



# RESEARCH NOTES

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## Trends in Israeli–Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987–1999

By Alisa Mandel and Joshua Obstfeld\*

The following study examines trends in Israeli–Palestinian fatalities related to political violence from the beginning of the intifada (uprising) (December 1987) through the end of Binyamin Netanyahu's premiership (July 1999). The study analyzes the incidents and resulting fatalities by their total number, their cause of death, their location, and the groups or individuals responsible for them. This analysis is divided into two parts. The first part of the study compares trends in fatalities in the periods before and after the September 1993 signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DoP). The second part explores these same trends under three periods of Israeli governments: Yitzhak Shamir's Likud-led government, Yitzhak Rabin's and Shimon Peres's Labor-led governments, and Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud-led government.

The study is derived from a database The Washington Institute compiled of Israeli–Palestinian incidents since the beginning of the intifada that each have resulted in at least one fatality. A note on the research methods and terminology of this database is included at the end of the study. The full database is available upon request from The Washington Institute.

This study is only a statistical analysis. It does not examine the causes for the trends it describes. There should be no presumption that the signing of the DoP or either of the changes in Israeli government caused any change in the number or frequency of violence-related fatalities. Those dates were chosen because of their political significance, not because they were necessarily factors influencing violence. Neither does this study take into account differences in the character of the fatalities examined. There are clear differences between a terrorist killed by a policeman and a civilian victim of terrorism, but both are counted here equally as fatalities.

### Key Findings

- **The average number of Palestinian fatalities per month decreased precipitously through the three governments (Shamir: 18.7; Rabin/Peres: 10.1; and Netanyahu: 3.3).**
- **The per-month average of Israeli fatalities was highest under the Rabin/Peres governments (6.0), lower under the Shamir government (2.7), and lowest under the Netanyahu government (1.9).**
- **Bombing was the cause of death for 54.0 percent of the Israelis killed by Palestinians in the post-Declaration of Principles (DoP) period compared to only 2.4 percent in the pre-DoP period.**
- **The number of Israelis killed per incident in the post-DoP period nearly doubled in comparison to the pre-DoP period.**
- **Israeli civilians (as compared with Israeli military personnel) were involved in more than twice as many incidents in which Palestinians were killed in the post-DoP period than in the pre-DoP period (13.8 percent vs. 6.6 percent).**

\* Special thanks to Benjamin Orbach for his considerable assistance, and to the many other staff members who helped on this project


## I. Before and After the Declaration of Principles

The following figures and statistics compare the trends in fatalities resulting from Israeli–Palestinian political violence in the time periods before and after the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DoP). The trends explored are as follows: the number of incidents that resulted in fatalities; the number of fatalities; the number of fatalities per incident; the cause of death; the location of the incidents; the group responsible for the fatality; and the classification of the Israeli dead as civilian or military. The pre-DoP period is December 9, 1987, through September 13, 1993 (69 months); the post-DoP period is September 14, 1993, through July 6, 1999 (70 months).

### Number of Lethal Incidents

In the post-DoP period, the number of incidents in which Israelis died dropped as shown in Figure 1. In the pre-DoP period, Israelis suffered a per-month average of 2.2 lethal incidents (152 total). In the post-DoP period, the number of lethal incidents dropped 27.3 percent, to a per-month average of 1.6 (112 total).

The number of lethal incidents also dropped for Palestinians. Palestinians suffered an average of 14.1 lethal incidents per month (973 total) in the pre-DoP period. After the signing of the DoP, incidents resulting in Palestinian fatalities dropped 74.3 percent, to a per-month average of 3.6 (254 total).



### Number of Fatalities

In the post-DoP period, the number of Israeli fatalities increased dramatically. Israeli fatalities per month increased by 32.3 percent in the post-DoP period, from 3.1 in the pre-DoP period (212 total) to 4.1 in the post-DoP period (287 total). On the other hand, the number of Palestinian fatalities decreased dramatically. The average number of Palestinian fatalities per month decreased roughly 68.7 percent, from 17.9 in the pre-DoP period (1,236 total) to 5.6 in the post-DoP period (391 total). (See Figure 2)


### Number of Fatalities per Incident

The number of fatalities per incident for both Israeli and Palestinian incidents increased in the post-DoP period. This increase was more dramatic for incidents involving Israeli fatalities. In the pre-DoP period, the rate of Israeli fatalities per incident stood at 1.4. That number rose by 78.6 percent, to 2.6 fatalities per incident in the post-DoP period.

