from China. In response, the U.S. Treasury Department [highlighted \(https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf\)](https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf) China's role “as a key supplier of components for Iranian ballistic missile and UAV programs,” and followed up with [designations \(https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0175\)](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0175) targeting companies involved in this activity.

War Aims

According to IDF Chief of Staff Gen. Eyal Zamir, it was the combination of Iran's ballistic missile efforts, along with the degradation of its regional proxies, and recent nuclear advancements that "**compelled** (<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936084157819498839>) [Israel] to strike and deliver a preemptive blow." Iran and its proxies severely miscalculated when they decided to plot and then carry out a massive attack against Israel on **October 7, 2023** (<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/road-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified>), and then surround Israel with a "**ring of fire** (<https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/israel--gaza--and-iran-s--ring-of-fire>). Now, as Zamir put it, Israel is "**turning** (<https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-858359>) the ring of fire ... against [Iran] on their territory."

As Iran's longstanding proxy strategy fell apart in the face of Israeli attacks, the Iranian regime seems to have seen a sprint to a nuclear weapon as the **one remaining path** (https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/uscentcom_posture_statement_2025.pdf) to impose its will on the region and deterring its adversaries from attacking. According to Israeli intelligence, Iran gave its nuclear scientists permission to **secretly** (<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/information-on-the-iranian-nuclear-project/>) sneak toward a nuclear weapon, even as it negotiated with the Trump administration. "The IDF is revealing for the first time," an Israeli reports **states** (<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/information-on-the-iranian-nuclear-project/>), "that the Iranian regime is advancing a secret plan for the technological advancement of all parts of the development of a nuclear weapon. In the framework of this plan, senior nuclear scientists in Iran have been working to secretly develop all components needed for developing a nuclear weapon."

Israel's intelligence assessment explains its war aims: destroy or severely degrade Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Calls for Iranians to **rise up** (<https://www.foxnews.com/world/netanyahu-calls-iranian-citizens-seize-opportunity-regime-change>) against the oppressive revolutionary regime—as well as Israeli airstrikes on Iranian state television and Evin prison, where political dissidents are held—have more to do with destabilizing the enemy in the midst of war, but likely also represent an **aspirational** (<https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-israel-regime-change-war-military-trump-protest/33448817.html>) goal: Israelis are unlikely to shed a tear if the theocratic regime falls. Successful Israeli strikes may have promoted regime change to an **unstated goal** (<https://www.axios.com/2025/06/17/iran-regime-change-israel-war-trump>), but the Trump administration seems to have **convinced** (<https://www.axios.com/2025/06/17/iran-regime-change-israel-war-trump>) Israel not to target Khamenei, even when it had the chance.

Israel's exit strategy was therefore straightforward: once the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs were sufficiently degraded, and the threat of continued Iranian aggression against Israel was diminished, the Israeli air campaign came to a close. After 12 days of war, and the U.S. bombing campaign against key Iranian nuclear sites, Israel agreed to a ceasefire. At the end of the day, a senior Israeli military official **explained** (https://x.com/Nadav_Eyal/status/1936065317324661225), "Our goal is to fight all the way to a good agreement." Put another way, Israeli leaders seek to degrade or eliminate Iran's ability to produce the weapons necessary to act on their intent to do severe harm to Israel.

End State

The Iranian revolution was never **intended** (<https://www.npr.org/2024/08/13/nx-s1-5049799/a-history-of-hezbollah>) to stop at the borders of Iran. While the Iranian military was **tasked** (<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/explainer-iranian-armed-forces>) with defending the country's border, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps set out to defend—and through its Qods Force, **export** (<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/explainer-iranian-armed-forces>)—the revolution. To that end, the regime in Tehran engaged in a wide range of malign activities that destabilized the Middle East (see Syria, Iraq, Yemen), with a special focus on funding and arming militant proxies to undermine Sunni regimes (see Gulf States) and attack Israel. The Iranian regime will continue to aspire to play such a role in the future.

But the Israeli, and now American, air campaign has degraded, if not eliminated, Iran's capability to produce the weapons necessary to carry out these threats. Khamenei is both revolutionary and pragmatic, and faced with serious challenges to the regime, he will opt for protecting the revolution at home in the hopes of being able to resume exporting it abroad someday. In other words, with his back against the wall and his revolutionary regime at risk of collapse, the Supreme Leader could be forced to "drink from the poison chalice," as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, put it in the context of ending the Iran-Iraq war. That poison was not strong enough to end the revolutionary regime in 1988, and it may not be strong enough to do so now in 2025. But if Tehran is forced to focus inward and far less capable of causing mayhem outside its borders, the world is a safer place.

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Energy and Economic Implications of the Iran-Israel Conflict

Jun 27, 2025



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