



Inside the DHS Prevention and Protection Mission Addressing Targeted Violence and Terrorism

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We contend with a domestic threat environment that is very different from the one we faced even five years ago. The threat from domestic terrorist movements has risen, and authorities are now treating them as co-equal to foreign terrorist organizations in priority. Last month, three different independent assessments re-emphasized the growing challenge that racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremists (what we now refer to by the acronym REMVE) pose. On February 5, FBI Director Christopher Wray noted that 2019 was domestic terrorists' deadliest year since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. He has elevated REMVE to a national priority equal to that of ISIS and al-Qaeda.¹ On February 26, the Anti-Defamation League released a report concluding that 90% of the 42 deaths attributable to domestic terrorist movements in 2019 were associated with REMVE ideologies and movements.² And the non-governmental organization Moonshot CVE reported last month that its tracking of online extremist content confirms that there is a global REMVE movement, with a robust presence on social media sites like Telegram.³ There have been thousands of Internet searches for REMVE content over the past ten months across numerous countries.

Further, terrorist groups have changed their tactics over time, in part because technologies that previously were unavailable to terrorist organizations have become more widely accessible to consumers, including terrorists. ISIS famously mastered the art of leveraging the combination of social media and encrypted communications to widely disseminate its message, radicalize its target audience, mobilize followers to violence, and even provide them guidance and assistance remotely through the use of *virtual plotters* who are a part of the group's external operations bureaucracy. ISIS encouraged homegrown terrorists to bring their own weapons to the fight and eschew international travel in favor of acting at home. The late ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani exhorted followers to kill disbelieving Americans and Europeans "in any manner or way however it may be," providing a laundry list of techniques to be employed: "Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him."

¹ Christopher Wray, Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, February 5, 2020, available at <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-oversight-020520>.

² Anti-Defamation League, "Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2019," February 26, 2020, available at <https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2019>.

³ Moonshot CVE, "Global Trends in REMVE," February 2020 (unpublished manuscript).

There are now shorter planning cycles before attacks and consequently fewer opportunities for the intelligence community and law enforcement to identify and interdict those preparing to engage in acts of terrorism.

The rise of a global REMVE threat combined with the continued determination al-Qaeda and ISIS place on attacking the homeland complicates DHS's operational approach to preventing attacks from terrorist groups. But in addition to terrorism, no description of the domestic threat landscape can be considered complete absent mention of the continued drumbeat of attacks that can be defined as *targeted violence*. Targeted violence includes attacks that lack political, ideological, or religious motivation (*i.e.*, terrorism) but where the attacker intends to inflict casualties or destroy property commensurate with the damage done in a terrorist attack. Examples of targeted violence include the slaying of 58 concertgoers in Las Vegas in 2017, the killing of twelve employees in D.C.'s Navy Yard in 2013, and the infamous massacre of 26 grade school students and their teachers in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012. In August 2019 alone, we witnessed barbarous attacks that claimed innocent lives at an annual garlic festival in Gilroy, California; at a chain store in El Paso, Texas; at an entertainment district in Dayton, Ohio; and on the streets of the Texas cities of Midland and Odessa. This rash of killing left many Americans to wonder whether they were no longer safe even when participating in simple, everyday activities.

Targeted violence and terrorism have not only rattled the sense of security commonly felt in our Republic, but they also inflict lasting harm upon everyone directly and indirectly impacted. Too many families have buried loved ones. Too many first responders have arrived at scenes of unimaginable devastation, and are forced to live with those images for the rest of their lives. The National Center for PTSD at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that 28 percent of people who witness terrorism, targeted violence, and other mass shootings develop post-traumatic stress disorder, while another third will have acute stress disorders that require lengthy and sometimes intensive treatments.⁴

At the Department of Homeland Security, I lead the Office of Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention. My team develops and coordinates policies for some of the most important security mission areas, including the screening and vetting of arrivals to the United States, the dismantling of transnational criminal enterprises, countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and the countering of foreign influence on society and politics. My office acts as a force multiplier for DHS's 240,000 employees. We tackle large problems by bringing the skills, resources, and authorities of dozens of offices and components to bear on specific problem sets. My office also ensures that DHS meets the baseline requirements of state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) partners in the broader homeland security enterprise. These partners serve as the foundation of a whole-of-society response to these threats.

