Assessing What Arabs Do, Not What They Say:

A New Approach to Understanding Arab Anti-Americanism

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Front cover: Jordanian women sign a condolence book at the U.S. embassy in Amman on September 16, 2001, in sympathy with Americans mourning the terrorist attacks on the United States. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/ Jamal Nasrallah.

About the Authors

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Table of Contents

Illustrations

About the Data

THIS BOOK IS BASED on The Washington Institute's Arab Anti-American Protest Database, which inventories media-reported anti-American protests in Arab countries between 2000 and 2005. The database allows users to retrieve information regarding the size, date, location, composition, and other characteristics of these protests. It can be downloaded for free from The Washington Institute website at www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC11.php?CID=421.

The Microsoft Office program Access (2000 edition or later) is required to open the database file. If you do not have this software on your computer, it is available for purchase on the Microsoft website (www.microsoft.com/office/access/howtobuy/default.mspx) and through other vendors.

Assessing What Arabs Do, Not What They Say

THE MOST CELEBRATED question to emerge from the September 11, 2001, attacks was President Bush's primetime query "Why do they hate us?"[1] Respondents offered a range of answers: They (variously defined) hate us for our values. They hate us for our policies. They hate us for who we are. They hate us for what we do. They hate us because they hate themselves, their leaders, and their societies and have no better way to show it. They don't hate us at all.

Regardless of the specific response, the most widely used evidentiary tool in support of each contention regarding Arab anti-Americanism has been polling data. With the explosion of public opinion surveys in Arab (and wider Muslim) societies post–September 11, advocates could cite polling results to support just about any view. Indeed, in the months that followed the al-Qaeda attacks against the World Trade Center, numerous pollsters undertook multicountry polls that attempted to assess the depth and range of Arab anti-Americanism.[2] Statistical details aside, the most fundamental outcome of this process was reliance upon attitudes—that is, what people tell pollsters—as the prime source for how U.S. political leaders as well as American media elites understand Arab political preferences and how they assign value to those preferences.

This process began to take on a life of its own. Poll results—especially when they underscored the depth of Arab or Muslim hostility to the United States—became headline news.[3] These reports had as a recurring theme the need to take account of how foreign public opinion views U.S. policy initiatives while those initiatives are still in the planning stage.[4] This recommendation, a staple of governmental and nongovernmental reports on public diplomacy,[5] appears to have been endorsed at the highest levels of the Bush administration.[6]

The irony was that the suicide terrorism of 9/11 was, by definition, a manifestation of extremely violent and antisocial *behavior* by people whose intentions could never be fully known or discerned. Nevertheless, 9/11 gave rise to a reliance upon assessments of *attitude* as the principal source for understanding the political psyche of the societies—and perhaps even the cohorts—from which the 9/11 perpetrators emerged. The unspoken assumption is that a direct linkage exists between attitude and behavior, that what people tell pollsters about their view of the United States is not only truthful and accurate but, most important, a useful indicator of their likely actions toward the United States, U.S. interests, and U.S. citizens.

The purpose of this research is to offer a behavior-based alternative method to assess Arab positions toward the United States. Instead of focusing on what Arabs say, this research focuses on what Arabs do. Here, the assumption is that assessing behavior is at least as revealing of true preferences as assessing attitude. In addition, only by assessing behavior can researchers appropriately test the "unspoken assumption" of the linkage that pollsters implicitly draw between attitude and behavior. Focusing on this unspoken assumption is especially important in authoritarian societies, such as those that predominate in the Middle East, where a strong likelihood exists that responses to poll questions are skewed by factors ranging from social expectations, to perception of political correctness, to fear of intrusion of intelligence agencies into the polling process, to the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial characteristics of both the pollsters and those they poll.[7]

In gauging the depth of pro- or anti-Americanism among Arab publics, a long list of different types of behaviors may be relevant—travel to America, study in America, purchase of American goods, investment in American companies, and enjoyment of American entertainment, to name a few. This particular research project focuses on a single behavior—public protest. Public protest is an important indicator because it represents direct personal action by individuals; whereas a reply to a pollster's question can be motivated by the question itself, participating in a public protest is a deliberate act that represents some judgment as well as some action on the part of the participant. Focusing on public protest is a modest but important beginning

toward the creation of a full, behavior-based model of assessing Arab pro- or anti-Americanism.

