



*Proceedings of the 2007 Weinberg Founders Conference*

# Autumn of Decisions: A Critical Moment for American Engagement in the Middle East

OCTOBER 19–21, 2007



*Proceedings of the 2007 Weinberg Founders Conference*

# Autumn of Decisions: A Critical Moment for American Engagement in the Middle East

---

OCTOBER 19–21, 2007

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY  
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 452-0650

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

© 2008 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Published in 2008 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication  
Photography by Stan Barouh

### EDITOR'S NOTE

Most of these conference proceedings are presented as edited summaries of speeches and panel discussions; text designated as such should not be cited as actual transcripts of speaker remarks. The presentation by Vice President Richard Cheney is included as an unedited transcript of his speech and may be cited as such. The presentation by Walid Jumblatt is included as an edited transcript of his remarks and may be cited as such.

# Table of Contents

---

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>PREFACE</b>  | <b>IX</b> |
| <b>THE SPEAKERS</b>   | <b>XI</b> |
| <b>THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON</b>                              | <b>I</b>  |
| EDITED TRANSCRIPT   |           |
| Walid Jumblatt<br><i>Chairman, Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanon</i>               |           |
| <b>TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: WESTERN OR NOT?</b>  | <b>15</b> |
| RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY  |           |
| Soner Cagaptay<br><i>Director, Turkish Research Program, The Washington Institute</i> |           |
| Asli Aydintasbas<br><i>Former Ankara bureau chief, Sabah newspaper</i>                |           |
| <b>AMERICA'S FUTURE DIRECTION IN IRAQ</b>   | <b>19</b> |
| RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY  |           |
| J. D. Crouch<br><i>Former deputy national security advisor</i>                        |           |
| Antony Blinken<br><i>Majority staff director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee</i>  |           |
| <b>ISRAEL-HIZBALLAH-SYRIA: LESSONS FROM THE LAST WAR,<br/>PREVENTING THE NEXT ONE</b> | <b>25</b> |
| RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY  |           |
| Nicholas Blanford<br><i>Beirut correspondent, Christian Science Monitor</i>           |           |
| Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky<br><i>Deputy chief of staff, Israel Defense Forces</i>      |           |

**ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN VIEWS ON PEACE: WHAT POLLS  
CAN AND CANNOT TELL US** 31

RAPPOREUR'S SUMMARY

Nader Said

*Director, Development Studies Program, Birzeit University*

David Makovsky

*Director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process,  
The Washington Institute*

David Pollock

*Visiting fellow, The Washington Institute*

**HOMEGROWN RADICALIZATION IN THE  
UNITED STATES** 37

RAPPOREUR'S SUMMARY

Matthew Levitt

*Director, Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy,  
The Washington Institute*

Mitchell Silber

*Senior analyst, Intelligence Division, New York City  
Police Department*

Pam Byron\*

*Deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats,  
National Intelligence Council*

**WOMEN, YOUTHS, AND CHANGE IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST** 43

RAPPOREUR'S SUMMARY

J. Scott Carpenter

*Keston Family fellow and director of Project Fikra,  
The Washington Institute*

Jared Cohen

*Member, State Department Policy Planning Staff*

Shaha Ali Riza

*Advisor, Foundation for the Future*

Tulin Daloglu

*Washington correspondent, Turkey's Star Television;  
columnist, Star newspaper*

\*Speaker's remarks were off the record

---

**WHAT DOES IRAN WANT IN THE REGION?** 49

## RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY

Stephen Grummon

*Former director, Office of Middle East Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department*

Ahmad Rafat

*General secretary, Foreign Press Association of Italy*

Kassem Jaafar

*Former Middle East and defense correspondent, BBC*

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Mark Kimmitt

*Deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East***BOOKS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE MIDDLE EAST** 55

## RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY

Jason Epstein

*Former editorial director, Random House*

Kanan Makiya

*Sylvia K. Hassenfeld professor of Islamic and Middle East studies, Brandeis University*

Bob Woodward

*Assistant managing editor, Washington Post***PALESTINIAN POLITICS AFTER THE HAMAS COUP** 61

## RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY

Ehud Yaari

*Lafer international fellow, The Washington Institute*

Sari Nusseibeh

*President, al-Quds University***THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE PEACE PROCESS (PART I)** 67

## RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY

David Makovsky

*Senior fellow and director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process, The Washington Institute*

Daniel Kurtzer

*Daniel S. Abraham visiting professor of Middle East policy studies, Princeton University*

Jim Hoagland  
*Senior foreign correspondent, Washington Post*

Dennis Ross  
*Counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow,  
The Washington Institute*

**SPECIAL ADDRESS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT** 73

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney

**THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE PEACE  
PROCESS (PART II)** 85

RAPPORTEUR'S SUMMARY

David Makovsky, Daniel Kurtzer, Jim Hoagland, and  
Dennis Ross

---

# Preface

---

THE NEWEST TRUISM IN WASHINGTON is that the Middle East has replaced Europe as the focal point of American foreign policy. Given the numerous U.S. troop commitments in the region—shooting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, defensive roles throughout the Gulf, military cooperation with countries from North Africa to Turkey to Israel, and efforts to counter al-Qaeda and its affiliates—the broader Middle East is clearly the central arena for America’s armed forces. And with the Bush administration investing its political capital to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process and preserve Lebanese democracy as the showcase success of its “freedom agenda,” the Middle East is also a high-profile arena for political and diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, the price of oil is at a record high. In a world with hotspots that compete for Oval Office attention, the Middle East is, at the very least, first among equals.