Of particular concern for us are the problems of terrorism and targeted violence. For the past year, my office has worked with diligence, determination, and the rapidity not typically associated with large bureaucracies to craft a new approach to addressing terrorism and targeted violence. We documented this approach in DHS's *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*, released publicly this past September.⁵ The *Strategic Framework* updates traditional counterterrorism tools so as to better address the new threat environment, and it recalibrates the Department's prevention and protection missions. We have secured new budget resources to expand these missions, have retooled the office structures implementing these missions, and are currently in the final stages of producing a corresponding implementation plan that documents how these missions will expand, and what they are designed to accomplish, in the years to come. We are proud of all the work

⁴ Amy Novotney, "What Happens to the Survivors," *Monitor on Psychology* 49:8 (September 2018), p. 36, available at <https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/09/survivors>.

⁵ See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* (2019), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-and-targeted-violence>.

we have done to address the domestic threat, but I believe it's necessary to explicitly state that there remain problems beyond our reach, where Congress in particular can play a vital role. I will outline this role—and, in particular, advocate for the creation of a bipartisan commission akin to the one that helped guide this country's security policies in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks—at the conclusion of this statement.

I know many readers will be unfamiliar with the Department's approach to countering terrorism and targeted violence, and how we are adjusting our toolkit to deal with the evolving threats. Thus, I will focus in this statement on the Department's new strategy that my office worked to build, and how it addresses all forms of terrorism and targeted violence. I hope that my explication of the strategy's principles, and the specific programs that it establishes or advances, can build a deeper appreciation of the thinking that guides our work, and what our efforts will mean in practice for advancing the safety of the American public.

DHS'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TARGETED VIOLENCE

The backdrop that I just described of a broader and more complex threat spurred the Department to release its *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* in September. The strategy clearly describes an evolving threat landscape that is no longer dominated solely by the challenges that foreign terrorist organizations pose. The *Strategic Framework* highlights domestic terrorism, and the need for the Department to “amplify its focus on the growing domestic challenge.”⁶ Yet it is the inclusion of targeted violence alongside terrorism that serves as a clear break from prior strategies. As DHS's then-Acting Secretary, Kevin McAleenan, wrote in his introduction to the *Strategic Framework*: “The Federal Government has been moving toward recognizing terrorism and targeted violence as intertwined and interrelated for the first time, but this is the first national-level strategy to explicitly state that terrorism and targeted violence overlap, intersect, and interact as problems, and that they necessitate a shared set of solutions.”⁷

Indeed, the *Strategic Framework* recognizes that DHS had to expand on its traditional counterterrorism measures, such as countering terrorist travel through the screening and vetting of travelers to the United States to eliminate terrorist travel. The *Strategic Framework*'s first two Goals outline how DHS will continue to invest in the programs and efforts that have been so successful at preventing foreign terrorist attacks against the nation over the past 17 years. But the *Strategic Framework* also clearly explains that mobilization to violence occurs at the local level: As I have said, an exclusive focus on the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations will fail to apprehend the current threat landscape. Thus, the *Strategic Framework* uses Goals 3 and 4 to identify how the Department will support SLTT efforts to identify signs of mobilization to terrorism and targeted violence, to “off-ramp” susceptible individuals before they strike, and strengthen the preparedness and protection of the most vulnerable communities.

I noted my office's current work on an implementation plan for the *Strategic Framework*, which is designed to document the efforts needed to meet the *Framework*'s goals. The implementation plan designates lead offices and supporting roles for each priority action in the *Framework*, and sets specific milestones that each of these lead offices will need to achieve. This process will allow the implementation plan to serve as the basis for the Department's counterterrorism budget requests for years to come. Further, a public version of the implementation plan will be forthcoming to ensure that we at the Department remain accountable to the American

⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷ Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, letter in the *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* (2019), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-and-targeted-violence>.

public. The *Strategic Framework* was not an end unto itself, but rather the outline upon which the implementation plan and its supporting budgets will forge the Department's approach to addressing current and future challenges of terrorism and targeted violence.