The Database

The Arab Anti-American Protest Database inventories all media-reported protests in Arab countries with anti-American content in the six-year period from 2000 through 2005. The countries included are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. "Protests" are defined as demonstrations, riots, or any officially or unofficially sanctioned public gathering at which participants, either orally or physically, advocated criticism of the United States, the U.S. government, U.S. officials, U.S. policy, or the American people.

The full database can be downloaded from The Washington Institute website (www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC11.php?CID=421). Because the data will be updated and improved regularly, readers are urged to revisit the online file often to check for updates.

To be included in the database, a protest had to be the subject of at least two media reports. At least one of those sources must have been a Western news outlet (for example, Associated Press, BBC, Agence France Presse), whereas the second source could have been from major Arab media (for example, *al-Hayat*, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, *al-Ahram*). All data are based on the cumulative and composite reporting of these sources; no effort has been made to check the accuracy of individual reports. In addition, the database makes no claim to include all protests with anti-American content that occurred in Arab countries in the period 2000–2005; undoubtedly, some protests escaped news coverage. Only those incidents that met the news coverage test described are included in the database.

The database provides objective information about each protest incident, based on the media reporting. This information includes site (city, country, region); timing (month and year); magnitude (from very small to very large); and extent of violent content (symbolic, vandalism, injury, death).

In addition, the database includes two intrinsically subjective pieces of information about each incident: the ostensible trigger for the protest, and the political-social demographic composition of the protesters. Trigger events are divided into three categories: some act of authorized U.S. policy that is cited by the protesters as the rationale, excuse, or springboard for protest (for example, the invasion of Iraq); some unauthorized act by U.S. officials or representatives (for example, torture at Abu Ghraib prison); and some act by Israel or a third party allegedly supported or endorsed by the United States (for example, targeted killing of Palestinian terrorists). The composition of the protesters is divided into a series of somewhat arbitrary categories, including students, refugees, political party activists, and government employees, with the added wrinkle of combining all Islamists under a single, unified heading. Taken together, these two protest characteristics—trigger and composition—are inherently more subjective than the other attributes described in the database. First, the proximate trigger for a protest may mask the real reason behind it (for example, a certain government may use the occasion of a visit by a U.S. official to instigate a protest of government workers against U.S. support for Israel that is actually designed to warn U.S. policymakers away from promoting democratic change in that country). Second, there may be multiple and overlapping attributes to the political-social complexion of a group of protesters that a superficial news report does not capture (for example, news reports may highlight political party affiliation when, in fact, ethnicity or sectarianism was the key factor). In each case, an attempt has been made to collect, compare, and filter the information in each news report in order to provide as accurate a portrait of the incident as the data reasonably permit.

Basic Findings

Protest incidents: A total of 538 protest incidents met the threshold for inclusion in the database.

Region: Of the total, 321 protests (60 percent) occurred in the Levant (defined as including Egypt, Israel/West Bank/Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), 195 (36 percent) in the Gulf (defined as including

Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), and 22 (4 percent) in North Africa (defined as including Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia). For details, see figure 1.

Country: The countries that were the scene of the most protests were Iraq (25 percent), Egypt (21 percent), and Israel/West Bank/Gaza (13 percent). The countries that were the scene of the fewest protests were the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Tunisia. For details, see figure 2.

Protests per capita: Taking account of population size in each country, the countries that were the scene of the most protests per capita were Bahrain, Lebanon, and Jordan. The countries that were the scene of the fewest protests per capita were Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. For details, see figure 3.

Cities: Major cities that were the scene of the highest number of protests were Cairo (17 percent), Baghdad (12 percent), and Amman (8 percent). Major cities that were the scene of the fewest protests were Tel Aviv, Dubai, Casablanca, and Tunis. For details, see figure 4.

Timing: In the six years of incidents included in the database, the highest number of protests was registered in 2003 (231, or 43 percent) and the lowest in 2000 (29, or 5 percent). For details, see figure 5.

Size: A plurality of protests (236 out of 538) fall in the "medium" category, defined as including between 1,000 and 10,000 persons. Just over 10 percent of the protests (60) were in the "large" category, defined as including between 10,000 and 100,000 persons, and only 3 percent (16) were in the "extra large" category, defined as exceeding 100,000 protesters. For details of protests by size, see figure 6a. For correlation between size and year, see figure 6b.

Violence: Only 25 protests (5 percent) included a level of violence that led to death (of protesters, security forces, or bystanders). An additional 31 protests (6 percent) included a level of violence that led to injury. A total of 150 protests (28 percent) involved symbolic violence (for example, flag burning), and 56 protests (10 percent) included miscellaneous violence in which news reports made no reference to injuries or attacks. Another 157 protests (29 percent) included no reference to violence at all. See figure 7a. The most violent protests occurred in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain. For a correlation between country and violence, see figure 7b. For a breakdown of violent protests by year, see figure 7c.