These critical issues are now reaching a crescendo across the region. In Iraq, assessments regarding the success or failure of the “surge” strategy will determine the direction of U.S. engagement for the balance of the Bush administration. In Lebanon, the aftermath of the presidential election process will signal the balance of power between the forces that compelled a Syrian military withdrawal two years ago, and the forces that triggered a war with Israel one year later. In the Arab-Israeli arena, the convening of a peace “meeting” in Annapolis tested both the strength of the Israeli and Palestinian governments and the wisdom of the notion that now—so soon after the Hamas coup in Gaza—is the time to press for diplomatic breakthroughs. And behind all these items lies the looming nuclear standoff with Iran, which is complicated by Tehran’s negative role in each of the other arenas of crisis.

The 2007 Weinberg Founders Conference explored these critical issues with an eye toward the overall direction of U.S. Middle East policy as the Bush administration enters its final year in office. In keynote plenary sessions and breakout seminars, and over coffee in the hallways, a select group of American and international officials, experts, diplomats,



■ *Robert Satloff is executive director of The Washington Institute and author of The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.*

and journalists joined members of the Institute's Board of Trustees in a weekend of discussion and debate.

In addition, this year's conference featured a very special event: the launching of The Washington Institute Book Prize. Beginning in autumn 2008, this substantial prize will be awarded annually by an independent jury recognizing the most outstanding contributions to America's understanding of Middle Eastern politics and U.S. policy. To inaugurate the prize, we presented an evening program dedicated to honoring the essential role that books play in shaping this understanding. As President Franklin Roosevelt said at the height of World War II, "A war of ideas can no more be won without books than a naval war can be won without ships." The same, we believe, is true today.

Robert Satloff  
*Executive Director*



# The Speakers

---

**SHAHA ALI RIZA** is an advisor to the Foundation for the Future, a nonprofit organization launched at the November 2005 Forum for the Future in Bahrain. From 1992 to 2005, she worked at the World Bank, including four years as manager for external affairs, communications, and outreach for the Middle East and North Africa region. In addition, she worked with the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy from 1992 to 1997, helping to create the institution's Middle East program. She also helped establish the Iraq Foundation in 1991.

**ASLI AYDINTASBAS** is a prominent Turkish journalist whose areas of focus include Turkish foreign policy, U.S.-Turkish relations, and the European Union accession process. Most recently, she served as Ankara bureau chief for the Turkish daily *Sabah*, following posts as the paper's correspondent in Washington and New York. She has also reported from Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and written widely in the international media, including the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, and *New Republic*.

**NICHOLAS BLANFORD**, a Beirut-based correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* and *Time*, is author of *Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East* (2006).

**ANTONY BLINKEN** is majority staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and senior foreign policy advisor to the committee's chairman, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.). In the Clinton administration, he served as special assistant to the president, senior director for European and Canadian affairs, senior director for speech writing, and senior director for strategic planning with the National Security Council.

**SONER CAGAPTAY** is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. In addition, he serves as chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, and as an assistant professor at Georgetown University. His publications

include *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (2005) and *Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections, Troubling Trends* (The Washington Institute, 2007).

**RICHARD CHENEY** is the vice president of the United States. His four decades of public service include time as a congressman from Wyoming, chief of staff to President Ford, and secretary of defense to President George H. W. Bush.

**JARED COHEN** is a member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, responsible for public diplomacy, Muslim world outreach, and North Africa. He is the author of *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (2007) and *Children of Jihad: Journeys Into the Hearts and Minds of Middle Eastern Youth* (2007).

**J. D. CROUCH** served until earlier this year as assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor. Previously, his public service included tours as ambassador to Romania and assistant secretary of defense for international security policy.

**TULIN DALOGLU** is a Washington-based correspondent for Turkey's Star Television and a columnist for *Star* newspaper. Previously, she was a reporter and producer for the BBC in Turkey. In the 2002 general election, she competed for parliament as a member of the New Turkey Party.

**JASON EPSTEIN**, one of the most influential editors of the past half-century, served for many years as editorial director of Random House. He is responsible for founding Anchor Books, cofounding the *New York Review of Books*, and creating both the Library of America, the prestigious publisher of American classics, and The Reader's Catalog, the precursor of online bookselling. He was the first recipient of the National Book Award for distinguished service to American letters.

**STEPHEN GRUMMON** heads Greentree Enterprises, an international research and training firm. Previously, he served as director of the Office of Middle East Analysis in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has also served as director for Persian Gulf and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council and as a scholar-in-residence at The Washington Institute.

**JIM HOAGLAND**, a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize, is a columnist and senior foreign correspondent for the *Washington Post*. Since joining the *Post* as a metropolitan reporter in 1966, he has served as foreign editor and as a correspondent in Africa, the Middle East, and Paris.

**KASSEM JAAFAR** is a Britain-based analyst and advisor on strategic and diplomatic affairs. Previously, he worked for more than a decade as a Middle East and defense correspondent with the BBC and as defense and diplomatic editor at the London-based *al-Hayat* newspaper and its sister weekly, *al-Wasat*.

**WALID JUMBLATT** is chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon, leader of the Druze community, and an outspoken ally of the March 14 alliance.

**MOSHE KAPLINSKY** is deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Previously, he served as head of IDF Central Command, as military secretary to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and as commander of the Golani infantry brigade.

**BRIG. GEN. (RET.) MARK KIMMITT** is deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East. Previously, he completed a thirty-year career in the U.S. Army, which included service as deputy director of strategy and plans at U.S. Central Command and as deputy director of operations and chief military spokesman for coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**DANIEL KURTZER** is the Daniel S. Abraham visiting professor of Middle East policy studies at Princeton University. A distinguished diplomat, his postings included service as ambassador to Israel and Egypt and deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

**KANAN MAKIYA** is the Sylvia K. Hassenfeld professor of Islamic and Middle East studies at Brandeis University and author of *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (written pseudonymously, 1989), *The Monument* (2004), and *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World* (1994). In addition, his articles and essays on political and cultural issues have appeared in *al-Hayat* (London), the *New York Times*, the *New York Review of Books*, and the *Times* of London.

