Matthew Levitt: Hi, I’m Matthew Levitt, and this is ‘Breaking Hezbollah’s Golden Rule,’ a podcast that shines a bright spotlight on the criminal, militant, and terrorist activities of Lebanese Hezbollah.

Hezbollah is an organization that engages in everything from overt social and political activities in Lebanon to covert militant, criminal, and terrorist activities around the world. The group goes to great lengths to conceal its illicit and violent pursuits.

One Hezbollah operative was taught by his commander that the golden rule of the group’s terrorist unit is this, quote: “The less you know, the better.”

In this podcast we set out to break this rule.

We start every episode with a quote from a Hezbollah operative: when it comes to the group’s terrorist wing, “the less you know, the better.” In this episode, we’ll meet the operative who shared that rule with investigators. We’ll also discover the identity of that operative’s handler, the one who taught him this rule. I’ll give you a hint—you’ve already met him.

Hezbollah operations have centered around two main trends in the years since the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh in February 2008. One set of plots stems from Hezbollah’s desire to avenge the death of the longtime leader of its international terrorist wing. The other set of missions began slightly later and were part of Iran’s shadow war with the West prior to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. We talked about that motivator in Episode 5—you’ll recall that Iranian operatives were tasked with targeting officials from countries that undermined Iran’s nuclear program, and Hezbollah was told to hit ‘soft targets’—primarily Israeli tourists—which led to the Hezbollah plots in Cyprus and Bulgaria, among others.

Together, these two triggers led Hezbollah to identify promising recruits for the group’s Islamic Jihad terrorist unit from within its armed militia. Once spotted—for their existing skill sets, demonstrating particular promise, or having foreign passports and/or dual-nationalities—these recruits received training in the dark arts of espionage, countersurveillance, operational security, weapons training, and more.

As a result, Hezbollah stepped up its terrorist activities beyond Lebanon’s borders. Over the next few years, Hezbollah plots were thwarted in places like Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Chile, Great Britain, Kuwait, Nigeria, Peru, Thailand, Turkey—and the United States.

From 2005 to 2012, Mitch Silber served as the Director of Intelligence Analysis at the New York City Police Department. There, he was a principal advisor to the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence on counterterrorism policy and analysis. Today, Mitch is a professor at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs and the author of *The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West*.

Mitch Silber: So in Summer of 2017, two individuals who were members of Hezbollah’s IJO, Islamic Jihad Organization, were arrested in New York City.
Silber:
The significance was twofold. Number one, this was the first time the FBI had ever arrested two individuals and indicted them for membership in IJO, Hezbollah’s external operations unit. And number two, as assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community, this was part of a larger pattern where Hezbollah had these individuals in place as part of their playbook to potentially operationalize in the event of hostilities between Iran and the U.S.

Levitt:
On June 1st, 2017, U.S. authorities arrested Ali Kourani and Samir el-Debek. Taken together, the arrests forced the U.S. Intelligence Community to revisit its longstanding assessment that Hezbollah was not likely to attack the U.S. homeland.

In a press conference a few months later, the director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, Nicholas Rasmussen, spoke about his organization’s new insight into local Hezbollah modus operandi.

Levitt:
This isn’t to say that Kourani or el-Debek were plotting specific attacks or that they were caught just in the nick of time. Rather, they were self-described ‘sleeper agents.’ They scouted potential targets and created targeting packages with ready to go plans for possible attacks that Hezbollah operatives could carry out on short notice, should Iranian or Hezbollah leaders deem them necessary.

Rebecca Weiner is the Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Analysis at the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, where she manages counterterrorism and cyber intelligence analysis.

Rebecca Weiner:
Hezbollah is not a “just-in-time” terrorist organization. It is much more of a “just-in-case” terrorist organization.

And this is an organization that is effective and that is expert at what it does, in large part because it focuses on preparation, ex-ante. One of the ways it does so is by creating off-the-shelf blueprints that it can use when geopolitical circumstances change, and the conditions may be right for the energy that’s been focused on planning to be turned from potential to kinetic in an attack.

Levitt:
But why send sleeper agents to the United States? And where were their potential targets?

