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Israel and the Gulf Crisis: Changing Security Requirements on the Eastern Front

BY DORE GOLD

No matter how the Gulf crisis is ultimately resolved, it has already led to dramatic strategic changes along Israel's eastern front that will bring about long-term alterations in Israel's security environment. Fundamental alignments in the region that have held for at least a decade will no longer be the same. Previous assumptions have been irreversibly shaken.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

However it is ultimately resolved, the Gulf crisis has set into motion several fundamental strategic changes along Israel's eastern front. Taken together, these developments could dramatically alter Israel's security requirements in the West Bank, making it more difficult for any Israeli government to offer far-reaching concessions in negotiations with the Palestinians.

The Gulf crisis has led to three major changes that draw into question Israel's security margin vis a vis the West Bank:

- Increasing domestic instability in Jordan and King Hussein's support for Iraq raise doubts about Jordan's ability to engage in an eventual peace settlement as a stable partner cooperating with Israel to contain a future Palestinian entity.*
- A rapid rapprochement between Iraq and Iran will permit Iraq's army to reduce its pre-occupation with guarding the border with Iran and instead focus more of its deployments toward the west against Israel.*
- A decline in the qualitative superiority of the Israeli Air Force owing to massive U.S. arms sales planned for Saudi Arabia which will reduce Israel's ability to rely on air power to stop Arab armies advancing from the east.*

These developments will make military access to the West Bank more important than ever for Israel. As a result, Israel's security requirements in negotiations with the Palestinians will increase, complicating efforts to achieve a settlement that addresses both Palestinian political rights and Israeli security. Understanding Israel's new strategic concerns and taking them into account will present a serious challenge to U.S. diplomacy as it tries to invigorate the peace process in the post-crisis period.

For Israel, the new regional fluidity may introduce opportunities. However, it has also provided new reasons for caution, particularly in connection with the strategic parameters of a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. Whatever setbacks Iraq ultimately suffers, it will remain a nation of seventeen million people with sufficient resources to rebuild in time whatever military forces it requires, particularly in the conventional area.

In the pre-crisis period, most of the attention to the West Bank/Gaza issue was in the context of the Palestinian problem. But Israel's search for defensible borders along the West Bank's hill ridge and in the Jordan Valley was never simply a function of the threat of the Palestinian Arabs residing in those territories. Instead, Israel's main security interest in the West Bank emanated from the dangers posed by Arab armies to Israel's east, including the repeated threat posed by Iraqi expeditionary forces. In purely strategic terms, the issues of West Bank security and Israel's relations with Arab states along its eastern front have always been inextricably linked.

During the 1980s, Israeli analysts examining options for the future of the West Bank could point out what were expected to be lasting features of the security landscape east of the Jordan River. These features were believed to provide Israel with a sufficient security margin to permit certain territorial concessions:

- *A stable Jordan* to serve as a buffer between Israel and Iraq and which could be engaged in an eventual peace settlement as an eastern anchor containing the expansion of a future Palestinian political entity.

- *The Iraqi army's pre-occupation with Iran.* After the Iran-Iraq cease fire, it could reasonably be asserted that Iraq would be tied down with a long-term Iranian threat, leaving most of its force structure deployed eastward against Iran and limiting the size of any westward deploy-

ment in the direction of Israel.

- *The preservation of Israel's qualitative edge in the air*, allowing for a prompt and effective Israeli response to an Iraqi ground threat, should Iraqi forces cross Israel's "red line" at the Jordan-Iraq border. Israel's freedom to respond to Iraqi provocations was neither constrained by an Iraqi retaliatory capability nor by the presence of friendly allied forces close to the theater of combat. The Middle East arms race had been partially slowed by reduced oil revenues as well as by a deterioration of the Soviet Union's ability to assist its regional clients with large-scale credit.

Each of these assumptions may be undergoing a major transformation as a result of the Gulf crisis. The destabilization of Jordan has been accelerated. Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation has progressed far more rapidly than anticipated prior to the crisis. The projected expansion of the Saudi air force could eventually pose a challenge to Israel from the southeast not seen in past Arab-Israeli conflicts. The enormous U.S. arms sales packages planned for Saudi Arabia could set off a new wave of Middle East arms races that will make itself felt in the Arab-Israeli balance. The re-establishment of large-scale Saudi aid to Syria, for example, could restore Syria's force modernization and expansion programs that slowed in recent years.

The military impact of these developments for Israel's position on the West Bank can only be appreciated if the basic elements of Israeli security interests are understood. For 20 years, deep political differences have existed in Israel regarding the ultimate status of the territories. But a surprising degree of rough consensus could be identified as to the sorts of security arrangements Israel would need to retain in the event of a peace settlement.

These security arrangements for the West Bank went well beyond the demilitarization usually referred to in the Western press. Besides full Israeli control of the West Bank's air space,

they included the continuation of Israeli early-warning and air defense units as well as a substantial ground force presence above the Jordan Valley. To the extent that differences existed among analysts, it related to the magnitude of these deployments and to whether some could be withdrawn over time as a comprehensive regional peace accord was reached and implemented.

Politically, analysts differed over the degree of Israeli sovereignty that would be needed to make these security arrangements workable. In this regard, political assessments varied from seeing such deployments as possible only with full Israeli sovereignty to envisioning Israeli security arrangements placed, through special treaty rights, on the soil of a sovereign Palestinian state.

To the extent that the Gulf crisis results in a narrowing of Israel's security margin beyond the Jordan River, Israeli security arrangements in the West Bank grow in importance. The rejuvenation of the Iraqi threat to Israel, combined with the weakening of the Jordanian buffer, will transform the West Bank into the front line of Israel's defense against Iraq. This does not mean Israelis and Palestinians will not find a *modus vivendi* in the post-crisis environment. It does mean, however, that Israeli diplomacy will have to be stricter in demanding that any proposed political solution does not threaten Israeli security access to the West Bank, now that such access is more important than ever before.

From Israel's standpoint, the emerging new strategic environment heightens Israel's defense needs against the eastern front and its opposition to an independent Palestinian state. Ironically, just as the end of the Gulf crisis might bring increased global pressures to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conditions on the ground in the Middle East are making a Palestinian state settlement in the West Bank and Gaza strategically more dangerous than ever for Israel.

Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, U.S.-Israeli relations were marred by strong disagreements over elements of the 1989 Shamir Peace Initiative. Neither side entertained a dialogue over issues of final status like the acceptability of Palestinian statehood. But behind the procedural debate that occurred, such as the role of the PLO in the implementation of Palestinian elections, an implied difference concerning final status was present. American impatience with Israeli cautiousness could be partly explained by the degree to which the United States thought that some Palestinian political entity based on the 1967 borders was ultimately inevitable.¹

In the past, U.S. expectations about the ease with which Israel's security interests could be met affected U.S. judgements about the chances for reaching an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.² In the post-crisis environment, an American misreading of Israel's security concerns could have serious consequences for the prevention of future Middle East conflicts. If the United States does not have reasonable expectations concerning the limits of Israeli flexibility over the territories, the two allies could fall into a situation of constant political haggling. Such displayed tensions could undermine their collective deterrence of mutual threats and impair whatever Middle East security structure the United States will erect in the Middle East once the Gulf crisis passes.