**SARI NUSSEIBEH** is the president of al-Quds University and co-chairman of the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization. He coauthored *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life* (2007) with Anthony David and coedited *Jerusalem: Points of Friction and Beyond* (2000) with Moshe Maoz.

**DAVID POLLOCK** is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on public opinion and political dynamics of Middle Eastern countries. He joined the Institute after a long government career that included service as senior advisor for the broader Middle East in the State Department's Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues; as senior specialist on the Near East and South Asia for the State Department's

Policy Planning Staff; and as chief of Near East, South Asia, and Africa research at the U.S. Information Agency, where he supervised many of the first political polls ever conducted in Arab countries.

**AHMAD RAFAT**, general secretary of the Foreign Press Association of Italy, is chief correspondent on Italy and the Middle East for the influential Spanish weekly *Tiempo*. He has also worked for several other major European newspapers and magazines.

**DENNIS ROSS**, the counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute, is author of *Statecraft, And How to Restore America's Standing in the World* (2007) and *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (2004). Previously, he served as special Middle East coordinator in the Clinton administration, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in the George H. W. Bush administration, and director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council during the Reagan administration.

**NADER SAID** is director of the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University and team leader for the UN's Palestine Human Development Report. He also serves as an advisor to a number of local and international institutions, including the United Nations Development Programme.

**MITCHELL SILBER** is a senior analyst in the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department and coauthor of its recent report *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (2007).

**BOB WOODWARD**, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize, is assistant managing editor of the *Washington Post* and author of several bestselling books, including *State of Denial* (2006), *Plan of Attack* (2004), and *Bush at War* (2002).

**EHUD YAARI** is an Israel-based Lafer international fellow of The Washington Institute, Middle East correspondent for Israel's Channel Two, and associate editor of the *Jerusalem Report*. He is coauthor, with the late Zeev Schiff, of such bestselling books as *Intifada* (1991) and *Israel's Lebanon War* (1985).

2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Lebanon



# The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Lebanon

*Walid Jumblatt*

EDITED TRANSCRIPT


LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, distinguished trustees, I'm delighted and honored to be able to express some viewpoints concerning Lebanon at this particular and decisive moment of my country's history, here hosted by the prestigious Washington Institute. But to be able to grasp the complex situation, allow me to go back to some historical moments and events that triggered, and are still triggering, the current crisis.

The moment of truth, if I can say so, started on August 26, 2004, when Bashar al-Asad summoned Rafiq Hariri, the late prime minister of Lebanon, to Damascus. The meeting did not last more than ten minutes, and Asad told him bluntly, "Emile Lahoud (the then Lebanese president) is me, and if somebody in Lebanon wants me out, I'll break Lebanon. Go and renew his mandate."

Hariri was prevented from even arguing, and went straight back to Beirut, where he met with me and told me what happened to him with Bashar. For President Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Aridi, ministers and members of parliament, and Bassem Sabaa, another member of parliament, the moment of truth had come. Some of you might ask why it took me such a long time to defy Syrian occupation of Lebanon. One day—if I manage to escape from the butcher of Damascus, correctly described by Bernard Lewis as the inheritor of the assassins—I will write my memoirs.

Going back to the same day, August 26, 2004, I told Hariri not to stay depressed. I told him, "Don't defy him. Don't defy Bashar. He's dangerous. Go and amend the constitution. I will not attack you, but I will not vote for the amendments." On August 28, the government of Lebanon met and decided to amend the constitution. The minister representing my parliamentary group objected and, three days later, resigned. The parliament convened on September 3 and voted for the amendments. Out of 128 members of parliament, twenty-nine defied Syrian orders—Bashar's orders. I was one of them. Hariri could not but abide reluctantly.

On September 2, the Security Council had met and issued Resolution 1559, denouncing Syrian interference and declaring its support for a free



■ *Walid Jumblatt is chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon.*

The mandate imposed on Lebanese by the president of Syria is coming close to its end.

and fair electoral process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential election. This, of course, did not happen at the time. It could happen this year—in three weeks' time. The mandate imposed on us by the president of Syria is coming close to its end. But one of us, Antoine Ghanem, was assassinated three weeks ago by a car bomb—Bashar keeping his promise to break Lebanon. And back to 2004—nearly a month after the amendments of the constitution, Marwan Hamadeh, minister and member of parliament, miraculously escaped death from a car bomb on his way out of his home in Beirut. Bashar was just then beginning to keep his promise to break Lebanon.

Resolution 1559 called on all remaining forces to withdraw from Lebanon. We still had Syrian troops at that time, with the Israelis having left in 2000. The Syrians left at the end of April 2005 under the pressure of international support for a free Lebanon. But they also left after a huge, peaceful, popular upheaval of free Lebanese on March 14, 2005, called the Cedar Revolution, asking them to leave, defying Syrian puppets and allies, and paying homage and tribute to the memory of Rafiq Hariri and his comrades. He had been assassinated by a truck bomb on February 14, forty days beforehand—Asad once again trying to break Lebanon.

But the journey of the Lebanese people for life, freedom, and democracy continued, defying each time the will of Asad to break Lebanon. On April 7, 2005, upon the request of the Lebanese government, the Security Council approved Resolution 1595, an international commission of inquiry into the murder of Hariri and his comrades. Because we could not at that time—and still in some cases are not able, after thirty years of Syrian occupation—to rely on our security apparatus, the killing continued. Asad was not intimidated and is still not.

On December 12, 2005, the day Gibran Tuani, hero of the Cedar Revolution and prominent editor of *al-Nahar* newspaper, was assassinated, the Lebanese government asked the United Nations for a special tribunal of international character. The Security Council approved this request three days later. The day Tuani was killed, the ministers of Hizballah and Amal left the government—the ministers allied to the Syrian and Iranian regime. They came back later on, but from that day until November 2006, the Syrian-Iranian coalition did its best to prevent the formation of the UN tribunal. On November 11, 2006, they finally resigned from the government, two days after the government of Fouad Siniora was to finally approve the draft agreement between the Lebanese government and the UN.