Trigger: Deliberate, authorized acts of U.S. government policy were the stated trigger for 73 percent of incidents. Deliberate, authorized acts of Israeli government policy, for which the U.S. government was deemed an accomplice, were the stated trigger for 20 percent of incidents. Acts for which the U.S. government was held responsible but which were not authorized by the Bush administration—for example, the Abu Ghraib prison torture or the alleged desecration of the Quran at Guantanamo Bay—were the stated trigger for just 2 percent of incidents. Protests against other countries, institutions, or international organizations (for example, the United Nations) believed to be supportive of U.S. policies triggered 5 percent of protests. For details, see figure 8a. For a correlation between trigger and year, see figure 8b.

Composition: Demonstrators affiliated with governments (that is, members of the ruling party or government employees) composed the main body of protesters in 6 percent of incidents. Generally, non-Islamist demonstrators opposed to the government—that is, opposition parties—formed the main body of protesters in 14 percent of incidents. Overall, Islamist activists constituted the main body of protesters in 22 percent of incidents. Nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups—for example, professional groups or student movements—were the main elements in 38 percent of protests. In about 20 percent of all protests in the database, news reports did not discuss the composition of the protesters. As a result, the raw data are too sketchy to use as a basis for clear findings.

Setting: Protests occurred in various settings. The largest number—31 percent—took place in public areas,

defined as public squares, streets, or stadiums. About 14 percent of protests occurred near a U.S. governmental institution or property, such as an embassy or consulate, while 13 percent took place at or near mosques and other religious sites. For details, see figure 9a. In 2003—the year with the highest number of anti-American protests—68 protests (29 percent) took place in public areas, while 37 protests (16 percent) occurred near a U.S. institution. For details on the number of protests by year and setting, see figure 9b.

Observations

The following general observations emerge from a review of the database:

1. The total number of anti-American protest incidents was low. A total of 538 reported incidents in 18 countries and territories over a six-year period averages to fewer than five protests per country per year. Even in countries with the highest frequency of incidents, the numbers can only be considered low. In Egypt, for example, scene of the second-highest number of protests, incidents occurred at a rate of 1.6 per month—not a large number for a country of 77 million people, 18 metropolitan areas of 1 million people or more, 13 major universities, and tens of thousands of mosques. Examining the month of March 2003, when the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq occurred, provides a useful comparison. During that month, four times as many anti-American protests (of 1,000 or more people) occurred in France, with a population of 60 million, than in all of French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), whose combined population is 75 million. Similarly, at a time when President Bush's approval ratings were about 60 percent and most Americans told pollsters they would support a war in Iraq, more sizable anti-American protests were reported in the United States (31 of 1,000 people or more) than in any Arab country (Egypt led the list with 28).

2. Incidents were driven almost exclusively by the news cycle. A chart of the total number of incidents over the six-year period shows steep spikes at moments of great international tension and immersion news coverage of regional events—for example, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the face-off between Israeli troops and Palestinian fighters in Jenin in 2002, and the targeted killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004. Reaction to those events was swift and popular; reaction subsided almost immediately after the event concluded. For details, see figure 10.

3. Not all "Arabs" are the same; proximity matters. Given that the Iraq and Palestinian issues were high on the regional agenda in the 2000–2005 period, not surprisingly, Iraq and the Palestinian areas were two of the top three sites for protests. Farther away, especially in populous and largely Berber North Africa, protests were rare. Here the outlier was Egypt, which did not participate directly in either the Iraq or the Palestinian clashes, yet was the setting for the second-highest number of protests. On a per capita basis, Bahrain and Lebanon stand out, with Bahrain the scene of twice the level of protests of any other country. Although more research is necessary to explain this phenomenon, the fact that Bahrain and Lebanon have the first- and third-highest concentrations of Shiites of all Arab countries—Iraq is second—likely plays a role.

4. Incidents were generally nonviolent. Specifically, the number of direct attacks on U.S. property, interests, or persons was very low. In March 2003, when U.S. air and land forces invaded an Arab country, occupied a historic Arab capital, and overthrew a longstanding Arab ruler, protests led to attacks on U.S. installations on only three occasions (specifically, the embassies in Manama, Cairo, and Beirut). By comparison, when the Reagan administration launched a brief military strike on an isolated Arab state—Libya—in April 1986, protests led to attacks on four U.S. installations in the region (specifically, the embassies in Cairo and Sanaa and consulates in East and West Beirut).

