



Policy Analysis /

# The Tuna and Noodles Saga: Findings from a War of Words Between Militias

by [Hamdi Malik](#)

Mar 3, 2021

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS



### [Hamdi Malik](#)

Hamdi Malik is an Associate Fellow with the Washington Institute, specializing in Shia militias. Hamdi is the coauthor of the Institute's 2020 study "Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces."



### Brief Analysis

Part of a series: [Militia Spotlight](#)

or see Part 1: [How to Use Militia Spotlight](#)

## Bitter squabbles between the social media platforms of two competing Iraqi militias offer insights into the movements and their relationship.

February 22-23, 2021, saw latent rivalries between the social media channels of [Kataib Hezbollah](#) (KH) and [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) (AAH) break out into bitter squabbles. As usual, these episodes teach a lot about the movements involved and their interrelationships.

**Step 1:** KH criticizes rocket attack on the U.S. embassy. The disagreement began after a rocket attack on the International Zone (IZ) in Baghdad on February 22. Rockets fell on a parking space, damaging a number of cars. Jafar al-Husseini, military spokesman of KH, condemned the attack on the same day, saying "malicious hands are behind the attack to muddy the waters." As background, it seems KH had accepted Iranian guidance since October to hold off from attacking embassies, before the shift in tactic happened after a February 26 U.S. airstrike.

الوحدة 10000

المتحدث العسكري لكتائب حزب الله جعفر الحسيني:  
بحسب معلوماتنا فان القصف الذي طال المنطقة الخضراء اليوم تقف خلفه اياد  
خبیثة تريد خلط الأوراق.

centerkaf@

Figure 1: Unit 10,000 reports KH's spokesperson on firing rockets at the U.S. embassy, February 22, 2021.

**Step 2:** AAH rejects this criticism. AAH's [Sabereen news](#) was quick to reply, posting a photo of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Qasem Soleimani captioned: "[Revenge for the] blood Iraq's guest [referring to Soleimani] and its senior [referring to Muhandis's nickname] is your responsibility of the honorable *muqawama* members." The post also had a telling hashtag in Farsi: "fire at will" (see below). This phrase is an indication of AAH's sentiment that the militia does not need to receive orders from Iran's Qods Force to attack U.S. interests in Iraq. Qais al-Khazali, AAH's leader, has been reiterating this line for a long time, particularly his remarks that the "*muqawama* [resistance] is a purely Iraqi decision."

Sabereen news - صابرين نيوز



ضعف العراق المظلوم وشيبتة دمكم ب أعناق الشرفاء المقاومين ...  
#اتش\_به\_اختيار

Figure 2: Sabereen news hashtag in Farsi: "fire at will," February 22, 2021.

**Step 3:** AAH mocks KH's credibility as a resistance faction and accuses it of being subject to foreign influence. Seven minutes later, Sabereen posts the following message: "The number of NATO [forces] has increased in Iraq, so what are you doing about it? Tribal poetry and dances? Or wait for a convoy carrying cans of tuna?" AAH's Sabereen is clearly mocking KH's strategy of hitting U.S. logistical convoys via its "facade" group [Saraya Qasem al-Jabbarin](#).

## Sabereen news - صابرين نيوز

زاد عدد الناتو في العراق ، فما انتم فاعلون ؟  
هوسات ومهاويل ؟ ام انتظار رتل يحمل علب سمك التوننا ؟  
المقاومة قرار عراقي بحت ... كفلته كل الاديان والغرائز البشرية ، حتى الكلب  
(اجل الله القارئ) يدافع عن نفسه حينما يتعرض للظلم والاهانة.

يرى الضيم يغشاه فيلتذ وقعه  
كذي جرب يلتذ بالحك جلده

وما يكن صواباً فمن الله... وان يكن خطأً فهو من الشيطان

Figure 3: Sabereen news angrily responds to KH's criticism of IZ rocket attacks, February 22, 2021.

Sabereen concluded: "Resistance is a purely Iraqi decision." This is a sentiment regularly repeated by Khazali, as mentioned above. Sabereen then reposted a message by Al-Faqaar, also assessed as an AAH outlet, citing a hadith saying: "Tell the truth even if it causes your death...and leave the untrue even if it saves you." This is an implicit accusation that KH is misrepresenting itself as real resistance.