WORKING FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

Before I explain how the Department is updating and expanding its more traditional counterterrorism roles, I would like to examine the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations in more depth. Foreign adversaries remain committed to attacking the American homeland. DHS thus seeks to push out the country's borders as far as possible in order to increase the lead time we have to intercept terrorists and mechanisms designed to support and advance their cause. Foreign terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, ISIS and Hezbollah remain persistent challenges:

- Al-Qaeda has suffered significant losses in its leadership ranks through years of counterterrorism pressure, but the group continues to wage insurgencies, recruit from local populations, and target Western interests in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and beyond.
- ISIS branches and offshoots have popped up across the globe. Those who identify with its hateful ideology are trying to establish footholds under the ISIS flag.
- The ideology espoused by groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS also manifests itself in attacks by homegrown violent extremists, who often find their inspiration online.
- Iran continues to support various terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, which has established sophisticated networks all over the world, including in the United States. These branches conduct a wide range of illicit activities, which in turn help fund terrorism and other strategic activities.

A critical part of the Department of Homeland Security's mission has always been, and will continue to be, ensuring that terrorism does not visit our shores again from abroad.

One major way DHS does this, as outlined in Goal 2 of the *Strategic Framework*, is preventing terrorists and other hostile actors from entering the United States in the first place. For DHS, this effort begins by trying to ensure that our global transportation and trade networks are neither the victim nor the transit for terrorists and other hostile actors. One example of our evolution in this space is the 2018 establishment of the National Vetting Center (NVC), which centralized and accelerated the Department's review of applications for travel and immigration. NVC allows national security partner reviews to take place prior to the issuance of a travel document. Prior to the NVC's establishment, national security vetting results could be delivered *after* adjudications had been made, meaning that there were times when we found derogatory information on individuals who had already traveled to the United States. Further, NVC's common technology platform and process allow for a coordinated and comprehensive review of sensitive information, streamlining how unclassified applicant data is shared with national-security partners and ensuring that the results of reviews of sensitive information are quickly shared with adjudicators. The NVC thus creates a more proactive and comprehensive capability than watchlists in screening online applications for those wishing to enter the U.S. through the Visa Waiver Program.

I mentioned that the Department prioritizes pushing the U.S.'s borders out. The Department recognizes that building the capacity of international partners to investigate and interdict terrorism abroad strengthens our own national security. DHS is making significant investments in improving security sector assistance programs, in coordination and partnership with the Department of State. The Department is also relying on the numerous lessons we have learned over the past sixteen years to provide international standards for counterterrorism that

our partners can adopt.

DHS plans to create a program office to manage the Department's efforts to counter illicit travel through information sharing with foreign governments, and to review how well foreign partnerships contribute to stymying terrorist and criminal travel. DHS has a basic responsibility to determine whether prospective travelers are who they claim to be, and whether they pose a public safety risk. To date, that process has remained far too analog in a digital age, focused on such paperwork as passports, rather than incorporating readily accessible details about individuals' history. The program office will, among other efforts, expand the Department's international biometric interoperability programs with Visa Waiver Program, Western Hemisphere and other priority countries; and develop a consistent policy and legal framework for how DHS shares information with foreign governments. Within its first year of operations, the program office will expand the number of partner countries with biometric interoperability solutions with DHS, and will ensure that all DHS international engagements on information sharing are appropriately prioritized and coordinated.

All these efforts are designed to improve DHS's counterterrorism mission. At times, however, the U.S. Government needs to take more drastic steps. In 2017, through Executive Order 13780, President Trump determined that foreign governments must meet minimum, baseline standards of identity management and information sharing for their citizens to be eligible to travel to the United States. These standards are based on international legal obligations and best practices, and requiring that other countries satisfy them helps to ensure that we can confirm travelers' identity, and assess the likelihood that they pose a threat to public safety. Most countries meet these requirements, but a few do not. The President thus issued restrictions on entry from certain foreign nationals in Proclamations 9645 and 9983. These restrictions have been tailored to reflect the risks posed to U.S. security, as well as our assessment of how likely foreign governments are to make improvements. DHS is working with willing governments whose citizens face travel restrictions to improve their identity management and information sharing practices to a level where routine travel can resume.