Israel's Pre-Crisis Security Parameters in the West Bank

Prior to the Gulf crisis, Israel was engaged in an intense political debate over the future of the West Bank and Gaza that was no less heated than the American debate over Vietnam. While the debate focused on what sorts of political control Israel ought to aspire to in the territories, it never involved a strategic debate over the importance of the West Bank to Israeli national security. The basic geo-strategic importance of the West Bank to Israel is worthy of review, though

it has been detailed elsewhere.

While the West Bank is only 34 miles wide, its strategic value is derived from the 81 mile long range of hills that runs through its center along a north-south axis. To the west, the hill range overlooks the most densely populated and industrially developed portions of Israel, situated along the narrow coastal plane. To the east, the West Bank hill range overlooks the Jordan River Valley and the Dead Sea which are some 1,200 feet below sea level; thus, the net height that the 3,000 foot high West Bank ridge poses to an attacker from the east is a steep incline of approximately 4,200 feet.³

Were the West Bank just flat land, the strategic significance of its additional 34 miles to Israel's narrow waistline would be small; Iraq's ground forces moved twice that distance to Kuwait City in six hours. But because of its topography, the West Bank serves as a formidable barrier to an attack from Israel's east. And since there are only five basic east-west routes through the territory, an attacking army would not only have to climb a steep incline, but also move across predictable axes which could be reasonably defended.

These topographical features have special importance because of the asymmetry between the size of Israel's standing army and those of its neighbors. At peacetime, according to foreign sources, Israel has approximately 3-4 active service divisions that are not all available for a single front as long as other threats exist. With adequate strategic warning, the Israeli Army can expand to 12 divisions in 48 hours, after the completion of the reserve call-up. In contrast, Arab armies keep most of their forces on full-time active duty; reserves only fill out existing combat formations.⁴

- Syria's standing army numbers about 10 divisions—some reinforced with four brigades. During 1990, Syria was in the process of forming an additional two divisions.

- Iraq has over 55 divisions. Before its army mushroomed to this size, Iraq had consistently dedicated about one third of its ground force order of battle against Israel.

- Jordan has 4 active service divisions—the same number of active formations as Israel.

- Saudi Arabia, prior to the crisis, had no divisional level formations. However, the 10 brigades that made up its army and national guard amounted to the equivalent of 3 active service divisions; an equivalent of one reinforced division was generally deployed at Tabuk, near Israel.

With this superiority in active service divisions, the wartime objective of any Arab state coalition is to score a decisive victory with its overwhelmingly advantageous initial force ratios, before Israel completes calling up its reserves.

The West Bank figures prominently in Israel's reserve call-up calculations. The distance from Iraq's westernmost border with Jordan to the West Bank is approximately 210 miles. It has been estimated that an Iraqi division could cover this route in about 35 hours—less time than the Israeli reserve call-up.⁵ Thus, an Israeli ground force in the West Bank is critical for holding an initial defensive line in the event of an Iraqi assault. These forces must be backed up with tactical radars and electronic intelligence units that assist in the effort to acquire effective intelligence about ground force preparations to the east.

Israel would never forgo such forward-deployed units and rely only on its own intelligence assessment to supply adequate early warning for a timely reserve call-up. Similarly, Israel could not always rely on the successful interdiction of the Iraqi army by its air force; in 1973, the Israeli air force failed to stop Iraq's expeditionary force as it crossed Syria to the Golan Heights. In the future, ballistic missile attacks against Israeli air bases could signifi-

cantly delay operations against an Iraqi force. In this sense, ballistic missiles, by temporarily neutralizing Israeli air power, actually increase the importance of defensive ground positions, rather than make territory less important, as is often argued in the West. Because of past intelligence failures and the limitations of air support, there is no real substitute for an Israeli ground force in the West Bank.⁶

The West Bank is important in another way for Israel's reserve call-up. In hostile hands, the West Bank hilltops would expose many of Israel's main highways to harassing mortar fire and other varieties of light attack. Local Palestinian units could serve this strategic task. Even if such attacking units are eventually subdued, the impact of their activities along main inter-city arteries would be to lengthen the Israeli reserve call-up beyond 48 hours, thereby drawing out the period of Israeli vulnerability.

Finally, the West Bank is strategically significant not only for Israeli ground forces, but also for the Israeli Air Force. Hostile aircraft entering the West Bank's airspace at the Jordan River can reach the Mediterranean in 3 minutes—the same amount of time that is needed to scramble Israeli interceptors. Thus, if Arab fighter aircraft were to regularly utilize West Bank airspace, they could not be intercepted in adequate time in the event that they suddenly crossed the Green Line and headed for targets in pre-1967 Israel.

Even without crossing into the Green Line, Arab aircraft—including civilian aircraft—could acquire considerably improved electronic intelligence coverage of Israel were they to gain regular access to West Bank airspace. For this reason a special regime for West Bank airspace will be necessary in any political settlement.

Israel's main early-warning radar station, at Ba'al-Hatzor, is located in the Bet El hills northeast of Ramallah.⁷ Such ground-based radars situated on the West Bank hilltops will continue

to have considerable importance for countering low flying air threats—advanced strike aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles—in the future. Fire-control radars, for directing anti-aircraft missiles against such low-altitude targets, would find their line-of-sight blocked by the West Bank hill range, in the event that they were moved to coastal lowlands behind the pre-1967 borders.

Alternative elevated sites for such radar stations may themselves be the subject of negotiation—such as Mount Hermon in the Golan—or are located in populated areas—such as Jerusalem—or provide less than optimal radar coverage. Airborne early-warning may supplement ground basing, but it is important to note that no modern air defense system—whether that associated with the U.S.-Canadian North American air defense, or with NATO's air defense, or, for that matter, the U.S.-designed Saudi air defense system—relies on airborne early-warning alone, even when AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft) and satellite reconnaissance data are available.

AWACS are particularly well-suited to defending vast airspaces where they can provide long-range radar coverage from points that are safely located a considerable distance from hostile aircraft and surface-to-air missile batteries.⁸ An early-warning system, based only on airborne early-warning, would be highly vulnerable in Israel's narrow airspace and easily blinded at the outbreak of hostilities before hostile air defenses were suppressed and air superiority established.