The number of Palestinian fatalities per incident increased as well, but not as dramatically. In the pre-DoP period, the number of Palestinian fatalities per incident was 1.3, whereas after the DoP that number rose by 21 percent, to 1.5. (See Figure 3)

### Cause of Death

In the pre-DoP period, the primary cause of Israeli fatalities was gunfire, at 39.6 percent; stabbing was the second most common cause, at 30.7 percent; and bomb explosions accounted for only 2.4 percent of



Type of Incident	(as percentage of all fatalities)	
	Pre-DoP	Post-DoP
Bombing	2.4%	54.0%
Gunfire	39.6%	29.6%
Stabbing	30.7%	7.3%
Beating	4.2%	3.8%
Vehicle	8.0%	0.0%
Molotov cocktail	3.3%	0.0%
Other	4.7%	1.4%
Unknown	7.1%	3.8%
<b>Total*</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>99.9%</b>

\*Because of rounding, totals may not equal 100%

Type of Incident	(as percentage of all fatalities)	
	Pre-DoP	Post-DoP
Gunfire	94.6%	93.6%
Beating	1.4%	1.5%
Other*	2.2%	3.6%
Unknown	1.9%	1.3%
<b>Total**</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*Other includes stabbing, bombing, and interrogation  
\*\*Because of rounding, totals may not equal 100%

fatalities. In the post-DoP period, however, bomb explosion rose dramatically as a cause of Israeli fatalities to 54.0 percent, while gunfire and stabbing fell to 29.6 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the various causes of violent death as a percentage of the total.



Gunfire was the most common cause of Palestinian fatalities both before and after the DoP, accounting for 94.6 percent of fatalities in the pre-DoP period and 93.6 percent in the post-DoP period. (See Table 2)

**Location of Lethal Incidents**

In both periods, incidents resulting in Israeli fatalities occurred most commonly inside pre-1967 Israel (in-

cluding all of Jerusalem). In the post-DoP period, however, the percentage of deaths resulting from incidents that took place inside Israel increased markedly. In the pre-DoP period, 47.2 percent of Israeli deaths occurred within pre-1967 Israel; in the post-DoP period, 66.2 percent of Israeli deaths occurred within pre-1967 Israel. As seen in Figure 4, the percentage of fatalities occurring inside the West Bank and Gaza during this same time period fell accordingly.

The majority of incidents resulting in Palestinian fatalities, both before and after the DoP, occurred in the West Bank. In the pre-DoP period, 57.2 percent of all Palestinian fatalities resulted from incidents that took place in the West Bank. In the post-DoP period, the percentage remained almost exactly the same, at 56.5. The percentage of Palestinian fatalities from incidents in Gaza, however, decreased from 34.5 percent before the DoP to 26.1 percent after it. At the same



time, the percentage of fatalities resulting from incidents inside Israel (including Jerusalem) increased from 5.7 percent to 9.0 percent. (See Figure 5)

**Responsibility for Deaths in Lethal Incidents**

In the pre-DoP period, only 22.4 percent of Israeli fatalities resulted from incidents attributed to Palestinians affiliated with a political organization (such as Hamas). In the post-DoP period, this proportion increased dramatically, to 50.9 percent. Hamas was attributed responsibility for nearly three times as great a share of the lethal Israeli incidents in the post-DoP period (27.7 percent, or 31 incidents) as it was in the pre-DoP period (10.5 percent, or 16 incidents). Conversely, the percentage of incidents attributed to Fatah decreased significantly. Table 3 lists the groups considered responsible for incidents resulting in Israeli deaths and the proportion of incidents attributed to each in both the pre- and post-DoP periods. The Palestinian Security Service is considered part of “other” in the post-DoP period.