WORKING FROM THE INSIDE: THE DEPARTMENT'S NEW PREVENTION AND PROTECTION MISSIONS

The *Strategic Framework* reflects DHS's determination to expand prevention efforts at the local level in order to reduce the draw of terrorism and targeted violence. DHS is rapidly establishing and expanding prevention efforts to offer individuals alternatives to the path to violence. Prevention can stop violence before it occurs. It can provide help to individuals before they become violent criminals. Prevention works hand in hand with protection. Even the most robust efforts to prevent individuals from committing violence will never reduce incidents of terrorism or targeted violence to zero. Thus, when attacks do occur, it is vital that potential targets are prepared and protected, in order to reduce the harm that can be done.

To accomplish its prevention and protection missions, DHS needs to act in a coordinated manner. Often this is described as a whole-of-government approach, wherein all elements of state power are brought to bear on a problem in a coordinated way. While multiple DHS offices and components need to work with interagency partners for the Department's prevention and protection missions to succeed, this is not the foundation or lynchpin for success. *DHS fundamentally understands that the scale and complexity of the terrorism and targeted violence problem set dictate that the federal government cannot prevent every attack nor protect every citizen on its own.* Rather than a whole-of-government approach, a whole-of-society approach is needed. Every locality should build relationships of trust among key stakeholders—including law enforcement, government agencies, civic organizations, houses of worship, private businesses, and others—that will empower rapid and effective information sharing and threat assessments.

For example, the *Strategic Framework* highlights the problems of terrorists being able to reach and catalyze new audience online, and of the spread of grievances designed to spur acts of targeted violence. The *Framework* clearly discusses the need to build resilience to malign information operations initiated by foreign states and non-state actors that directly or indirectly work to enhance the pernicious impact of targeted violence and terrorism. DHS works to accomplish this in part through continued engagement with such mechanisms as the Global Internet Forum for Counterterrorism and the evolving frameworks found in the Aqaba Process and the Christchurch Call to Action. Yet DHS also supports efforts by individual technology companies, non-governmental organizations, and civic partners to halt the spread of dangerous hate speech and violent extremist ideologies online. Mechanisms like the Digital Forum for Terrorism Prevention and new and expanded digital challenges are designed to turn the tools terrorists and others use for malicious purposes back on them.

Federal prevention efforts have confronted well-documented budget and resource challenges. Yet the future looks bright for the expansion of locally-based prevention efforts. The most recent DHS budget tripled the size of the Department's prevention budget. This budget will expand field-deployed regional coordinators to cover the country, and it will re-establish a grant program. The FY20 budget will build a solid foundation upon which to implement the vision for prevention outlined in the *Strategic Framework*. It will be critical to ensure that all DHS offices and components can contribute to a harmonized effort to expand prevention and protection efforts.

The President's FY2021 Budget further strengthens DHS's prevention and protection missions. The President's FY2021 Budget will allow DHS to bring its prevention mission to scale. It resources Department efforts to provide technical assistance, training, and grants to SLTT partners and civil society to enable them to implement local prevention frameworks. The FY2021 Budget enhances DHS's protection mission by expanding the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) field forces, in order to reduce the potential harm that might come to victims of targeted violence and terrorism. The budgetary expansion will also harmonize DHS's prevention efforts with similar efforts underway at the Department of Justice, which is working to implement its Disruption and Early Engagement Program (DEEP) model. That model assesses the degree of threat posed by particular subjects, and develops options to mitigate threats and divert or disrupt mobilization to violence.

PREVENTION

The centrality of prevention to DHS's new *Strategic Framework* can be discerned by the fact that the entirety of the *Framework's* third goal is a call to develop societal resistance to radicalization to violent extremism and mobilization to violence, and to ensure broad awareness of these threats. The *Framework* also commits DHS to working to develop and sustain locally-based prevention frameworks that work to "offramp" individuals before they commit acts of terrorism or targeted violence.