Let’s start with Ali Kourani, who primarily worked out of New York. He served as an Islamic Jihad Organization sleeper agent in the United States for eight years, from 2008 to 2016.

Weiner:
So, here in New York, we’re focusing on two primary modes of activity. The first is fundraising. Often from diaspora communities, via low-grade illicit activities, like trademark counterfeit, or more complex trade-based money laundering schemes. And the second, which is frankly much more concerning from our vantage point, is pre-operational surveillance and intelligence gathering by members of the groups’ elite highly trained external security organization, ESO, which the case of Ali Kourani exemplifies really well.
At the time of the Kourani investigation, Emil Bove was co-chief of the national security unit at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Today, he is a lawyer in private practice.

**Emil Bove:**
So, I first got involved in the Kourani case shortly after his first interview with the FBI at Seton Hall, where he was with counsel.

The FBI spent some time prior to me entering the case trying to recruit Kourani as a source and that happened most directly in 2016 during a series of interviews that occurred in Chicago. I was brought in to try and think about and strategize the criminal prosecution angles that might have arisen based on what Kourani said in the first interview.

**Levitt:**
Kourani’s family is well-known in Hezbollah circles—later, he actually bragged to FBI agents that his family was like the “Bin Ladens of Lebanon.” When he was still a teenager, Kourani participated in a Hezbollah boot camp, around the year 2000. Soon after, his father illegally entered and settled in the United States, and Kourani followed a couple of years later. But events in Lebanon would soon pull Kourani’s attention back home.

*Clip: Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 rockets to Israel, an average of 120 rockets a day. In Israel, it was dubbed the Second Lebanon War.*

**Bove:**
And I think the next significant event is the 2006 war, which likely motivated him in connection with events back in the homeland. He still had family back in Lebanon that were significant players in Hezbollah, by his own admission. And finally, in late 2007, he took a trip back to Lebanon, where we believe it was the first time that the IJO actually recruited him into the group. And so, to us – us being the government at the time – that looked to us like a promotion within Hezbollah from this sort of the militia component of that group into this elite external attack plotting cell, which we believe he joined by about 2008.

**Levitt:**
Kourani was recruited into Hezbollah’s elite Islamic Jihad Organization, or IJO, around January 2008.

The timing is significant: It shows that even before Mughniyeh’s death just a month later, Hezbollah was looking to rebuild its international terrorist networks. It’s also significant because it puts Kourani in the right place at the right time. Recall that in a video broadcast at Mughniyeh’s funeral, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah threatened that attacks abroad—or, “open war,” as he put it—would follow. Shortly thereafter, Kourani’s secret work for Hezbollah’s IJO abroad began.

For Hezbollah, Kourani was a very attractive recruit. He and his family were now pretty well-established in the United States, giving Kourani perfect cover to return to New York and start spying for Hezbollah’s terrorist unit.

**Bove:**
At that point, when he was recruited, he at least had family with firm roots in the United States that I think, from the perspective of Hezbollah, would allow Kourani to travel more freely internationally, including to locations other than Lebanon and the U.S.

**Levitt:**
Hezbollah immediately capitalized on Kourani’s U.S. roots. His first step was to obtain U.S. citizenship and secure a U.S. passport.

**Bove:**
And so, shortly after Kourani is recruited to join the IJO, he returns to the U.S. and applies for naturalization. That’s in 2008. April 2009: that application is granted. On the same day that he’s sworn in, he applied for a US passport.

**Levitt:**
On his passport application, Kourani wrote that he had no upcoming travel plans. But as soon as he got his passport, he immediately applied for a visa to China. Eight days later he had the visa, and three days after that he was on his way to Guangzhou, China.

Kourani trafficked in counterfeit clothing, but he traveled to the other side of the world to attend a medical device trade show. When investigators later asked him about the odd trip, he was pretty much stumped. He told FBI agents that he
traveled to China with the son of a contact in the New York counterfeit clothing business, but he only knew his contact’s first name, Frank, and didn’t know the name of the son, his supposed travel companion, at all.