Moreover, the West Bank hills mask Jordanian ground radar and intelligence coverage of Israel that can be relayed back to Iraq. Noting the problems these hills pose to Jordanian military planners, Anthony Cordesman explained several years ago: "Two north-south mountain ranges shield either side of the Jordanian-Israeli border . . . this creates a north-south barrier 2,000-3,000 feet high which shields most of Israel from radar coverage, and which severely restricts both practical artillery and SAM range as

well as the ability to target and register and make artillery, rocket, and missile fire effective."⁹

Given these contributions of the West Bank to Israel's security, several common themes emerge from analyses of Israeli security requirements in the event of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Some variations exist over the magnitude of the presence envisioned in each security requirement:¹⁰

- *Demilitarization of the West Bank from Arab conventional armies.* While demilitarization does not preclude the development of a strong police force in the territories, it is usually associated with the exclusion of Arab combat aircraft, artillery, surface-to-air missile batteries, and tanks. Another point of concern in a demilitarization regime is the issue of ground fortifications and mine fields; because of the need to preserve Israeli access to the territories in the event of an eastern front attack, Israeli proposals for demilitarization specifically preclude such Palestinian defensive arrangements. It is noteworthy, for purposes of comparison, that in Annex 1 of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, while field fortifications are allowed to Egypt in Zones A and B in Sinai, in sensitive Zone C—next to the Israeli border—there is no provision for Egyptian ground fortifications. For minimalistic security models that seek to move most Israeli defense capabilities into the West Bank in the event of a threat, this prohibition against Palestinian fortifications is particularly vital.

- *Deployment of Israeli ground forces along the sparsely populated eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge, particularly close to the five axes running from the Jordan River westward to the coastal plane.* The size of the suggested deployment will be related to its primary function and the size of the threat it has to cope with. A trip-wire force might be sought in the event of an attempted re-militarization of an evacuated West Bank. Larger forces would be required if the army's mission is actually to block an attack while the reserve call-up is conducted. Thus, estimates of the necessary

IDF deployment in the West Bank have generally ranged from two to seven brigades (about 3,000 soldiers each).¹¹ But whatever the size of an ongoing deployment, most analysts recognize that Israel would always retain the right to extensively reinforce these units should a higher-order threat begin to materialize. Under such conditions, the IDF's West Bank deployment could reach several divisions.

In August 1978, just prior to the Camp David Accords, former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan offered his view on the size of Israel's deployment in the territories: "in my view, the IDF has to have the right to be in every area that the general staff finds it appropriate up to the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip, because situations can change; however in any event it [the IDF] does not have to be there to intervene in the lives of the Arabs . . . if a period of peace comes we will want, of course, to reduce our forces as much as possible . . ." ¹² One of the achievements of Camp David, according to Dayan, was that IDF deployment in the West Bank was not made conditional upon the mutual agreement of the parties, but upon Israeli decision-making alone.¹³ The preservation of flexibility, according to circumstances, was important for Israeli negotiators to protect.

- *Utilization of West Bank routes to resupply forward-deployed Israeli ground forces.* The variations in the estimates of an Israeli ground force in the West Bank is accompanied by different views of the preferred axes of resupply to such a force. A minimalistic approach would seek a north-south axis of resupply along the Jordan River that would be removed from heavily populated areas. A more conservative military approach might insist on preserving current east-west routes of resupply, that while crossing more densely populated areas, would be largely outside the arc of Jordanian artillery fire.

- *Full Israeli control of West Bank airspace.* The most important aspect of airspace control is the denial of the area to hostile aircraft. But airspace

control is also needed to give Israel the means of verifying any demilitarization regime and to grant the Israeli Air Force enough area for training, especially after the loss of training sites over Sinai in the aftermath of Camp David.

• *The continued utilization of West Bank hilltops for early-warning stations.* The vulnerability as well as technical limitations of airborne early-warning has been recognized by most Israeli analysts. According to former Israeli Air Force Commander, Maj. General (res.) Benny Peled, the movement of air force early-warning stations to behind the 1967 borders would leave Israel with the problem of coping with the threat of all low-altitude air attacks.¹⁴

Some variations on the size of early-warning facilities have been considered; for example, another former Israeli Air Force Commander, Maj. General (res.) Amos Lapidot, has proposed utilizing "forward sensors" that would transfer "a large volume of digital data" to the "entire operational unit (that would stay behind) in our territory."¹⁵ This minimalistic approach to the manning of early-warning stations, while reducing the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, would make them vulnerable "to the clip of a pliers" according to General Peled.

• *The retention of Israel's air defense systems in the West Bank.* As previously noted, the West Bank hill ridge is particularly important for providing Israeli air defense units the ability to intercept low flying aircraft that otherwise would be undetectable from low points along the coastal plain. With the West Bank hills blocking their fire-control radars, an Israeli air defense system behind the 1967 borders would only be able to destroy such low-flying targets on the outskirts of Israeli population centers instead of over the Jordan River.

Brig. General (res.) Giora Forman has suggested that the current HAWK (range-25 miles) anti-aircraft system might be replaced by a longer-range PATRIOT (range-50 miles) anti-aircraft

system and that PATRIOT could then be deployed within the 1967 borders.¹⁶ While addressing the threat of medium to high altitude air attack, such an option would not be able to cope with low altitude air attack. Moreover, from positions behind the 1967 borders, shorter range air defenses (Chaparral, Stinger) would lose much of their effectiveness; Israel's air defense line over the Jordan River would come to depend on long-range PATRIOT air defense alone. Israeli air defense planners would not be able to build a system based on layered defenses of short, medium, and long-range surface-to-air missile batteries.

Running through much of the discussion of Israeli security requirements is the assumption that Israeli forces must ultimately be responsible for the early warning, ground defense, and verification of any demilitarization regime in the West Bank. In other words, the proposals for the Israeli deployment preclude a security system based on UN forces or even American military units. "Our experience teaches us that an (international) apparatus only works when both sides are prepared to fulfill an agreement," explained former IDF Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit.¹⁷ The weakness of an international presence becomes immediately apparent once one of the sides breaches an agreement.