Prevention has been effective at addressing all forms of terrorism and targeted violence. Peer-reviewed research continues to confirm that individuals engaging in terrorism and targeted violence adhere to various ideologies and grievances, and increasingly are driven by a combination of both. These same studies confirm that, regardless of the grievance, we can prevent this violence before it happens using locally-based frameworks and programs. There is no single pathway through which terrorists and others come to embrace the use of violence, but the factors driving them are consistently observed by those who know these individuals best. Families, friends, and others who care for the wellbeing of these individuals are critical to prevention. They are often the ones who recognize that an individual needs help.

So, as I said, the threat we face requires a whole-of-society prevention solution. We need one that builds meaningful and trusting partnerships among many different actors in our local communities, and that provides them with resources, personnel, training, and other assistance to act when someone is in need. A good deal of this work is underway already. For example, the State of Colorado has a robust prevention program. Initially established to address terrorism, this program has broadened to include targeted violence prevention, primarily by incorporating existing school safety programs. Using grants and a field-deployed regional prevention coordinator, DHS supported State and local prevention programs that in the past three years have intervened in 40 cases where targeted violence and terrorism were underlying concerns. 35 of these 40 cases were related to domestic terrorism related ideologies.

In April 2019, Acting Secretary McAleenan created the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP) and directed that it be the primary entity responsible for driving and coordinating the Department's prevention mission. OTVTP looks across the Department to identify complementary efforts that can be amplified, prevent duplication, and address gaps through the creation and deployment of prevention programs supporting SLTT efforts. These programs include awareness briefings that provide effective ways to identify individuals who might mobilize to violence, Digital Forums on Terrorism Prevention that connect experts in technology firms to community stakeholders and build lasting partnerships, and the placement of regional coordinators across the country to catalyze and expand locally-based prevention efforts.

Let me put a finer point on this. Between 2017 and 2019, the Department ran a dedicated grant program that supported 25 distinct prevention programs across the country. These grant-funded projects have allowed DHS to evaluate promising best practices and innovations in the prevention space throughout the country. The programs that grantees enacted reached 42,000 participants, and over 4 million people viewed grantee-generated content online. As a result of these grant projects, four states adopted statewide strategies to prevent targeted violence, and seven cities are establishing regional resilience frameworks. The grant program resulted in six models of prevention programs that SLTT partners can employ. As I mentioned earlier, we are now re-launching the grant program. This prevention grant program will help build local prevention capacity across the country.

PROTECTION

But everyone acknowledges that even the most robust prevention and law enforcement efforts will, at times, fail to stop individuals from mobilizing to violence. Protection is therefore the *Strategic Framework's* fourth goal, and it remains critical to our counterterrorism efforts. Prevention and protection efforts complement one another to help to reduce the loss of life and increase the difficulty of carrying out an attack. Protection enhances the disincentive for conducting the attack in the first place.

On the protection side, DHS continues longstanding work with communities to share threat information, harden soft targets, train law enforcement and first responders, and conduct active shooter exercises and trainings. These are proven initiatives since DHS's creation that improve safety and security in communities, and DHS is re-focusing these efforts based on emerging threat indicators.

An example of this is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA's) Soft Targets and Crowded Places Task Force. The Task Force provides training, information sharing, security assessments, and other tools to the private sector to protect against acts of terrorism of all ideologies. This is amplified through CISA's Protective Security Advisor (PSA) program. Since the program's inception in 2011, nearly 40,000 participants from security and human resource disciplines have participated in workshops. Following the tragic attack at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, members of the synagogue credited the training coordinated by the local

PSA with saving lives. The Federal Protective Service, which protects over 9,300 federally-owned or leased facilities in the U.S., has trained over 100,000 members of the federal workforce on how to respond to an Active Threat in the building where they work.

Protection remains front of mind for DHS, which is why the *Strategic Framework* calls for more effort to be placed on both prevention and protection together. The December 2017 report from the Homeland Security Advisory Council titled *Preventing Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities* validated much of this approach, and urged DHS to do more in the prevention and protection space. DHS is folding these recommendations into the implementation plan for the *Strategic Framework*, and both documents will continue to guide the expansion of prevention and protection efforts across the United States.