Then the crisis widened. The parliament was illegally closed by the speaker, Nabih Berri, to prevent the members of parliament—the actual surviving majority—from voting and ratifying the agreement concerning the tribunal. Meanwhile, on November 21, eight days after the government's approval of the tribunal draft, Pierre Gemayel, minister and mem-

ber of parliament, was killed. Yes, Assad was trying to break Lebanon and oppose justice.

Finally, the Security Council, having realized that it was impossible to establish the tribunal through the normal constitutional process in Lebanon, decided to adopt the tribunal on May 13, 2007, by Resolution 1757, and provided until June 10 to implement it under Chapter 7, in case the Lebanese parliament could by some miracle be convened. This miracle did not materialize, but another bloody message was delivered on June 13: Walid Eido, member of parliament, member of the legal commission of the parliament, outspoken critic of the Syrian regime, like Gibran Tuani, like Samir Kassir, like others, was assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut. Yes, Bashar was continuing to crack down and oppose local and international justice in Lebanon.

Three weeks from now, we will face the moment of truth. Either we will be able to elect a president who will fulfill the aspirations of the Lebanese for a free, independent, sovereign country in conformity with the March 14 movement, the Cedar Revolution—a president who will respect international resolutions and cooperate fully with the tribunal—or Lebanon will succumb to Syrian tyranny and Iranian hegemony. If that happens, Lebanon will disappear as the only model of diversity, pluralism, and democracy in the Middle East.

But let nobody be fooled that the killing machine will stop. As long as he is there, the ruler of Damascus will feel secure in his capital, supported by the Iranians. Some people think that engaging him could lead to changes in behavior—well, in such a case, why not engage with Osama bin Laden, like Chamberlain a long time ago engaged with Adolf Hitler. We know that history is full of examples where engaging dictators led to massacres, to tragedies.

I will end by saying that it took me quite a long time, quite a long journey, to grasp certain values and conclusions about the importance of democracy, freedom, and justice. But I joined the March 14 forces—the courageous Lebanese seeking freedom, democracy, and justice—and I discovered, perhaps late (you know, sometimes there is a kind of veil in front of your eyes, obstructing the vision of truth), that justice cannot coexist with tyrants. And the so-called resistance movements or movements of national liberation supported by dictators in Damascus or forces of darkness in Tehran cannot but act according to their wishes, to the wishes of their masters and dictates. And having done my best—with my March 14 comrades, all of them—to materialize the tribunal, waiting for the verdict and reminding the audience how fierce the allies of Syria and Iran are in opposing the tribunal, in opposing justice, I hope that justice will be done, and that the murderers will be brought to trial. And that somewhere I will have been faithful to the memory of a gentleman—as Arthur Sulzberger described him in the *New York Times* on March 16, 1997—Kemal Jumblatt, who was murdered in the Chouf

History is full  
of examples  
where engaging  
dictators led  
to massacres,  
to tragedies.

Although the Syrians withdrew, they left behind what some might call a brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Mountain area of Lebanon, killed by the Syrian regime along with many other innocents.

**ROBERT SATLOFF**, *The Washington Institute*: I'd like to open up a question-and-answer session with you by asking you one or two questions. First, you've been in the United States for the past couple days. The United States was not mentioned in your remarks, and so I wanted to ask you what sort of advice or requests you have made either on this trip or on recent trips to your American interlocutors about what we can do, or what we should do to advance the cause of freedom and democracy that you so eloquently talked about.

**JUMBLATT**: I mentioned in my speech that the international forces led by the administration, Mr. Bush and Mrs. Rice and others, and by Mr. Chirac oblige the Syrians to get out of Lebanon. And thanks to this administration and other administrations, we've finally got the so-called tribunal. What is left is to materialize the tribunal and to name the prosecutor—and I did my best here to ask them to help us name a good prosecutor. We had a good one at one time, a commissioner called Mehlis. He went straight to the point. I hope the Brammertz will also go straight to the point, but we need a prosecutor.

So we've gone to this administration and the people of the United States to get help. But as I told you, the killing machine will not stop, and although the Syrian troops withdrew officially, they left behind what you might call a brigade or division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that occupy half of Lebanon, paralyzing the economy and facilitating Syrian efforts to kill us. That's it.

**SATLOFF**: When you think about the presidential election that is currently underway, there is an impasse at the moment. How do you imagine that the Lebanese and the March 14 faction specifically, but parliament more generally, will resolve this impasse?

**JUMBLATT**: We have no choice. Mr. Hariri tried to engage in dialogue with the other side—Mr. Berri, the speaker of the parliament—but we have no choice but to elect one of us. And here some will say, "But why don't you fix up a compromise?" The compromise was fixed a long time ago. Let's not fool ourselves. The compromise was fixed in 2005 when we said to the French, and to the Americans, it is impossible—technically or politically—to disarm Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon. It's impossible. And we began at that time the so-called dialogue.

Of course, we thought dialogue was possible. We discovered later on that dialogue was impossible. You are talking with people who are willing to attack you. This is why we need a president who will abide by international resolutions. Later on, perhaps the regional circumstances will be

better—and when I say better I mean if Bashar is ousted from power. Let's be blunt and frank. Unless he's not, if he is still secure and immune, we will still have the same problem: the borders between Lebanon and Syria will remain open, an issue that both international observers and the Lebanese army have faced. The United States is now providing adequate technical and military assistance to the army, although we must also take into account that some people in the army, not to name them, are still from the old regime. After thirty years of Syrian occupation, it's not that easy to establish a new generation of independent Lebanese army officers.