Because of Israel's poor experience with international forces, it is highly doubtful that any Israeli government would depend on them **solely** in the small areas of the West Bank. Unlike in the case of Sinai, Israel's margin for error in the territories is extremely narrow. Similarly, international security guarantees would be largely unacceptable to most Israelis if offered as a substitute for Israeli self-defensive capabilities. As Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan told President Carter in September 1977, Israel would favor a superpower security guarantee in any peace settlement—but not in exchange for secure borders.¹⁸

West Bank Security Requirements and Israel's Eastern Front

A rough Israeli consensus could be outlined prior to the Gulf crisis regarding the essential elements of Israeli security in the West Bank: "the vast majority of those involved in security matters," asserted former Israeli Army Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, in 1988, "would agree with the central conclusion . . . that the continuation of an Israeli military presence, even after a political settlement, will remain vital for a considerable period of time."¹⁹ One difference between analysts of West Bank security that nonetheless is evident from the previous section is the estimate of the necessary magnitude of the Israeli military presence in the territories. The more minimalist models have been largely based on certain assumptions about Israel's strategic landscape to the east:

The Existence of a Reliable Jordanian Buffer

Because the size of any Israeli deployment in the West Bank has been directly a function of the threat emanating from Israel's eastern front, minimalist models of Israel's West Bank security needs have sought to control the threat through understandings with Jordan. Several sorts of Israeli-Jordanian arrangements have been suggested in this context: the reduction of Jordanian force deployments near the Jordan Valley; the prohibition against Jordan joining military pacts against Israel; the prevention of the entry of foreign armies—like that of Iraq or Syria—into Jordanian territory for exercises, transit, or stationing. Israelis intuitively understood the weaknesses and limitations of the Hashemite Kingdom. Nonetheless, at a minimum, it was hoped that Jordan could resist the encroachments of its larger Arab neighbors; at best, Jordan might be fully incorporated into a Palestinian settlement and undertake the kinds of self-limitations described above.²⁰

The idea that Jordan would have a strong interest in not becoming a route of transit or a

platform of attack against Israel was a very reasonable point of departure. True, in 1948 and again in 1967, Jordan permitted the entry of Iraqi expeditionary forces seeking to attack Israel. But in 1967, the four brigade Iraqi force was only half the size of the eight brigade Jordanian army of the time. With the expansion of the Iraqi army to over 50 divisions during the 1980s, an Iraqi expeditionary force today against Israel could easily be larger than the entire size of the four division Jordanian army. Moreover, since the 1967 Iraqi deployment in Jordan lasted through 1970, it was reasonable to assume that King Hussein would never want to expose himself again to the possibility of such an extended Iraqi presence.

But already in the period before the Gulf crisis, Jordan was defying such rational expectations of its behavior. In July 1989, Amman gave permission to Iraq's air force to fly through Jordanian air space to photograph sites in Israel. By early 1990, Iraq and Jordan announced the formation of a joint air squadron and ground force brigade. Intelligence collaboration between the two countries was intensified during the same period, including information from Jordanian radar stations concerning Israeli air movements. If Jordan had been a reliable buffer state separating Israel and Iraq since the early 1970s, by the early 1990s the buffer had become increasingly porous.

King Hussein still has good reasons not to allow Jordan to become a battlefield between Israel and Iraq. He has made formal statements that he will not permit the entry of foreign forces into Jordan. However, as the Gulf crisis has demonstrated, the king operates under considerable political constraints; Jordanian policy must maneuver through the varied interests of each of the kingdom's powerful neighbors.

It is not difficult to imagine incremental developments in Jordanian-Iraqi cooperation that could come close to crossing Israel's declared "red line" against the stationing of Iraqi

forces in Jordan: rotating air squadrons, the introduction of small ground formations for joint exercises, and the pre-positioning of Iraqi military equipment in Jordan are all conceivable possibilities. Such incremental erosion of the Israeli "red line" will undermine Israeli deterrence of an Iraqi attack as well as provide Iraq with an improved local infrastructure, within Jordan, for military options against Israel.

Ever since the 1950s, observers have been predicting the imminent overthrow of King Hussein. But he has proven himself to be the most skilled survivor in the Middle East. The Gulf crisis is likely to leave Jordan with new socio-economic burdens that will further strain its fragile structure. Already the status of the Palestinian communities in the Arab Gulf states has been called into question due to the pro-Iraqi political alignment of most Palestinians. As a result, in the 1990s, employment opportunities in the Gulf for excess Jordanian labor cannot be expected to be favorable.

On top of that, mass expulsions of Palestinian workers with Jordanian passports from the Gulf states cannot be ruled out; this would not only preclude Jordan from acquiring the kinds of remittances that it once enjoyed, but it will also further upset the demographic and political balances within the kingdom. These internal sources of instability are likely to arise regardless of the size of the Iraqi military at the end of the crisis. At the same time, the damage caused to Saudi-Jordanian relations could well affect Saudi readiness to support King Hussein with post-crisis financial assistance. It is noteworthy to recall that Saudi Arabia's formal financial obligations to Jordan, made at the 1978 Baghdad Summit, ran out in 1988. It is unlikely that, in the 1990s, Jordan will benefit from both Iraqi and Saudi assistance as it did in the 1980s.

In short, a large question mark exists over the future status of Jordan and the degree to which Israel can realistically plan on integrating it into a West Bank settlement. Jordan has been

showing far less resistance to the Iraqi encroachments than has been expected. Moreover, the prognosis for continued Jordanian stability, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, is not good. The marked increase of Palestinian infiltration attempts from Jordan in 1990—involving Jordanian security personnel as well—has been seen in Israel as indicative of the King's weakened grip on events.²¹ While interested parties, like the United States or Syria, might act to prevent a forcible Iraqi entry into Jordan, there is little outside parties can do about less dramatic forms of Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation or about increasing internal instability in Jordan itself. Syria, with increased self-assurance after establishing supremacy in Lebanon, might be moved to preemptively penetrate a declining Jordan.

Whether Jordan remains a Hashemite Kingdom throughout the 1990s, or becomes Palestine, south Syria, or western Iraq, Israel will not be able to depend on its stability with the same degree of certainty. For planning purposes, Israel will not be able to structure its approach to West Bank security with the assumption that King Hussein will be able to control events east of the Jordan River. Unilateral Israeli policy statements regarding the entry of foreign forces into Jordan will remain as relevant as ever. Jordan should not be written off as a factor in an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. But its capacity to assume added burdens of any controversial security arrangements with Israel must be very soberly assessed.

Iraqi Pre-Occupation with Iran

One important variable in any assessment of the threat to Israel's east—and hence the defensive levels necessary in the West Bank—has been the size of any future Iraqi expeditionary force. Iraq has participated in three Arab-Israeli wars. In 1948, two Iraqi brigades out of a total army of two divisions joined the coalition against Israel; in 1967, four brigades out of four divisions were dispatched by Baghdad; and in 1973, the Iraqis sent two divisions and three independent bri-

gades out of a six to seven division army to the Golan Heights. Thus, in each Arab-Israeli war, approximately one third of Iraq's ground forces were sent against Israel.

Iraq's participation in Arab war coalitions always transpired against a background of other Iraqi military concerns—whether internal threats from the Kurdish rebellion or the Shah's military buildup in Iran. Generally, Iraq's ground force deployments reflected these other national security concerns. After an eight year war against Iran, Iraq could have been expected to be more engrossed than ever with the threat from its east. Even with the expansion of the Iraqi army to approximately 55 divisions by the war's end, it would have been reasonable to project that an Iraqi expeditionary force against Israel would never come close to reaching a third of the ground force order of battle; it would have been safe to assess that no more than four to six divisions would be sent in the direction of Israel.