5. No significant change took place in the size, frequency, or violent nature of incidents over time. Apart from precipitating events, the pattern of protests remained remarkably constant throughout the

region and over time. The data do not suggest any worsening of anti-American sentiment as expressed by larger, more frequent, more violent protests. A related observation is that, apart from immediate precipitating events, no difference occurred in the frequency of incidents before or after September 11, 2001.

6. No correlation exists between frequency of incidents and political alignment of the governments involved. The countries with the highest frequency and the lowest frequency of incidents—in both absolute terms and per capita—were countries politically aligned with the United States. Interestingly, the most violent protests did occur in countries most closely aligned with the United States. Countries politically opposed to the United States—such as Syria and Libya—fall in the middle of both categories; no doubt a sizable number of protests that occurred in those countries were organized (or at least instigated) by the government.

Conclusions

An assessment of anti-American protests in Arab countries suggests that expressions of anti-Americanism are episodic and event-driven, with little evidence of a continually rising tide of popular animosity toward the United States, its people, or its policies as manifested through the indication of popular protest. The speed with which Arabs came out to the streets—sometimes in large numbers but rarely in huge numbers—is matched by the speed with which they went back to their regular lives. Persistent mass demonstrations, such as the type seen in France in March and April 2006 to protest the French government's proposed youth labor laws or the type seen in a rolling format throughout numerous Arab and Muslim countries to protest the Danish cartoon episode, did not happen in Arab countries during the six-year period under study.

Given poll results that show consistently high, often rabid levels of anti-Americanism, the relatively infrequent and generally nonviolent nature of anti-American public protest is surprising. There are many possible explanations for these results, some or all of which may be mutually reinforcing and not necessarily contradictory. Arab governments may be preventing protests from taking shape, either because they prefer not to offend the United States or because they fear protests may turn against the regime or for some other reason. Alternatively, Arab populations may have decided that street demonstrations are not effective means of protesting, perhaps because of limitations placed on their activities by local governments.

At the same time, it is possible that the number of incidents that did occur may itself represent an inflated representation of real anti-Americanism. Indeed, governments in the region almost surely provoked or instigated a significant number of protests, either as a way to signal official displeasure with some U.S. policy (perhaps unrelated to the theme of the protest), to divert popular attention from some other issue, or for some unknown reason.

Indeed, the discrepancy between the database findings and the poll results suggests that the latter are in need of reassessment, at least in terms of their relevance in assessing or predicting behavior. This conclusion has important policy ramifications.

1. Given this apparent discrepancy between attitudinal anti-Americanism and behavioral anti-Americanism, further research is needed to understand the full depth and breadth of the phenomenon in Arab countries: What does it mean to be anti-American? Do attitudes matter nearly as much if they do not translate into behaviors? Additional research should focus on other indicators of anti-American behavior, such as boycotts of American goods; travel to the United States; and study at American schools, colleges, and universities.

2. Until conclusive judgments can be made, the U.S. government would be mistaken to constrain its foreign policies or overseas activities principally because it fears the extent of popular reaction. Specifically, little evidence indicates that U.S. actions—even "provocative" measures like military action—trigger persistent, mass, or violent reaction among Arab publics. Although that situation may not always be the case, it has been the record of the turbulent half-decade just concluded.

Endnotes

1. See President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress, September 20, 2001.

2. See, for example, polls by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Gallup Poll of the Islamic World, and Zogby International, to cite just three.

3. See, for example, "Many in Islamic World Doubt Arabs behind 9/11," *USA Today,* February 27, 2002; "Poll Finds Hostility Hardening toward U.S. Policies," *New York Times,* March 17, 2004; "Opinion of U.S. Abroad Is Falling, Survey Finds," *Washington Post,* March 17, 2004; "Polls Show Surge in Anti-U.S. Views," *Chicago Tribune,* May 30, 2004; and "Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.," *Washington Post,* July 23, 2004.

4. See, for example, Government Accountability Office, "International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism," GAO-05-852, September 2005; Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan, "A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World," Council on Foreign Relations, May 2005; Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy," GAO-05-323, April 2005; and Edward P. Djerejian, Jr., chairman, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," October 1, 2003, available online at www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf.

