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SECURITY FOR PEACE:
ISRAEL'S MINIMAL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE PALESTINIANS

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There is little doubt that the Palestinian uprising marks a critical turning point in the long and bloody Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet despite fundamental changes the uprising may have wrought, the rush of daily events has left little time in the peace process for sober, detached long-range planning.

In order to strike a balance between Israeli security and Palestinian rights – the essence of any peace agreement – Israeli and American strategic planners need a clear conception of Israel’s security requirements. This Policy Paper begins the process of strategic planning by exploring the security component of any potential settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

In the following chapters, Ze’ev Schiff closely scrutinizes Israel’s minimal security requirements. As he notes, the following proposals are not the framework for a settlement, setting down markers which no Israeli government could cross, regardless of its commitment to a peaceful resolution. But his suggestions do constitute a major step forward in thinking about the peace process.
These proposals, at times controversial, are made doubly important by the stature of their author. As the senior Israeli defense correspondent, Mr. Schiff is widely acclaimed as a leading analyst of military and strategic issues in the Middle East. Respected by Israelis, Arabs and Americans across the political spectrum, his words carry an authority that makes them worthy of consideration by all those who would seek a lasting and stable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Barbi Weinberg
President
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories has undermined the status quo that Israel has been trying to preserve in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In so doing, the uprising has created an opportunity for the parties to resume the peace process and re-examine a number of basic premises. Like the situation after the October 1973 war, conditions exist that make possible a series of interim agreements which could lead to a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians.

The premise of this work is that Israel and the Palestinians eventually will sit down at the bargaining table. In subsequent negotiations, Israel would need to decide what its minimum military conditions are before agreeing to a territorial compromise. These conditions are the subject of this work. They are presented not in the form of a technical military plan but as cardinal principles on which Israel must insist. Each topic is dealt with separately, but all are related to the termination of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a compromise that does not endanger Israel's existence or security. The overall strategic outlook of this work is dovish, but it is rigorous and hawkish in its details and military conditions.
• The conflict will only be solved through an agreement reached between Israel and the Palestinians. Therefore, Israel and the PLO must eventually come to an understanding. This is the political principle on which Israel’s actions must be predicated. The search for an alternative to the PLO will, at best, lead to a partial agreement and, at worst, become a political time bomb. Rather than striving for a substitute to the PLO, Israel must seek to change that organization.

• It is imperative that Jordan be included in any overall peace agreement, regardless of who leads its regime. Militarily, Jordan is an organic part of the bloc that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From a security standpoint, the parts of this bloc cannot be treated separately. The East Bank must be involved in the peace agreement to reduce the military risks that Israel would face – including a surprise attack on its eastern front – after it withdraws from territory in the West Bank. If Jordan is not a party to the peace treaty and military arrangements, Israel would be forced to station permanently a substantial military force on the West Bank.

• A political solution can be found only through a confederative arrangement that includes Israel, the Palestinian entity and Jordan. This confederation would have a binding constitution that could be suspended or changed only through the unanimous agreement of the parties. The constitution would include clauses on the demilitarization of the Palestinian entity and verification arrangements involving Israel. It would prohibit the Palestinian entity from entering any military treaties or accepting any foreign military advisers. The Palestinian entity could not annex or be annexed by any other political construct. It would be independent but have strict limitations placed on it. The Palestinians would secure the right to self-determination but be deprived of the means to imperil or infringe upon the rights of their neighbors.
• Terminating the conflict requires transition stages which would build trust between the sides and reduce the military threat to Israel. This conflict involves many parties, including some Arab states that are opposed to a peace treaty and Palestinians who are divided on the need to solve the conflict. During the transition period, the Palestinians would need to prove to Israel that they have abandoned the idea of destroying the Jewish state in stages. Israel, in turn, would have to demonstrate to the Palestinians that it was not avoiding negotiations on the final status of the territories.

• The transition period would need to last until the Arab states bordering Israel sign peace treaties with it. As long as a state of war and a danger of attack exists, Israeli forces will be stationed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If Jordan joined the peace treaty, Israel’s military presence in the West Bank could be reduced and concentrated in the northwest, facing Syria. If Syria signed a treaty, the IDF’s deployment in the West Bank could undergo substantial change.

• Israel would deploy forces on the West Bank in two or three concentrations during the transition period. These forces would be on the eastern slopes of the Samarian and Judean mountains overlooking the Jordan Valley, a sparsely populated area. Israel would maintain armored forces, early-warning stations and batteries of anti-aircraft missiles there. To avoid unnecessary friction with the local population, movement between these areas would need to be restricted to specific axes from the Beit She’an Valley in the north to Jerusalem via Ma’aleh Adumim. In Gaza, the IDF would deploy its forces in the Katif region that separates the Strip from Sinai.

• In the Gaza Strip, an entirely different approach can be taken during the transition period. Because Gaza does not border an Arab country in a state of war with Israel, and because its inhabitants are dependent upon Israel for their jobs
and water, the strategic situation in Gaza differs markedly from that in the West Bank. At a certain stage, therefore, the Palestinians' ability to uphold their agreements and prevent acts of terrorism could be tested. Gaza could be turned over to an elected Palestinian leadership acting in coordination with the PLO if the two pledge not to establish a Palestinian state in the area. They would need to ensure that no terrorist actions were launched from Gaza and to cooperate with Israel in the war against terrorism. During this trial period, the inhabitants of Gaza could work in Israel. Development projects could be launched with the aid of Arab and international backing, including the rehabilitation of refugees and the construction of a port. If the experiment in Gaza succeeded, it would convince Israel that cooperation with the Palestinians in the West Bank is also possible.

- The transfer of responsibility to the Palestinians for internal security could also be divided into a transition period and a period of final arrangements. The transition phase for internal security need not parallel that of external security; progress here depends primarily on the Palestinians' willingness to cooperate with Israel on preventing terrorism. Neither side would be able to contend with terrorism on its own; only close cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian entity and Jordan would make it possible to eliminate this problem. Therefore, a joint command for the war on terrorism will need to be established in the territories. The arrest and interrogation of those suspected of terrorist acts, as well as supervision of the Jordan bridges and the airports, would be handled jointly until full responsibility could be transferred to the Palestinians. Those accused of terrorism would likewise be tried jointly by Palestinian and Israeli judges.

- The Palestinian entity would be allowed to establish a strong police force of a few thousand men in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the final stage, this force would be under an independent Palestinian command. Hence, demilitarization of
the Palestinian entity would be only partial, although unlimited in time.

- Border adjustments would be made between Israel and the Palestinian entity. The two prime factors that would influence these adjustments are security and Israel’s obligation to preserve its large subterranean water reserve along the coastal plain. It is very easy to damage this important reservoir through the unrestricted drilling of wells on the western slopes of the Samarian mountains.

- Israeli settlements not included in Israel’s territory as a result of the border adjustments would be allowed to remain within the area of the Palestinian entity, providing their residents are prepared to follow local laws, just as Israel’s Arab citizens are bound by the laws of Israel. Palestinians who are included in Israel’s territory as a result of the border changes would also be subject to Israeli law. Jewish settlers who remain in the Palestinian entity would not be allowed to have their own armed force, just as the Arabs of Israel do not have one.

- Among the minimal conditions that Israel must insist upon is an explicit commitment that, upon the signing of a peace treaty, the Palestinian leadership would declare the conflict terminated. The Palestinians would also need to pledge that they renounce their “right of return” to Israeli territory; undertake to solve the refugee problem with the aid of outside parties, including Israel; guarantee that the Palestinian entity would not claim the allegiance of Palestinians living in Jordan and Israel; and renounce irredentism vis-a-vis its neighbors.

- The United States and the Soviet Union must be involved in the political process and be co-signers to the peace treaty. The Soviet Union’s integration into the process is particularly important because of its past involvement in helping the Arab states wage war. It would now need to neutralize the radicals in
the Arab world who might attempt to sabotage the peace treaty. Moscow must commit itself to abstaining from any military agreements with the Palestinian entity, stationing military units or instructors in any part of the confederation or supplying arms and equipment that would violate the demilitarization arrangements. The United States would play an active role in supervising the treaty and helping solve the refugee problem. It would also continue to help Israel maintain its security and the quality of its army.

Even if the Palestinians accept Israel’s minimum military demands, it would not eliminate the risks to Israel’s security. But these risks would be accompanied by the prospect of an improved political climate, whereas the status quo promises neither security nor hope. The Palestinians would receive a restricted independence, Jordan would receive better protection against Palestinian irredentism and Israel would receive peace, acceptance by its Arab neighbors and improved security.
I TOWARD ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS

The time has come to think seriously about Israel’s security requirements in the context of peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Like Anwar Sadat’s decision to launch the October 1973 war, the Palestinian uprising against Israel has shattered a static situation that Israel has consistently sought to preserve. The uprising has not only underscored the need for Israeli-Palestinian talks but, for the first time, it may have created the opportunity for such negotiations. Sadat’s bold move eventually led to a series of interim arrangements that culminated in the Camp David Accords and the signing of a bilateral peace treaty with Israel. The issue at stake today is whether or not another peace based on a series of agreements and interim stages – one between Israel and the Palestinians – can be constructed out of the splintered fragments of the status quo. This paper attempts to define Israel’s fundamental security requirements in the event that Israelis and Palestinians start down the path of negotiations.

These requirements consist of the military and security demands on which Israel cannot compromise. The overall approach to any negotiations must be to balance Israel’s absolute and irreducible national security requirements with the need to avoid partial or incomplete settlements that would
prolong the conflict, not terminate it. This guiding principle of conflict resolution must govern all aspects of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. But while remaining fundamentally "dovish," Israel must be strict and "hawkish" in maintaining its security and its character as a democratic, Jewish state. As a result, some issues (e.g., the establishment of early warning stations in the West Bank) that previously loomed large in the minds of Israeli planners are, in fact, open to negotiations. Other issues (e.g., the demand by Palestinian refugees for their "right to return" to homes and property in pre-1967 Israel) are completely non-negotiable.

Withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and Gaza as part of the peace settlement would have far-reaching implications for Israel's security. In return, Israel would not be able to rely on promises, oral commitments or a change in Palestinian and Arab rhetoric. For decades the Palestinian leadership has refused to recognize the right of the Jewish national movement to its own independent state. Moreover, since its inception, the PLO has failed to keep dozens of agreements, ranging from cease-fires with its various adversaries in Lebanon to agreements with Egypt and other countries. All of this obligates Israel to be extremely careful when it presents its conditions during negotiations. The test of Palestinian sincerity for peace will be based on actions, not words.

Calculations of Israeli security concerns are not restricted to the future disposition of the West Bank. Security arrangements would largely depend on the role Jordan and Syria play in negotiations. Their participation in the agreement, for example, would immediately affect the Israel Defense Forces' requirements on the West Bank. By the same token, superpower involvement in a negotiated settlement would have a significant impact on Israel's evaluations of its security needs.

Israel should not settle for a limited and partial peace but should demand a comprehensive settlement – a "package
deal” – that resolves the sources of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Therefore, refugee resettlement in the Palestinian entity and the Arab states – but not inside the Green Line – is a high priority. Only if the refugee issue is finally defused can Israel be confident that the embers of the conflict have been extinguished. Similarly, building economic interdependence between the parties to the settlement is critical in order to guarantee that the price of war remains higher than the price of peace. Israeli security requirements, therefore, should be guided by the need for a settlement that links the Israeli-Palestinian political dispute to military arrangements with the neighboring Arab states and efforts that defuse sources of future conflict.

THE EFFECTS OF THE UPRISING

Because of the intifadah, the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is immeasurably greater than it was before December 9, 1987, the day the uprising began. The uprising, after all, has opened a new chapter in the political relationship between Palestinians and Israelis. It was only as a direct result of the uprising that the Palestinian National Council met in Algiers in November 1988, to adopt resolutions reversing a more than 40-year-old rejection of U.N. resolution 181. This resolution calls for the establishment of two states – one Jewish, one Arab – on the land west of the Jordan River. And it was only as a result of the uprising that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, at a press conference in Geneva, formally renounced terrorism and extended virtual recognition to the state of Israel. The uprising thereby gained an important political dividend: a U.S. dialogue with the PLO. This effectively extended American recognition to the PLO as a legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians.

Even more important, the uprising removed any lingering suspicions that the Palestinians could be sidestepped in the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement. It has led to the unavoidable conclusion that there can be no end to the Arab-Israeli conflict without a resolution of the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians. As a result of the steps taken by the PLO since the Algiers summit, a political solution for reaching such a settlement may now be at hand.

JORDAN’S SHRINKING ROLE

Although the uprising focused attention on the Palestinians, it also forced a reappraisal of Jordan’s role in the peace process. For years, Israeli politicians and strategists, with significant support from Washington, pushed for the “Jordan option.” In essence, this proposes that Jordan— not the PLO or Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza — is the principal partner for reaching a territorial settlement. Many Labor Party leaders have only been prepared to discuss “territorial compromise” with Jordan’s King Hussein, not the Palestinians, believing that only an agreement with the Hashemite monarch would be secure.

One effect of the uprising has been to push Jordan further away from the center of the peacemaking picture — a reality that Hussein readily admits. From a military standpoint, Israel will always accord the eastern bank of the Jordan River a sensitive and unique status. But it is clear that the king’s 1988 decision to sever administrative and legal links between the East and West Banks and extend official recognition to the newly declared state of Palestine has placed narrow limits on any role he might play in resolving the political aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The more painful reality is that Jordan’s ability to determine the future of the West Bank has been diminishing steadily since 1967. It is doubtful that the “Jordan option” could ever have been implemented. One lesson Jordanian leaders gleaned from the bloody Jordanian-PLO battles of 1970-71, was that Palestinians threatened Jordanian rule not just on the West Bank but also on the East Bank.

Hussein made his first concession to insurgent Palestinian nationalism in his 1972 United Arab Kingdom plan (the
Federation Plan), offering to replace the unification of the two banks of the Jordan with a federation; the Palestinians demurred. Two years later, at Rabat, the Arab League deprived him of the right to represent the Palestinians by crowning the PLO as their sole, legitimate representative. Then, after the Lebanon War, there was hope that Hussein could benefit from the 1982 Reagan Plan and the PLO’s post-war disarray to regain his lost status in the West Bank. These hopes were short-lived. In 1985, Hussein took another step backward, offering “confederation” between Jordan and a proposed Palestinian entity in place of “federation” of the two banks. After a year, this effort at Jordanian-PLO cooperation also unraveled.

Israel is partly responsible for Hussein’s loss of influence among the Palestinians. In 1972, Israel rejected Hussein’s United Arab Kingdom “federation” proposal and, in 1974, it rejected Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s suggestion for a partial disengagement agreement along the Jordanian front. Labor Party governments that ostensibly promoted the “Jordan option” refused to apply the principle of disengagement and territorial withdrawal to Israel’s eastern border that was implemented in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The most that Israel was willing to offer Jordan was responsibility for the civil administration of the territories that would have bound Hussein to a partnership in ruling the West Bank. Without anything to show for his efforts, Hussein slipped further and further in the eyes of the Palestinians.

The Palestinian uprising was only the most recent and most decisive episode in the Hashemites’ withdrawal from political influence and control over the West Bank. Caught between two tangible dangers – a fear that the intifadah might spill over the Jordan River into the East Bank and that Israel might “solve” the Palestinian problem via mass expulsions of Palestinians eastward – Hussein decided to secure his East Bank interests, sever his ties (and political ambitions) to the West Bank and recognize the fledgling state of Palestine.
As a result, the uprising has rendered moot any questions of Hussein’s ability to negotiate with Israel in the name of the Palestinians or to cede territories which belong to the Palestinian state he has already recognized. Any attempt by the king to re-assert his role in the West Bank and Gaza would be soundly rejected by the Palestinians and could invite a spread of the intifadah to the East Bank. Hussein’s direct role in determining the political fate of the Palestinians has therefore been lost. Though still a vital partner in any prospective regional agreement with Israel, Hussein is no longer the senior partner.

DANGEROUS OPTIONS

The new reality is that the Palestinians have taken Jordan’s place as Israel’s primary partner for peace. This requires Israel to reject the proposal for an international Middle East peace conference. Those in Washington and Jerusalem supporting a conference never conceived of it as an end unto itself, but only as a means to ease Hussein’s inter-Arab constraints and enable Jordan to enter formal negotiations with Israel. Therefore, with Jordan’s removal from the limelight, Israel need not take any of the attendant risks of participating at this stage in such a conference. Given the hostility of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and the limits on U.S. support for Israel during negotiations, the conference was always fraught with problems for Israel. Today, following the inauguration of a U.S.-PLO dialogue, it is clear that an international conference not only holds no benefits for Israel but is, in fact, a recipe for disappointment and failure.

Other proposed solutions also present serious problems for Israel. Rather than using direct talks as a means to settle the conflict with the Palestinians, some Israelis have suggested more radical options: on the one hand, “unilateral withdrawal” from certain parts of the West Bank and Gaza and, on the other hand, the forced expulsion (or, in the Israeli euphemism, “transfer”) of Palestinian residents from the territories. Underlying each idea is a deep sense of despair that
there is no diplomatic solution for the demographic problem facing Israel and that there is no acceptable partner for peace negotiations. In each case, therefore, the goal is to free Israel from the nasty job of ruling over the Palestinians.

A unilateral withdrawal would solve Israel's "Palestinian problem" through a disassociation from the main population centers. A transfer would clear the territory under Israeli control of many of its problematic residents. So far, neither proposal has been discussed by the Israeli government, but it is safe to assume that if the regional situation deteriorates and Israelis and Palestinians do not find a way to begin the process of negotiation, then the voices for withdrawal and transfer will grow louder.

The most important strategic flaw of both proposals is that they are based on the notion that unilateral action can provide better security for Israel than a negotiated settlement in which Israel gains concessions, guarantees and commitments which provide for its military and political requirements. Because a unilateral withdrawal would sidestep a general agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, it is clear that the Palestinians would not wait to declare the establishment of an independent state. Similarly, a transfer of the Palestinians might temporarily lessen Israel's administrative burden, but in the long-run it would only aggravate the root causes of the conflict, damming Israel to a perpetual battle with the Palestinians.

As a result of the intifadah, unilateral withdrawal – sometimes called unilateral autonomy – has gained new adherents. Although it offers attractive and convenient answers to Israel's security dilemmas, in reality it is perilous. First, "unilateral withdrawal" contradicts the fundamental principle enshrined in U.N. Security Council resolution 242, namely the trade of territory for peace. The territories would no longer be bargaining chips to gain concessions in peace negotiations, as Menachem Begin used the Sinai to win concessions in peace talks with Egypt. After all, a unilateral
withdrawal is tantamount to abandoning the idea of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.