**SATLOFF:** You just referred to international forces. One of the innovations since last summer's Israel-Hizballah war that many people point to as a positive development is the deployment of international forces in southern Lebanon. What is your evaluation of the effectiveness of these forces, especially in terms of their role in preventing Hizballah operations and the smuggling of weaponry from Syria and Iran?

**JUMBLATT:** These international forces on the border between Lebanon and Israel have nothing to do with the border between Lebanon and Syria. According to Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government is to ask the Germans, I believe, to assist them with the technical issue of how to control the Lebanese-Syrian border. They have begun a very slow and, I would say, endless process, and we still have rockets and other things coming through the border. It will take some time. But the actual UN forces have nothing to do with the Lebanese-Syrian border, according to their mandate. And again I say, as long as these borders are open, you won't be able to speak on equal terms with Hizballah.

**SATLOFF:** Just one last question before I open up the discussion session. There is much talk about the potential for a Syria-Israel peace negotiation. One of the fears expressed by many is that such a negotiation would have an immediate impact on Lebanon. Is it, in your view, possible to imagine or to create a negotiation in which Lebanon's security is protected, or is it by definition an issue in those negotiations?

**JUMBLATT:** Up until now, this administration is adamant in its views on the Syrian regime, and it won't trade Lebanon for anything else. But looking back at history—and knowing the Syrians quite well, and indirectly the Israelis, of course—I can say that when they fight, they fight on our soil. The last fight between them was in 1973, when they fought the so-called war of 1973, and from that time on, the Golan has been occupied, and there hasn't been a single shot on the Golan.

I wouldn't mind engagement of the Syrians if such talks were restricted to Resolution 242 regarding the Golan. But knowing the Syrians well, they would attempt to make trades, to trade Lebanon, the tribunal, democracy

After thirty years of Syrian occupation, it's not easy to establish a new generation of independent Lebanese army officers.

The international forces on the Lebanon-Israel border have nothing to do with the border between Lebanon and Syria.

in Lebanon, and maybe something else—again, knowing quite well their past deeds, and Israel’s past deeds, in Lebanon. They don’t care about an independent, sovereign, democratic Lebanon. I know this from past experience. And if you want to make the story very long, we’ll go back to 1975, 1976, when, unfortunately, Lebanon was given as a gift to Hafiz al-Asad by a previous American administration and Kissinger.

**DENNIS ROSS**, *The Washington Institute*: Walid, your message was very, very straightforward, hardly subtle: you pretty much called for regime change in Syria. I would suggest that in this town, regime change probably doesn’t have quite the allure it once had, so I would ask you the question: if regime change isn’t likely in terms of American policy toward Syria, what do you want to see the administration do? What could it do at this point? Beyond what you described in terms of supporting prosecution, what could it do more than it’s doing today to try to affect the ongoing killing machine, as you described it?

**JUMBLATT**: Look, I might be blunt, and you might find my remarks quite unusual. But it was not a mistake in the absolute to remove Saddam Hussein. Removing dictators is never a mistake. Maybe the timing was a mistake. Maybe the procedures were mistaken later on. I said, maybe. But removing Saddam Hussein was not a mistake. I know that American people are suffering because of the casualties. I know that. And Bashar al-Asad did profit from it—as you know, he sent a lot of terrorists and car bombs, imported a lot of them from Lebanon, from Saudi Arabia, from Yemen, even from Chechnya, and sent them to kill you in Iraq.

I don’t think you can change his behavior. And I know very well that he’s ready to sit with you. He’s anxious, he’s dying to sit with the Americans, but there is one issue: Lebanon, the tribunal, one issue. I’m not going to speak about Hamas and other things now because it would complicate issues, but I know him quite well. I know the Syrian regime quite well and I have the experience of history. My father, after all, opposed Syrian interference in Lebanon. That is why he was killed. So back to your question, there haven’t been effective sanctions against him. What do you want me to say? I’m speaking to a diplomat. No, I’m not going to be a diplomat. If you could send some car bombs to Damascus, why not? [Laughter, applause]

**SATLOFF**: I can honestly say we’ve never had that before at The Washington Institute. [Laughter, applause]

**MOUAFAC HARB**, *former director of network news, al-Hurra*: This is your fourth trip to Washington, so let me put Dennis’s question in more journalistic language: do you feel that you are getting the appropriate support from this administration, or are you only getting lip service?

**JUMBLATT:** No, it's not just talk. The issue of the tribunal was a major issue, a major issue, and I can tell you we faced major obstacles at that time from the Syrians and from the Russians also.

But is it enough? We've got to wait for the prosecutor, we've got to wait for the verdict so we and the American administration can intimidate Bashar. He knows it, and he's playing on time, trying to delay things, until next month, next year, when we might not be here. Until then, the actual majority remains—but not if they kill four more and manage to get a Syrian-Iranian puppet installed as president of Lebanon. My knowledge in law is limited, but I know that somehow this puppet could delay the tribunal in various ways. The tribunal on Milosevic in Yugoslavia was begun in 1993 but not delivered until 1999, when Milosevic was offset by popular revolution. The Cambodian tribunal on genocide took thirty years to catch one from the Khmer Rouge. So I know what Asad is doing. I know it.

And now we are speaking about not genocide, but political assassination, and he knows it. Asad cannot afford to have the Lockerbie scenario. He can't afford even to say too much. I would like him to be indicted. He can't allow that because it would affect his prestige and weaken him.

But I've got the support, yes. More than that, what can I ask? I was joking when I said car bombs. Just a joke, okay? [Laughter]

**DAVID SCHENKER**, *The Washington Institute*: It's very easy to imagine a situation where at the midpoint in November, parliament would be constitutionally forced to sit in session on these issues. And if a vote doesn't come to pass—or even if it does—what will the army do? The army is traditionally the great unifying force in Lebanon. What will General Suleiman do? Which side will the army take?