The Gulf crisis has accelerated Iranian-Iraqi rapprochement and has hence removed one of the principle limiting factors in massive Iraqi force deployments against Israel. That the rapprochement was largely on Iran's terms gives Teheran strong incentives not to restore the pre-crisis level of hostility by engaging in a threatening force buildup against Iraq. Initially, the burden of facing the freed-up Iraqi divisions is being placed on Saudi Arabia and the forces of the anti-Iraq coalition located there. But once the crisis is resolved, Iraq's military concerns in the south will be substantially reduced, allowing many of the additional units now deployed in southern Iraq to become usable in a future expeditionary force against Israel.

Of course, should Iraq's military potential be cut back as a result of the Gulf crisis, the size of the expeditionary threat should proportionally be cut back as well. However, such a change in Iraq's military potential can only prove to be temporary. "No outcome is likely to permanently eliminate Iraq as a regional power . . ."

predicted Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, in October 1990.²²

Iraq will remain a country with upwards of 17 million people and enormous oil resources. It should have the capacity to recover whatever losses it suffers in its conventional armed forces. Even after Israel's past victories against Arab states, the recovery of their defeated armies and air forces was completed within two to three years time. While global arms control efforts aimed at the Middle East are likely to focus on non-conventional armaments, foreign arms suppliers from Europe to the USSR will continue to have considerable interests in supplying Iraq's conventional military needs. A post-crisis Iraqi army that is reduced from 55 divisions and built up again to only 30, could still project a 10 division threat against Israel.

Iraq's post-crisis ability to wage war against Israel will also be a function of its potential Arab coalition partners. For example, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Syria under Hafez al-Assad have been locked in bitter enmity up to the Gulf crisis. Should Saddam be replaced as a result of the crisis, the chances of Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement would increase considerably, especially since Syria's pro-Iranian orientation will be less of an issue under conditions of improved Iraqi-Iranian relations. Syria, given a new set of relations with a post-crisis Iraq, might be more willing than previously to permit its territory to be used as a route for the Iraqi army to the Golan Heights, as was the case in 1973. As far as the West Bank is concerned, should there be a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, Syrian sensitivities to Iraq's utilization of transit routes would be considerably reduced.

Israeli Air Superiority

The notion that Israel might need defensive positions to its east because of the potential threat of an Iraqi expeditionary force—backed by Jordanian or other Arab armies—might seem to ignore the decisive role that Israeli air power

would be expected to play in interdicting the Iraqis in eastern Jordan, long before they reached the Jordan River and Israel's defensive lines. If Israel's real line of defense is its "red line" on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, then a defensive line in the West Bank, it might be argued, is at best of only secondary importance and at worst, superfluous.

In fact, there has always been a relationship between the magnitude of Israel's eastern deployment and Israeli air superiority: the strength of the latter has allowed a minimal approach to the former. In analyzing the air threat to Israel from Jordan, former Israeli Air Force Deputy Commander, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yehezkel Somech, wrote in 1982: "Israel succeeded today to live with this problematic border (its eastern border), among other reasons, because of its enormous superiority in its air force and in the freedom of action it enjoyed in this theater... This superiority allowed, among other things: the reduction to a minimum of the need to allocate Israeli ground forces against this front, with the assumption that the Israeli Air Force will be able to hold up any significant threatening movement until the reserves are called up or until other ground forces are brought... and indeed thus matters developed in the Six Day War and in the Yom Kippur War."²³

It is important to stress that the efficacy of air power, utilized in this manner, has not always been proven in the past and could be seen to be problematic in the strategic environment of the future. In 1973, the Israeli Air Force did not succeed in interdicting the Iraqi expeditionary force as it crossed Syria and headed for the Golan Heights. Even in 1967, the Iraqi 18th mechanized brigade was only halted by the Israeli Air Force near the Jordan River and not in eastern Jordan. In the future, the Israeli Air Force could find itself extremely busy with new tasks that might limit its capacity to provide support against invading ground forces: in addition to its initial task of suppressing enemy surface-to-air missile launchers, the IAF could

be directed to destroy ballistic missile launchers at the outset of a war. Between its air superiority missions and any such new offensive tasks, the IAF may not be able to provide sufficient airpower at the outset of hostilities to stop an Iraqi ground intrusion through Jordan.

With the massive arms sales planned for Saudi Arabia as a result of the Gulf crisis, Israel's air balance against potential adversaries along its eastern front will, in all likelihood, be worse than what might have been expected had the crisis not erupted. Not only will the Israeli Air Force have the added challenge of ballistic missile launchers, but it will also have to allocate added resources to achieving air superiority, especially if the Saudi air force decides to participate in any conflict.

In 1973, while the Saudis deployed a brigade in the Golan Heights, their air force stayed out of the war. At the time, Israel enjoyed a clear-cut qualitative advantage to the Saudis in hardware, since the Saudis had not yet received state-of-the-art American equipment. Today, the Saudis already possess 62 F-15 Eagle air superiority fighters; they are expecting 48 additional F-15s in the near future. With 100 outdated F-5E aircraft needing replacement, and British Tornado aircraft on the way, the Saudi air force will have 250 of the latest generation aircraft by the latter part of the 1990s. Saudi Arabia will no longer remain a peripheral factor in the air balance, but will become a major power.

In addition, should the new Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian axis hold, Saudi aid to Syria could increase, allowing Damascus to step up air force modernization without the economic constraints of the pre-crisis period. American opposition to a new round of Soviet arms sales to Syria, in the newly emerging strategic environment, will be difficult to imagine. Thus even if the Iraqi air force is scaled back, Israel might face considerably strengthened air forces on either flank of Jordan, which would have to be accounted for in any interdiction missions against the Iraqi army.

Changing Security in the West Bank: Implications

Each of these developments caused by the Gulf crisis has altered the strategic environment on Israel's eastern front and must impinge on Israeli security considerations toward the West Bank. It becomes difficult to imagine the implementation of limited security arrangements in Jordan that would allow a minimalistic Israeli West Bank presence; Jordan seems to be either aligned closely with Iraq or on the verge of internal instability. The relief of the Iraqi military from an immediate Iranian threat suggests that Iraq's post-crisis military weight might eventually be directed westward more easily than was ever expected even after the Iran-Iraq war ended. The success of Israeli air-to-ground operations against a potential Iraqi thrust may not be assured at the outbreak of hostilities.

In this new environment, it may be necessary to review the actual magnitude of West Bank security arrangements. The more uncertain situation to the east will necessitate greater levels of readiness and caution than in the past. This could translate into a search for more dispersed, hardened, well protected and even redundant installations, precluding reliance on more vulnerable facilities or thinner deployments. Calculations of the number of anti-aircraft batteries that are adequate for the eastern front may change. What seemed to be an acceptable minimal security condition in the more predictable pre-crisis environment could be viewed as wholly inadequate given the greater instability that has been introduced eastward.