Second, unilateral withdrawal contradicts a basic premise of the peace treaty with Egypt: that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved through military means and that Israel will not bend under violent pressure. Rather than voluntarily abandoning the territories, Israel must re-affirm to the Arabs that the only way to recover territories is through a negotiated political settlement that takes account of Israel’s legitimate security interests. Egypt, which accepted this concept in the Camp David Accords, paid the price with nearly a decade of inter-Arab isolation. Unilateral withdrawal would greatly embarrass Egypt, implying that it paid that price for nothing.

Third, even if there were a unilateral withdrawal, it clearly cannot encompass all of the territories. Even the most detailed proposals for it do not take into account the areas from which Israel cannot withdraw, regardless of the density of the Arab population. These include territories near the Green Line on the western slopes of Samaria whose retention by Israel is essential to preserve control over one of Israel’s main water reservoirs.

Unilateral withdrawal, therefore, is not a way to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. Indeed, like many other proposed solutions that skirt the issue of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is likely to worsen the conflict, not lessen it. Only a mutually agreed settlement offers an opportunity for a peaceful and enduring settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, the unavoidable conclusion is that only by opening direct talks with the Palestinians can Israel hope to terminate the conflict.

In the ultimate analysis, war is the only alternative to negotiations; time is not on anyone’s side. For Israel, the question is whether to negotiate from a position of strength with support from its American strategic ally, or to await a time when it will be inevitably weaker, worn out socially,
economically and morally. For the Palestinians, any belief that demography has bought them a strategic advantage over Israel is tragically self-deluding. War, if it breaks out, will harm them no less than in 1948 and will almost surely result in mass expulsions from the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, the Palestinians are risking the growth of home-grown Islamic fundamentalist forces that may foil any proposal to resolve the conflict with Israel. Similarly, the rise of such forces presents a clear danger to Israel and Jordan. The more Jordan is confronted by Palestinian irredentism, the longer the conflict with Israel will fester. Logic, if it is still applicable in the Middle East, dictates that the parties make every effort to reach a settlement before it is too late.

ELEMENTS OF A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Any prospective settlement must involve two main tiers, political and military. The guiding principle in dealing with the political aspect of the conflict is that no resolution of the problem can be reached without a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. In the end, this means a settlement must be reached between Israel and the PLO. Seeking alternatives to the PLO will, at best, only produce a partial settlement and, at worst, lead to a political time bomb. Inevitably, any election in the territories – as now proposed by the government of Israel – will bring PLO supporters to the surface, as happened in the 1976 West Bank municipal elections. At one stage or another, any effort to build mutual trust and confidence among the parties will also require PLO involvement. Israel is inching toward this realization. While still banning contacts with PLO representatives abroad, the Israeli government is prepared to negotiate with Palestinians in the territories, although it knows that none would participate in such talks without PLO endorsement and approval.

Although the political tier is mainly an Israeli-Palestinian issue, Jordan has an indispensable role to play in determining the military aspect of the settlement. Much has been written about the military importance of the West Bank in the defense
of Israel, but little has been said about the need to involve Jordan in evaluations of security *vis-a-vis* the West Bank. It is impossible to arrive at a reasonable settlement of military issues without including Jordan. Developments in military technology and improvements in armaments and firepower demand that the East Bank, regardless of who rules that territory, figure into any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Jordan’s participation in a settlement would determine the size and character of Israeli forces that remain on the West Bank. If Jordan is absent from the agreement, Israel would not permit itself to remove its army from the West Bank.

The best way to meet the political and security requirements of a settlement is to create a confederation that would include Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity that would be established in the territories. This confederation would be founded on a constitution that defines such issues as demilitarization and the monitoring of the peace treaty. No amendment to, or abrogation of, the constitution would be allowed without the unanimous consent of the three signatories: Israel, the Palestinian entity and Jordan.

**TOWARD PEACE AND SECURITY**

This paper does not offer a complete blueprint for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor does it address every item on the prospective agenda of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There are so many details that depend on the dynamic of the negotiations that it would be foolhardy to assess them all at the outset. Moreover, political issues like the hotly charged question of Jerusalem’s future status are not dealt with in this paper. Suffice it to say that it is my belief that the Jerusalem issue can be resolved at a later stage of negotiations. The question of Jewish settlements in the territories, perhaps even more complex and explosive than the Jerusalem issue, is discussed in the context of security arrangements for the territories.
But it should be clear from the discussions above that there are several fundamental principles on which a settlement must be based. From that starting point, the suggestions outlined in the following chapters define Israel’s minimum security requirements in the context of a peace settlement and thereby offer a practical way to begin a process of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There are no simple, easy and risk-free answers. For each party the rewards of joining the agreement are high and the risks for breaking it are great. In this vision of a settlement, there is no contradiction between Israeli security and Palestinian independence. Indeed, they are dependent on one another. Israel would gain security by permitting the Palestinians to fulfill their desire for self-determination and independence, provided that it is a limited independence that deprives the Palestinians from determining the fate of their neighbors. This sort of framework for an agreement is the only hope for all parties to achieve their strategic aims. From the outset, the Palestinians must know that a failure to abide by the terms of this agreement could forfeit their only chance for independence. Meanwhile, Jordan must understand that only by joining the tripartite confederation can it guarantee its independence against dangers looming on its frontiers.

These proposals hold for Israel the promise of peace and a chance that the long, bloody battle with the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states may end. The risks will not completely disappear. For Israel, the choice is to take a risk for peace or to maintain the risk of the status quo. The latter will not only ensure a stalemate, continued uprising and war, but could entail economic crisis, social and national disintegration, and a growing rift among the Jewish people in Israel and throughout the diaspora. Faced with a risk with a chance and a risk with no chance, there is no alternative.
II THE ELEMENTS OF SECURITY

During the past 20 years, much has been written about the strategic value of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and on the concept of "secure borders" enshrined in U.N. Security Council resolution 242.\(^1\) Normally, such analysis is based on classical military doctrines taught frequently in military academies throughout the world. This straightforward approach assesses terrain in terms of natural characteristics such as mountains, deserts, forests, rivers and other natural obstacles. On the basis of these and other factors, a determination is made as to whether or not borders are

\(^1\) The operative sections of Security Council resolution 242 call for:

"(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;"

"Affirms further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."
defensible and whether or not there is adequate “strategic depth” from the frontier to the vital centers of the state.

An important lesson of the Palestinian uprising in the territories is that this classical approach is grossly inadequate. Because this approach is limited to the geographical component of territorial defense, it overlooks some vitally important elements which constitute “security.” For Israel, security involves more than just a line on a map. This chapter examines several of the components that Israel must consider when it evaluates its security requirements.

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

It is impossible to evaluate terrain without considering the composition of its population: its human geography. The presence of both Palestinian residents and Jewish settlers in the territories determines the character of that terrain no less than its physical characteristics. Indeed, population may be more important than topography in calculating the security value of a certain piece of land.

For a number of years, some Israeli policy-makers treated the territories as though they were unpopulated. They viewed local Palestinians either as lacking political aspirations or lacking any desire to fulfill them. Eventually, the assumption that the Palestinians would never take action to change the situation in the territories spilled into Israel’s security circles. Local Palestinians were regarded as one dimensional, as a source of potential support for terrorists. The possibility that they might one day rebel against Israeli rule was completely discounted. As a result, the assessment of the territories’ military importance became distorted.

The Palestinian uprising shattered this cozy view of Palestinian capabilities. Its shock waves have shaken Israeli

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politics, the IDF and even the morale of the Israeli population. The uprising may have led the Arabs to conclude that Israel’s deterrence power has diminished.

As a result, for the first time since 1967, many Israeli strategists have re-oriented their approach to West Bank and Gaza security concerns. Israel has learned that the strategic importance of the area is not only a function of territorial depth, but also of the activities of the populace. The uprising has taught Israel that ruling the West Bank and Gaza does not automatically provide greater security to the rulers. What was once considered a security belt may now be a security burden. Israel has learned that one nation, particularly a small one, cannot rule another nation for long; that 3.5 million Israelis cannot keep 1.5 million Palestinians under perpetual curfew.

Israel has witnessed a demographic explosion as the population in the territories has reached critical mass. Gaza alone has mushroomed from 350,000 people in 1967, to more than 650,000 in 1989. In the process, the territories have been transformed from what was considered a calm and quiescent strategic asset into a security problem demanding the costly deployment of large numbers of troops and resources. In some ways, demography is the Palestinians’ greatest strategic advantage over Israel. According to Professor Arnon Sofer, a geographer:

The number of Palestinian Arabs in the territories and in Israel now reaches 2.2 million, while the number of Jews is 3.5 million. In 12 years, the Arabs will reach 3.5 million while the Jews will reach 4.2 million. It does not matter whether the

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3 In a presentation to the Peace and Security Council (Tel Aviv, Aug. 1, 1988), Matti Steinberg suggested that the Palestinians are aware of Israel’s existential predicament in this area and are afraid that Israel may be impelled to take radical action, such as expulsion, in the event of some cataclysmic act such as wide-scale war. According to this opinion, the Palestinians have no interest in a comprehensive war, especially on the eastern front, because Israel might use the opportunity to erase the demographic imbalance.
Arabs will be 44 or 46 percent of the population. What matters is that it will be a binational state. Whoever brings about this situation will be responsible for the end of the Jewish, Zionist state.4

Among Sofer’s disturbing observations is that the average monthly increase in Gaza’s population will soon match the total number of Jewish settlers in the Katif region of southern Gaza.5

All of this strengthens the conclusion that evaluations of Israeli security vis-a-vis the territories can no longer ignore the human dimension. A proper assessment of the West Bank and Gaza must factor in the demographic, political and psychological composition of the population as well as the traditional geographic and military elements. In the present situation, Israel must take account of the Palestinians’ rapid population growth and of the population’s willingness to make sacrifices in order to fulfill its national aspirations. At the same time, Israel cannot overlook the role of Jewish settlers, who would seek to play an important role in any potential Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

A key facet of any settlement is the need to remove one of the main focuses of the conflict – the refugee camps. Unless a remedy is found for the refugee problem, it will grow into a

4From a presentation by Professor Arnon Sofer before the Peace and Security Council (Tel Aviv, May 23, 1988).

5Far-reaching demographic changes are also taking place among Israeli Arabs, which also have an impact on Israeli security concerns vis-a-vis the West Bank and Gaza. According to Sofer, the population of Israel’s northern region, where Arabs outnumber Jews 52-48 percent, grew in 1987 by about 20,000 Arabs but only by 2,500 Jews. Since 1972, he noted, the Arab population of Haifa has grown by 58 percent while the Jewish population has actually declined by 0.5 percent. At the same time, he notes that Israeli Arabs are generally younger than Jews; nearly two-thirds of Israeli Arabs are under the age of 19, while the proportion of elderly in the total Jewish population is four times more than in the Israeli Arab population. By 2000, the Israeli Arab population will reach 1.2 million. These changes are taking place against the backdrop of rapid social and economic dislocation for Israeli Arabs.
festered sore that eats away at the peace agreement. The uprising, after all, was as much a product of socio-economic conditions as political frustration. It is no coincidence that it originated in Gaza refugee camps and then spread to the camps of the West Bank where tens of thousands of Palestinians live in sub-standard, over-crowded conditions with little hope for improvement. More than two decades of exposure to the Israeli labor market has only intensified Palestinian resentment and reinforced their self-image as an oppressed people. For years, Israeli policy-makers remained oblivious to the socio-economic cauldron brewing in the territories, believing that Palestinians would do little to change their situation.

Even if Israel were to withdraw from most of the territories, the refugee camps in surrounding countries would remain a dangerous source of hostility, extremism and recruitment for Palestinian and Arab terrorism. Many refugees are waiting to return to villages inside Israel that they and their parents left 40 years ago, villages that often no longer exist. Palestinians must realize that Israel will refuse even to consider negotiating on the Palestinian “right of return.” For its part, the Palestinian entity in the territories could only accommodate a minority of the refugees. Peace, however, can never be secure if hundreds of thousands of people continue to live in precarious conditions along Israel’s border. Therefore, it is essential that any peace agreement aim at settling the refugee problem in its entirety.

This is one area in which the Arab states, especially the oil-producers, can contribute to the peace settlement. Similarly, there is much that the international community, notably Europe and Japan, could contribute to solving this aspect of the problem.

WATER

In addition to the human factor, military assessments of Israel’s security requirements in the West Bank and Gaza rarely focus on the need to defend the country’s water sources. Except for several passing references, this subject has not been
treated seriously by military analysts. Despite the vitally important role water plays in Israel’s overall security, Israel’s political echelon has paid little attention to this sensitive subject. Instead, discussion of water has been relegated to Israel’s water experts, who have periodically produced secret reports on the issue. But there is no real need for secrecy on this matter; it is impossible to conceal the facts.

In the arid Middle East, water is a more valuable strategic resource than oil. Water is the proverbial source of life, without which there is no chance of economic or social development. When water resources are limited, it is possible for one state to “dry out” a rival, either by seizing complete or partial control of the former’s water sources, by limiting their flow or by causing their salinization.

A survey of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict reveals that water disputes have been one of the main causes of war. As early as the 1950s, conflicts over Israeli construction projects next to the Jordan River resulted in exchanges of fire between Syria and Israel, and eventually led to American pressure on Israel to suspend work on the projects. The recommendations of Eric Johnston, the American “water mediator,” did not calm the area for very long, and Arab attempts to divert the sources of the Jordan River provided the background for one of the triggers that led to the 1967 war. It should be recalled that the Arabs made the decision to begin these diversion works at the Arab summit conference in 1964, after Israel had begun to transfer water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev via the “National Carrier.” It was that summit conference which also established the joint Arab military command and founded the PLO.

The question of West Bank and Gaza water resources poses especially complex and difficult security problems. Water has no boundaries. Subterranean flows, reservoirs and aquifers cannot be dealt with in the same way as geographic landmarks or artificial border demarcations. Israel must protect against the threat of uncontrolled drilling in the West Bank.
Such drilling could have a direct effect on the water balance of Israel’s most populated area and could result in the salinization of the reservoir that supplies water to the coastal plain.

The water problem is concentrated primarily in the thin strip of Israel’s coastal plain, known as “the narrow waist.” The security of this region was a constant concern for Israel’s military planners prior to the 1967 war, who were fearful that a surprise attack from the east might split the country into non-contiguous parts. An identical water problem exists in the Gaza Strip, although the roles of the players are reversed. There, overdrawing of water by Israel could affect Gaza’s overall water level and lead to its salinization.

In other words, water must be viewed as an additional dimension of the terrain. To disregard this sensitive question is to ensure a future casus belli between Israel and the Palestinian entity that would be established in the territories. At the same time, correct treatment of the water question makes future cooperation between Israel and its eastern neighbor possible. This cooperation would be a more positive contribution to peaceful coexistence than any joint action in the military sphere. As King Hussein has said, water can either be the cause of conflict or the source of peace in the Middle East.6

Water Interdependence

Approximately 30 percent of Israel’s water sources flow through the West Bank.7 Since Israel already exploits more than 90 percent of its own water resources, a total cut-off from these West Bank sources would expose it to grave danger.

There are two subterranean water reservoirs common to Israel and the West Bank. The smaller one, the northern

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reservoir, extends into the Gilboa-Beit She'an area. Approximately 110 million cubic meters are drawn annually from this source, of which approximately 25 million cubic meters are drawn by Arab residents in the northern part of Samaria.

The second and more important reservoir is the Yarkon-Taninim Stream, located along the coastal plain of Israel near the slopes of Samaria. This reservoir extends from the southern slopes of the Carmel range in the north to Beersheba in the south. To underscore its importance, one need only note that the 340 million cubic meters of water drawn annually from this underground stream is close to the amount that is drawn from the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s largest reservoir. Of that amount, Israel draws approximately 320 million cubic meters and the Palestinians living on the western slopes of Samaria in the West Bank draw approximately 20 million cubic meters.

According to experts, the importance of the Yarkon-Taninim reservoir stems from the quantity and quality of its water. It supplies drinking water to Jerusalem and the entire coastal plain as far south as Beersheba. In addition, this underground reservoir functions as a seasonal regulator, collecting winter water for use during the summers, and as a long-term regulator between dry and rainy years. With its enormous flow, the underground Yarkon-Taninim water reservoir – called the “spinal column” of the Israeli water system – can actually be considered Israel’s second national carrier.

Any damage to the Yarkon-Taninim reservoir is liable to undermine the country’s entire water system.8 This danger was underscored in a secret 1977 report by the Israeli water commissioner that warned that overdrawing from the reservoir could tap an already existing “hole” that leads directly to the Mediterranean, thereby threatening

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8 Information in this section was obtained through private discussions in 1987 and 1988 with Israeli water experts.
salinization. The report said that unsupervised drilling in the West Bank, especially on the western slopes of Samaria, is liable to cause serious damage to the reservoir.

In comparison, similar unsupervised drilling and over-drawing of the northern reservoir would only damage that reservoir at its peripheries. This would reduce the amount of water available to Israel but it would not permit sea water to penetrate the reservoir and damage the water quality. The danger of over-drawing from the northern reservoir, therefore, is not critical. But experts agree that uncontrolled over-drawing of water on the western slopes of the West Bank — either intentionally or accidentally — would very quickly damage the northern portion of the Yarkon-Taninim reservoir, threatening the quality of approximately two-thirds of this vital reservoir.

Before 1967, the Palestinians drew only about 20 million cubic meters annually from the Yarkon-Taninim reservoir. Palestinian agriculture was primitive, and the first drilling activities on the western slopes of Samaria only began in the mid-1960s. On the eve of the Six Day War, the Jordanian government prepared a plan to draw additional water from the area and transfer it to East Jerusalem and Ramallah. Since then, Israel has grown acutely aware of the danger of over-drilling. It prohibits Palestinians in the West Bank from drilling new wells except for drinking purposes and does not permit any increase from the 20 million cubic meters drawn in 1967. While it safeguards the minimal drawing rights of the Arab residents, as determined by the 1976 Water Census, Israel does not permit the drawing of additional water to meet the needs of Arab agricultural development in the area. There is no doubt that the Jewish residents currently enjoy much larger quotas than the Arab residents.

Any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement would require cooperation between the two parties on sharing water resources. Palestinians would certainly demand a greater quantity of water from the Yarkon-Taninim reservoir. This is a
demand Israel cannot disregard if it hopes to build close cooperation with the Palestinian entity in order to prevent uncontrolled drilling.