5. See, for example, James H. Dickinson, "A Strategy to Improve a Negative American Image in the Middle East," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 18, 2005, available online at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil51.pdf; William A. Rugh, ed., *Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: The Public Diplomacy Council at George Washington University, 2004); Defense Science Board Task Force, "Strategic Communication," September 2004, available online at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.

6. In September 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "I am a very strong believer in the integration of public diplomacy, of message, of communications and of policy. And [Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs] Karen [Hughes] will be a part of my policy team, as will the members of her team be a part of the policy teams of the assistant secretaries and other undersecretaries." (See www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/52748.htm.) On October 14, 2005, Hughes said: "We're bringing public diplomacy to the policy table and integrating it into every aspect of the State Department." (See www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55165.htm.) On May 10, 2006, Hughes told the Council on Foreign Relations: "Public diplomacy is helping shape policy. . . . We've raised the presence of public diplomacy in the regional bureaus, which as you know, develop much of the policy for the State Department at the earlier stages. So I'm trying very hard to institutionalize the integration of public diplomacy and policy at the State Department." (See www.state.gov/r/us/66098.htm.)

7. To a certain extent, these factors influence polling in democratic countries, too, but they are more powerful in many Middle Eastern countries. For a critique of polling in the Middle East, see Robert Satloff, "Polls Apart," in *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), pp. 94–98. Polling in advance of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, none of which foreshadowed Hamas's landslide victory, is an excellent example of a combination of these factors.

Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Arab Anti-American Protests, 2000–2005



Percentages represent a total of 538 protests.

Figure 2. Arab Anti-American Protests by Country, 2000–2005



Figure 3. Arab Anti-American Protests Per Capita, 2000–2005



Figure 4. Arab Anti-American Protests by City, 2000–2005



Figure 5. Arab Anti-American Protests by Year, 2000–2005



Figure 6a. Arab Anti-American Protests by Size, 2000–2005



Percentages represent a total of 538 protests.

Figure 6b. Protests by Size and Year



Figure 7a. Arab Anti-American Protests by Level of Violence, 2000–2005



Percentages represent a total of 538 protests.

Figure 7b. Violent Protests by Country



Figure 7c. Violence by Year



Figure 8a. Arab Anti-American Protests by Trigger, 2000–2005

Percentages represent a total of 538 protests.

Figure 8b. Protest Triggers by Year



Figure 9a. Arab Anti-American Protests by Setting, 2000–2005



Percentages represent a total of 538 protests.

Figure 9b. Protests by Setting and Year



Figure 10. Dateline of Protests, 2000–2005



Figure 10. Dateline of Protests, 2000–2005 (cont.)

MONTH	KEY EVENTS	NUMBER OF PROTESTS
Jan '00	Ninth anniversary of Gulf War	1
Feb	IDF air raids in southern Lebanon; French prime minister calls Hizballah terrorists	3
Mar	Clinton/Assad summit in Geneva	1
April	Arafat meets Clinton and Albright in Washington	1
May	Israeli pullout from Lebanon; Nasrallah "spiderweb" speech	0
June	Annan reports Israel has withdrawn in accordance with UNSCR 425	0
July	Camp David peace summit	0
Aug	Violence in the West Bank; Iraq sanctions controversy; tenth anniversary of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait	2
Sept	Sharon visits Temple Mount; Muhammad al-Dura incident; launch of Palestinian uprising; Egypt withdraws ambassador from Israel	0
Oct	Riots by Israeli Arabs; Israeli reservist lynched in Ramallah	17
Nov	Violence in West Bank; Muslim Brotherhood wins 17 seats in Egyptian parliamentary elections	0
Dec	Violence in the West Bank; Clinton presents a plan based on earlier negotiations	4
Jan '01	Taba negotiations; tenth anniversary of Gulf War	3
Feb	U.S. sanctions on Libya; Lockerbie trial; U.S. and British air raids on Baghdad; Powell's regional visit; Sharon wins 60 percent of Israeli vote	16
Mar	Congressional resolution to transfer embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; United States vetoes proposal to send UN observers to the Middle East; Land Day	7
April	Escalating violence in West Bank and Gaza; air raids on a Syrian radar post in Lebanon	1
May	Escalating violence in West Bank and Gaza	0
June	Escalating violence in West Bank and Gaza	1
July	Escalating violence in West Bank and Gaza	0
Aug	IDF killing of PFLP leader Mustafa Zabiri; anniversary of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait	2
Sept	September 11 attacks; U.S.-led forces invade Afghanistan	3
Oct	Afghanistan invasion	18
Nov	United States announces support for Palestinian statehood	0
Dec	IDF attacks PA headquarters; United States vetoes draft Security Council resolution demanding cessation of violence	1
Jan '02	President Bush labels Iran, Iraq, North Korea as "axis of evil"	0
Feb	Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah proposes full Arab normalization with Israel in return for withdrawal to 1967 boundaries	0
Mar	Arab League summit; "Passover massacre" terrorist attack in Israel; IDF operation Protective Shield; Cheney regional visit	21

Figure 10. Dateline of Protests, 2000–2005 (cont.)