**JUMBLATT:** Look again to the constitution. On November 14, we should be able without the permission of the speaker, Nabih Berri, to convene, to meet anywhere in Lebanon. It is better to meet in Lebanon, not outside—but anywhere, really—and elect a new president.

The army should abide by the orders of the new president, and it should allow free access to Baabda for that president. The army cannot stay neutral, and it should focus on protecting public institutions. Let us see them protect us, protect public institutions and not stay neutral.

**DAN RAVIV**, *CBS News*: For people who follow the Israeli-Arab dispute, it was surprising to hear no mention of last year's war. Rob brought it up, you made a brief comment about the international forces, but did the war last year not impact what you're concentrating on tonight? Did it leave Asad stronger? Did it make Nasrallah stronger, and does that make a difference to you? Did the war last summer mean nothing for your campaign?

It was not a mistake to remove Saddam Hussein. Removing dictators is never a mistake.

There is a parallel state called the state of Hizballah, with its own army and financing.

**JUMBLATT:** Well, when we assumed our ministerial declarations, it was our duty to respect international resolutions and lead the Lebanese people. We are entitled to deliberate their occupied land, which means this poisonous gift called Shebaa, which is up to this moment not legally Lebanese. It could be legalized two ways: either the Syrian government agrees to sign an agreement with the Lebanese government that Shebaa is Lebanese, or we do what Siniora proposed and fix it for a transitory period and under the United Nations mandate. Nothing has been done. Neither this nor that.

The war was not about Shebaa, though. Nasrallah did not want captured Israeli soldiers from Shebaa. He went to the Blue Line, the internationally recognized border between us and the state of Israel, between Lebanon at the time of the French mandate and between Palestine at the time of the English mandate. And I think he went there to derail the process of the tribunal. Of course, here, thanks to the stupidity and arrogance and at the same time barbarous aggression on Lebanon as usual, we stood by the people of the South. We stood by ourselves. After all, they are our people.

But for the sake of history, just after the end of the war and when we had the combination of 1701 and the seven points jointly made by Siniora and the government (when the ministers of Amal and Hizballah were present along with Nabih Berri), the campaign of denunciation began. It was started first by Asad in a speech denouncing us as traitors and calling us Israeli and American agents. Then Khamenei, preaching in Tehran, said that he would destroy American influence in Lebanon. Then began the process of destabilization. But mind you, somewhere the main issue was how to delay the implementation of the tribunal.

**SATLOFF:** You mentioned the Iranian Supreme Leader's views on Lebanon. Can you give us your evaluation of Iranian influence in your country?

**JUMBLATT:** It's the same. We have a parallel state called the state of Hizballah. They have their army. They have their security forces. They have their security apparatus. They have their money totally parallel to the Lebanese state, and they are paralyzing downtown. They are controlling part of the country so that one cannot enter without approval. The Lebanese-Syrian border is open to all kinds of traffic—weapons, terrorists, money, rockets. We can still survive, but it's a question of time.

And the Iranians do profit in a way. I'm not going to call it—as King Abdullah of Jordan or Hosni Mubarak did—the “Shiite crescent,” because you have Lebanese Shiites who are refusing the dictates of Nasrallah but are unable to speak. I will say it's like a Persian crescent, yes—a Persian crescent from Tehran through Iraq to the Alawi regime to Lebanon.

**DAVID MAKOVSKY**, *The Washington Institute*: Mr. Jumblatt, picking up on Rob's last point, can you envisage any circumstances where the interests of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah do not precisely overlap? Is there a way to divide them from each other in your view, or is this impossible because they see things very similarly?

Also, I think we tend to view Nasrallah in a certain way. Can you maybe tell us how you see his objectives? Is he a complete Iranian puppet?

And one last one point on Shebaa, if I could. Certainly in the United States, and I think in Israel as well, the Shebaa issue is viewed very much as an excuse—that is, even if Shebaa is given up, some believe that it would not matter because Hizballah and others would say that there are seven villages from 1948 that also could be questioned. Could you say categorically whether this is the last territorial difference that exists between the countries?

**JUMBLATT**: Well, you've asked a difficult question to start with about the possibility of differences between the Iranians and the Syrians. On the ground, of course, I know that trade-wise the Syrians are telling Hizballah, as the Iranians are telling the Israelis and the Americans, if you want to have a dialogue with us, let's trade. Both the bazaar of Tehran and the bazaar of Damascus are quite clever in trade, and the main basic item of trade is Lebanon. And I remind you what a disastrous year 2006 was for innocent Lebanese being killed in Lebanon. But bizarrely, emissaries from Israel were somewhere meeting with the Syrians. It's very bizarre. Once an Israeli airplane accidentally dropped a bomb on the Syrian border, then suddenly both unite as if nothing happened. It is a very bizarre and hypocritical attitude.

So back to the issue, Asad has no need to disengage from Tehran. I don't see him disengaging from Tehran. He's just profiting, and for the time being he's done a good job, unfortunately.

As for the Shebaa—Shebaa is a pretext. When the south of Lebanon was liberated in 2000 and the Israelis withdrew, we didn't have the question of Shebaa at that time. Suddenly, because we were under Syrian occupation, the Shebaa issue came up. It's a tiny land, and if you go back and listen to the scholars and look at the maps, you'll end up taking the whole Golan. Shebaa is just a pretext for the Syrians and Nasrallah to say, "Let's keep the weapons until we liberate Shebaa." Later on they might say, "Let's go from Shebaa to Jerusalem."

**JAAP VAN WESEL**, *Jerusalem Report*: A big and a small question. The big question is whether you are in favor of removing President Asad given that some experts say the alternative would be worse—even worse than the Iraq civil war, with the Muslim Brothers perhaps taking over. The small question is: are you in favor of the Hariri tribunal taking place in the Hague, or should it be somewhere else?