In the Gaza Strip, mutual dependence on water resources poses a greater danger to Palestinians than Israelis. Israel is the party sitting “up-river” and excessive drawing on the Israeli side could affect the quantity of water available to residents of the strip. Gaza already suffers from overdrawing and its water has become considerably salinized. Israel erred when it permitted Jewish settlements in the area to draw water from local sources instead of supplying them with water from inside the Green Line. In doing so, Israel accelerated the exploitation of Gaza’s meager reservoir and will be at least partially responsible for future water shortages. Finally, in 1988, the Israeli government decided to lay a special water pipeline for the Jewish settlements in the Katif bloc.

Security Implications

Israeli-Palestinian interdependence on water resources, especially on the West Bank, has created a Gordian knot which cannot be artificially severed. The answer certainly does not lie in annexing the territories to preserve control over water resources. This would only perpetuate the conflict with the Palestinians.

On the contrary, Israel should seek to adjust the border within the framework of a peace agreement and gain a commitment to full cooperation on water issues from the Palestinian entity. Without a guarantee of such cooperation, and without specific adjustments on Israel’s eastern border that would allow it to secure a portion of its water sources, Israel should not agree to any withdrawal from the West Bank. This is the *sine qua non* condition of any peace settlement. No government would permit the loss of what water experts
estimate would be about one-fifth of the state's overall water supply.\(^9\)

This threat underscores the danger of a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. In such a move, Israel would voluntarily sacrifice any hope of eliciting a Palestinian commitment to cooperate on water issues. With no Israeli role in the supervision of drilling, the Yarkon-Taninim water reservoir is sure to suffer. Israel could only avoid this situation by refusing to withdraw from the area from which a significant amount of water flows into its own reservoirs. (In Gaza, however, Israel can withdraw unilaterally without jeopardizing its own water sources, even in the absence of cooperation between itself and the Palestinian residents.)

One way to safeguard Israeli water security is to establish a joint Israeli-Palestinian water committee. This committee would supervise water resources, establish water quotas and oversee their distribution in accordance with internationally accepted criterion. Israel must also insist that, even if a Palestinian entity is established, the committee would continue to meet.

Regional cooperation on water issues will also be essential. Without Egyptian help, it is clear that the Gaza Strip would face enormous difficulties regarding its water supply. In this respect, Gaza cannot rely on Israel alone. Egypt could make a significant contribution to the peace settlement by channelling water from the Nile River to Gaza in the context of the Egyptian plan to bring Nile water to the Sinai coastal city of el-Arish, which borders the southern end of the Gaza Strip.

Cooperation with Jordan is even more important. Jordan cannot sever itself from the West Bank geographically. Just as water sources in northern Jordan are connected to Syria and Israel, so also is the West Bank connected to the kingdom's

\(^9\)In private discussions, Israeli officials estimate the potential loss to be between 16.4 percent and 18.4 percent of the state's water supply.
Jordan River development plans. It must be remembered that as far back as the Johnston Plan, the West Bank was always viewed as a recipient of water resources from any development of the Yarmouk River. Jordan’s role is essential to ensure that the West Bank benefits from Yarmouk River water projects and from the underground and wadi water that feeds the Jordan River.

When the final borders are drawn between Israel and the Palestinian entity, Israel must insist on adjustments on its eastern frontier. These adjustments would greatly restrict the degree to which Israel’s water system could be damaged in the event of a future misunderstanding with a Palestinian entity.

The danger to the large Yarkon-Taninim underground water reservoir stems mainly from drilling on the western slopes of Samaria. According to Israeli water experts, the critical strip in this regard extends to the foothills of these slopes, and penetrates as far east as the vicinity of the village of ‘Anabta, in the Tulkarm-Qalqilya area. It has been estimated that this critical strip extends for a distance of 2 to 6 kilometers east of the Green Line.10 Israel must retain this strip in order to limit the possibility of acute friction over water resources.

It is appropriate to note that Israel would need to adjust its eastern border in this area in order to widen “the narrow waist” left by the pre-1967 frontiers. The difficulty is that a border determined on the basis of water sources would not be a straight line, but would twist and turn around the foothills and penetrate different wadis. Nonetheless, this difficulty must be dealt with in negotiations. Therefore, it is important that water experts, not just military planners, play a decisive role in the determination of Israel’s final borders.

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TECHNOLOGY

Like population and water, one cannot discuss security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza without assessing the influence of technological change on the future battlefield. Military experts agree that the effect of new technologies will be profound. A debate rages, however, as to whether such changes will be felt on the level of strategy and doctrine or will be limited to the realm of tactics and basic combat techniques. Rather than try to describe the future battlefield, it is sufficient to highlight the main trends in technological development that will affect Israeli perceptions of the future battlefield and the security requirements Israel must demand from any peace agreement with the Arabs in these circumstances.

According to a recent Defense Department report, revolutionary improvements in several areas of military technology may significantly change the character of warfare during the next 20 years.11 These changes will be felt particularly in areas of long-range observation, target acquisition and the launching of various types of munitions (including "smart" munitions and, eventually, "brilliant" munitions) at distant targets with high precision. The next two decades will witness great strides in the development of pilotless aircraft and the development of missiles and aircraft that can penetrate enemy territory virtually undetected by radar. As far as the Middle East battlefield is concerned, the three main trends in technological development will focus on quick data gathering on the battlefield, advanced missile capabilities and electronic warfare.

Despite all of these innovations, it is doubtful that the development of military technologies will necessarily improve the quality of senior command decision-making.

Quick data gathering involves the ability to store and then distribute information rapidly in order to launch highly destructive and penetrating munitions at longer ranges with greater precision. Sensors will not only be able to obtain a better picture of the battlefield and transmit data more dependably, but they will have the power to locate stationary targets (and, to a great extent, mobile targets) with greater certainty, greatly increasing the chances of registering direct hits.\(^{12}\)

These advanced sensors, which have the ability to "see" beyond the horizon at long ranges, will be mounted either on manned or unmanned aircraft or on balloons that will carry radar and advanced electronic equipment. The balloons will be able to remain in the air for weeks, with crews if necessary, undeterred by darkness or bad weather. As a result, surveillance will be accomplished in "real time" and advanced means of computation will permit quick data distribution. Ground forces will therefore have a greater capability than ever before to continue fighting at night. Improvements in sensors and in satellites will also facilitate methods of verifying various aspects of military agreements.

Developments in stand-off weapons will make it easier for aircraft to strike their targets from considerable distances. Over time, missile accuracy will improve and cruise missiles, able to carry chemical warheads, will appear. In comparison to traditional ground-to-ground missiles, cruise missiles are easier to maintain and more difficult to locate before they are launched. Better intelligence capability, including the ability to distribute data quickly to the fighting units and to give them the authority to use such weapons, will enhance the use of highly-advanced missiles. Such improvements will affect not

\(^{12}\)Henry S. Rowen, "Intelligent Weapons: Implications for Offense and Defense" (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1988).
only precision weapons but also the ability to strike at entire units and delay their movement. With the help of scattered mines launched from long distances, it will be possible to create sudden obstacles and slow down the advance of armor at critical stages of the attack, especially when transit routes are known in advance.

Great strides are expected in the development of electronic warfare. But at the same time, development of technology to protect against electronic warfare will improve at a similar rate. Whoever succeeds in registering more rapid improvements in this race will have the power to slow down his adversary's advance in battle.

One important implication of these changes is that ground forces will be able to fulfill missions that air and sea forces have fulfilled in the past, namely, to locate and hit targets far beyond the horizon. Also, these changes ensure that the technological competition between tank armor and antitank weapons will continue. On the one hand, new guidance systems (based on the radiating of millimeter waves) will enable ground forces to use relatively simple weapons, such as mortars, to strike from above, against the less protected parts of tanks. On the other hand, the tank will also undergo some improvements.\(^\text{18}\)

According to Gen. Israel Tal, one of Israel's leading authorities on tank warfare, advances in precision weapons will not succeed in shifting the emphasis in the conventional battlefield from maneuver to fire during the next two decades. The real danger to tanks, he said, will come from combat helicopters since they bring to the art of war a change in both the rate of firepower and mobility. For the first time, armor would face an antitank weapon that has superior operational mobility.

\(^\text{18}\)Private conversation with Gen. Israel Tal.
A particularly disturbing trend that has had a great impact on Israeli security planning is the rapid spread of the production and use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East. Throughout the region in recent years, chemical weapons have become acceptable. This is a trend that the January 1989, Paris Conference, reaffirming the prohibition against using chemical weapons, did nothing to change. An important threshold has been crossed in that some Arab states have already used chemical weapons, sometimes against civilians.

Many Arabs have argued that chemical and biological weapons are needed to act as a deterrent against Israel's nuclear capability. But since nuclear weapons have never been intended by Israel for use in anything other than a worst-case scenario in which Israel is on the verge of military defeat, the assumption that chemical and biological weapons can deter the use of nuclear weapons is clearly a mistake.

The possibility remains, therefore, that Arab chemical weapons are intended for use in other circumstances, perhaps to hit Israel's strategic depth in the midst of war. In reality, a second threshold – no less dangerous than the first – has also been crossed. This involves deterrence against the use of chemical and biological weapons. Neither nuclear bombs nor conventional weapons would provide Israel with an adequate deterrent. The former would be disproportionate, the latter would be insufficient. The only deterrence that remains as a defense against chemical weapons is, in fact, chemical weapons. Chemical weapons, therefore, only beget more chemical weapons.

Some believe that chemical weapons are only intended for use against military objectives on the battlefield. Given the region's geography, this assumption is fatally flawed. The proximity of military targets to centers of civilian population,

especially in Israel, blurs any possible distinction between the use of chemical weapons against military and civilian targets. If chemical weapons are used against such targets as airfields, emergency depots of reserve forces or military objectives in the Golan Heights, there is a high chance that civilian objectives would be hit, resulting in a deadly escalation of the conflict.

It should be remembered that chemical weapons are not only important because of the number of casualties that they can inflict, but because of their indirect effect on other aspects of a country's war-fighting capability. Israel is especially sensitive to chemical weapons for two reasons. First, these weapons can terrorize the population, causing the loss of precious time in the mobilization of reserve troops in the event of a surprise attack. Second, they can contaminate weapons, forcing a critical delay while troops wait for dangerous gasses to dissipate before they can enter emergency arms depots.

In sum, these are the main trends in the anticipated development of military technologies. It is safe to assume that their introduction in the Middle East will not keep pace with the speed of their development. This is not because these technologies will be unavailable, but rather because they may be too expensive. Most Middle East states are facing economic difficulties that may constrain their ability to pay the ever-climbing price of new weapons systems. Even improvements on existing systems would be costly. Therefore, the introduction of the new technologies would be slower in the Middle East than elsewhere, but it is still sure to take place eventually.

For Israel, advances in technology raise important security questions. Will technology serve, to a greater or lesser degree,

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15 In the October 1973 war, for example, Syria launched Frog missiles against the Israeli military airfield at Ramat David. The missiles missed their target and hit the community of Migdal Ha'emek instead. Israel responded by opening strategic bombing against Syria.
as a substitute for territory? Will technology hold greater benefits for the attack or for the defense? Will it increase the danger of a surprise attack or reduce it? Will it increase the readiness\textsuperscript{16} of the defender or restrict it? Will technology enable Israel to increase its deterrence power or will it drive Israel into parity or inferiority with respect to its Arab adversaries?

On either side of the debate there are gross distortions regarding the effect of technological change (especially improvements in missiles) on the role of territory. On one end, some have hastened to declare that the West Bank and Gaza have lost their military importance in an age of deep penetration ground-to-ground missiles. On the other end, others have warned that any withdrawal from the West Bank would make civilian airliners flying in and out of Lod’s Ben-Gurion International Airport vulnerable to terrorists armed with shoulder-carried anti-aircraft missiles.

Each of these generalizations distorts security arguments in favor of a particular political bias. It must be remembered that Arabs who already have long-range anti-aircraft missiles (e.g., the Syrian SA-5 missiles) do not need shoulder-carried missiles to attack civilian aircraft.

Before the entry of missiles into the Middle East, there were Israelis who argued that the main reason for gaining the Golan Heights was the need to remove the Syrian artillery that fired on Israeli communities in the Huleh Valley below. The Syrian guns have been removed, but have been replaced by missiles that can reach communities in the valley from an even greater distance without even seeing the target. Israeli

\textsuperscript{16}Readiness is a measure of a force’s ability to fight with little or no warning. It remains the highest defense priority. We cannot base our preparedness on estimates of potential adversaries’ intentions, as they could change quickly. Rather, we must be prepared to defend against those forces’ most formidable capabilities.” Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, “Annual Report to the Congress” (Washington: Department of Defense, January 1989), p. 129.
settlements have been established in the Golan Heights, where they can be exposed to direct Syrian artillery fire. Through it all, the reason Syria never resorted to firing missiles at Israeli airplanes or lobbing artillery shells on the Huleh Valley is due to a Syrian fear of Israeli retaliation. In other words, Israeli deterrence has worked.

These arguments, which are essentially tactical, should not lead – or, rather, mislead – us to the conclusion that the presence of long-range missiles cancels out the importance of territory as a security belt. Those who maintain such views evidently apply a separate yardstick to Israel than to other states. Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact have reached the conclusion that advanced missiles have made a territorial defensive belt obsolete. Neither side has decided that keeping large advance and expeditionary forces, maintaining intelligence and warning stations or planning ways to delay advancing troops is superfluous or irrelevant. And given the vastness of the European theater, in contrast to the tight confines of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, what is good for NATO and for the Warsaw Pact is even better for Israel. After all, the loss of some NATO territory would not result in a total defeat for NATO. But for Israel, the loss of territory could place the survival of the state at risk.

Missiles, especially those armed with chemical warheads, exacerbate the territorial problem; they do not eliminate it.\(^{17}\) They increase the firepower and destructive power of the Arab armies, enabling Israel’s adversaries to thwart reserve mobilization at the critical opening stages of a war. This destructive power could be used as a tool to terrorize the population and indirectly influence the decision-making of the political echelons conducting the war. At the same time, one should bear in mind that in order to win a decisive decision, an army must occupy the conquered territory with its ground forces. Improvements in the destructive power of the ground forces will make that task easier. The defender, in

response, would try to contain the advance in order to gain time for the mobilization of reserves. It is precisely because of the growth of firepower in the Arab armies that Israel will need better ways to limit the capability of the attacking enemy to maneuver in the contested territory.

Moreover, as missiles become more advanced, it will be more difficult for the Israeli air force to pre-empt their use and prevent them from penetrating into Israel’s rear. Even if Israel, with American assistance, were able to develop an anti-missile system – the Arrow – it could not protect all of Israel’s territory. At most, Israel can think in terms of defending specific “point targets” against missiles, but even this limited achievement would be extremely costly. In any case, defending point targets with anti-missile missiles would require a vast area in order to position the Arrow system. It would have to be positioned in an area that is in front of the target that the enemy wishes to strike. Greater numbers of missiles could then be launched to intercept an incoming enemy missile.

Implications For Israel’s Security

The foregoing discussion leads to several conclusions:

- It will be difficult to surprise the side that makes proper use of the wide variety of new military technologies. Though these technologies cannot reveal the intentions of the attacker, the chances of discovering many of his moves in advance will increase immeasurably. For example, it will no longer be necessary to overfly Jordanian territory to see the troop movements in that country. Acquisition of suitable “spy” satellites will increase Israel’s ability to prevent a surprise attack. Israel can make considerable progress in its early warning capability without having to maintain ground stations in the territory from which it might withdraw.¹⁸

¹⁸Some people disagree with this assertion. They contend that while it may be easier to discover troops approaching from a distance (e.g., an Iraqi expeditionary force), new technologies will do little to warn of an impending surprise attack along the Syrian border, where the main
All this leads to the conclusion that demilitarization arrangements, with Jordanian participation, will include clear "red lines," to be monitored with the help of new technologies. Israel will have to improve its intelligence capability, with American help, and to expand its use of satellites. It is far better to agree on these "red lines" as part of a peace agreement than to return to the situation that existed on the eve of the 1973 war, when the IDF was stationed opposite Syrian and Egyptian forces without knowing Syrian or Egyptian intentions.

- The battlefield will expand to a depth of several dozen kilometers.\(^{19}\) Any defensive arrangement based on the idea of a single, static defense line, such as a river or an obstacle, will have to be revised in order to take account of the need for greater depth. As a result, the term "secure borders" will become obsolete.

This conclusion has several implications. First, Israel must take every precaution to prevent war from originating on or reaching the West Bank. Fighting on the West Bank would place most of Israel's strategic objectives within accurate range of the Arab armies.

Second, Israel would have to accept the fact that any IDF force stationed along the Jordan River would be unable to stop armies attacking from the east. The mission of this IDF force would have to be limited to providing a visible Israeli military presence, serving as an advance guard and as a concentration of Arab armies is located. Moreover, even if there is adequate warning, it is argued that Israel must always take into account the possibility that its reserves will be prevented from mobilizing on time or that its air force is not able to provide the necessary support during the early stages of battle, as was the case in the October 1973 war. Conversation with Ze'ev Bonen, former director of RAFAEL, Israel's weapons development authority in 1988.

\(^{19}\)In West Germany, for example, military experts are talking about the necessity of a defense belt of about 55 kilometers to contain an attacking enemy.
surveillance/observation post, and directing fire toward the Jordan passes.

Third, any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian entity must include rigid demilitarization provisions. These would not only prohibit the deployment of heavy weapons in the territories under Palestinian control, but would ban various sensors that could support the precision weapons systems placed at a further distance. Through a rigid demilitarization regime, Israel would gain the depth it lacks. A demilitarized Palestinian entity would provide Israel with vital "frontal depth." This would be analogous to the depth offered by the Egyptian force limitations in the Sinai.

- New military technologies present both the attacker and the defender with various advantages. If the defender discovers the intentions and objectives of the attacker in time, the latter will suffer serious losses. Conversely, if the attacker can gain strategic surprise, especially in a situation in which the defender lacks sufficient territorial depth, the attacker will have a considerable advantage. Therefore, the advent of new technologies will not alter by itself Israel’s traditional security doctrine, which holds that war cannot be won with defense alone.

Although some experts maintain that technology may make it possible to bolster conventional deterrence in Europe, the consensus in Israel is that technology will not permit Israel to rely on a defensive strategy. Gen. Tal, for example, believes that despite the difficulties in sustaining mobility and maneuverability on the battlefield, Israel must adhere to a strategy of "the few against the many," the basic principle of which is the assertion that the few can only hope to win through maneuverability. "Only in attack lies Israel's ability to

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win,” he said, “and the carriers of attack on land are the armored units.”