The Israeli military was involved in the overwhelming majority of incidents in which Palestinians were killed in the past twelve years. In the pre-DoP period, the Israeli military was involved in 86.5 percent of fatal incidents. There was a decrease in that figure after the DoP signing, with the percentage falling to 74.0. The proportion of incidents involving individual Israeli civilians increased in the post-DoP period from 6.6 percent to 13.8 percent of all incidents in which

Group Attributed Responsibility	(as percentage of all incidents)	
	Pre-DoP	Post-DoP
None	77.6%	49.1%
Hamas	10.5%	27.7%
PIJ/IJ	6.6%	9.8%
Fatah	2.6%	0.0%
PFLP	2.0%	6.3%
DFLP	0.0%	0.9%
Other	0.7%	6.3%
<b>Total*</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100.1%</b>



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
Palestinians were killed. (See Figure 6)

**Israeli Civilian vs. Military Deaths**

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a violent act is targeted at civilians or at military sites and personnel. Owing to this difficulty, as well as the difficulty of classifying targets as either civilian or military, this study analyzes only who died, not who or what may have been the intended target.

In the pre-DoP period, 64.2 percent of Israeli fatalities in Palestinian-on-Israeli incidents were civilian, and in the post-DoP period, 69.7 percent were civilian, indicating a consistent pattern of Palestinian violence affecting Israeli civilians. (See Figure 7)





## II. Israeli Government in Power

This section explores Israeli and Palestinian violence during three different periods of Israeli government since the start of the intifada. The pattern of violence may have influenced Israeli politics and is therefore worthy of careful study. Determining the causes of violence, however, is beyond the scope of this study. The Israeli political periods analyzed are

*Period One:* Likud-led, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (December 9, 1987–July 13, 1992) (55 months)

*Period Two:* Labor-led, Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres (July 14, 1992–June 17, 1996) (47 months)

*Period Three:* Likud-led, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (June 18, 1996–July 6, 1999) (37 months)

### Number of Lethal Incidents

Israelis suffered the highest average number of le-



thal incidents per month during the Labor-led governments of Rabin and Peres (2.8), followed by the Likud-led government of Shamir (1.8), and finally the Likud-led government of Netanyahu (0.9). Looked at another way, of the 264 lethal incidents, 131 occurred during the Labor-led governments, 100 during Shamir's government, and 33 during Netanyahu's government.

Incidents that resulted in Palestinian fatalities were most numerous during Shamir's premiership (14.8 per month, 814 total). Since then, the figure has steadily decreased, falling to 7.2 per month under Rabin and Peres (337 total), and to 2.1 per month under Netanyahu (76 total). (See Figure 8)

### Number of Fatalities

The Labor-led governments of Rabin and Peres witnessed by far the highest rate of Israeli fatalities, at an average of 6.0 per month (282 total). Fatalities were fewer during the Shamir government (2.7 per month, 146 total) and fewer still during the Netanyahu government (1.9 per month, 71 total).

The number of Palestinian fatalities per month has rapidly declined over the past decade, as shown by Figure 9. During Shamir's government, an average of 18.7 Palestinians were killed in violent incidents each month (1,028 total). That per-month average dropped by nearly 50 percent, to 10.1, during the Rabin and Peres governments (476 total), and from that level it dropped a further 66 percent, to 3.3, during the Netanyahu government (123 total).




### Number of Fatalities per Incident

For Israeli incidents, there was a high increase in the average number of fatalities per incident from the Shamir administration to the other two periods. In the Shamir period, there were 1.5 deaths per incident, whereas in both the Rabin–Peres period and the Netanyahu period, there were 2.2 deaths per incident.