**Bove:**
From our perspective, based on that sequence and based on subsequent events – I think beginning in 2012 where you start to see seizures of ammonium nitrate caches in different countries around the world – we assessed, fairly confidently, that the reason that Kourani took that trip was to start to establish a network that could supply those ammonium nitrate ice packs for use by the IJO around the world.

**Levitt:**
So Kourani said he went to China to attend a trade show, but in reality he went to visit the medical device company that produced the ammonium nitrate ice packs that Hezbollah uses to make explosives—like those the group used for its stockpile in Cyprus or the bus bombing in Bulgaria. Prosecutors established that the true purpose of this trip was, quote, “to develop relationships which the IJO could rely on to obtain ammonium nitrate to be used as an explosive precursor chemical.”

At this time, Ambassador Nathan Sales was Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department. Nathan played a central role in exposing Hezbollah’s aggressive procurement of ice packs to build ammonium nitrate explosives.

**Nathan Sales:**
One of the regions that we were particularly concerned about is Europe because we saw Hezbollah stockpiling enormous quantities of ammonium nitrate in countries across Western Europe.

To take one example, in the United Kingdom, according to press reports, authorities disrupted a plot by Hezbollah operatives there to stockpile an amount that I think was three metric tons of ammonium nitrate in the United Kingdom. What’s it there for? I mean, these are first aid cold packs and it’s not because Hezbollah operatives are worried that soccer players or cricketers are going to come down with sports-related injuries that need to be treated immediately. These are weapons caches.

And I think one of the things that this story about the ammonium nitrate caches really brought home was, yes you should worry. This is stuff that is happening in the heart of Western Europe.

**Levitt:**
We’ll hear more from Ambassador Sales next episode.

Ultimately, though, Kourani’s China trip was a brief interlude from his main assignment: conducting surveillance of potential targets for Hezbollah attacks.

**Bove:**
The main thing that Kourani did was to act as a sleeper cell operative on behalf of the IJO and Hezbollah in the New York City area. And so, he made himself available as a member of the group to be living in the U.S. under deep cover and available to be activated if Hezbollah wanted to take action in the U.S. or if Iran chose to use Hezbollah as a proxy to take action in the U.S.

**Levitt:**
Later, an FBI investigator would recall Kourani’s exact words. During a meeting with FBI agents, Kourani sat back, squared his shoulders and said, quote: “I am a member of 910, also known as Islamic Jihad, or the black ops of Hezbollah. The unit is Iranian-controlled.”

Kourani went on to note that Hezbollah’s “black ops,” as he put it, the Islamic Jihad Organization, reports directly to Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, and he added that Iran oversees its operations as well.

Kourani carried out a variety of pre-operational missions to gather intelligence, mostly in New York City. His assignments included identifying Israelis in New York who could be targeted by Hezbollah, and searching for weapons suppliers in the U.S. who could provide firearms for IJO operations.

**Bove:**
In addition to that, while Kourani was in the U.S. as a member of the IJO beginning in about 2008, he took other steps to facilitate that organization’s preattack planning and surveillance.

So, he surveilled armories in Manhattan and in Harlem. He surveilled a Secret Service building in Brooklyn. And as we investigated the case and talked to people about what was actually in those facilities, they were all sort of critical structures for where people would gather to strategize about how to respond to an attack.

**Levitt:**
Kourani was also tasked with collecting detailed information about New York’s JFK and Toronto’s Pearson International airports. Prosecutors used Kourani’s travel documents to show that he went through JFK nineteen times and through Pearson seven times.

**Bove:**
And that kind of passive surveillance while transiting those airports was part of the IJO playbook, and they were trained to focus on things like security procedures, where people were positioned, the locations of cameras, how people acted at the security checkpoints, where the baggage claim area was, how people worked through those areas.

**Levitt:**
Kourani and another U.S.-based Hezbollah operative, Samir el-Debek, were given their assignments by their handler, a man we touched on previously, who they knew as Fadi Kassab. But half a world away, Hossam Yaacoub—the Hezbollah operative in Cyprus from Episode 5—he knew him as Sami Helo.

Here’s Mitch Silber again, former Director of Intelligence Analysis at the NYPD.