## Sabereen news - صابرين نيوز

### Forwarded from Alfaqaar - الفقار

عَنْ أَبِي الْحَسَنِ مُوسَى بْنِ جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ أَنَّهُ قَالَ لِرَجُلٍ مِنْ أَصْحَابِهِ: "يَا  
فُلَانُ، اتَّقِ اللَّهَ، وَقُلِ الْحَقَّ وَ لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِ هَلَاكُكَ فَإِنَّ فِيهِ نَجَاتَكَ، يَا فُلَانُ، اتَّقِ اللَّهَ،  
وَدَعْ الْبَاطِلَ وَ إِنْ كَانَ فِيهِ نَجَاتُكَ فَإِنَّ فِيهِ هَلَاكُكَ".

- تنبيه الخواطر و نزهة النواظر .

<https://t.me/Alfaqaar313m>

Figure 4: Sabereen reposts content of other channels such as Al-Faqaar supporting its position on IZ hits, February 22, 2021.

**Step 4:** KH mocks International Zone rocket tactics. The next day, February 23, the KH media channel Unit 10,000 replied to Sabereen in a post without mentioning any names: "Whoever fires these expired rockets at empty green spaces and parking without touching the [U.S.] embassy is from those who sanctify the embassy, not from its enemies. The goal is clear: discrediting the resistance."

## الوحدة 10000

من يرمي هذه الصواريخ الاكسباير في مساحات الخضراء الفارغة و كراجاتها  
دون أن تمس سفارتهم هو من مقدسي السفارة لا من اعدائها

و الهدف واضح : تشويه سمعة المقاومة

Figure 5: Unit 10,000 criticizes IZ attack that did not hit the U.S. embassy, February 23, 2021.

**Step 5:** AAH mocks KH's roadside bombings. This harsh criticism seems to have enraged Sabereen and prompted the outlet's administrator to create a poll forty-four minutes later with a question and four potential answers:

**How do you think we can expel the Americans from Iraq?**

- A. By political resistance.
- B. Targeting convoys of tuna and noodles on the international [highway].
- C. Weapons of real *muqawama fasail* the size of Usbat al-Thaireen and Saraya Awliya al-Dam.
- D. The Americans will never leave.

The poll was deleted a few minutes later.



Figure 6: Sabereen news' sarcastic poll, February 23, 2021.

## Analysis

This two-day exchange is a real spat, having exposed important fault lines between the two largest *fasail* in a damaging online exchange. The divisions reflect not just the rivalry of entourages, the digital generals in electronic armies, but also real differences between KH's policy of avoiding attacks on the U.S. embassy and AAH's keenness to strike bases and not just supply trucks.

The exchange also underlines that the *fasail* online operators are not disciplined, and they seem to emotionally identify with the groups. This suggests that multiple accounts are not being handled by the same group, that they are

not being run by composite multi-*fasail* crews, and that they are not run by Iranian or Lebanese Hezbollah operators. Finally, the spat between KH and AAH media platforms—reminiscent of the late 2020 arguments over attacks on Baghdad media parlors—is a reminder that some of the best counter-*fasail* information operations themes are identified by the groups themselves as they periodically feud with each other. ❖



[View/Print Page as PDF](#)

SHARE



EMAIL ALERTS



[Sign Up](#)



TO TOP

## PART OF A SERIES

### Militia Spotlight

[How to Use Militia Spotlight](#)

[“Pylon-Gate”: Reconstruction of a Muqawama Disinformation Operation](#)

[In Their Own Words: Senior Leaders Admit to Membership of the Tansiqiya](#)

## RECOMMENDED



BRIEF ANALYSIS

### [Hammas-Israel Violence: Context and Trajectory](#)

May 14, 2021, starting at 12:00 noon EDT (1600 GMT)

◆  
Ghaith al-Omari,  
Ehud Yaari,  
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen



BRIEF ANALYSIS

## The Challenges behind Youth Leadership in the Arab World

May 11, 2021

Amro Selim



BRIEF ANALYSIS

## The Dangers of the United States Ignoring Intra-Kurdish Dialogue in Syria

May 11, 2021

Azad Ahmed Ali

### TOPICS

Arab and Islamic Politics

Military and Security

### REGIONS & COUNTRIES

Iraq

### STAY UP TO DATE



SIGN UP FOR EMAIL ALERTS



THE  
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE  
*for Near East Policy*

Washington D.C. 20036

Tel: 202-452-0650

Fax: 202-223-5364

[Contact](#)

[Press Room](#)

[Subscribe](#)

*The Washington Institute seeks to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them.*

The Institute is a 501(c)3 organization; all donations are tax-deductible.

[About TWI](#) /

[Support the Institute](#)



© 2021 All rights reserved.

[Employment](#) /

[Privacy Policy](#) /

[Rights & Permissions](#)