For Palestinians, the number of fatalities per incident rose steadily with each successive government. In the Shamir period, approximately 1.3 Palestinians died per incident, compared to 1.4 in the Rabin and Peres period, and 1.6 in the Netanyahu period. (See Figure 10)

### Cause of Death

The cause of Israeli fatalities shifted dramatically during the three periods. In the Shamir period, stabbing was the most common cause of death, accounting for 33.6 percent of all Israeli fatalities at the hands of Palestinians; gunfire was second, accounting for 31.5 percent. During the Rabin and Peres governments, bombing rose dramatically to become the leading cause of violent death, at 47.2 percent; gunfire dropped to 30.9 percent. In the Netanyahu period, gunfire was the most common cause of death, at 50.7 percent, while bombing dropped to the second-most-common cause of death, at 33.8 percent. In the Netanyahu period, stabbing as the cause of death fell to only 8.5 percent of all Israeli fatalities. (See Table 4)




Type of Incident	(as percentage of all fatalities)		
	Shamir	Rabin/Peres	Netanyahu
Bombing	2.1%	47.2%	33.8%
Gunfire	31.5%	30.9%	50.7%
Stabbing	33.6%	11.0%	8.5%
Beating	4.8%	3.5%	4.2%
Vehicle	11.0%	0.4%	0.0%
Molotov Cocktail	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Other	4.8%	2.5%	0.0%
Unknown	7.5%	4.6%	2.8%
<b>Total*</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*Because of rounding, totals may not equal 100%

Throughout all three political periods, gunfire was overwhelmingly the principal cause of violent Palestinian deaths. During the Shamir and Rabin–Peres periods, 94.5 percent of Palestinians were killed by gunfire, compared to 92.7 percent during the Netanyahu period. (See Table 5) Under the Netanyahu government, gunfire was the only cause of Palestinian death perpetrated by the Israeli military, as all deaths by beating during this period were caused by Israeli civilians.

### Location of Lethal Incidents

One notable change in the location of incidents resulting in Israeli fatalities is the proportion of



Type of Incident	(as percentage of all fatalities)		
	Shamir	Rabin/Peres	Netanyahu
Gunfire	94.5%	94.5%	92.7%
Beating	1.7%	0.4%	3.3%
Other*	2.1%	3.2%	3.3%
Unknown	1.8%	1.9%	0.8%
<b>Total**</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100.1%</b>

\*Other includes stabbing, bombing, and interrogation  
 \*\*Because of rounding, totals may not equal 100%

incidents that occurred in the West Bank. During the Shamir period, 26.0 percent of fatalities resulted from incidents that occurred in the West Bank, compared to 19.9 percent during the Rabin and Peres period. This percentage rose to 35.2 percent under Netanyahu. (See Figure 11)



Throughout the three periods, the West Bank has consistently been the most common location of incidents resulting in Palestinian fatalities, followed, in order, by Gaza and pre-1967 Israel. But that trend has changed slightly over the three political periods. During the Shamir period, 60.8 percent of Palestinian fatalities resulted from incidents that occurred in the West Bank. This proportion declined to 51.2 percent during the Rabin and Peres period, and it declined further to 48.0 percent under Netanyahu.

The proportion of incidents resulting in Pales-

tinian fatalities that occurred in pre-1967 Israel (including Jerusalem) has increased over the three periods. During the Shamir period, only 5.4 percent of the incidents in which one or more Palestinian was killed by an Israeli occurred in Israel. This percentage rose to 7.8 in the Rabin and Peres period, and it increased further to 10.6 percent during Netanyahu's administration. (See Figure 12)

### Responsibility for Deaths in Lethal Incidents

Over the three political periods, there has been a change in who has been attributed responsibility for violence against Israelis. More lethal incidents perpetrated against Israelis were attributed to Palestinian organizations during the Rabin and Peres period than before or since. Of the 131 incidents during the Rabin and Peres governments, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were attributed responsibility for 59 incidents (45.0 percent); the balance was attributed to "unofficial individuals." Of the 131 incidents, 36 were by Hamas (27.5 percent) and 14 were by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (10.7 percent). During the Netanyahu government, only six incidents (18.2 percent of the total 33 incidents) were attributed to these five Palestinian groups. Of the seventeen lethal Israeli incidents caused by the Palestinian Security Services (PSS), which was established in 1994, fifteen occurred under the Netanyahu government. Table 6 shows a breakdown of the percentage of attri-