Therefore, even after a peace agreement is achieved and demilitarization arrangements are in place, Israel cannot assume a defensive posture. A significant violation of the agreement by the Arabs will force Israel to react decisively by seizing large portions of the Palestinian entity. Israel must make this clear during the negotiations preceding the agreement, so that all of its participants—especially the United States—understand that Israel will not be able to abstain from reacting sharply to a large-scale violation of the agreement.

- The attrition of military forces in a future war will be far greater than it would be now. Civilian population centers would be in greater danger. More objectives would be hit on the battlefield in a relatively limited period of time. As a result, the duration of the fighting, especially in confined areas of the Arab-Israeli battlefield, would be shorter and the intervention of the superpowers to prevent escalation of the conflict is likely to be quicker. This means that Israel not only must avoid being surprised at the start of a war, but it must also seek decisive gains in the first stage of battle. This would, in turn, increase the need for a pre-emptive strike should it appear that one of Israel’s adversaries is preparing to launch a war.21 Given the fact that Israel is a democracy, the Israeli government would have to determine in advance clear procedures for responding to violations of the agreement and evidence of an expected attack.

- Territory and logistics are of vital importance.22 The West Bank and the Golan Heights will not lose their significance as a result of the introduction of new military technologies.

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21 This approach regarding a pre-emptive strike is in line with the view of Soviet experts who write about expected change in the future battlefield. See Department of Defense, “Sources of Change,” p. 11.

22 See Rowen, “Intelligent Weapons: Implications for Offense and Defense.”
Indeed, one cannot summarily dismiss the argument that improvements in destructive power and firepower make territory more important than before. For example, to guard against chemical weapons and the precision of firepower, Israel must scatter its emergency arms depots in a different way across a wider area. Under no circumstances will Israel be able to keep most of its airfields near the border, in close proximity to Arab military concentrations.

• For Israel, territory means time. Compared to regular Arab armies, Israel's force structure has a built-in "negative advantage" in that it needs an additional 48 hours to mobilize its reserves. Arab strategists are well aware of this fact and would therefore try to establish "facts on the ground" as quickly as possible in the first stage of a war. To prevent this development, Israel cannot wait for the enemy but must retain the ability to maneuver.

• It is clear, therefore, that the introduction of new, even conventional, technologies would make the future battlefield more perilous than it is now. But technology is no substitute for territory, which remains an important, though not the exclusive, determinant of security. Therefore, it must be reiterated that the civilian population in the area has influence and importance, as the earlier discussion on human geography emphasized. Technology, however, does provide means to ensure enforcement and verification of the security arrangements that will form part of the peace agreement.

TERRITORY

Were it not for Israel's particular geographic reality, it would be safe to assume that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have been resolved much more easily. Despite the fact that this conflict is laden with competing religious and historical claims, it would probably have been more amenable to compromise if Israel's geopolitical security pressures had not been so severe. Possibly more than any other
consideration, the territorial imperative has had a decisive impact on Israel's security concept.

Prior to 1967, Israel found itself in a precarious geographical situation, with more than 75 percent of its population, especially its military reserves, concentrated in a narrow coastal strip. Most of the state's strategic objectives were dominated by the mountainous terrain of the West Bank. Tel Aviv was within Jordanian artillery range; Jerusalem was within Jordanian light arms range. Israel's military-geographic vulnerability stretched nearly the entire length of the Jordanian border. Almost all of its airfields were within enemy artillery range, while Arab airfields were outside of Israeli artillery range. Israel's aerial depth was sorely limited and Arab aircraft could reach Israeli airspace in minutes.

Any military penetration into the narrow coastal strip would have endangered Israel's very existence. Given Israel's peculiar configuration - with two narrow strips, one coastal and the other connecting Tel Aviv with Jerusalem, as well as the Galilee "finger" and the road to Eilat in the south - it would have been easy to dismember Israel with a short armor incursion. This oblong configuration created a negative ratio between length of border and territory. This ratio represented Israel's lack of "strategic depth," defined by one leading Israeli strategist as the territory between the most advanced line at which a state can maintain armed forces without affecting the sovereignty of another state.23

Israel's lack of strategic depth is very tempting to an enemy who may correctly determine that strategic gains can be made with a single armor charge. Samaria has been described as a classical bridgehead thrust in the heart of Israel. Whoever controls Samaria could threaten Israel's population centers.24

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24See Yuval Ne'eman, Ma'arachot, pp. 273-274, 1981; and "A Foundation for Israel's Security," Ma'ariv, April 10, 1981. Ne'eman did not point out
Hence, it would be an unacceptable risk for Israel to return to the military situation that existed before 1967.25

This difficult geographical position prompted Israel’s pre-1967 military strategists to depend on two main elements: first, pre-emptive military strikes26 and, if necessary, preventive war. Second, transferring the battle to enemy territory as quickly as possible. Out of this reality emerged Israel’s policy regarding the use of unconventional weapons in the event of an impending defeat within the 1967 borders.

Israel’s victory in 1967 may have altered its territorial situation but it did not put an end to its territorial debate. Overnight, the addition of new territories had a calming effect on Israel. For the first time, Israel’s air warning stations were closer to Arab capitals than Arab warning stations were to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Many believed that with the acquisition of greater warning depth against air attack, Israel could spread its anti-air defenses more effectively and at greater distances from the objectives they were defending. The additional territory was thought to be useful in absorbing an attack as well as in maneuvering outside of Israel’s vital areas. Strategic objectives were now at safe distances from the border.27 And, perhaps

that this “bridgehead” is surrounded on both sides by Israel, and that any force entering it might find itself cut off, as almost happened in the 1967 war.

25The late Yigal Allon, former foreign minister and one of the IDF’s outstanding commanders, correctly stated that no country had faced greater geostrategic danger than did Israel prior to the 1967 war. Allon, “The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs, April 1976, p. 40.

26Abba Eban, who always advocated a dovish approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, defined the term “defensible border” as a border which does not require a pre-emptive strike for its defense. See “Borders which can be Defended without a Preemptive Initiative,” Ma’ariu, June 6, 1969.

27Of all Israel’s airfields, only the one that was built in the Negev with American aid after the IDF’s withdrawal from the Sinai is within range of artillery across the Jordanian border.
most importantly, the IDF gained ample time to mobilize the reserves in case Israel was surprised by the Arab armies.

These changes in Israel’s geostrategic position argued for a new approach to the concept of pre-emptive strikes. With the acquisition of strategic depth, Israel’s leadership felt it could now absorb a first strike. This was the main reason Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan rejected IDF proposals to launch a pre-emptive strike before the Arab attack in October 1973.

The lesson of 1973 was that Israel’s 1967 achievements could not prevent another war. Additional territory did not give Israel greater deterrence. On the contrary, Arab states had a stronger motivation to fight in 1973 than they did in 1967. Rather than battling for the sake of the Palestinians, they were fighting to regain their own lost land.

Israel may have gained strategic depth in 1967, but it paid a dear price with the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War. This led to a renewal inside Israel of the territorial debate. Very few political voices suggested that retention of the territories might exact a high price from Israel. It should be recalled that long before the issue of territorial compromise in the West Bank arose, there was a serious debate inside Israel as to how much, if any, of Sinai could be returned as part of the second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement in 1975. The consensus of 1967 broke because Israel broadened its national and security objectives to include the West Bank and Gaza. As Israeli aspirations grew, the national consensus shrunk.

The central questions remain: Is it necessary to control all of the historic Land of Israel in order to protect the State of Israel? Does retention of all the territory augment Israeli security or endanger it?

On the one hand, there is the maximalist argument, such as the one offered by Professor Yuval Ne’eman, leader of the
Tehiya Party. Ne’eman argues that Israel must retain an active military presence throughout the territories because any effort at demilitarization would be meaningless. The West Bank, he contends, would be exploited by the Arabs for maintaining surveillance on Israeli military activity and would enable the Arabs to attack Israel from the East Bank. In that case, he said, no IDF force stationed in the Jordan Valley would be able to block an Arab attack and an advancing Arab force would be on Tel Aviv’s doorstep within hours.

Warning devices, demilitarization or agreements cannot prevent the occupation of the reserve mobilization area before mobilization is completed. In the area taken by the enemy there will be some one million hostages. Leaving Samaria puts us once again in an indefensible position, at a time when Arab sophistication has grown immeasurably.  \(^{28}\)

On the other hand, a growing number of senior officers and military thinkers, including several former IDF chiefs of staff, are among those who challenge this assertion. They do not say that withdrawal does not incur risks. But they maintain that, on balance, holding on to the territories may pose a greater danger to Israeli security, including the demoralization of the IDF, than it provides in return. They argue that carefully constructed security arrangements can minimize the risks of withdrawing from some of the territories. According to former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur:

One can give up most of the territories of Judea and Samaria on several conditions, such as full demilitarization, Israeli warning stations in the area and Israeli control of some of the areas, such as the Jordan Valley and Ma’ale Adumim.  \(^{29}\)

The only hope for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict lies in accepting the proposition that more territory does not always


provide more security. This is the situation now facing Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. Because of the existence of a large, volatile Palestinian population, more danger than benefit will accrue to Israel from holding on to all of the territory.

THE NEED FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD

The Arab-Israeli conflict, whose origin dates long before the establishment of Israel, cannot end in one bold stroke. Promises, commitments and peace agreements will not suffice to wipe away the deep chasm of enmity and mistrust that has built up. It is clear, therefore, that the road to peace must include a transition period during which each side can instill trust and confidence in the other as a precursor to reaching the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For Israelis, the concept of transition is especially important. After decades of Arab and Palestinian rejection of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign, Jewish state, Israel must demand more substantive evidence of the Arabs' commitment to peace than mere declarations of sincerity and compromise. For them, a transition period is an essential element in the peace-making process. It would provide the time for Palestinians to prove that they have truly forsworn their traditional "strategy of phases," in which the establishment of a Palestinian state in some of the territories would only be a stage toward the total liquidation of Israel.

For Palestinians, the time and breathing space of a transition period is needed not only to build confidence in Israel but to build the prestige, power and authority of moderates within the Palestinian political community. After all, the Palestinians are not monolithic. The Arafat-led PLO claims to be the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people, but there are important groups that do not accept its authority. These include two organizations under Syria's control, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Abu Musa-led Fatah rebels. There are also smaller groups, such as Abu Nidal's
Fatah Revolutionary Council, which have engaged in the most
heinous acts of terror. Meanwhile, much to the PLO’s
consternation, Islamic fundamentalists are gathering power
and momentum inside Gaza and the West Bank. They see the
Arab-Israeli conflict as a life-and-death conflict between Islam
and Judaism and are steadfastly opposed to any form of
compromise.30 One of their principal goals is to prove that the
new political program endorsed by the PLO at the Algiers PNC
is misguided and fundamentally wrong.

Because Israel needs to have a Palestinian partner for peace,
it has an important interest in strengthening the more
moderate and pragmatic elements among the Palestinians.
This cannot be achieved if Israel completely rejects the
Palestinians’ legitimate political demands. But Israel cannot
afford to make vast concessions overnight. The answer lies in a
transition period in which there is gradual progress toward an
overall settlement. This sort of transition period would prove to
the Palestinian public that compromise can bring tangible
 dividends and would, in the process, bolster the position of the
moderates. Palestinians must be assured that transition is not a
ruse to avoid the final resolution of the conflict, but rather a
defined period whose goal would be to help dissipate fears and
make a solution more attainable.

Moreover, transition is important because the Arab-Israeli
conflict is not merely an Israeli-Palestinian dispute. On the
Arab side, Israel faces many different adversaries. Syria has
committed itself to a military solution to the conflict with
Israel. Libya, a Syrian ally, is a key player in international
terrorism. Until recently, Iraq had also favored a military
solution to the conflict with Israel and its future political stance
is unclear. Even a negotiated settlement between Israel and the
PLO, therefore, would not necessarily terminate the Arab-
Israeli conflict. A transition period is a useful way of linking
improvement on the Israeli-Palestinian level with
improvement on the regional level.

30 See “The Islamic Covenant and Its Significance” (Tel Aviv: The Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, September 1988).
Similarly, transition is one way to safeguard the peace process against the threat of the Middle East’s endemic crisis of stability. Political change – *coup d’etat*, civil wars, internal disturbances and assassinations – happens quickly in the Middle East and states frequently sever diplomatic relations with one another. Israel cannot ignore the fact that it lives in a dangerous neighborhood where Arab states, such as Syria, Libya and Iraq, have waged war and mounted aggression against their Arab neighbors. Moreover, regional stability suffers from the global competition among the superpowers, European states and countries like China, Brazil and Argentina that sell a wide variety of weapons systems and military hardware. Under these circumstances, it is only natural that Israel insist on all necessary safeguards to ensure that an agreement can withstand the region’s turbulent politics and survive long after the ink has dried.

Optimally, the duration of the transition stage in the territories should be a function of performance, not time. Therefore, one way to determine its length is to link it to the participation of neighboring Arab states in the peace process. Transition would last as long as the Arab countries bordering Israel are in a state of war. The extent to which each of these countries – first Jordan, then Syria – contributes to, or obstructs efforts, to reach a peace settlement will have a direct effect on Israel’s defensive position, including its military deployment, on the West Bank. Moreover, Jordanian and Palestinian cooperation in preventing terrorist activity would further quicken the pace of the transition stage.

Israel, for its part, would have to contribute to the transition stage by taking steps to build trust for it among the Palestinians. These measures are discussed below. Meanwhile, Israel must recognize that it is difficult to anticipate full cooperation from the Palestinians without them knowing the direction of negotiations. From the outset, therefore, Israel should assure the Palestinians that a successful fulfillment of their part of the transition stage could result in meeting their aspirations for self-determination as an entity with limited independence
within the framework of a confederation with Israel and Jordan.

The Gaza Option

One way to test Palestinian goodwill and commitment to a phased settlement with Israel would be to experiment with a special transitional arrangement in the Gaza Strip. That narrow sliver of territory poses such unique demographic and economic problems that even inside the right-wing Likud Party there are those who privately admit the need for a separate settlement for Gaza, despite their belief that it is part of the historic Land of Israel.

The Gaza option could work as follows: at a certain stage, Israel would transfer virtually total control of the strip to the elected Palestinian leadership that is acting in coordination with the PLO. It would be this leadership's job to prove that they can prevent terrorist activities from the area. The Palestinians would, of necessity, cooperate with Israel in this regard. Israel would agree to keep the borders with Gaza open and continue to employ tens of thousands of Gaza workers. Massive economic aid for development and refugee resettlement would need to begin to flow into Gaza at the outset of the transition period. In particular, Egypt would be integrated in development projects, including the vital issue of water supply for the Palestinian residents of Gaza. Israeli settlements in the area separating Gaza from Sinai would remain intact for the duration of the transition. From the outset, the PLO would have to commit itself not to establish a Palestinian state in the evacuated area without Israel's consent.

Gaza's distance from the volatile eastern front gives Israel the breathing space to run risks there that it would not dare to take on the West Bank. There is always the risk that this idea of "comprehensive transition" could boomerang and result in the creation of a terrorist "vipers' nest" in that teeming coastal strip. But the Palestinians have a strong motivation to make it work. They can be assured that after several years of
successfully administrating Gaza, the Palestinians can expect to receive similar control over areas on the West Bank.

Mutual Confidence-Building Measures

It is clear that only a phased settlement can defuse the clash of intense religious and nationalist aspirations that fuel the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this is not enough. Even before Israelis and Palestinians sit across the bargaining table to negotiate the arrangements of a transition period, it will be necessary to tear down the walls of hatred and mistrust that have built up between them. After all, negotiations will only be successful if the two parties have confidence and trust in one another. Efforts to build such confidence should begin without delay.

Confidence-building measures would help dismantle the psychology of war and violence and replace it with a psychology of accommodation and peace. They would create a framework for mutual cooperation and reciprocity and would provide experimental models for shared responsibilities between Israelis and Palestinians. Confidence-building would permit each side to taste the risks and benefits of peace and cooperation, lightening the burden of later negotiations.

The fundamental principle of confidence-building is reciprocity. Israelis and Palestinians are besieged by fear and distrust of the other; give-and-take is expected from both parties. Each side must be careful not to abuse the sensibilities of the other. For example, the positive impact of an Israeli decision to free detainees or permit the return of deportees would be dashed if these people simply re-join the uprising upon their release.

At the same time, it is important that confidence-building measures encompass Israel's relations with the larger Arab world. The participation of Arab states in this effort would go far toward persuading Israelis that their enemies have finally decided to make peace, not war.
One of the basic conditions for any attempt at building mutual trust and confidence is an agreement among the parties on an early cessation of hostilities. This could be done in stages. Without PLO involvement, there can be no such agreement. The PLO will not participate if it believes that confidence-building measures are only a ploy to end the intifadah, exclude it from the negotiating process and freeze a new interim situation in the territories. But the PLO must allow its supporters inside the territories to select representatives through democratic elections, to work out the details of the confidence-building measures. Israel must understand that residents of the West Bank and Gaza who take part in these measures will be PLO loyalists. In this way, the PLO would endorse the steps and be part of the confidence-building process.

A cease-fire would be declared along the Lebanese border and everywhere else. The PLO would not send out squads of terrorists to infiltrate Israel and would not extend aid to other organizations, such as Hezbollah, in their efforts to attack Israel and its inhabitants. Israel would not have reason to mount pre-emptive military actions if it is not threatened by attack. This cease-fire would be an important test of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s ability to ensure that the various factions of his organization observe a critical agreement with Israel. Indirectly, it would also be a test of the Soviet Union’s willingness to join in the peace process through deeds, not just words. Moscow would have to persuade Damascus to prevent the Palestinian organizations under its aegis, which do not belong to the PLO, from violating the cease-fire.

Many confidence-building measures come under the heading of improving Palestinian living conditions. As such, they should not be underrated. But past experience shows that these steps are not, by themselves, decisive in advancing the political process. Therefore, it is important that both parties understand that confidence-building measures constitute a necessary element in the process toward political change. Optimally, these measures would be implemented as the
product of some sort of understanding among the United States, Israel, the PLO and, perhaps, third parties.

The first set of confidence-building measures deals primarily with the attitude of the Israeli military administration toward Palestinians and Palestinian society. These steps would be best implemented as soon as possible, regardless of the intifadah. They include:

- Eliminating economic sanctions that have been imposed on large segments of the Palestinian population as a result of the intifadah (e.g., aggressive tax collection and unnecessary harassment in conjunction with the issuing of various permits and licenses).

- Building substantive cooperation between the Israeli administration and al-Haq, the Palestinian human rights association in the territories. Liaison officers should be designated to coordinate work between al-Haq and the respective Israeli government agencies, including the IDF.