Asad has no need to disengage from Tehran when he profits so much from the relationship.

Many senators and congressmen have met with Asad, but none have expressed reluctance about him.

**JUMBLATT:** No, I don't agree. I just don't agree. If it's appropriately managed, helping the credible Syrian opposition inside and outside the country, I think we would slowly but surely be able to have a new Syria. This does not mean dismantling the Syrian army or the Baath Party—they are part of the society of Syria. Yes, Syria is conservative, but I don't see in Syria the sectarian or communal tensions of Iraq. The transition would have to be well done, though.

I'll give you one example. Many senators and congressmen have visited Damascus. They say Asad speaks fluent English, and they find him nice. But I wish one of them would express reluctance about him. I wish that they would remind him about the 6,000 political prisoners in Syria. Pre-eminent writers and activists in human rights such as Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, al-Labwani, Riad Seif—and the latter is dying of prostate cancer. If you start like that, it would be reminiscent of how it started with the Soviet Union. It started with human rights—that was one of the reasons why the Soviet Union later collapsed. I don't agree that Syria will break down, and I'm not for breaking down Syria. But you have to find the credible answer, the appropriate opposition outside and inside the country.

As for the tribunal location, I think the Security Council found a place in the Netherlands—not in the Hague, next to Hague. But the real question now is how to finance it. The United States has pledged \$6 million, the Lebanese state \$6 million, and France \$6 million, but we have to get more. We need \$130 million.

**ROBERT RABIL,** *Florida Atlantic University:* Recently, we have heard some implicit statements that sounded like veiled threats, made by Muhammad Raad and, later, by none other than Defense Minister Almur. In short, they've suggested that if the March 14 forces try to elect a president under a "half plus one" majority, then the opposition is preparing certain countermeasures. It would seem that the opposition, led by Hizballah, may be preparing a takeover of Beirut and of the March 14 forces. What's your position on that? If this attempt indeed took place, what would you expect from the international community?

**JUMBLATT:** We speak about the opposition as if we are speaking about an opposition in a civilized democratic country, as if we were in the United States, France, Switzerland, or Holland. I haven't seen in my life an opposition with a parallel army, with rockets, with a security apparatus, with independent financing, with anything like we see in Lebanon. I haven't seen in my life an opposition whereby the speaker can undemocratically and unconstitutionally close the parliament. I don't think that could happen here in America, if Mrs. Pelosi decided to close the House, for example.

This is not an opposition. This is a trick of the word. Yes, they are willing to overthrow the government if they can, slowly but surely. Yes, the

killing machine will continue. Yes, if you read the books of Nasrallah, you see that they don't care about the so-called democracy of Lebanon, pluralism of Lebanon, or diversity of Lebanon. They have one thing in mind, and they are working on it in the long term: how to change the whole structure of Lebanon. In southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, they are buying land—not ordinary, bourgeois, Shiite citizens, but rather an Iranian institution purchasing settlements surrounding Mount Lebanon and later perhaps looking to link the south of Lebanon to the north. And yes, they are profiting from demography. So it's not an opposition in normal terms.

So what can we do? We don't have the same weapons, unfortunately. We don't have the same means. We stick to the aspiration of the Lebanese, the million and a half that every day say no to Syrian occupation. Yes, we'll stick to that. Although they are stronger, they have not been able to defeat our will. We'll see in three weeks.

**SALAMEH NEMATT**, *former Washington bureau chief*, al-Hayat: There are reports that indicate differences between you and the Hariri bloc over what kind of president you would accept as a compromise formula for a resolution of this crisis. Could you explain your position on that, and to what extent you agree or disagree with Saad Hariri over this matter? And since you obviously know Lebanon better than any of us, could you tell us which scenario is most likely to unfold on November 14 and beyond, assuming that nothing major changes?

**JUMBLATT**: There is no difference between Hariri and me. We are a front composed of a variety of forces. We consult with each other, Hariri, Jaja, Gemayel, myself, and all the others. If there is a consensus somewhere and any one of us thinks that he could achieve a compromise, I would abide by it, as I told him. But I also told him, and said publicly, that I lead a parliamentary group, three of whom are members of the Future Movement, al-Mustaqbal, and are independent people.

If there were a compromise, I would still not vote for a compromise president because I don't believe in a compromise president. The compromise was set when we were unable to convince Nasrallah to disarm peacefully and to engage under the Lebanese banner and under Lebanese army orders. We were discussing the so-called defensive strategy. When we reached the point about weapons, Nasrallah said bluntly, "Look, I have my own security apparatus, I have my army; let's find out a solution whereby we coordinate your state and myself." He said it bluntly. And two weeks later he went to war. But if Hariri feels that he's obliged to reach a compromise, I will back him.

We are living day by day. But the issue that has been raised about the neutrality of the army, I don't like it. I just don't like it because I've also heard rumors about the possibility of causing chaos downtown so that some will appeal to amend the constitution to allow a certain general to

Pressuring  
Damascus  
starts with  
human rights—  
one of the  
reasons the  
Soviet Union  
collapsed.

The more instability persists, the more educated people from all communities will simply leave Lebanon.

come to power. I have to remind myself and others that we accepted Resolution 1559, and we found out that there is no basic difference between it and the Taif agreement. 1559 led to the killing of Hariri. At that time we refused to amend the constitution. We will not amend it now for the military.

**SATLOFF:** Mr. Jumblatt, in your opening speech, you looked back a bit on your own evolution, on how you came to your current views. I'd like you to look forward a bit into the future of Lebanon. You lead a community—the Christians of Lebanon—that is not growing. When you look at the future of your country—not November 14, but a decade or two from now—what sort of Lebanon do you see demographically, politically, and culturally?