MONTH	KEY EVENTS	NUMBER OF PROTESTS
April	IDF siege on Arafat headquarters; confrontation in Jenin; Powell Mideast trip; allegations of Israeli war crimes; Bush statement to Israel: "Stop taking West Bank"; Marwan Bargouti arrested	37
May	Likud central committee votes to oppose Palestinian state, over objections of Sharon	2
June	Construction begins on West Bank security barrier; Bush Rose Garden speech on Palestinian democracy; Israeli forces attack Arafat's headquarters	3
July	Powell Mideast trip; IDF strike in Gaza	3
Aug	Fear of confrontation with Iraq	2
Sept	IDF tightens Arafat siege; elections in Morocco	6
Oct	Sharon visits White House; congressional resolution on Jerusalem; elections in Bahrain	3
Nov	U.S. drone attack in Yemen; military curfew in Ma'an, Jordan	1
Dec	United States declares at the UN Security Council that Iraq has materially breached Resolution 1441	3
Jan '03	U.S./British threat against Iraq; Bush State of the Union address cites Iraq threat	29
Feb	Powell's UN speech on Iraqi WMD; United States and Britain lobby Security Council on Iraq	26
Mar	Sharm al-Sheikh Arab Summit; launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom; Land Day	97
April	Arafat appoints Abbas as prime minister; Baghdad falls; Bush administration releases Roadmap	26
May	Terrorist bombings in Casablanca and Riyadh	5
June	Aqaba Summit (Bush/Sharon/Abbas); Palestinians declare "hudna"	4
July	Parliamentary elections in Kuwait	8
Aug	Growing insurgency in Iraq	4
Sept	Abbas resigns as prime minister	8
Oct	Escalating violence in West Bank and Gaza; Israeli bombing raid in Syria	14
Nov	Bush NED and Whitehall speeches on Middle East democracy; UNSC endorses Roadmap; Israeli attack on Syrian terrorist training camp	2
Dec	Geneva Accords; Sharon outlines plans for Gaza withdrawal; Saddam captured	8
Jan '04	Construction of West Bank barrier; Pentagon designates Saddam POW rather than war criminal	14
Feb	International Court of Justice hears case on Israeli security barrier	2
Mar	Yassin assassination; interim constitution signed in Baghdad	30
April	Murder arrest warrant for al-Sadr; Rantisi assassination; Fallujah assault; Bush letter to Sharon about settlement blocs	24
May	Abu Ghraib; U.S. sanctions on Syria; IDF Gaza incursion	8
June	Bremer hands over limited sovereignty to Iraqi Interim Government	2

Figure 10. Dateline of Protests, 2000–2005 (cont.)

MONTH	KEY EVENTS	NUMBER OF PROTESTS
July	Escalating violence in Iraq	4
Aug	Escalating violence in Iraq	7
Sept	—	0
Oct	Tenth anniversary of Jordan-Israel peace treaty; Taba terrorist bombings	2
Nov	Arafat dies in Paris; assault on Falluja; Bush proposes Middle East Forum; Egyptian border police killed by IDF in Rafah; passage of UNSCR 1559 on Lebanon	6
Dec	Launch of BMENA initiative in Rabat; attack on Karbala mosque	1
Jan '05	Abbas elected president; Sharm al-Sheikh summit (Abbas, Sharon, Mubarak); Iraqi national election; Israeli airstrike on Hizballah	1
Feb	Hariri assassination	0
Mar	Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon; local council elections in Saudi Arabia	7
April	Talabani becomes Iraqi president	6
May	Quran abuse scandal; women win right to vote in Kuwait	9
June	—	3
July	Sharm al-Sheikh terrorist bombings	0
Aug	Israel implements Gaza withdrawal	3
Sept	—	0
Oct	Mehlis Report; allegations of U.S. prisoner abuse	4
Nov	Palestinian municipal elections	9
Dec	Iraqi elections; second Mehlis Report	3

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