The Gulf crisis underlines one of the potentially complicating political aspects of the Israeli ground deployment in the West Bank: well before the outbreak of actual hostilities, Israel may need to reinforce its deployment to the east for a considerable period of time. In a more threatening environment, the number of Israeli troops in the West Bank could increase. The size of these forces will be a direct function of the

anticipated size of expeditionary Arab armies coming through Jordan. Already in November 1990, in the somewhat different context of counter-terrorism, the increased frequency of cross-border infiltration attempts from a less stable Jordan has led to considerations of building up the IDF presence along the Jordan Valley. As previously noted, should these Israeli forces be vulnerable to missile or air attack, there would be a desire to avoid confining them to easily targeted fixed locations and instead keep them moving on West Bank roads.

Might not the Gulf crisis introduce regional security arrangements that could compensate Israel for giving up territorial assets? Perhaps an extended U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia would add greater credibility to the sorts of security guarantees that Moshe Dayan found to be an unacceptable substitute for defensible borders in the 1970s. The lessons of the Gulf crisis are, however, not likely to be so clear-cut for Israel. Israel's confidence in American intelligence warning—in lieu of its own capability in the West Bank—will not be enhanced by the assessment errors made by Washington prior to the crisis. Moreover, Israelis would still be concerned that U.S. policymakers might be tempted to withhold or re-interpret intelligence data that would give Israel cause for a preemptive attack.

Whether the ultimate size of any post-crisis U.S. regional presence would be adequate to deter war beyond the Arabian peninsula is very doubtful. It is more probable that the only ongoing U.S. presence that would be acceptable to Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies would be based primarily on skeletal crews protecting pre-positioned equipment. If American forces are drawn down in Saudi Arabia, it is unlikely that Iraq would have to retain enormous forces to its south in order to defend against the minuscule Saudi ground threat. Baghdad would still have considerable flexibility regarding westward deployments toward Jordan and Israel.

Moreover, in the narrow time frame of Is-

raeli vulnerability—forty-eight hours before the reserve call-up is completed—there is little the U.S. reinforcement of Israel could accomplish. In the 1990s, the United States will still need ten days to two weeks before U.S.-based ground forces could reach divisional strength in the Middle East. And one rapidly deployed American division could do little when Israel faces threats of ten divisions or more on each of its fronts. In addition, U.S. facilities already located in theater in the Arabian peninsula, unlike extra-territorial bases, are likely to be scenario specific—that is, they will only be usable in contingencies that Americans and Saudis agree warrant their use. In that context, the chances that Saudi Arabia would permit the use of its territory for American operations defending Israel are extremely slim.

In short, an American presence in Saudi Arabia might add to Israeli security if it is viewed as a real threat by Israel's adversaries. But in order to constitute a concern for post-crisis Iraq, the presence would have to reach levels that Saudi Arabia would find difficult to accept. Whatever the final level of forces decided upon, it is doubtful that such a presence could serve as a substitute for the hard military assets currently held by Israel in the West Bank.

The Gulf Crisis and Israel's Post-Crisis Peace Options

The discussion of Israel's security requirements in the West Bank has not yet come up in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Yet this issue already affects the diplomatic choices Israel must make at very preliminary procedural stages. The most critical question an Israeli government must answer is under what conditions it can best preserve security access it needs to the West Bank in order to defend Israel from an eastern front coalition, while at the same time addressing the political needs of the Palestinians.

There is a rough consensus among Israeli analysts and security experts about the sort of

assets Israel needs in the West Bank for its self-defense. Some variations can be noted regarding the magnitude of these security arrangements. But the essential disagreement focuses on the question of what kind of sovereignty is needed in order to obtain the level of security that is generally agreed to as necessary. Some say that demilitarization and Israeli security arrangements are only obtainable if the West Bank is brought under full Israeli sovereignty.

Others argue that in exchange for receiving sovereignty, the Palestinians will agree to an extra-territorial Israeli military presence on the soil of a Palestinian state. Another school of thought seeks to annex territory where most of the Israeli forces would be deployed; the Allon Plan, for example, sought to retain 700 square miles of the 2100 square miles that make up the West Bank. Still others, rejecting these options, seek alternatives to exclusive Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty.

The upshot of the strategic analysis presented here is that if Israel's security requirements in the West Bank increase in the post-crisis environment, the Palestinian state option becomes even less workable than ever and more dangerous for Israel to accede to. Moreover, any post-crisis peace process that appears to be leading to a Palestinian state outcome will be viewed by Israel's government as implicitly placing Israeli security assets in the West Bank at an unacceptable level of risk. The new environment, in this sense, narrows the range of Israeli political options.

In any negotiations, the chances of Israel preserving its defensive assets—if the terms of reference are Palestinian statehood—were never extremely good, at least if the Camp David process is a precedent. The most minimal requirement of demilitarization was found to be partially workable in Sinai only because Sinai was considered a peripheral area of Egypt. A demilitarization regime covering the whole of a West Bank Palestinian state would be the func-

tional equivalent to the demilitarization of the Nile Valley—the heartland and not the periphery of a country.

But the most difficult aspect of preserving Israeli security interests rises in connection with the Israeli Army presence. The very notion of Israeli extra-territorial military installations on Arab sovereign soil was impossible to implement even in the peripheral Sinai case, when continued access to Etzion Air Base was sought by Israeli negotiators. If the Israeli Air Force does not have use of Sinai airspace, it is difficult to envisage obtaining control of the airspace of the entire Palestinian patrimony. In the heartland of a Palestinian state, it would be extremely doubtful that the Israeli Army presence would ever be acceptable. The more robust presence required in the post-Gulf crisis period would simply be a non-starter.²⁴

In fact, it is far more likely that the Israeli presence would be internationalized to a UN force that has never been an acceptable substitute for Israelis. And if some Israeli security arrangements on Arab soil would become acceptable at all, it is very likely that the Arab side would acquire some veto power over their modification or reinforcement.

The time period of any extra-territorial force deployment would also probably be compressed; Palestinians would likely seek to limit any foreign presence to the interim period—five years in Camp David—leaving their state free of foreign troops by the time of final status. Yet Israelis believe that some presence might need to be permanent while other aspects could be removed only after a decade of stable regional peace. Any post-crisis peace process will have to take into account that Israel will seek to protect its military access to the West Bank now that such access is more important than ever.

Might Israel be able to draw down its West Bank presence if negotiations with the Palestinians ever move from an interim agreement to

final status? Some Israelis argued before the Gulf crisis that as long as the threat to Israel from the east exists, Israel needs defensive borders; but if the Middle East settles down and becomes another Western Europe, Israel will not need defensible borders any more than the Netherlands. According to such reasoning, then Israel could hold out the promise of evacuating most of the West Bank after thirty or forty years of regional peace.