**Silber:**
What links Kourani and el-Debek to some other external operations that Hezbollah conducted in Europe was the fact that the same handler for Kourani and el-Debek was also the handler for the operative in the Burgas attack in Bulgaria.

**Levitt:**
Kourani told the FBI that Fadi Kassab was the person “responsible for IJO operatives in both the United States and Canada.” Apparently, even as Kassab was running Kourani as an agent in New York, he was overseeing Yaacoub in Cyprus, and playing a hands-on role in the Hezbollah attack in Bulgaria. The FBI did some digging, and soon agents were pretty sure that Fadi Kassab’s true identity was Majed Abdullah.

All they had left to do was show his picture to Kourani.

Emil explains:

**Bove:**
So, based on other work that the agents had done, when they put that picture in front of Kourani, they understood the handler’s true identity to be Majed Abdullah. And so that is a fact that we presented at a trial to connect these references to Fadi Kassab and Majed Abdullah.

**Levitt:**
So, when FBI agents showed Kourani a picture of Fadi Kassab, Kourani identified Kassab as his handler and explained that he knew this person as Majed Abdullah. Kourani then backtracked, alleging he wasn’t actually sure. Nonetheless, whenever Kassab came up during the interview, Kourani pointed or motioned toward the photograph of Majed Abdullah. To keep things simple, we’ll just keep calling him Fadi Kassab.

According to Kourani, Fadi Kassab is a dual citizen of Lebanon and a European country, possibly England.

Clearly, Hezbollah trusted Fadi Kassab with some of the Islamic Jihad Organization’s most important and secretive missions. In a conversation with FBI agents, Kourani recalled a discussion with his handler. Kassab told him that the golden rule of Hezbollah’s IJO is—say it with me now: “The less you know, the better.”

So it shouldn’t surprise you that Kourani and Kassab communicated under tight operational security.

**Bove:**
And so, what Kourani described in the interviews, and what was borne out by the electronic evidence in the case, is that there was very little communication other than coded recall messages to come back and to see the handler. And that
then in in-person meetings, the handler could provide instructions and Kourani could relay information or data that he had collected in connection with the operational surveillance taskings that had been assigned to him. So, this to us, the significance of a handler, was really a operational security mechanism.

**Levitt:**
Kourani made multiple trips to Lebanon during his time as an IJO operative.

According to Kourani himself, his standard operating procedures depending where he was located. While outside of Lebanon, Kourani corresponded with his handler via coded messages by email. Kourani and Kassab used Gmail and Hotmail email addresses, including one address listed in the name of one of Kourani’s childhood friends.

When they discussed operations, the two used marriage-related terms; for example, the word “bride” was a cue that Kourani should return to Lebanon. After he actually got married, they adjusted their code accordingly and used references to jobs or employment prospects. But they ceased using email altogether in 2011 or 2012, after Hezbollah reportedly found an Israeli agent inside the inner circle of the IJO in Lebanon.

Rather than email his surveillance photographs, Kourani was instructed to use USB drives and memory cards, and to bring those back to Lebanon whenever he visited. In September 2015, Kourani was found in possession of one such memory card, hidden beneath a sticker on his passport, when traveling through customs at JFK International Airport.

To reach Kassab once inside Lebanon, Kourani was instructed to call a telephone number associated with a pager and punch in a predetermined code. Someone would then contact Kourani to set up a meeting by calling one of Kourani’s relatives, either his father or his brother.

The NYPD’s Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Analysis, Rebecca Weiner, explained how the Department assesses the threat posed by an organized, disciplined terrorist group.

**Weiner:**
So, this is a group that is quite sophisticated in how it handles communications and how it handles operations among compartmentalized groups of individuals.

And in our hierarchy of threat from the lowest level being general sympathy for fealty to the organization potentially exercised through low-level fundraising, you ratchet up toward individuals who have spent time overseas in conflict zones and perhaps participated in fighting. Or who have received specialized weapons training, explosives training, and there the threat would be the most considerable from our perspective.