- Coordinating medical treatment between Palestinian and Israeli hospitals for those seriously injured during the intifadah. This is particularly important with regard to those who are innocent victims of the violence.

- Implementing a liberal approach toward family reunification in the territories.

- Releasing children from prison, especially those jailed for a first offense limited to stone-throwing.

- Transferring to the territories money collected via income or social security taxes from the wages of Palestinian workers employed in Israel. This fund should be targeted for development projects in the West Bank and Gaza.

- Re-opening schools in the territories, following guarantees by school administrators – in concert with other
bodies – that there would be no demonstrations on school premises and that students would not block nearby roads.

- Having the PLO officially declare that gasoline bombs should no longer be used in the uprising. This would be issued in tandem with stricter IDF regulations regarding the use of live ammunition and with a suspension on home demolition of those involved in stone-throwing. Eventually this form of punishment, which affects many innocent people, would be banned.

- Establishing mixed courts in the territories in which Israeli and Palestinian judges hear Arab and Jewish grievances against one another.

- Refraining from enforcing the law that forbids Israelis to meet with official PLO representatives. Such encounters are useful in establishing contact between public figures of the two societies and in exchanging ideas about how to resolve the conflict between them.

In the second stage, measures would be more political in nature. At that point, the confidence-building process could either proceed gradually through a step-by-step approach or could involve a bold and decisive gesture. The latter would only be possible if Israel were ready to negotiate with the PLO, either directly or via Washington. An example of this kind of initiative is the Gaza option described above.

American mediation may be necessary to implement some of the measures in the step-by-step approach. Measures to be adopted in this context include:

- Palestinian elections for municipal office or for a self-administrative authority. These would be supervised by a team of international representatives approved by the United States, Israel and the PLO.
• Guarantees that those elected would be free to contact the PLO and coordinate their actions with PLO officials, if they so desire. The elected representatives would also appoint liaisons with the Israeli authorities and the two would deal with the implementation of the confidence-building measures.

• A transfer of responsibility from Israel to the elected Palestinian representatives for various "portfolios" in the civilian administration including education, welfare, health, agriculture, tourism and religion.

• Withdrawal of the IDF from all West Bank and Gaza towns and refugee camps. As part of its dialogue with Washington, the PLO would commit itself not to take any unilateral action in the areas evacuated by the IDF, such as declaring independence in those territories.

• Establishing joint Israeli-Palestinian working committees to deal with problems that arise on the following issues: family reunification, water, access to and maintenance of holy places, economics, tourism and municipal affairs. The purpose of these committees is not to engage in negotiations but to solve immediate problems. Palestinian representatives on these committees would be free to coordinate their activities with the PLO. Israeli cities and municipal councils would offer to cooperate with Palestinian counterparts as part of "a municipal alliance."

• A PLO declaration announcing the cessation of the armed struggle against Israel. At the same time, Israel would start releasing administrative detainees. An even better suggestion is for a joint PLO-Israeli declaration, negotiated via the United States and perhaps the Soviet Union, ending all hostilities between the two parties. In this case, the intifada would end, and Israel would release all administrative detainees and stop all deportations. In addition, Israel would permit all people deported during the intifada to return to their homes, provided that they accept the PLO declaration calling for the end of the armed struggle. The Palestine National Council, the supreme
body of the PLO, would review the Palestinian covenant and rescind all clauses that directly or indirectly call for the liquidation of the state of Israel.

- The formation of local Palestinian police forces in towns evacuated by the IDF. These groups would nominate representatives to the joint Palestinian-Israeli committee to coordinate anti-terrorism activities.

- The formation of an international committee to discuss refugee resettlement. This committee would include, among others, local Palestinian residents, PLO officials and Israeli representatives. High on the agenda would be proposals for the economic rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip, home to hundreds of thousands of refugees. It is hoped that Egypt would express its willingness to assist in solving Gaza's water problem. This committee would also examine the feasibility of building a port in Gaza that could accommodate Palestinian and Jordanian commerce.

At this stage, it would be vital for Jordan and other Arab states to lend support to the emerging peace process. In this regard, they could offer declarative support for the confidence-building effort, cease their open hostility toward Israel at international institutions and forums, and end their economic boycott of Israel and of companies that do business with Israeli firms.

Trust is a key element in Israel's security calculus because it is being asked to give up tangible real estate for intangible commitments from dedicated adversaries. Only through this kind of confidence-building process which would lead to a more formal transition period will it be possible to promote a peace process that meets Israel's security concerns.
III  SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN 'ENTITY'

Israel's minimum security arrangements should be
examined in two stages: transition and final status. On many
issues, the distinction between the two stages would be fluid.
While security restrictions would necessarily be tighter
during transition, some can be lifted prior to the
implementation of final status arrangements. The key
criterion for progress from stage to stage, and even for
movement within stages, is the development of cooperation
and coordination between the Palestinians and Israel.

During transition, heavy emphasis must be placed on the
technical details of the security arrangements. But in the final
stage, Israel should stress the strategic importance of mutual
security. Throughout the process, Israel should continually try
to avoid security arrangements that are too burdensome or too
restrictive, lest they develop into sources of friction that could
gnaw away at the peace settlement. At the same time,
Palestinians must accept the fact that the freedom and
independence they would gain from the peace settlement
would be subject to certain constraints.

One of the most obvious sources of friction, the geographical
separation between the West Bank and Gaza, could best be
neutralized by the establishment of a confederative arrangement among Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity. This tripartite confederation is also the only way that Israel can ensure several of its important security requirements, such as demilitarization or the prohibition against Palestinian-Arab military alliances.

According to international law experts, immediately after any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian entity goes into effect, the entity would be sovereign in every respect and would have the power to sign additional agreements.\(^1\) Given that demilitarization agreements deteriorate over time, as demonstrated by past experience, the only way to guarantee observance of the security arrangements is to demand that the Palestinian entity be established on the basis of a confederation, with a constitution that can neither be amended nor abrogated without the unanimous agreement of all three members. Israeli security requirements demand that the following arrangements be enshrined in the constitution, or in its military annexes.

DEMILITARIZATION

The Palestinian entity would be prohibited from allowing the deployment, transit or training of foreign military or police forces on its territory. This prohibition would apply to foreign military advisers and instructors.

The Palestinian entity would have to be demilitarized and barred from having its own armed forces. Therefore, no tanks, military aircraft, artillery or other weapons systems would be permitted inside its frontiers. In addition, bans on military fortifications, electronic warfare systems and certain electronic sensors would be specified.

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\(^1\) Conversation with Professor Yoram Dinstein, former dean of the Tel Aviv University Law School, in 1989.
Demilitarization would be perpetual but only partial. The total demilitarization of a political entity, whether it is a fully independent state or an entity with qualified sovereignty, can produce volatile political friction over time. Therefore, the Palestinian entity should have the right to form a relatively large police force. At first, local police forces could be established in the principal urban centers. At a later stage, these would expand into two regional police forces, in Gaza and the West Bank. Ultimately, a single, centrally administered police force of several thousand could emerge. Since the force would be responsible for maintaining public order, it should be permitted to receive partial military training at the platoon level. At first, the Palestinian police would be armed with light weapons. Eventually, it could be permitted to equip itself with transport, non-combat helicopters, light armored cars and light mortars, the numbers of which would be fixed by prior agreement.

Demilitarization, particularly with American participation in the monitoring process, is a way to help limit the possibility of a surprise attack against Israel from neighboring Arab states. The principle that a massive violation of the demilitarization agreement would constitute a legitimate *casus belli* would be included in the peace agreement. Such violations would include the entry of a foreign army into the Palestinian entity, with or without the latter’s expressed invitation; the acquisition of banned weapons systems; or large-scale terrorist activities from the Palestinian entity which the Palestinian police are unable to stem.

In the event of a large-scale violation, Israel would retain the right of extra-territorial self-defense. But on the assumption that the members of the confederation would maintain close cooperation against terrorism, Israel would only retain the

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2 Some people maintain that with demilitarization in place, Israel will be able to continue to base its strategy on reserve units. See Dan Horowitz, "Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders" (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1975), p. 29.
“right of hot pursuit” of terrorists who escape into the Palestinian entity during the transition period. Prior to the implementation of final status arrangements, the members of the confederation would sign an extradition agreement specifically targeted against terrorist offenses.

ISRAEL’S MILITARY DEPLOYMENT

During transition, the IDF should remain deployed in some defined points in the territories. This arrangement, which is incorporated in the Camp David Accords, is intended solely for defensive purposes. An Israeli military presence is one of the most important tools in deterring any attempt to exploit Israel’s weakened territorial position by attacking Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian entity.

Transition would last as long as neighboring states remain outside of the peace agreement. If Jordan joins the confederation, the need for an Israeli military presence on the West Bank would diminish. In that case, Israel would focus more resources on the northeastern sector to contain the danger posed from Syria. If Syria joins the peace agreement, Israel’s requirements vis-a-vis the West Bank would shrink even further.

There have been many ideas raised as to where the IDF should be stationed after it withdraws from the populated areas of the West Bank. These include:

- Deploying a massive military presence in a limited area on the western slopes along the Green Line. This proposal is both unpopular and inadequate to meet Israel’s security needs during the transitional stage.

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3 Israeli military deployment was discussed after the Camp David Accords were signed and during the Israeli-Egyptian autonomy talks. Not only did the two parties fail to reach an agreement, but the Israelis were split on the issue.
• Deploying troop concentrations, including electronic warning stations, along the hilltops. This suggestion, supported by Moshe Dayan, would have the benefit of ensuring control of junctions along both the east-west and north-south axes. Moreover, territories under IDF control would include some of the Jewish settlements in the area. The principal disadvantage of this proposal, however, is that the geographic distribution of the Palestinian population has changed since it was first discussed seriously two decades ago. If implemented today, this plan would leave the Israeli army in the heart of the densely populated area of the Palestinian entity. The IDF would be forced to use roads that now pass through many Arab communities. This would inevitably create the impression that the army had only redeployed from inside the large towns to the perimeters.

• Deploying troop concentrations along the eastern slopes of the West Bank and in the Jordan Valley. This option is preferable to the previous suggestions because it would enable the IDF to overlook Jordan from an area of very low Palestinian population density. IDF officers who support this option maintain that two or three concentrations of Israeli armored forces, plus electronic warning stations and batteries of anti-aircraft missiles (and in the future, anti-missile missiles), would constitute a sufficient presence.

Israel would station one concentration east of the Israeli town of Ma’ale Adumim, in the area of the southern Bokeah. A second concentration would be located on the northeastern slopes in a place known as the “knee outposts,” not far from the Israeli settlement of Meholah. Traffic to the military areas would run in two directions, from Beit She’an in the north, and from Jerusalem to Ma’ale Adumim and the Jordan Valley in the south. This would restrict friction on the highways between the IDF and the Palestinian population centers. With this disposition of forces, Israel would need only to reserve the right to dispatch troops through routes in the West Bank in the event of a clear and present military threat.
In Gaza, the preferred deployment option is to restrict IDF forces to the Katif region, a narrow strip separating Gaza from Sinai. In addition, the IDF would operate several observation posts along the Mediterranean coast in order to prevent penetration from the sea.

**WARNING STATIONS**

Warning stations are frequently mentioned in discussions of Israel’s security needs in the event of a peace settlement. In fact, there are two kinds of warning stations: intelligence stations and air force stations whose mission is to provide early warning of an air or missile attack. Israeli planners must decide what type or types of warning stations need to be stationed within the IDF concentrations on the West Bank.

In the opinion of many experts, Israel does not need to insist on maintaining any intelligence warning stations in the area from which it would withdraw. Acceptable alternative sites can be found within Israel and on the Golan Heights. Although those new positions may not provide all the benefits of West Bank sites, Israeli intelligence would increase its electronic capability through its use of airborne warning stations and reconnaissance satellites.

Air force warning stations pose a more complicated problem. Many experts argue that airborne stations, either AWACS planes or reconnaissance balloons, do not provide an adequate substitute for ground stations. Airborne stations are more vulnerable to missile attacks and are susceptible to weather changes; ground stations provide better continuity. The main drawback of ground stations is that their presence, combined with the need to maintain regular transportation routes from Israel, would heighten the level of friction with the Palestinians.

There are two possible solutions to this problem. First, drawing on the Sinai model, early warning stations could be manned by American personnel. Second, after the conclusion
of the transition period, these stations could be operated by a joint team of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians under American command.

It should be stressed that Israeli and American military experts are increasingly reaching the conclusion that the need for air force warning stations is not an absolute requirement. They maintain that a combination of airborne stations and ground stations inside of Israel would provide an adequate answer to all problems except one – the threat of low-flying enemy helicopters that could exploit deep wadis on the East Bank of the Jordan in order to enter the West Bank.

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5 In this regard the words of former Israeli Air Force Commander Gen. Amos Lapidot deserve special attention:

“Radar stations must be located in dominating points. From this standpoint, the hilltops of Judea and Samaria are the ideal place, but my assumption is that in the event of peace we will evacuate those places. There are several ways of resolving the problem. We could leave a very small unit in an advanced area along with the limited force the IDF will leave in the area. New technologies enable us to switch to a method of forward sensors with the entire operational unit staying behind, in our territory. One can transfer a large volume of digital data without any difficulty.

“A second possibility is to close gaps with the help of radar intended for that purpose, known as gap-fillers. Their ranges are smaller, but they can be placed in the Jordan Valley. They will provide an alternative solution for the loss of radar coverage if we remove the radar station in Ba’al Hatzor. Airborne radars also provide an adequate answer and, in any case, will be in the air in the event of war. One can also find adequate alternative sites for the Hawk air defense missile batteries. In the future, there will be more advanced weapon systems, with longer ranges and greater reaction speed. The problem, then, will decrease in the future.

“There is another problem which is relatively difficult, namely, training space for the air force. We have a large air force in a small state. Since we gave up those training areas in the Sinai, we have to insist that we can continue to train in the areas we evacuate.
MONITORING

Monitoring is one of the most important aspects of the security arrangements. Its main purpose is to safeguard against violations of the arrangements as early and expeditiously as possible. Monitoring should be supervised by a neutral body, preferably the United States. A U.S. presence would lend the agreement greater validity and would deter potential violators.\textsuperscript{6} Israel would adamantly refuse any U.N. role in the arrangements, arguing – justifiably – that the United Nations lacks impartiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the close proximity of the area to Israel's vital strategic objectives, Israel would insist on participating in the monitoring arrangements. Under the umbrella of the monitoring arrangements, the Israeli air force would continue to overfly the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian and Jordanian representatives could participate in monitoring also, which would have the "educational" effect of promoting mutual trust among the confederation's partners.

IV REGIONAL SECURITY: JORDAN’S PLACE IN ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC THINKING

Calculations of Israel’s vital security requirements do not end at the Jordan River. The territory east of the river, namely Jordan’s “East Bank,” has always occupied an important place in Israel’s strategic thinking. This was the case both before and after the 1967 war. No political declaration, such as King Hussein’s severing of Jordan’s legal and administrative ties to the West Bank in July 1988, could significantly alter Jordan’s special status in the minds of Israeli strategists.

Israel has long been preoccupied with Jordan’s geography and demography. Geography is important because Jordan shares the longest border with Israel and forms the central link in Israel’s eastern front. All of Israel’s vital objectives and population centers are within close proximity of the East Bank. Demography is important because Palestinians, not bedouins or Hashemites, constitute the majority of Jordanian residents. Israel, therefore, has shown particular sensitivity to the nature of the regime governing Jordan, to Jordan’s alliances and to any shift in the kingdom’s foreign and domestic policy.

It is important to recall Israel’s decades-old concern over changes in the military disposition on the East Bank. In the 1950s, Israel grew jittery over such possible changes and on
more than one occasion warned Jordan against them. In the pre-1967 era, one of the "red lines" that Israel regarded as posing a serious threat to its security was the possibility of an Iraqi force entering Jordan. This was even considered by some as a legitimate casus belli. Indeed, one of the reasons for Israeli troop mobilization in June 1967, was the movement of Iraqi troops toward the Jordanian frontier. Israel considered the presence of an Iraqi division in Jordan after the 1967 cease-fire as an act of war, until it withdrew to Iraq.

Israel's reaction to events on the East Bank of the Jordan changed in September 1970, when the Syrians invaded Jordan to defend a Palestinian insurrection against King Hussein. The Israeli response — massing forces on the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border — was considered by many as a defense of Hussein's regime and was intended to prevent a change in the status quo. Despite the state of war between Israel and Jordan, Hussein's regime has been acceptable to Israel politically and militarily. Should conditions change, however, it is doubtful that Israel would consider the existence of his regime a strategic necessity, especially since there are those in Israel who argue, like former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, that Jordan should be the Palestinians' homeland.

Some Israelis have been moved by the fear that mechanized and armored units could advance overnight from their concentration points on the East Bank and line up before dawn on the high ground of the West Bank, a distance of a mere 45 miles. Thus, in just a few hours, Arab troops could "directly threaten vital and sensitive places in Israel before the IDF has a chance to mobilize its reserves." On one level, these fears are exaggerated, since they do not take into account the resistance that invading armies would encounter as they

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1 Dan Horowitz, "Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders" (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1975), p. 10.

crossed the Jordan and moved westward uphill. Nevertheless, given the relatively short distances involved, this sort of breakthrough cannot be completely discounted. Even if the invading force does not succeed in reaching the western slopes, any move that takes Israel by surprise would pose a serious danger.

In other words, Israel has always felt threatened by large force concentrations on the East Bank, regardless of whether the West Bank was under Jordanian rule, and partially demilitarized with Amman’s tacit consent, or under Israeli control. A surprise attack along the eastern front, like the attacks across the Golan and the Suez Canal in 1973, would find Israel in a perilous position. Even the presence in Jordan of foreign troops would pose a threat and would force Israel to mobilize a large number of reserve forces and might push it toward a possible pre-emptive strike.\(^3\) Therefore, as long as Jordan refuses to make peace with Israel and maintains military alliances with such belligerents as Syria and Iraq, Israel must still regard any far-reaching changes in the disposition and capabilities of the armed forces located on the East Bank as a grave danger. Regardless of who rules that territory – King Hussein, his Hashemite successor or a different regime – Israel must guard itself against any such development.

ANXIETY ABOUT JORDAN’S ARMED FORCES

Despite the fact that the Jordanian army is smaller than the armies of Egypt and Syria, Israel has shown greater sensitivity to its composition and its weaponry. Concerned that the Jordanian army might turn “offensive,” Israel is still carefully observing Jordan’s military exercises to see whether or not they are strictly defensive. The anxiety level among the Israeli general staff always rose whenever it appeared that Jordan

\(^3\)At various times during the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraqi and Saudi forces have been stationed inside Jordan, giving rise to intense Israeli anxiety.
might acquire advanced interception and attack aircraft. Some officers on the Israeli general staff have argued that, given Jordan’s proximity to Israel’s strategic objectives and population centers, it would be necessary to plan to “take Jordan out” at the outset of a general war if the kingdom had acquired large numbers of new attack aircraft. This kind of thinking is dictated by a fear that King Hussein might be dragged into war under pressure from the Arab states.