This raises a fundamental issue relevant for all countries in the post-Cold War era. Even if a threat level radically diminishes, what sort of defensive capacity should nations retain in the event that the “ideal world” suddenly breaks down. For the United States, the question to be answered is how far should Washington cut back its defense budget. For Israel, in this instance, the level of peacetime capabilities relates to the extent of Israeli security arrangements and territorial depth on the West Bank.

In the event of an unanticipated international change, the U.S. Navy could always bring back into service a battleship that it was forced to mothball because of defense cuts. The Israeli Army could not so easily re-take lost defensive positions in the West Bank that it had abandoned. For both the United States and Israel there is a problem of defining the level of vulnerability that they can responsibly expose themselves to in an improving international situation, keeping in mind that sudden reversals are conceivable and must be considered.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a reminder that, especially in the Middle East, considerable defensive capabilities must be preserved in the event of unexpected change. Israel, in short, should not be expected to place itself in a position of not having defensive borders or adequate defensive strength. In this sense, Israeli negotiators should not limit their security access to the West Bank in time nor in magnitude. That was the achievement in the security clauses of Camp David, noted by Dayan above. In the

uncertain regional environment created by the Gulf crisis these two dimensions of the Israeli defensive posture in the West Bank will undoubtedly continue to be vital for Israeli security.

Clearly, the assertion of Israeli sovereignty in areas where Israel needs security would best protect Israeli security arrangements from the vagaries of Middle Eastern changes. Notions of real territorial compromise like the Allon Plan, that gave Israel at least one-third of the West Bank for such purposes, have not only been the basis of thinking of former Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, but also were formally declared as a proposal meriting serious examination by the government of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin.²⁵

At the same time it is important to recall that Israel's West Bank interests are geographically dispersed. Ground forces are ideally deployed along the eastern slopes of the hill ridge overlooking the Jordan River. Early-warning is best suited to the highest points along the central vertical axis of the hill ridge. East-west re-supply roads cut across the West Bank horizontally, while air space control covers all the skies of the territories. This geographic dispersion of strategic assets does not lend itself to neat territorial divisions.

Reconciling Palestinian rights in the West Bank and Israeli security interests will require considerable diplomatic creativity. In the uncertain era created by the Gulf crisis, Moshe Dayan's vision for the West Bank remains as relevant as ever:

"It was my view that we had to establish a pattern of relationship between us and the Palestinians that would preserve our vital interests, and at the same time enable the Arabs to lead their lives as they wished. For our part, we had to make certain that no Palestinian state would rise west of the River Jordan; that we would have the right to maintain military

units and installations in that territory; and that we would be entitled to establish settlements there providing that this was not done at the expense of the Arabs . . . The Jewish settlements would be linked to the Government of Israel, and the Arabs could decide whether they wished to have ties with the Government of Jordan or of Israel, or run their own institutions . . ."²⁶

Dayan's "functional" division of sovereignty protects Israeli military access by making Israeli military sovereignty over the West Bank permanent. But at the same time, it falls short of outright Israeli annexation by giving the Palestinians political rights in all other fields of endeavor and the opportunity to associate themselves politically with a neighboring Arab state. Neither party can exclusively control the West Bank. Instead of seeking absolute sovereignty, both sides must look to creative alternatives to sovereignty. It is less than what the Palestinians want, but it may be the most that Israel can offer.

One feature of the Middle East that might not have been apparent in Dayan's time was the critical role of Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Syria in stabilizing Israel's eastern border. The functional compromise concept of the 1970s was built on shared control of the West Bank by Israel and Jordan. Iraq was only a peripheral actor whose involvement in the peace process would have been preferred but was by no means necessary.

Yet after the Gulf crisis, Iraq will have emerged as a central actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the massive expansion of ground forces, Iraqi expeditionary forces could conceivably be larger than the entire armies of some Arab front-line states. Under such circumstances, it will be difficult in the future to envisage a solution of the West Bank issue that does not include post-crisis Iraq.

Jordan alone will not have the capacity to

anchor an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The main Arab military powers of Iraq and Syria, aside from Jordan, will emerge as absolutely critical elements for dealing with the strategic aspects of the West Bank issue. The logic of a peace process that seeks to normalize Israel's relations with the Arab states alongside with Israel's relations with the Palestinians will be even more compelling in the post-crisis period.

In the post-crisis environment, Israel will remain more reluctant than ever to consider Palestinian statehood in territory whose strategic importance to Israel's defense will increase. It may be that, at the next stage of the peace process, efforts will have to focus on improving the environment between Israel and several Arab states. But when the West Bank issue

eventually returns, Israel will only advance forward if it believes that it is entering a process in which its vital security interests are being taken into account and not placed at risk.

Dore Gold is a 1990 visiting fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

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NOTES

1. Israeli concerns about where the Bush Administration was precisely heading began to accelerate after the speech of Secretary of State James Baker before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on May 22, 1989. Whereas in the final Middle East address by former Secretary of State George Shultz, given at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy on September 16, 1988, explicit reference was made to Israel never returning to the 1967 borders, in the Baker speech, the explicit reference to borders was absent. Nor could Shultz's former statement be extracted from President Bush in subsequent private meetings with American Jewish leaders. If in the 1982 Reagan Plan, self-government for the Palestinians, in the American vision of final status, required ultimately "association with Jordan," by the 1989 Baker speech, association with Jordan was no longer a necessary condition. Taken together with the central role designated by Baker for the PLO in the implementation of the Shamir election initiative, Israelis quickly suspected that the Bush-Baker team was pushing Israel in the

direction of a Palestinian state under PLO control as the "inevitable solution" to the West Bank/Gaza problem.

2. William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986), see footnote 22, p. 45.

3. Several outstanding surveys review the geographic and military importance of the West Bank for Israeli security: Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev, *The West Bank: Line of Defense* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) and Brig. Gen. (res.) Aharon Levran and Michael Widlansky, "The Potential Military Dangers from a Palestinian State," in Michael Widlansky (ed.), *Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?* (Jerusalem: IASPS, 1990). A historical review of the strategic importance of the West Bank to Israel in the pre-1967 period is covered by Michael Oren in "Israel and the Jordan Crisis of 1958" (*Studies in Zionism*, forthcoming). Oren describes how the Israeli security establishment, facing an Iraqi takeover of Jordan in 1956-7 and subsequently an Egyptian Nasserist takeover, considered seizing the West Bank in order to achieve defensible borders

against a major Arab power to Israel's east.

4. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Israel has nine armored divisions in reserves and three in active service totalling twelve divisions (see *The Military Balance, 1990-91*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 107.) The Jaffee Center, using foreign and Israeli publications also maintains that Israel has twelve divisions (see *The Middle East Military Balance, 1988-89*, p. 190). Using foreign sources, Shalev has calculated Israel's standing army at four to five divisions (see Shalev, p. 41).