**Table 6**  
**Palestinians Responsible for Deaths in Lethal Israeli Incidents**

Group Attributed Responsibility	(as percentage of all incidents)		
	Shamir	Rabin/Peres	Netanyahu
None	79.0%	55.0%	66.7%
Hamas	7.0%	27.5%	12.1%
PIJ/IJ	7.0%	10.7%	0.0%
Fatah	3.0%	0.8%	0.0%
PFLP	3.0%	3.8%	6.1%
DFLP	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%
Other	1.0%	1.5%	15.2%
<b>Total*</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100.1%</b>	<b>100.1%</b>


\*Because of rounding, totals may not equal 100%

bution of responsibility for each group during each period of government.

The majority of fatal Palestinian incidents during the periods under review involved the Israeli military. The percentage of incidents involving the Israeli military dropped from 87.1 percent during the Shamir period to 79.8 percent during the Rabin and Peres period and to 68.4 percent during the Netanyahu period. Israeli civilians were involved in fewer incidents of fatal violence against Palestinians, but the percentage of lethal Palestinian incidents attributed to Israeli civilians has increased steadily, rising from 7.0 percent during the Shamir period, to 8.3 percent in the Rabin and Peres period, and to 18.4 percent during the Netanyahu period. (See Figure 13)

**Israeli Civilian vs. Military Deaths**

During the periods under review, the percentage of Israeli civilians killed has gradually declined, while the percentage of Israeli soldiers killed has gradually risen. Civilians, however, were still unequivocally the most frequent victims of Palestinian violence. In the Shamir period, 70.5 percent of Israelis killed were civilians (103 total), whereas 22.6 percent were Israeli soldiers (33). The percentage of Israeli civilians killed dropped during the Rabin and Peres period: 66.7 percent of Israeli fatalities were civil-



ians (188), and 32.6 percent were Israeli soldiers (92). These trends continued during the Netanyahu administration: 63.4 percent of Israelis killed were civilians (45), whereas 36.6 percent were Israeli soldiers (26). (See Figure 14)

**III. Conclusion**

The most notable findings in this study are the changes in the number and frequency of Israeli fatalities. The trends are quite different depending on how one divides the entire period examined. Comparing the period before the DoP to that afterwards, Israelis have suffered a significant increase in the average number of fatalities per month. Yet, comparing the different Israeli governments in the past twelve years, the average number of Israelis killed per month reached its lowest levels under the Netanyahu government.

In the pre-DoP period, there were generally fewer fatalities per incident in which Israelis died, the incidents usually involved gunfire or stabbing, and they were generally not attributed to any organization. In the post-DoP period, these incidents killed a greater number of Israelis per incident, often involved a bombing attack, and were subsequently claimed by terrorist organizations. Also, whereas before the DoP slightly less than half of Israelis were killed within Israel's pre-1967 borders (plus Jerusalem), after it, two-thirds died from incidents in those areas.

Equally notable is the rapid decline in the average number of Palestinian fatalities per month throughout the post-DoP period and through the three



Israeli governments. Fatalities caused by the Israeli military similarly declined. On the other hand, Palestinian deaths resulting from incidents of violence between Israeli civilians and Palestinians rose over time. Also on the rise during the past twelve years was the percentage of Palestinian fatalities occurring inside the borders of pre-1967 Israel (plus Jerusalem), as was the number of fatalities per incident against Palestinians.

Finally, as noted in the beginning, this study does not attribute cause to any of the trends it has reported.

The trends may be attributed to any number of factors; further research would be needed to determine causality. For instance, this study should not be construed to show in any way that the Israeli government in power was necessarily a factor in the development of the trends reported herein.

*Alisa Mandel was a research intern at The Washington Institute in the summer of 1998, and Joshua Obstfeld was a research intern during the spring of 1999.*

### Appendix: Research Methods

Data from a list compiled by B'tselem, the Israeli human rights organization, was the single most important source used in creating the database for this study. Other sources used to compile the database were newspaper articles; *Facts on File* publications; the State Department's annual report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*; the Israel Defense Forces; the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Anti-Defamation League; and internet resources.