Similarly, shifts in Jordan’s armored forces have greatly worried Israel. In the 1960s, Israel insisted that American tanks that were being supplied to the kingdom for the first time not be stationed on the West Bank. At first, Jordan acquiesced and stationed only British tanks west of the river. But when Jordan advanced its U.S.-equipped armored units into the Jordan Valley on the eve of the 1967 war, Israel viewed it as a harbinger of war.

Israel has also shown great sensitivity to Jordanian acquisition of surface-to-air missiles. Jerusalem has argued that a Jordanian anti-aircraft missile capability would reduce the deterrent power of the Israeli air force, thereby easing Jordanian participation in a joint Arab offensive. Moreover, Israel has pointed out that anti-aircraft missiles are not solely defensive weapons. Located along the border, they could neutralize Israeli sorties over a large part of the West Bank.

The East Bank, then, is considered by Israel to be the most sensitive link in the eastern front. Overall, Israel’s gravest military danger is the formation of an Arab coalition along all fronts with a large enough concentration of forces to surprise Israel. Although this front has never been organizationally and militarily consolidated, Israeli strategists must plan for that possibility. Even if the Arab coalition is limited to the eastern front, it would pose a significant danger. Jordan is the most convenient area from which to launch an attack on Israel’s vital areas; both attacker and defender would want to exploit its territory for military moves. For Israel, Jordan is not only important for conducting a defensive and stalling battle, but it is the most convenient area in which to maneuver and
outflank the attacking Arab armies. At the very least, Israel must take account of the likelihood that Jordanian territory might serve as a site for the massing and transit of other Arab forces.

ASSESSING THE EASTERN FRONT

Some in Israel argue that calculating the balance of forces on the eastern front must take into account the combined forces of all potential Arab adversaries, including possible expeditionary forces from North Africa. Although it is true that some Moroccan, Libyan and Kuwaiti forces, including pilots, took part in the 1973 war, this kind of all-inclusive assessment would be excessive and misleading. Rather, a correct assessment of military balance on the eastern front should only take account of the Syrian army, the Jordanian army, an Iraqi expeditionary force, small Palestinian forces and the possible participation of Saudi expeditionary forces. Given that those countries have acquired advanced weapons systems and increased their firepower in recent years, that coalition should be potent enough.

Syrian military development since the Lebanon War has fueled Israel’s anxiety about any move toward creating an Arab coalition on the eastern front. Despite its difficult economic situation, Syria has found the means to build up a capacity to strike at Israel’s depth with long-range land, sea and air missiles, as well as to acquire a chemical and biological weapons capability. Numerically, the Syrian army surpasses the IDF in combat aircraft, tanks and, especially, artillery pieces. Including its independent brigades, the Syrian army has the equivalent of 11 divisions, organized in two corps, and for the first time is capable of operating on two fronts. In addition, the acquisition of about 150 surface-to-air missile batteries has given the Syrians a more comprehensive air defense system.

Although the IDF has improved its capability to conduct a combined forces campaign, Syrian numerical advantages give the Syrians the sort of firepower they never before wielded.
Syria may still have difficulty in attaining strategic parity with Israel, but it has acquired a better independent attack capability and has improved its endurance for a prolonged battle. If it successfully launches a surprise attack and exploits its ability to strike at Israel’s rear, Syria may be able to make substantial territorial gains. To turn the tide and wipe out these gains in the second stage of a war, Israel would have to pay a much higher price than ever before.

Based on assessments of the military balance on the eastern front, Israel is in a highly uncomfortable position, even against a limited Arab coalition. In the air, the Arab coalition outnumbers Israel 1.4 to 1 in combat aircraft, 2.1 to 1 in combat helicopters and 2.7 to 1 in airfields. On the ground, the Arab advantage is 2.1 to 1 in divisions and 8.3 to 1 in tanks. The general trend away from infantry-based armies to modern armies with mechanized and armored forces that include large air forces and massive artillery support – including long-range missiles – has changed the complexion of the Arab armies.

Furthermore, the termination of the Iran-Iraq war has forced Israel to reassess several of its basic assumptions, heightening Israeli fears about the possible participation of an Iraqi expeditionary force in an eastern front coalition. Iraq emerged from the war with extensive operational and logistical experience, having been able to maintain a massive army along its long front with Iran. Considering the huge quantity of tank-carriers Iraq acquired and the improvement in Iraq’s road network to Jordan, Israel must assume that Iraq could transport a considerable number of armored forces quickly and efficiently to the eastern front. No matter how great its post-war demobilization, Iraq would undoubtedly be able to dispatch a larger expeditionary force to the eastern front – 5 to 7 divisions – than ever before.

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4 This coalition would include Syria, Jordan and an Iraqi expeditionary force. See The Middle East Military Balance 1986-87 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Westview Press), p. 436.
Jordan's army in recent years has also undergone modernization and development. Although it alone does not pose a direct threat to Israel, Jordan has an important role to play in terms of the larger eastern front. Jordan almost certainly would not initiate a war against Israel, but it may find itself dragged into a war initiated by others. Israel, therefore, must remain closely attuned to any improvements in Jordan's military capability.

Collectively, the developments on the eastern front have increased Israel's defense burden considerably. In particular, Israel's air force has been saddled with additional missions, such as the difficult task of dealing with the expeditionary forces flocking toward Jordan and the southern part of the Golan Heights. At best, the air force can impede or damage these expeditionary forces, but it cannot stop them. At the same time, the air force would be distracted from several of its other missions designed to shorten the war.\(^5\) Israel, therefore, would be forced to enlarge the missions of its air force in the future. Despite its qualitative superiority over Arab air forces, even the Israeli air force cannot be in two places at the same time.

**JORDAN, THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL: PART OF ONE MILITARY ASSESSMENT**

The strategic conclusion from this discussion is that the military arrangements of any peace settlement must include Jordan. Regardless of the political relationship between the East and West Banks, Israel must continue to regard them as a single strategic unit. Security arrangements that are limited to the West Bank would be incomplete. It would be a serious mistake for all parties, especially Israel, not to negotiate security arrangements as a single bloc. Similarly, Palestinians must understand that without a security agreement that

\(^5\)In addition, Saudi Arabia's purchase of British Tornado combat aircraft and the possibility that the Tornados may be stationed in an airfield close to Israel requires the Israel Air Force to allocate additional aircraft to guard against potential penetration routes from the southeast.
includes Jordan, Israel would be forced to maintain large concentrations of forces on the West Bank indefinitely.

At the same time, the long-running Israeli debate over whether Israel’s security interests would best be served by the existence of one state to the east (i.e., Jordan, which would control part of the West Bank), or by two states (i.e., Jordan and “Palestine”), is no longer relevant. The equation has changed and the parameters of that debate no longer apply. Even under the unlikely circumstance that the current Jordanian regime were to negotiate a settlement with Israel under which it would accept control over some parts of the West Bank, there is no guarantee that it might not be replaced one day by a Palestinian regime that could abrogate that agreement.

After all, given historical and demographic trends, Jordan is gradually becoming more and more Palestinian. Time is working against Hussein, and the chances of continued Hashemite rule after him are slim. If the East Bank were to come under Palestinian political control, Israel would face a large and hostile Palestinian entity stretching from the West Bank to Iraq.

In the current circumstances, the more appropriate question for Israeli strategist is whether it is preferable to sign peace agreements, including security arrangements, with both a Palestinian entity and a Jordanian state now or to wait and see if the Palestinians can gain control over the East Bank. Jordan will never again rule the West Bank, but the Palestinians may eventually rule Jordan.

There are two options. In light of the historical and demographic trends on the East Bank, some Israelis have suggested that Israel should work toward a unitary Palestinian state on both banks of the Jordan. According to this argument, a small Palestinian state split like pre-1971 Pakistan between the West Bank and the Gaza strip could never be stable and that

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6 Although there are no authoritative statistics of Jordan’s Palestinian population, it is generally assumed to be about 60 percent.
Israel must therefore be concerned that any expansionist or irredentist pressures be vented eastward, not westward.

But this is unnecessary. Israel has better options than to destabilize the Hashemites and create a "Greater Palestine." If Israel were to consent to the establishment of a separate Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza, two separate "states" could emerge in the future, each developing its own particular local interests. These "states" would be a Palestinian entity in the territories and a Jordanian-Palestinian state on the East Bank. It is better for both Israel and Jordan to act now and create a new Palestinian "state." Such a "state" would be forced to rely heavily on Israel for its continued existence. In turn, Israel could exact commitments from it forswearing subversion or irredentism against neighboring states.

In this framework, Jordan's role in the peace settlement is more in line with its capabilities. There is no longer any hope that Hussein can negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Any attempt of his to reassert authority on the West Bank would be rejected and might invite the intifada to turn against him. But Jordan has a vital role to play as a partner in a regional agreement and it has important motives in ensuring that its interests are safeguarded in any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Israel's military requirements vis-a-vis Jordan can be divided into two phases for a future settlement. In the transitional period, Israel should demand:

- An agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian entity on joint supervision of movement across the Jordan River bridges.

- Enhanced Jordanian intelligence cooperation in all matters related to terrorism, especially in terms of preventing operations originating inside Jordanian territory. A quiet understanding on terrorism between the two countries already exists, but Israel should demand that this agreement be formalized and, eventually, include the Palestinian entity.
Jordan's armed forces and the IDF could organize joint border patrols, but there is little likelihood of that until Jordan signs a full peace treaty with Israel.

- A Jordanian commitment not to position anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Jordan Valley. There is currently a quiet understanding with regard to the positioning of American-made Hawk missiles. Israel should demand that this commitment cover all anti-aircraft missiles at Jordan's disposal.

Israel's demands in the final stage of the agreement should focus on easing its anxiety over Jordan's potential role in an Arab eastern front coalition.

Jordan would be prohibited from:

- Joining any military alliances or pacts targeted against Israel;

- Permitting the stationing or transit of foreign armies on its soil, especially those of countries at war with Israel;

- Allowing its territory to be used for military exercises by foreign armies in a state of war with Israel.

At a later stage, if Syria were to join the peace process, the regional security agreement could be expanded to address the issue of mutual force reductions. Meanwhile, Israel would consider a failure to comply with these conditions as a significant breach of the agreement. Implementation of these aspects of the agreement would be monitored by the United States.
V THE COMMON WAR ON TERRORISM

Terrorism presents one of the most difficult obstacles to any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. The difficulty is not that terrorism poses an existential threat to Israel. A comprehensive assault on Israel from the east, especially a surprise attack, would be a much greater danger. The problem is that terrorism cannot be solved with traditional military remedies and therefore taps a sensitive nerve in Israelis. Indeed, past experience shows that Israelis are shocked more by the psychological repercussions of terrorism than by the actual number of Israelis killed or injured in individual terrorist acts. Even though Israel has lost 15 times more people in wars than it has to terrorism,¹ terrorism is one of the most important factors in determining the political position of many Israelis.

Radical elements who oppose peace with Israel have a useful and convenient tool in terrorism. With the proper training and dedication, only a few “lone wolves” have the power to upset the negotiating process and drive a rift between

¹According to one estimate, 12,000 Israelis have died in wars since the establishment of the state, whereas only 800 have died as a result of terrorism. Aluf Har-Even, “Peace and Security: The Critical Questions,” Ha'aretz, Nov. 15, 1987.
Israel and the Palestinian entity. They could light a fuse which ignites reprisals and open warfare, forever dashing any hope for a peaceful settlement. Palestinian rejectionists inside the territories are sure to receive support from radical states like Syria and Libya and from external Palestinian organizations, including Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-General Command and Abu Nidal’s Fatah Revolutionary Council. In addition, Jewish radicals who oppose Israeli withdrawal from the territories could incite tensions and resort to terror in order to foil the peace process.

The war against terrorism is a daunting task. It demands more complex intelligence activities than are needed for conventional military intelligence. For example, fighting terrorism requires preventive intelligence, the kind that seeks information before the fact to prevent terrorist acts from occurring. Gathering data, via human or electronic means, is not sufficient. Agents must penetrate terrorist cells in the early stages of organization.\(^2\) Intelligence is also divided between “basic intelligence” and “task-oriented intelligence.” The former examines general issues of popular morale and political trends; the latter concentrates on specific objectives, such as preventing and investigating terrorist acts and liquidating terrorist units. Detention, prosecution and incarceration are all necessary elements of the war on terrorism. Monitoring those implicated in terrorism continues even after they have been sentenced to prison.

Historically, terrorism in the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken one of three forms. First, it has developed out of local Palestinian opposition to Israeli occupation. Usually, this form of terrorism is locally based and self-organized, manifesting itself in spontaneous acts of violence. In recent years, locally based terrorism has accounted for an increasing proportion of terrorist activities in the territories, reaching a peak with the

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\(^2\) Fighting terrorism is a battle Israel must conduct throughout the world. This study, however, only concentrates on Israel’s terrorism-related security requirements inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in December 1987. Logically, this kind of terrorism should decline with the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

The second form of terrorism involves cross-border activity. Even before the 1967 war, Israel was subjected to terrorist raids organized and implemented by Arab governments or Palestinian organizations. One of Israel’s main rationales for the 1956 war, for example, was the need to put an end to *fedayeen* cross-border activity. Today, such cross-border infiltration and terrorism is largely restricted to the Lebanon frontier. However, if the Palestinian entity is not willing or able to deal with extremists bent on carrying out terrorist acts against Israel, this form of terror could re-emerge on a wide scale.

The third form of terrorism is the kind committed by extremist groups like Islamic Jihad and those led by Abu Nidal and Ahmad Jibril. These organizations operate against Israeli targets, inside and outside of the Middle East, acting either independently of each other or through covert synchronization with various PLO groups. At least some of these organizations would be likely to continue their activities even after the establishment of a Palestinian entity.

Israel, therefore, would probably continue to face a certain terrorist threat even after reaching a settlement with the Palestinians. Moreover, it is possible that Israel’s withdrawal from the territories would lessen the capability of anti-terror activities. Task-oriented intelligence would weaken, Israeli involvement in terrorist investigations would decrease and Israeli participation in adjudicating terrorist cases would decline. This, of course, does not mean that the intelligence network in the territories would collapse. After all, Israeli intelligence has scored well in Arab countries that are at war with Israel, including those that do not border Israel. Conversely, it must be remembered that even after 20 years of unhindered intelligence operations, Israel has been unable to wipe out terrorism from the West Bank and Gaza. Withdrawal
from the area would undoubtedly cause problems for Israeli intelligence officials, but Israel's compensation would lie in an agreement with the Palestinian entity.³

Neither Israel nor the Palestinian entity would be able to eradicate terror by itself. Only via close cooperation can the two hope to win the war on terrorism and the struggle against radical groups that would try to undermine the peace process. The Palestinian entity is certain to be interested in such cooperation because it is the only way for it to protect the gains of a political settlement and to ensure a successful transition toward "independence."

JEWSH SETTLEMENTS IN THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY

An immediate and total Israeli withdrawal from all of the territories would most likely leave the Palestinian entity unequipped to deal with its radical elements.⁴ This would be especially true should Jewish settlements remain in the area. Settlers, who would still use the local road network, would become easy targets for terrorists hoping to spark a flare-up that might lead either to the evacuation of the settlements or a renewal of the conflict.

During the Camp David autonomy talks, Israel opposed any evacuation of settlements and instead suggested that they be allowed to remain in IDF-protected enclaves. Clearly, this solution is no longer feasible. Over the past decade, dozens of new settlements have been scattered throughout the territories,

³In a private conversation, a high-ranking Israeli anti-terrorism official endorsed this view, saying that it "is a situation which Israel will be able to live with, as it deals successfully with terrorism and even reduces the number of terrorist activities. But the prerequisite is cooperation between the Palestinian entity and Israel."

⁴Some Israeli experts doubt that the Palestinians would be able to control their own terrorist elements even under the best of circumstances. Interview in 1988 with Ariel Merari, editor of the annual survey International Terrorism, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.
many of which adjoin Arab settlements. There is no doubt that whoever designed the plan for the distribution of Israeli settlements clearly intended to prevent any potential territorial division or physical separation between the Jewish and Arab residents of the area. To maintain dozens of enclaves under IDF protection would make a mockery of the existence and "independence" of the Palestinian entity and would be a source of dangerous friction between Israel and the Palestinians.

The question of Israeli settlements involves numerous issues concerning the problem of "friction." For example, settlers are sure to demand the right to carry weapons for self-defense and the right to pursue their attackers. This would inevitably lead to an explosive situation, especially since settlers are opposed to granting any form of independence to the Palestinians. It would be ideal if Jewish settlers could exist in the Palestinian entity the way Israeli Arabs live in Israel, peacefully and unarmed, but this would require a level of political and psychological maturity that neither Palestinians nor Israelis have yet attained. If Jewish settlers try to torpedo the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, that stage of peaceful coexistence may never be reached. Therefore, like Israeli Arabs and Palestinians who would come under Israeli rule as a result of border corrections, Jewish settlers would not, under any circumstances, be able to maintain their own military force inside the Palestinian entity. They would have no special status in the Palestinian entity other than that of a minority whose rights must be respected. Those who refuse to abide by this arrangement would have to leave the territories.

THE POWERS OF THE PALESTINIAN POLICE FORCE

The desire to safeguard Palestinian "independence" and the fear of Israeli reprisals might provide a strong motivation for the Palestinian entity to fight against terrorism – but it would not be enough. To win the battle, the leadership of the Palestinian entity would need to have the tenacity, determination and firmness to make difficult decisions, and it
would need the tools to implement them. Israel has learned from experience that when strong Arab governments, like Egypt or Syria\textsuperscript{5}, want to prevent terrorists from operating across their borders, they can stop terrorism cold. Conversely, when Arab governments are weak, as in Lebanon, terrorists and radicals flourish. The Jordanian example showed that a country can change from a policy of vacillation, in which terrorism and internal subversion thrive (as was the case prior to the 1970-71 civil war), to a policy of firmness, in which calm and stability flourish (as has been the case for more than a decade). As a Rand Corporation study concluded, only a strong, authoritative Palestinian administration would be able to combat terrorism successfully and cooperate with Israel in preventing cross-border violations. By the same token, terrorists would surely exploit the weaknesses of a lame administration.\textsuperscript{6}

Issues of security, terrorism and the powers of the Palestinian authority were raised in the abortive Israeli-Egyptian autonomy talks, which had American participation. Although these talks were conducted in the absence of the Jordanians and the Palestinians, they can point toward potential areas of disagreement in future negotiations. Throughout the talks, Israel refused to compromise on its demand that all questions of security in the territories, both internal and external, remain its exclusive domain until the determination of final status. In addition, Israel insisted that it alone would determine the location of IDF bases remaining inside the territories.