5. Shalev, p. 40. By comparison, in 1973, the Iraqi 12th armored brigade—belonging to the 3rd armored division—began moving toward Syria on October 8 and managed to cross 1360 kilometers to the outskirts of Damascus by October 10. Thus, maintaining that future Iraqi armored units could cross the much shorter distance to Israel through Jordan in less than 48 hours—or even 35 hours—is entirely reasonable given the rate of advance achieved in 1973. See Tzvi Offer (ed.), *The Iraqi Army in the Yom Kippur War* (in Hebrew translated from Arabic study by Iraqi officers, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publications, 1986), pp. 109-110. Iraqi officers maintained that their expeditionary forces had three basic deficiencies in 1973: (a) an inadequate number of routes of access for moving their forces; (b) an inadequate number of armored fighting vehicle transporters; and (c) no mobile air defense missiles. Each of these deficiencies has since that time been more than adequately addressed by the Iraqi army.

6. Maj. Gen. (res) Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth—An Israeli View," in *Ma'arachot*, October 1979, pp. 21-25. Yariv maintains "However, our experience and the experience of other nations (which have been stressed in the previous data) teach that it is forbidden to base everything on intelligence warning that will provide enough time for the call-up of sufficient forces in order to cancel the threat posed by a surprise action by

the other side (on a small or large scale). We must maintain at all times enough forces, at sea, in the air and on land, that can stand against a surprise action and be of sufficient strength to allow the call-up of additional forces needed for eliminating the enemy . . ."

7. Moshe Dayan, *On the Peace Process and Israel's Future* (in Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publications, 1988), p. 173.

8. Group Captain M.B. Elsam, FBIM, RAF, *Air Defense* (London: Brassey's Defence Publications Ltd., 1989,) p. 173.

9. Anthony H. Cordesman, *Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Military Balance* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1983), pp. 47-49.

10. These concepts for security arrangements repeatedly appeared in the Israeli security debate in a variety of locations. A comprehensive presentation of Israeli security requirements appears in Appendix 1 of *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1989). Former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (res.) Mordechai Gur stated that while it was possible to concede most of the West Bank, it could only be done under the following conditions: (a) complete demilitarization including the establishment of intelligence warning systems based on observation points on the top of the hill ridge and other intelligence warning systems based on observation points on the top of the hill ridge and other methods; (b) Israeli control of the Jerusalem-Ma'aleh Adumim line, the Jordan Valley line and the passes (the five east-west passes from the Jordan to the hill ridge)—while keeping a presence along the Allon road and other security roads that Israel paved. (*Ha'aretz*, June 13, 1988.)

Former national security advisor in the Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. (res.) Abraham Tamir lists in his memoirs Israeli security requirements for the interim autonomy regime in the West Bank: permanent military camps and fortifica-

tions along the Jordan River; internal security system for counter-terrorism; maintenance facilities; early-warning facilities; communication facilities; settlements to be integrated into the security system; regular patrols; freedom of movement for operational and maintenance activities; freedom of action for the Air Force over the territories and for the Israeli Navy in the Dead Sea. "If in the course of years," he adds, "peace will be established between Israel and all the confrontation states . . . it will then be possible to consider possibilities of changes in the deployment." Abraham Tamir, *A Soldier in Pursuit of Peace* (in Hebrew, Tel Aviv: *Yediot Aharonot*, 1988), pp. 62-64.

Former head of the Central Command area, Maj. Gen. (res.) Rehavam Ze'evi, has stressed that an Israeli ground presence in the West Bank has three purposes: absorbing an attack, executing a defense, and counter-attack. For this purpose, he would insist on the right to have a force containing anywhere from one squad to the entire Israeli Defense Forces. Ze'evi adds that the Israeli ground presence must not be kept in fixed locations where it would be vulnerable to missile attack, nor must its whereabouts be known to the other side. Supply lines, he adds, must run from the depth of the front forward and not along the front itself. A future Israeli government, he warns, facing violations of the demilitarization arrangements or even an isolated mortar attack on an Israeli installation in non-Israeli territory would not respond any more than the Israeli government acted in 1970 when the Egyptians violated their cease-fire agreement by moving SAM batteries up to the Suez Canal. (Interview, October 14, 1990.)

Former Deputy Air Force Commander, Brig. Gen. (res.) Amos Amir, has noted that with regard to the Air Force, "there are other elements upon which it is agreed, at least in the Alignment, that are not to be conceded: the Jordan as a security border, demilitarization, our right to deploy early warning stations where we want them, and on the freedom to fly in the skies of

Judea and Samaria (*Ha'aretz*, July 25, 1988.)

11. Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev has recommended a proposed West Bank solution involving the stationing of two brigades "east of the highland plateau as far as the Jordan River . . ." (see Shalev, p. 143). Brig. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilboa maintains that the massive expansion of the Iraqi army in the 1980s, with the implied growth of the potential size of any Iraqi expeditionary force, requires a far larger deployment to defend Israel. Gilboa recommends stationing seven brigades — five in the passes — and two for reinforcement (Interview, November 8, 1990). The size of an Israeli brigade may be derived from Ze'ev Schiff and Eitan Haber, *Israel: Army and Defense* (Tel Aviv: Zmorov, 1976), p. 254. Given the approximate size of an Israeli brigade is 3,000 men, the range of stationed forces needed at all times in the West Bank could vary from 6,000 soldiers (two brigades) to 21,000 soldiers (seven brigades)—before reserve reinforcement.

12. Dayan, p. 108.

13. Dayan, p. 126.

14. Interview, September 10, 1990.

15. Ze'ev Schiff, *Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations With the Palestinians* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), Policy Paper, Number 15, p. 57. Interview, Amos Lapidot, November 12, 1990.

16. *Ha'aretz*, July 10, 1989.

17. *Ha'aretz*, July 22, 1988.

18. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 62.

19. *Ha'aretz*, June 22, 1988.

20. Alouph Hareven, *Jerusalem Post*, July 12, 1988. Also see Schiff, pp. 67-8, and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, *Toward A Solution*, pp. 23-24.
21. *Maariv*, November 14, 1990. In 1989, there were five infiltration attempts; in 1990, up until November 8, there were already 12.
22. *The New York Times*, October 4, 1990.
23. Brig. Gen. (res.) Yehezkel Somech, *The Supply of F-16 Aircraft and Mobile Hawk to Jordan: The Military Significance for Israel*, (in Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), Memorandum Number 6, April 1982.
24. It is important to recall that Israel actually negotiated with an Arab party—Egypt—over West Bank security arrangements and therefore encountered an Arab conception of reasonable security for Israel. On July 18, 1978, at Leeds Castle, the Egyptians recommended: (a) demilitarization of only part of the West Bank/Gaza and Israel; (b) restricted force areas in the West Bank and Gaza; (c) UN presence—not on a permanent basis; (d) U.S.-controlled early warning stations (see Tamir, p. 61).
25. Moshe Dayan, *On the Peace Process*, p. 257.
26. Dayan, *Breakthrough*, p. 304.

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