MOVING FORWARD: MEETING AND OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

In spite of these advancements in counterterrorism, prevention, and protection, real challenges face DHS and others when addressing terrorism and targeted violence. One challenge is how online platforms catalyze the spread of hate speech, radicalizing grievances and normalization of targeted violence. In testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee in January of 2020, Paul Goldenberg summarized this well when he discussed the depth and breadth of targeted hate speech against the small Jewish community of Whitefish, Montana. What is striking in his testimony is not just the depravity of numerous online figures targeting a Jewish community, and not even the added depravity of targeting specific leaders and members of the community—it was the ultimate depravity of targeting the children of that Jewish community. While the First Amendment might protect those openly supporting neo-Nazis or white supremacy, a frequent question those targeted with such hate ask is why law enforcement at the local, state, and federal level feel hamstrung to act when specific individuals are targeted online.

The truth is the federal government has a history of regulating certain forms of speech. For example, the Federal Communications Commission adjudicates numerous complaints concerning obscene, indecent and profane broadcasts over terrestrial radio and broadcast television.⁸ So while it is beyond the remit of DHS to tackle this alone, more must be done to take a fresh look at how the First Amendment applies to hate speech online. Some activity on this is already underway. For example, Congress has introduced numerous pieces of legislation examining Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that separates technology platforms from the users who use them to generate content. The legislation, as well as a February public workshop that the Department of Justice hosted to examine this issue, are revisiting this separation between hosts and users to examine, among other issues, the use of these platforms for spreading hate speech and fostering terrorism and targeted violence.⁹

The second issue is the question of designating domestic terror groups or movements, much as we use existing authorities to designate FTOs. Several witnesses from non-governmental organizations who testified recently on the rise of anti-Semitism in the United States supported the concept of designation for domestic terrorism.¹⁰ Jonathan Greenblatt of the Anti-Defamation League noted in his written statement that the US government should “examine whether certain white supremacist groups operating abroad meet the specific criteria to be subject to sanctions under its designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) authority.”¹¹

⁸ See <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts>.

⁹ Brian Fung, “These 26 Words ‘Created the Internet.’ The US Government is Coming for Them,” CNN Business, 25 February 2020. See <https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/25/tech/section-230-doj/index.html>.

¹⁰ See <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110366>.

¹¹ Jonathan Greenblatt, “Confronting the Rise in Anti-Semitic Domestic Terrorism,” Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 15 January 2020, Page 16. See

Designation is an intriguing concept that deserves serious study. When the US government designates a foreign terrorist organization, it uses a careful process that includes several required elements—including past acts of violence against Americans and/or their property. But designation raises a number of thorny issues that require careful consideration. For example, consider these questions:

- If Congress authorized the designation of domestic terrorism, what would those requirements be for designating domestic terrorist movements?
- Who would have responsibility for running the process of designation?
- And how do we ensure that we don't repeat mistakes of our past?

We need to be honest, that our history is rich with examples of abusing our authorities when we are fearful of being attacked. The internment of Japanese Americans during WWII and the campaigns associated with McCarthyism are but two of these shameful episodes. Indeed, much of our national security apparatus today operates under policies developed as a result of the Church Committee's investigations into domestic abuses of authority. Careful consideration of these issues now would go a long way to avoiding abuses of authority.

CONCLUSION

These are significant challenges and questions that need to be addressed with numerous Constitutional, ethical and political considerations. The Executive branch is not necessarily best left to answer or address these issues on its own, but they need answers and fast.

For this reason, it is my hope that Congress will consider taking a serious look at how we take the next steps. We have done this before in our history. After 9/11, a bipartisan commission provided chapters of actionable recommendations that Congress and the Executive Branch implemented. In some respects, the challenges that we face today are more complicated than after 9/11. Designating FTOs, extending our borders, and preventing bad actors from reaching the U.S. took a lot of work, but it was clear the actions we needed to take to share information better and implement enhanced security measures. But today the traditional intelligence collection and law enforcement operations do not lend itself as a solution, and adversaries in this space understand how to use their Constitutionally protected activities to straddle the line but not cross it.

I think we are at a moment in time where these questions deserve a serious, respectful study; before we have another mass attack attributed to domestic terror movements.