On the other side, the Egyptians agreed that Israel should be responsible for external security during the transitional stage,

\textsuperscript{5}Even though it is Israel's most implacable enemy, Syria prevents terrorists from crossing into Israel. While it supports terrorist groups that cross the Lebanese border, it makes sure not to violate the separation of forces agreement on the Golan Heights.

but they completely rejected Israel’s demand for control of internal security. Instead, the Egyptians vigorously argued that this should be the preserve of the Palestinian autonomous authority. The Egyptians also proposed to establish a joint committee to focus solely on security issues. Israel rejected the idea.

For their part, the Americans had serious reservations about some of Israel’s positions. They accepted the Israeli demand for responsibility over external security and anti-terrorist activity. But the Americans insisted that the Palestinians be allowed to assume gradual responsibility for internal security and public order, especially if the autonomous authority proved its competence and good intentions. In the American view, for example, local police would be under the command and responsibility of the Palestinians. The Americans also insisted on an early discussion of security issues, which Israel consistently hoped to postpone.\(^7\)

In future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, there would necessarily be changes in these positions. During the transition stage, issues of external security would depend primarily on Jordan’s willingness to be a party to the agreement and on Syria’s and Iraq’s determination to maintain their state of war with Israel. Negotiations on internal security and the war against terrorism are not dependent on these outside actors. The transition period on these issues can be shorter than the transition period on other issues. In fact, to help avert the growth of internal Palestinian resistance to the agreement, the transition period on internal security should be as short as possible. Moreover, Israel should adopt the American suggestion that responsibility for internal security should be gradually taken by the Palestinian entity.

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\(^7\)In hindsight, it appears that the Israeli participants in the autonomy talks had not dedicated much time, thought and effort to the problems of dealing with terrorism after an IDF withdrawal from the territories. Instead, they devoted most of their attention to the issues of military deployment on the eastern front.
Because of the great importance of symbols in the transfer of authority from Israel to the local residents, it is desirable that the internal security transition period be divided into sub-stages. As Israeli-Palestinian cooperation deepens, the transfer of responsibility to the local residents would be accelerated. In the first stage, the Palestinian entity would be allowed to establish local police forces in towns and rural areas that would operate under the overall command of the Israeli police. Then the organization would be expanded to cover two regional police forces, one for the West Bank and one for the Gaza Strip. They would coordinate with Israeli police but would operate independently of it. Subsequently, the two regional forces would be unified under a central Palestinian command. At some stage of the transition process, Palestinian police would gain responsibility for maintaining public order, combatting local crime and issuing permits to carry arms, among other things. They would dispatch representatives to Interpol under the separate and independent status of the Palestinian entity.

Since the Palestinian entity essentially would be demilitarized, its police would take the place of an army. The Palestinians would, therefore, not be able to argue that they were being deprived of their own “military” force, an important symbol of every independent political entity. The structure and equipment of the police force would be determined during Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; Jordan could join the talks in an observer status. It is only natural that the police force eventually would be equipped with helicopters, light armored vehicles and light mortars. This force, whose combined Gaza and West Bank elements would consist of several thousand policemen (excluding the prison service), must be powerful enough to handle internal disorder problems. It would have an intelligence unit to deal with security matters and the war on terrorism.

In the second stage, Israel would transfer responsibility for the prisons in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to the Palestinian police force. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee
would determine the criteria for releasing Palestinian security prisoners as well as the schedule for transferring security prisoners held in Israeli prisons. Clemency power would be transferred to the Palestinian entity, but in the beginning Israel would retain veto power over security prisoners. Over time, this would be reduced to a consultative role.

Investigations of terrorist and security matters would be conducted jointly. During the transition stage, Israel's General Security Service would retain its pre-eminent status. As cooperation grew and terrorist incidents declined, its role in investigations would diminish. If Israel required the detention of a Palestinian on suspicion of terrorist activity, the Palestinian police would detain the suspect at Israel's recommendation. During the transition stage, interrogation would be handled by the Palestinian police with the presence of an Israeli representative. Later on, interrogations would be the sole responsibility of the Palestinian police. Offices of the Israeli security service inside the Palestinian entity would be located on IDF bases and not in Arab communities.

During the transition period, adjudication of terrorist and security cases would be conducted jointly by Israelis and Palestinians. Courts would be convened under a mixed team of judges initially led by an Israeli, then by a Palestinian. Over time, if both parties agree, full jurisdiction would be transferred to the Palestinian judiciary. During the transition period, Israel would also retain the right of "hot pursuit" against terrorists who escape from Israel to the Palestinian entity.

Israel and the Palestinian entity would establish a joint command to fight terrorism, which Jordan would be invited to join. The command would be located inside Palestinian territory and would include a joint intelligence center under its authority. This center would continue to operate after the end of the transition period. In addition, Israel would demand that the Palestinian entity sign an extradition treaty with a special clause pertaining to terrorist offenses.
INTERNATIONAL POLICING

It is important to ask whether the Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and the war against terrorism in general, would be helped or hindered by the presence of an international police force and/or international inspectors. Israel has had experiences with these sorts of forces on each of its borders and the verdict is mixed.

In the Sinai, the Multinational Force and Observers has proven to be a valuable tool in maintaining the peace with Egypt. It is an international force, unaffiliated with the United Nations, in which U.S. troops play the leading role. It has successfully fulfilled its mission of safeguarding the military annex of the treaty, which includes maintaining and manning an electronic monitoring station. But given its limited mission, the MFO’s usefulness should not be exaggerated. The essence of the military arrangements in the Sinai is the partial demilitarization agreement and it is not the MFO’s mission to prevent either cross-border infiltration or terrorism. These functions are fulfilled by the two countries, Israel and Egypt, through wide-ranging mutual cooperation and intelligence sharing.

Similarly, the one U.N. force that does operate satisfactorily – the Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights – also has a very restricted mission, namely to monitor the separation of forces agreement. The reason there is no cross-border terrorism on the Syrian-Israeli frontier is because Damascus has taken a firm stand against it.

When countries do not take strong steps against infiltration and terrorism, the United Nations has been unable to fill the void. In this context, the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon has been the most disappointing example. Hastily formed, UNIFIL was cobbled together and deployed without prior understanding and consultation between Israel and Lebanon. Moreover, it has no strong central government authority to lend it support. Therefore, it finds itself in the untenable
position of having to confront various armies and militias with no government backing. Although UNIFIL has certainly helped make life easier for the local population in southern Lebanon, it could not be relied upon by Israel to safeguard the border frontier. Instead, Israel decided to establish a "security belt" inside Lebanon and to maintain and equip a local militia, the South Lebanon Army.

Despite its best efforts, UNIFIL lacks the power and the resources to fight terrorism in a serious way. It is a war that cannot be limited to dispatching nightly border patrols and to recording terrorist attacks and Israeli reprisals on an accounting ledger. To fight terrorism, UNIFIL would need to build a strong intelligence capability, interrogate detainees, prosecute suspects and punish criminals. UNIFIL has none of these powers, and therefore no deterrent against terrorists or their sponsors. It often finds itself in the position of capturing terrorists who are on the way to infiltrating Israel. UNIFIL confiscates their weapons and then frees them. Worse yet, UNIFIL often turns those weapons over to various militias.

UNIFIL is a model that Israel and a Palestinian entity should avoid emulating. An international force may have a role to play in monitoring the demilitarization of the Palestinian entity, but it should not, under any circumstances, be relied upon to prevent terrorist activities and cross-border infiltrations. It would simply not be up to the task.

The necessary conclusion is that an international police force is not an adequate answer for the war against terrorism. Such a force would not be able to solve problems that might develop if Jewish settlers in the Palestinian entity resorted to independent action. Rather, this must be the exclusive responsibility of the parties to the agreement. Success in this effort would be almost completely a function of their mutual cooperation.
MAINTAINING OPEN BORDERS

An important aspect of the security arrangements is the question of open borders. Those who support closing the borders argue that friction between Israel and the Palestinians can only be restricted by hermetically sealing one off from the other. According to this argument, it may be necessary to prohibit Palestinians from working inside Israel during the transition stage. Eventually, when tensions cooled, it would be possible to open the borders in a controlled manner.

This argument is diametrically opposed to the traditional belief that increased personal contact and economic ties between Israelis and Palestinians would lessen tensions and promote cooperation. Theoretically, Israel should therefore admit all Palestinians who wish to work in Israel. There is, of course, a security danger in this constant traffic of tens of thousands of workers, many of whom remain overnight in Israel. Israel has been taking this risk for years, both in terms of the Jordan River bridges and the Palestinians who work inside the Green Line. But unless Israel retains indirect supervision of movement over the Jordan River bridges, this risk would increase after an Israeli withdrawal. Therefore, supervision of the Jordan River bridges, and airports in the Palestinian entity, should be the joint responsibility of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity. Israel would retain a veto power early in transition, gradually limiting itself to a consultative role as the process progresses.

Gaza cannot be closed off from Israel. About 70,000 Palestinian workers from the region earn their livelihoods in Israel. To cut them off from their jobs would aggravate tension, incite the Palestinians against a compromise with Israel and turn Gaza into a pressure cooker primed for explosion. Open borders may make the fight against terrorism more complicated, but the flow of Palestinian workers can always be monitored. In the larger framework, open borders could play

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8 Interview with Ariel Merari in 1988.
an important role in building economic interdependence and
a common market among members of the confederation.
VI SUPERPOWER CONTRIBUTION TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT

The fear of an active Soviet presence near the heart of Israel has long been a main argument against the establishment of a Palestinian "state" or entity on the West Bank and Gaza. Opponents warn that Moscow would sign military cooperation treaties with the Palestinian state and station advisers and perhaps military units across the border from Israel. Facing a hostile superpower at short range, Israel would risk entanglement in border conflicts with Soviet forces. Israel’s ability to react to threats and defend itself would be limited by the Soviet presence. Washington might supply Israel with additional aid as an immediate response to a Soviet build-up, but in the end, the United States would likely pressure Israel to limit its defensive measures to avoid any potential escalation that could lead to a superpower confrontation.

Israel’s fear of Soviet encroachment in the Middle East stems from a litany of Soviet actions and policies that have confirmed in Israel’s mind that the Soviet Union is a hostile country. These include Moscow’s severing of relations in 1967; its massive supply of arms to the most extreme Arab states; its

1 For example, Soviet and Israeli pilots faced each other in dog fights during the 1970 Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition.
willingness to prevent an Arab defeat in a war against Israel, even at the cost of Soviet military intervention; its large-scale support of the PLO, including the most radical, terrorist Palestinian groups; and its universally antagonistic attitude toward Israel in every international forum. Although Moscow has never denied Israel's right to exist, it has consistently taken actions and assumed positions that appear to endanger Israel's basic interests. In addition, the issue of Soviet Jewry has always loomed in the background, further exacerbating relations between the two states.

Most important, Moscow has always taken a negative approach to questions of war and peace in the Middle East. The Arab war option depended largely on the Soviets' massive military support of Arab belligerents prior to the outbreak of war and the quick re-supply of Arab armies in the midst of battle. Moscow provided the Arabs with a defensive umbrella, often protecting them from a decisive defeat. This was the case in 1973, when Soviet military support gave Egypt and Syria the option to launch the war, and the Soviet re-supply shielded them from defeat. Moscow has also shown itself to be an opponent of peace, having criticized the Camp David Accords and backed the efforts of Arab rejectionist states which sought to punish Egypt for making peace.

NEW THINKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Since the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, traditional Soviet policy has undergone widespread change, despite the recent sale of SU-24 bombers to Libya, Iraq and Syria. Regional conflicts are being approached in new and innovative ways. Rather than rely on the old method of unilateral action, Moscow has now opted for the "Afghanistan model," which calls for the resolution of regional conflicts within a framework of superpower cooperation. In a sense, this involves a division of labor, with each superpower bringing pressure to bear on its friends and allies to compromise on their own maximalist positions.
In the Middle East, the impact of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and "new thinking" in general, has been felt by all Soviet clients. This has especially been true of Syria. The leaders of Syria, a country which has no territorial link to the Soviet Union, must have been unnerved to see the Soviets abandoning a military investment in Afghanistan, a country on the Soviet border. Moscow may continue to equip the Syrian army with the most up-to-date weapons systems but its political message to Damascus – no military adventures – is clearly upsetting. Of course, Damascus can always decide to implicate Moscow militarily by committing it to preventing a Syrian military defeat, but it has to weigh the possibility that the Soviets may not hasten to re-equip the Syrian army in a war that jeopardizes overall Soviet interests.

At the same time, "new thinking" has opened a new chapter in Soviet relations with Israel. After 20 years of a diplomatic deep-freeze, Moscow's consistently negative approach to Israel began to show some signs of change in 1987. Since then, Moscow has improved its positions on important bilateral and regional issues and has engineered a general rapprochement between Israel and the East Bloc. Evidently, the Soviets have accepted the fact that they need Israel's approval to play a significant role in the Middle East peace process.

In addition, in response to changes in Soviet policy, Israel has changed its approach to the Soviet Union. Although still wary of Soviet intentions and anxious that no opportunity be given so that the Soviets can impose their vision of a peace settlement on an unwilling Israel, Jerusalem is now more hospitable to the idea of Soviet involvement in the peace process. On the one hand, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres is prepared to attend, with certain conditions, a U.N.-sponsored international peace conference with Soviet participation. On the other hand, the Likud's Yitzhak Shamir has said that he would accept a Soviet role, in tandem with the United States, at a limited international conference designed to initiate negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, excluding the PLO.
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Soviet participation in the peace process is not just a procedural or a political issue. Rather, the Soviet role in peacemaking has a direct impact on Israel's long-term security interests. For Israel, the fundamental question should be whether its strategic interests would benefit from Soviet involvement in the next stage of the peace process or whether Israel should again insist on a Pax Americana, as it did with the Camp David Accords.

In the current environment, it would be hazardous to design a peace based solely on the interests and involvement of one superpower at the expense of the other. Soviet exclusion from the peace process would almost ensure a Syrian refusal to participate at any stage, persuade Jordan to shy away from public demarches in Israel's direction and certainly damage the stability of any settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Without some form of Soviet involvement, there is no chance for a comprehensive peace. Only with Soviet participation in the peace process can Israel and the United States gain Soviet support for a prospective agreement and neutralize Soviet backing for radical elements like Syria and extremist PLO groups that would oppose peace. It is far preferable to secure Moscow's constructive contribution to peace than to banish it from the peace process altogether. It may be possible to start the peace process without Soviet participation, but no productive process can end without it.

The optimal forum for Soviet participation is a U.S.-USSR conference to launch negotiations toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and a comprehensive regional settlement. Moscow's contribution to the peace settlement would be a commitment not to enter any military pacts or alliances with

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2This would be a different international conference than the one envisioned by Peres, because Jordan's dissociation from the West Bank has rendered moot any question of direct Israeli-Jordanian negotiations over the territories.
the Palestinian entity or Jordan, send either of them military forces or advisers or supply either of them with any offensive weapons that could undermine the demilitarization arrangements. Once agreement is reached on a peace settlement, Moscow would be invited to sign and witness it on par with the United States.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Israel views a potential U.S. role in the peace process in a completely different light. Without active American involvement, there is simply no chance to reach and maintain a stable agreement. Washington is expected to help deter any massive violation that could threaten peace, and to help provide the economic means to solve problems that could derail peace. In the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, for example, the United States played an active role in negotiations, accorded both parties generous financial aid to assist the Sinai withdrawal and recruited a multinational force to police the agreement.

Washington can play a vital role throughout the peace process. Even before the start of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the United States should reach an agreement with Israel on a number of fundamental issues. First, this memorandum should include an understanding that no peace agreement would force Israel, directly or indirectly, to act against its vital interests. Second, it should accord Israel the right to intervene militarily in areas from which it might withdraw in case of a serious treaty violation or a significant change in the military disposition that might endanger Israel. Third, because of the risks attendant with making peace, Washington should guarantee Israel enough aid to ensure its qualitative military advantage.

The second focus of American involvement should be in solving the problem of Palestinian refugees. This is, in reality, a two-part problem that encompasses refugees inside and outside of the territories, especially the pressing needs of the
rapidly growing refugee population in Gaza. America can make a major contribution to solving the refugee problem by providing much of the economic aid needed for resettlement and the construction of housing. This is not just a humanitarian issue. The continued existence of refugee camps near Israel's borders, either in Lebanon or inside the territory of the Palestinian entity, would fuel Palestinian frustration and hostility, and lead inevitably to a resurgence of violence, radicalism and terrorism. The amount of aid needed – about $2 billion, according to Israeli estimates – is no less essential to maintaining peace than the economic aid given to Egypt after the signing of the Camp David Accords or the assistance given to Israel to replace its lost Sinai airfields with new ones in the Negev.

The third area in which America has an important role to play in the peace process is in supervising the implementation and monitoring of the security arrangements. This would be similar to the role that the United States continues to play with regard to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Without an active U.S. involvement in the supervision of security arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian entity, it is doubtful that a peace settlement could be maintained.

INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

The question of international guarantees inevitably rears its head in discussions of possible security arrangements for Israeli withdrawal from the territories. It is a subject with which Israel has had a long and largely bitter experience. In moments of crisis, Israel has learned that guarantees are rarely kept. The unreliability of the international community, for example, was underscored by the U.N. secretary general's meek response to an Egyptian demand to remove the U.N. emergency forces from Sinai in 1967. Even American

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3According to one estimate, Gaza's population, which consists largely of refugees, will surpass 1 million by the year 2000. See Tamir, "A Soldier in Search of Peace," p.130.
commitments go unfulfilled, as Israel learned when Washington did little to enforce its guarantees to Israel when Egypt moved its army into Gaza in March 1957, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping in 1967. Israelis remember the words of French President Charles De Gaulle, who was asked by an Israeli representative to invoke the dormant 1950 Tripartite Declaration on Middle East security on the eve of the Six Day War. "Guarantees are not absolute," said De Gaulle, "and the situation develops."

Israel, therefore, is intensely suspicious of guarantees. It rejects the idea that guarantees could replace security arrangements that Israel would help supervise. Moreover, guarantees are certainly no substitute for actual territorial control, military presence or sovereignty. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon understood the true value of guarantees when he said that Israel should neither dismiss them nor rely on them. His approach, which is still Israeli policy, is that guarantees - even from a friendly power - can augment defensible borders but cannot substitute for them.