**Levitt:**
Around 2008, Kourani attended a Hezbollah training session in Lebanon on surveillance and resistance to interrogation. Three years later, in July 2011, Kourani attended an IJO military training camp, where he was taught to use a rocket propelled grenade launcher, an AK-47 assault rifle, an MP5 submachine gun, a Russian-made PKS machine gun, and a Glock pistol.

Mitch Silber explains that these periodic training sessions were not uncommon.

**Silber:**
So from our vantage point in New York City, travel by Lebanese nationals back to Lebanon for occasional training and sometimes even military participation, like during the Israel-Hezbollah 2006 War, was somewhat of a common factor that we saw, and probably was true nationally, within the U.S.

We knew that subjects of our Hezbollah investigation were going back and forth to Lebanon and getting training.

**Levitt:**
Remember Hossam Yaacoub, one of the Hezbollah operatives in Cyprus? He told Cypriot investigators that he thought some of the other Hezbollah recruits with whom he trained were also Western citizens. For security reasons, recruits were not allowed to see one another. But listening to their voices during one training session, Yaacoub said he heard another trainee speaking fluent Arabic with some English words mixed in. According to Yaacoub, one trainee spoke with a distinctly American accent.

Here’s Mitch, reflecting on Hezbollah’s American recruits in the New York City area.
Silber:
So Hezbollah actually has a relatively long standing history in terms of having operatives in New York, and in fact there's a recently declassified report that talks about from 1994, Hezbollah having a cell in New York City, and the fact that some of these teams were given guidance not to discuss Hezbollah matters outside of their team. And I can tell you during my time at NYPD, our investigation lasted for at least ten years and these individuals often originated from towns in southern Lebanon like Yaatar, like Ayat al Shab, and Bin Shebil.

Levitt:
Hezbollah asked Kourani to procure surveillance equipment like drones, night-vision goggles, and high-powered cameras, but he never did it. It appears he was too busy carrying out pre operational surveillance operations.

Hezbollah also instructed Kourani to apply for a job at the Department of Motor Vehicles, thinking he could provide the group with fake documents and license plates. Kourani decided it was too risky, yet he did apply for a job with the NYPD. Rebecca Weiner commented on this attempted infiltration.

Weiner:
So, I run the intelligence analysis program for NYPD's Intel Bureau, and the New York Times reported that Ali Kourani had applied for a job as an intelligence analyst with the NYPD, which was characterized in the trial as potentially an attempt to salvage his cover story. This kind of activity is something that we are attuned to, highly attuned to, and looking out for, not just from Hezbollah, but from other sophisticated threat actors. Attempts to infiltrate organizations like ours, that would give them access to tremendously sensitive information in ways that are less conventional than applying to work for a federal agency.

Levitt:
Kourani would later tell the FBI that Hezbollah was “desperate, because they were looking to exact revenge for Mughniyeh’s death.”

This makes sense, given what we know now about the several simultaneous sleeper agents Hezbollah had placed in the United States. The other Hezbollah operative arrested on June 1st, 2017 was Samir el-Debek.

Clip: The Dearborn suspect, Samir el-Debek, is accused of making bombs while scouting U.S. military, law enforcement, and government sites here and elsewhere.

Levitt:
El-Debek, a longtime Hezbollah supporter, was recruited as a paid IJO operative in late 2007 or early 2008. El-Debek had U.S. citizenship, and he later told U.S. authorities he believed Hezbollah recruited him because of his American passport.

Like Kourani, el-Debek also returned to Lebanon for training several times after being deployed. Unlike Kourani, el-Debek attended a six-day crash course in Hezbollah ideology in 2013 or 2014, complete with sessions on religious rules and martyrdom ideology. He also learned to build ammonium nitrate explosives.

Silber:
What's really interesting about el-Debek is that he received additional training. And that training was on explosives. And specifically how to use ammonium nitrate—what Hezbollah often referred to as ‘Samad’—and what ended up being the explosive that seems to be their explosive of choice in a variety of plots around the world.

Levitt:
El-Debek’s explosives training focused on methods to target people and buildings and create maximum damage and casualties. In fact, U.S. officials noticed that many of the techniques el-Debek learned were those used in the Burgas, Bulgaria bombing. I guess it ran in the family. Mohammad Husseini, the Hezbollah operative who became the accidental suicide bomber in Burgas, was el-Debek’s relative.