In addition, in some cases there was conflicting information because of the various sources; in other cases some information was missing. The database most likely does not contain *all* of the lethal incidents during this period, and it may inaccurately characterize some incidents.

**Lethal Incidents:** This study includes only those incidents that resulted in the death of a Palestinian or an Israeli by a member of the other group. No inter-Palestinian or inter-Israeli incidents were included. Also, this study does not include accidental or non-political deaths, such as those resulting from ordinary criminal activities or traffic accidents (except those that have been classified as "terrorist" by law enforcement agencies).

Although many of the episodes involved acts of terrorism, this study should not be construed as a study of terrorism per se. Some of the incidents in the database resulted from an individual acting in self-defense.

In determining the number of incidents for both Israeli and Palestinian deaths, the authors used the underlying premise that fatalities are separate incidents unless proven otherwise. The result of this premise is that the incident total presented in the study may be slightly inflated.

**Fatalities:** Fatalities are listed and analyzed according to the date the incident occurred, not the date of death.

**Cause of Death:** The *cause of death* is defined as the principal method of violence used in a fatal incident. It is possible that more than one method was used in any single incident.

For the sections detailing Israeli casualties, there are eight different categories for "cause of death": beating, bombing, gunfire, Molotov cocktail, motor vehicle, stabbing, other, and unknown. "Other" includes methods of death, such as stoning, of which there were not enough incidents to warrant a separate category.

For sections detailing Palestinian casualties, there are seven different categories for "cause of death": beating, bombing, gunfire, interrogation, stabbing, other, and unknown. "Other" includes, but is not limited to, fatalities that resulted from burns, clashes, prison conditions, and the use of a vehicle.

**Location:** This category is defined as the location where the fatal incident occurred. For the section detailing Israeli casualties, there are four categories: Israel, as defined by its pre-1967 borders plus all of Jerusalem; the West Bank; the Gaza Strip; and unknown.

For the section detailing Palestinian casualties, there are five categories for the possible location of the incident: Israel, as defined by its pre-1967 borders plus all of Jerusalem; the West Bank; the Gaza Strip; military custody; and unknown. An incident that occurred off of Israel's coast or near a border is considered to have occurred in Israel.

**Responsibility for Deaths in Lethal Incidents:** Responsibility is attributed to those

whose violence leads to the other party's death. For the section detailing lethal Palestinian incidents, there are four categories of Israeli responsibility. These categories are: Israeli civilian; Israeli military; the police; and unknown. "Israeli civilian" is an Israeli civilian acting in an unofficial capacity, including "off-duty soldiers." "Israeli military" includes several different types of military units ranging from commando units to the General Security Service (GSS, or Shin Bet). "Police" includes different types of police, ranging from Border Police to the regular Israeli police.

For the section detailing lethal Israeli incidents, there are seven different categories of Palestinian responsibility. These categories are: Hamas; PIJ; Fatah; PFLP; DFLP; other; and "no blame determined." Terrorist groups often claim responsibility for an attack, but that does not necessarily mean they were in fact responsible. Therefore, this category largely depends on information provided by the Israeli government.

"Other" applies to any group responsible for incidents other than the groups listed, including the Palestinian Security Service. "No blame determined" refers to either an individual acting alone, or an individual not known to be a member of a group that might have claimed responsibility. "No blame determined" also applies to circumstances in which there was not enough information to make an assessment of which group was responsible.

**Israeli Civilian/Military Distinction:** If military personnel were killed—even in an otherwise civilian-targeted attack (for example a bus bomb)—their deaths are classified as military deaths. All other deaths are classified as civilian deaths, unless the identity of the individual killed is unknown.


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By Hilal Khashan

Four years after the author's seminal research on the same subject, he once again analyzes the attitudes of Syrians, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Lebanese toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite movement in the peace process itself, the results of Khashan's surveys show little—if any—shift from confrontation to cooperation. Examines Arab attitudes toward globalization, peace, regional cooperation, Islamic militancy, building bridges with Israelis, and the U.S. role in the peace process.

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## Trends in Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987-1999

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