Not all guarantees are alike. For example, given the United Nations' long-time track record of hostility against it, Israel has no confidence in promises made by the organization. Israel would adamantly refuse to accept U.N. commitments to maintain the peace agreement or to guarantee Israeli security after its withdrawal from parts of the territories.

A joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee has greater diplomatic value. If such a guarantee were extended simultaneously to Israel and the Arabs, it could have a calming effect on both parties. The problem with this kind of guarantee is that it would be subject to shifts in superpower relations and would make the peace agreement hostage to the ups and downs in U.S.-Soviet relations.

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The most solid form of guarantee, from an Israeli viewpoint, is an American guarantee. It can provide a useful deterrent against those who seek to violate or undermine the peace agreement. But Israel cannot—and should not—expect much more than that. No unilateral guarantee, especially one from a big power to a small power, is absolute.

Of course, a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty might give greater weight to the deterrent factor of an American guarantee, but there are also strong disadvantages to the idea of a treaty. Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, one of its main opponents, apparently fears that a defense treaty would curtail Israel's freedom of action and independence, perhaps requiring consultation with Washington before implementing even small tactical operations. In addition, it is likely that any treaty would require Israel to submit to full nuclear inspection, which it has consistently opposed. In return, the most Israel would receive would be a one-sided treaty largely dependent on American goodwill.

Therefore, the most useful set of guarantees to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement would include an American guarantee to Israel and a joint U.S.-Soviet commitment to both parties. But, it must be remembered that these steps are valuable only insofar as they strengthen the security arrangements reached during negotiations, not as a substitute for them.
VII CONCLUSIONS: ISRAEL'S MINIMAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

In an enduring settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, neither party will achieve all of its aspirations or realize all of its demands. Stubborn posturing, which has already prolonged the conflict and caused much unnecessary bloodshed, will have to give way to compromise. Similarly, there is no chance of terminating the conflict if one side dictates its treaty terms to the other like victor to vanquished. Any agreement that leaves one party feeling that its vital interests have been threatened is a sure formula for renewing the conflict in the future.

In planning for negotiations with the Palestinians, Israel will have to evaluate its minimal demands. These are the non-negotiable, indispensable requirements which it must insist on in any peace settlement. Israel's guiding principles in this regard are to ensure that any settlement terminate the conflict, safeguard peace and security, and permit Israel to retain its character as a democratic Jewish state. No lasting agreement will provide all of the answers to Israel's security problems. But if a settlement includes the requirements outlined below it may offer at least a chance for a peaceful solution to Israel's seemingly endless conflict with the Palestinians.
The following is a summary of Israel’s minimal security requirements in negotiations with the Palestinians:

- Conflict termination. Israel has no interest in negotiating a partial or temporary lull in its struggle with the Palestinians. On the contrary, Israel should demand that a final termination of the conflict be a *sine qua non* condition of the agreement. It must insist that once the agreement goes into effect, neither party could make further claims or demands against the other. This concept would be outlined in the agreement and constitute a formal Palestinian commitment to renounce the “strategy of phases” for the step-by-step liquidation of Israel.

By the same token, Israel has no interest in negotiating an agreement with an unrepresentative group of Palestinians. Even if such a negotiating partner were found, this group would be unlikely to enforce its decisions on the Palestinians. Hence, there is no other way to end the conflict than to reach an agreement with the PLO. Of course, the PLO has problems of its own, namely internal political divisions, inadequate control over Palestinian splinter groups and a possible conflict of interest between Palestinians who live inside the territories and those who are in exile. But Israel should finally abandon any hope of circumventing the PLO through negotiations with Jordan or an “alternative Palestinian leadership.” There can no longer be any doubt that most Palestinians view the PLO as their political representative.

- The “right of return”. The PLO must renounce what it calls *al-haq al-'awdah*, or the Palestinian “right of return” to homes and property inside the Green Line. This is a formula for the destruction of the state of Israel from within. For too many years, Palestinian and Arab politicians cruelly exploited the refugees by preventing any resettlement and convincing them that they would eventually “return” to Palestine. That charade must come to an end. Just as Israel has absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jews from Arab countries, the Palestinian entity and the Arab states should absorb a
Palestinian refugees. Israel would, of course, agree to arrangements for unifying families.

- Refugee resettlement. No peace agreement would be stable if hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees continued to live in abject squalor in refugee camps along Israel's borders. Therefore, the Palestinian entity must make a formal commitment to resolve the refugee problem. Of course, it would need the cooperation and assistance of the international community, including Israel, to finance and implement a large-scale plan for refugee resettlement.

Refugee resettlement is an area in which other countries could make a constructive contribution to the peace process. Many who pay lip service to Middle East peace make large profits from the sale of weaponry, including chemical weapons, that only perpetuates the bloodshed. Contributing to refugee resettlement would be a way for many countries, especially the European states and Japan, to use economic means to liquidate one of the sources of the conflict.

- Irredentism. The Palestinian entity would need to renounce any claims to represent either Israeli Arabs or Palestinian-Jordanians. It would also need to commit itself not to engage in or support any activity which would incite, directly or indirectly, irredentist activities by Israeli Arabs or Palestinian-Jordanians.

- Confederation. Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity would form a confederation. The confederation would be founded on a constitution that defines arrangements on such issues as demilitarization, monitoring and the ban on foreign military alliances. No amendment or abrogation of the constitution would be allowed without the unanimous consent of the three signatories. The Palestinian entity would be prohibited from leaving the confederation, changing its political status, annexing other territories or being annexed by another political entity. This clause would prevent a future Palestinian takeover of Jordan, which would lead to the
establishment of a "Greater Palestine" from the Iraqi frontier to the Israeli border. From the standpoint of international law, locking the Palestinian entity into this form of confederation from its very creation would be the only way to hold a sovereign entity responsible for an agreement that, in effect, restricts its sovereignty.

- Jordan's place in the agreement. Because of the important role the East Bank plays in calculations of Israeli security, Jordan must be included in the military aspects of the peace agreement. Jordan's military capabilities and the broader Arab military disposition in Jordan would have a great impact on peace negotiations, regardless of who or what regime rules the land east of the Jordan River. Jordan's involvement in the settlement would greatly influence Israel's approach to the security arrangements. If Jordan participates in the peace settlement, Israel would have fewer requirements vis-à-vis the West Bank. If Jordan remains outside of the peace agreement, Israel's security needs would be greater. It is clearly in Israel's interest that Jordan join the peace settlement and be a member of the confederation. Jordan stands to benefit by gaining a guarantee against future Palestinian irredentism against the East Bank.

Within the framework of the confederation, Jordan could commit itself to abstaining from or maintaining any military alliance targeted against Israel. Furthermore, Jordan could prevent the armies of states at war with Israel from being deployed inside or transiting through Jordan. In this way, Jordan would cease to be a component of the "eastern front." During the transition stage, Jordan would be banned from stationing anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Jordan Valley.

At the outset of the transition stage, Jordan could begin to coordinate intelligence cooperation with Israel and the Palestinian entity in all aspects of the war against terrorism.

- Alliances and foreign forces. The Palestinian entity would be prohibited from entering into any military alliance
or from permitting the stationing, transit or training of foreign military or police forces on its territory. This ban would extend to foreign military advisers and trainers.

The Palestinian entity would be allowed to produce only light weapons for its police forces. The types and limits of these weapons would be specified in an annex to the peace agreement. Production and/or acquisition of all other types of weaponry, especially chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, would be prohibited.

- Demilitarization. No troops, weapons systems (such as tanks, missiles, artillery, military aircraft or electronic warfare), military fortifications or electronic sensors (such as missile target acquisition systems) would be permitted inside the Palestinian entity. This would reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack against Israel. There would be no time limitation on the prohibitions of demilitarization. But in reality, it would only be a partial demilitarization, since the Palestinian entity would be permitted to maintain a strong police force.

- Military presence. Demilitarization would not solve all of Israel’s security concerns. Safeguards must be built into the security arrangements in order to take account of the possibility that peace may collapse. To meet this contingency, the IDF would remain stationed in several points on the West Bank and Gaza throughout the transition period. This military presence would be intended solely to deter any potential adversary from trying to take advantage of the vulnerable geostrategic position in which Israel would find itself following a withdrawal.

Two or three concentrations of armored forces stationed on the eastern slopes of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley would be adequate. One concentration would most likely be located near and east of the Jewish town of Ma’ale Adumim. A second would be located on the northeastern slopes in an area known as the “knee positions,” not far from the Israeli
settlement of Meholah. These areas would also serve as sites for anti-aircraft missile batteries and, eventually, for anti-missile missiles. Transit to these military areas would run north-south from Beit She'an and east-west from Jerusalem to Ma'ale Adumim and to the Jordan Valley. This would minimize the chance of friction between the IDF and the Arab communities.

In Gaza, the IDF would be stationed in the Katif area, a narrow strip which connects Gaza and Sinai. In addition, the IDF would maintain several coastal observation posts to prevent infiltration from the sea.

- Warning stations. During the transition period, Israel would maintain warning stations inside its defined military areas in the Palestinian entity. These would include air and missile early warning stations. At the end of transition, these stations would either be operated by Americans or by a joint team of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians under American command.

- Monitoring. The objective of monitoring arrangements would be to prevent violations of the agreement as early as possible. Monitoring would be supervised by a neutral party. Preferably, this would include the United States, since its participation would reinforce the agreement and help deter potential violators. The United Nations would have no role in the monitoring regime.

Because of the proximity of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel's vital strategic objectives, Israel would insist on participating in the monitoring regime for the Palestinian entity. This framework would enable Israel to continue overflights of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel would not, however, participate in monitoring the aspects of the agreement that would apply to Jordan. That would be handled by the neutral monitoring authority, preferably the Americans. It is also desirable to integrate Palestinian and Jordanian representatives into the monitoring regime.
The transition period. The peace agreement would include a transitional period which would remain in effect until the final status of the Palestinian entity is ultimately determined, and as long as the Arab states bordering Israel are in a state of war with it. Transition would have two main components – arrangements for internal and external security.

The transition period for external security arrangements would last for as long as Jordan and Syria remain in a state of war with Israel. Jordan’s participation in the peace agreement would greatly reduce Israel’s security needs *vis-a-vis* the West Bank. Syria’s participation, critical for any long-term settlement, would further pare down Israel’s requirements. If Iraq were to join the peace settlement, transition could be further expedited. The security arrangements put in place during a transition would, for the most part, be lifted once the final status of the Palestinian entity and the confederation went into effect. Therefore, the extent to which a Palestinian entity is constrained by security restrictions during the transition stage is largely a function of the actions of the Arab states around it.

The transition period on internal security and the war against terrorism (see below) would include a number of substages. Progress from one stage to the next would depend upon the extent that the Palestinian entity cooperated with Israel.

A special regime for Gaza could offer a more daring approach to the transition stage. Under such an arrangement, virtually total control over the strip could, at a certain time, be transferred to the elected Palestinian leadership which would administer it in coordination with the PLO. This would offer a useful test of the PLO’s ability to control extremist elements, prevent terrorism and cooperate with Israel in a wide range of areas. The PLO would have to commit itself not to proclaim a Palestinian state in the area under its supervision. Israel would maintain open borders with Gaza and continue to employ Palestinian workers. During transition, a comprehensive economic plan for Gaza, including aid to the refugees, would be drafted and implemented.
As a prelude to the negotiations over transition, Israel, the PLO and the local Palestinians would take advantage of American mediation to agree on a series of mutual confidence-building measures. This pre-transition period (outlined in chapter two) would be a valuable test of the cooperation and commitment necessary for progress toward later stages of the peace agreement.

- Final borders. In final status negotiations, Israel must insist on corrections of its eastern border. These changes are needed to ease the burden on Israel’s “narrow waistline” and, most importantly, to prevent uncontrolled drilling along the western slopes of Samaria that could damage Israel’s most important water reservoirs. In this regard, it would be necessary for Israel to annex a strip 2 to 6 kilometers east of the “Green Line.” For similar, though less pressing reasons, Israel must demand border corrections in the Mount Gilboa area. In addition, border corrections need to be made near Lod, to expand the air space near Israel’s international airport; on both sides of the “Jerusalem corridor,” connecting Jerusalem with the coast; in the Etzion Bloc; and in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, in the area connecting Jerusalem with Ma’ale Adumim.

- Jewish settlements. Jewish settlers whose territory does not come under Israeli rule as a result of the border corrections would have to choose whether to be residents of the Palestinian entity, obeying its laws, or to relocate to Israel. Those who remain inside the Palestinian entity would not be allowed to maintain a military force. The guiding principle would be reciprocity between the rights and obligations of Jewish settlers in the Palestinian entity and Israeli Arabs inside Israel. Israel should insist that the status of Jewish settlers inside the Palestinian entity be equal to that of Israeli Arabs and those Palestinians who come under Israeli rule as a result of border corrections. Only through reciprocity could a mutuality of interests be created on this sensitive issue.

- The war against terrorism. No one party can eliminate terrorism on its own. The only hope to win the war against
terrorism and prevent extremists from foiling the peace process lies in close cooperation among Israel, the Palestinian entity and Jordan. Turning to an international or U.N. police force or observers is not the answer. Without the active involvement and commitment of local parties, international forces have proven themselves incapable of stopping terrorists and limiting cross-border infiltration.

Historically, only strong Arab governments with a commitment to maintaining a tranquil border with Israel have been successful in preventing cross-border terrorist activity from inside their territory. Therefore, it is important that the Palestinian entity have both the motivation and the strength to fight the war against terrorism. The Palestinian leadership's success in fighting terrorism would be a critical test of its overall willingness and ability to build an environment of peace and cooperation with Israel.

Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity would act jointly and independently to prevent terrorist activities. Each would be responsible for terrorist activities planned or implemented in its territory.

The transition stage for internal security matters would consist of a series of sub-stages. Progress from stage to stage would not be a function of the participation of other Arab states in the peace process but rather of the depth of cooperation between the Palestinian entity and Israel. As cooperation grew and public order stabilized, the Palestinian entity would gain additional responsibilities for internal security.

Throughout the transition, Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian representatives would jointly monitor traffic across the Jordan River bridges. At first, Israel would retain a veto power against the entry of Palestinians through the bridges and airports. Over time, Israel would retain only a consultative role in immigration and transit matters.
Throughout the transition, Israel would retain the right of "hot pursuit" to capture terrorists who escape across the border into the Palestinian entity. This right would expire with the implementation of final status arrangements.

Palestinian police would detain suspected terrorists at the recommendation of their Israeli counterparts. During the opening stages of transition, Israeli representatives would be present during detention and interrogation. At later stages, their presence would be unnecessary. Investigations of terrorist and security-related matters would be handled jointly by Israel and the Palestinian entity. Throughout transition, Israel's General Security Service (the Shin Bet) would be accorded special status and authority in these investigations. Its offices would be located inside IDF bases in the Palestinian entity, not in Arab communities.

During the transition, a joint anti-terrorism staff, including a joint intelligence center, would be established. Jordan would be invited to participate. This staff, located inside the territory of the Palestinian entity, would continue to operate even after the implementation of final status arrangements.

Throughout the transition, terrorist and security-related cases would be adjudicated jointly by Israelis and Palestinians. Judicial panels would be mixed, with an Israeli judge presiding in the early stage of transition and a Palestinian judge in the later stage.

If the transition proceeded smoothly, Israel would gradually transfer responsibility for prisons in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian police force. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee would determine the criterion and methods for releasing security detainees. The Palestinian entity would be able to grant clemency, with Israel retaining a veto power over the release of terrorist prisoners. Israel eventually would retain only a consultative role in clemency questions.
Israel and the Palestinian entity would sign an extradition agreement containing a special section concerning terrorist crimes.

- The Palestinian police force. The Palestinian entity would be permitted to maintain a strong police force numbering several thousand men. This would constitute the armed forces of the Palestinian entity.

At first, local police forces would be established in the main towns and in rural areas under the overall command of the Israeli police. Later, two regional police forces would be formed, one for the West Bank and one for the Gaza Strip. At that stage, the Palestinian regional police forces would operate independently but in complete coordination with the Israeli police. At a later date, the Palestinian police would be unified under a central Palestinian command.

At first, the Palestinian police would be limited to light weapons. Eventually, they would be equipped with light armored cars, light mortars and light, non-combat, helicopters. The police would receive regular training, not to exceed the platoon level.

- Violations. In the event of a massive violation of the demilitarization agreement – the deployment of foreign forces or banned weapons systems inside the Palestinian entity, with or without Palestinian consent – or of continued, large-scale terrorist activities originating from the Palestinian entity, Israel would retain the right of extra-territorial self-defense.

- The role of the superpowers. Without the involvement of both superpowers, a comprehensive peace will not be achievable. It may be possible to start the peace process without Soviet participation but no stable peace can be created without it playing a role at some point in the process. Soviet participation would lessen the chance that Syria would destabilize the peace agreement. Soviet exclusion would heighten the chance that Syria would stay out of the agreement. The cause of peace can
best be served by securing a Soviet commitment to solving the conflict rather than by ensuring Soviet hostility by excluding it from the peace process.

Optimally, the Soviets would participate in a joint U.S.-Soviet sponsorship of a limited international conference. This conference would launch formal peace negotiations after the conclusion of the confidence-building stage. As part of the security arrangements, Moscow would promise not to send military forces or advisers, supply offensive weapons that could threaten the demilitarization arrangements or enter into any military pacts or alliances with either the Palestinian entity or Jordan. It would be invited to sign the final agreement on a par with the United States.

For its part, America has a critical role to play throughout the life of the peace settlement. First, the United States would participate in monitoring the security arrangements of the peace settlement. Its involvement would provide a strong deterrent against those who would try to destroy the settlement. Second, the United States would join with other countries in an effort to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Third, the United States would help Israel take the risks necessary for peace by maintaining close coordination with Israel on the peace process and by continuing to provide it with enough aid to guarantee its qualitative military position.

CONCLUSION

From the point of view of Israeli security, the proposals outlined herein offer a practical way to begin a process of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. These proposals are not risk-free, but to reject them in favor of the status quo is to ensure political stalemate, violent confrontation and, inevitably, war.

For each party, the rewards of joining the agreement are great. The Palestinians would gain self-determination and independence, albeit with limitations that prevent them from determining the fate of their neighbors.
Jordan would gain security from the threat of irredentism that could otherwise undermine the stability of the kingdom.

Israel would gain the peace and security that it has yearned for from the day of its founding.
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