Hezbollah dispatched el-Debek on his first mission three years before the Burgas bombing, in May 2009. It was shortly after his first explosives training. Hezbollah operatives were collecting ice packs and storing the explosive material in a safehouse in Bangkok, Thailand. The group thought local authorities were on to them, and called on el-Debek to travel from the U.S. to Thailand to dispose of the explosive material in Bangkok. To avoid applying for a Thai visa, el-Debek flew on his American passport.
Hezbollah told el-Debek that his cover story would be that he was flying to Thailand for sex tourism. Earlier, he had reached out to a woman in Thailand, suggesting they get to know each other better. Once el-Debek reached Bangkok, he hired a female escort and sent her into the safe house first, trying to lure out any potential surveillance. Once he saw the coast was clear, he went in and packed fifty boxes into his car, dumped the remaining chemicals down the drain, and left. Two days later, when Hezbollah determined the safehouse had not, in fact, been compromised, he returned the chemicals and paid the rent before leaving the country.

Clip: The DOJ also saying today that el-Debek was sent by Hezbollah to conduct missions in Panama to locate U.S. and Israeli embassies and to assess the vulnerabilities of the Panama Canal and ships in the canal.

Levitt:
El-Debek then deployed to Panama twice, first in February 2010 and then in February 2011.

On his first trip, el-Debek traveled via Colombia and was told to get the lay of the land in Panama. Hezbollah instructed him to develop a cover story, so he took Spanish lessons and posed as a businessman visiting Panama to identify potential business opportunities. Hezbollah instructed him to locate the U.S. embassy and to case and identify security procedures at the Panama Canal and the Israeli embassy. And he located hardware stores where he could buy materials to build explosives, like acetone and battery acid.

When he returned a year later, Hezbollah told el-Debek that the Panama Canal would be his primary focus. El-Debek took a bunch of photos identifying areas of weakness, construction, security, and the proximity between the shore and ships passing through.

Hezbollah asked el-Debek to take pictures of the Israeli embassy, but he decided it was too risky and declined. His IJO handlers also asked for photographs of the American embassy and traffic patterns nearby. El-Debek told the FBI he never visited the embassy, but he did tell his IJO handlers it looked like a person could sit inside the embassy while waiting for a U.S. visa appointment.

In total, el-Debek was employed as an IJO operative from 2007 to 2015, eventually earning over $1,000 a month.

Weiner:
For the most part, the Iran-Hezbollah threat has made less noise and it’s been less visible to the public, but no less virulent. And I’d rate it actually among the highest in terms of its potential energy, if not its kinetic energy; classically thought about as a lower-probability, higher impact threat vector.

Levitt:
In May 2019, Kourani was convicted on all eight counts of his indictment, and was sentenced to forty years in prison.

Cards on the table: I served as an expert witness in the Kourani case, providing the jury with background on Hezbollah, the IJO, its international operations and modus operandi.

El-Debek has yet to stand trial. But it appears he may have pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the U.S. government.

As we wrap up this story, it’s hard to see how stationing sleeper agents in the United States meets Hezbollah’s stated goal of acting on behalf of the Lebanese people. In fact, Hezbollah’s global criminal and terrorist activities have severely hurt ordinary Lebanese people—their leaders have been sanctioned, their banks are unreliable, and their security is in the hands of a militant group with zero accountability.

In our final episode of Season 1, we will return to Lebanon, and examine how Hezbollah’s activities, both at home and abroad, impact its country of origin—and the people who live there.

OUTRO:
Thanks for listening to 'Breaking Hezbollah’s Golden Rule,' brought to you by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and hosted by me, Matthew Levitt.

This podcast is produced by Anouk Millet from Earshot Strategies, and written by myself and Lauren Fredericks, a research assistant at the Washington Institute.
To learn more about Hezbollah’s criminal, militant and terrorist activities, check out my book, The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.

You can also visit the Washington Institute’s website at WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG, where you can explore our map and timeline of Hezbollah Worldwide activities and access the extended show notes with all the sources for this episode.

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