**JUMBLATT:** The more instability persists, the more the educated people from all the communities—whether Christian, Shiite, Sunni, or Druze—will just leave. But in case Hizballah and others are serious about their plans regarding demography, the long-term strategy of buying land, and so forth, it is very important to remember the Taif agreement. It is based on division of power between Christians and Muslims regardless of demography. This was signed and finalized in 1989. If they say, “We want more power because we have weapons,” and Taif is somehow revoked, then the elite Lebanese would disappear and Lebanon would no longer be diverse, pluralistic, and democratic. It would become like any other Arab state, and that would be unfortunate.

**SATLOFF:** Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in thanking a very courageous Lebanese patriot.

2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# Turkish Foreign Policy: Western or Not?



# Turkish Foreign Policy: Western or Not?

*Soner Cagaptay and Asli Aydintasbas*

SUMMARY

## SONER CAGAPTAY

WHEN MOST WESTERNERS GO to Turkey today, they see prosperity and the free market economy concentrated in large cities, especially Istanbul, and in favorite vacation spots on the Aegean Sea. That bubble seems much larger, more prosperous, and more Western than it has ever been. Yet, the other Turkey is generally left out of focus. The issue of faith is becoming a factor separating the Western-oriented part of Turkey from the rural populace and from the working- and lower-middle-class suburbs of the big cities.

Domestic changes and changes in Turkish foreign policy are in tandem. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad consistently ranks as the most popular foreign leader among the Turkish public. Recent polls show that Iran is substantially more popular than the United States, and the gap has been growing rapidly. Indeed, Iran has more or less caught up with the European Union in approval ratings. Meanwhile, the number of people identifying themselves as Muslims first and Turks second has increased considerably—almost half the population declares itself Islamist.

In explaining the picture above, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is the biggest wedge issue between Turkey and the United States. In the 1990s, Washington gave Turkey significant support to combat the PKK and capture its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. This assistance was much appreciated in Turkey and helped create a very favorable public opinion of the United States. As a result of American support and successful counterterrorism operations by the Turkish military, the PKK was defeated in the late 1990s and declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1999.

Yet, the Iraq war created a power vacuum in northern Iraq that has benefited the PKK. In the 1990s, Turkey carried out regular crossborder operations into that area to clean out the PKK presence with the assistance of Iraqi Kurds. But this cooperation has practically ended since 2003. Accordingly, the PKK has regrouped, rearmed, and retrained in northern Iraq to an extent unseen since the height of its powers in the mid-1990s. It has also begun to launch attacks again. Meanwhile, Iran and Syria, which



■ *Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He also serves as chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.*

actually supported the PKK in the 1990s, have changed their behavior toward the group and now cooperate with Turkey against it.

### ASLI AYDINTASBAS

THE ANALOGY OFTEN USED for Turkey's EU journey is a train that never seems to arrive at the station. This train is similar to the one in the famous joke about the Soviet Union, namely, that under Lenin, some people pushed the train while others sat on it; under Stalin, everyone got off and pushed the train but the cars barely moved; and under Brezhnev, everyone sat on the train and said "choo, choo" while the train did not move an inch.

Today, there appears to be complete amnesia in Turkey regarding the EU. Turkish accession was made possible in 1999 when the EU declared that Turkey would be treated equally to other country candidates. The process became more of a reality in 2004 when the union began actual accession talks with Turkey, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was the strongest advocate of EU membership. Now, however, French president Nicolas Sarkozy has said that "there is no room for Turkey in Europe," and German chancellor Angela Merkel has hardly been more welcoming. Essentially, Turkey's progress toward EU membership has stalled, but among the Turkish public, nobody seems to mention the situation.

As EU membership appears to be losing domestic support, the United States remains Turkey's only anchor to the West. As long as the United States neglects Turkey's immediate existential concerns, Turkish public affinity for Iran and Syria might cause policy rifts between Washington and Ankara. The final outcome of this trend is difficult to predict.

At the same time, the AKP has consolidated a great deal of power with its control of the presidency, prime ministry, and parliament. Moreover, the party may score a massive victory in the upcoming local elections. All of this adds up to a profound change underway in Turkey.



■ *Asli Aydintasbas, a prominent Turkish journalist, formerly served as Ankara bureau chief for Sabah newspaper.*

## 2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



# America's Future Direction in Iraq



# America's Future Direction in Iraq

*J. D. Crouch and Antony Blinken*

SUMMARY

## J. D. CROUCH


THERE IS REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC about Iraq's future. Although mistakes have been made in the past, there is no reason to dwell on them; in fact, some of them were unavoidable. It is important to keep in perspective that it was not a mistake to remove Saddam Hussein—removing dictators from power is never a bad move. For Iraqis, they now have a chance to find common ground and rally around a nonpolitical idea. Agreeing on the necessity to remove Saddam Hussein is one such idea. Another one pertains to the future: that success in Iraq is still possible.

Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the Iraqi people, the region, and for the national security of the United States. A year ago, the situation in Baghdad was desperate. There was decreasing public confidence in U.S. efforts and an increase in sectarian violence in and around Baghdad. To bolster the increasingly precarious situation, the U.S. military implemented the surge and the Iraqi leadership attempted to extend its political presence throughout the country.

The surge was a change in U.S. strategy, turning the focus away from training and equipping Iraqi forces toward protecting the Iraqi people. This was a fundamental change, and it altered the way the U.S. command thought about its mission. The new focus meant that rather than combating al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) almost exclusively, more effort was spent on radical Shiite elements such as Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi.

Several elements of the new American strategy are working. Violence both in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq is down, Jaish al-Mahdi has become more quiescent, AQI is suffering in Anbar and on the run everywhere else, and American casualties have dropped. The economic situation in Iraq is improving as well.

In addition, there is a "top-down, bottom-up" political strategy, which combines national benchmarks with efforts to cooperate with local officials on core issues. In Anbar province, Sunni leaders were weary of American forces. But when AQI began to overplay its hand in the region, the province's tribal leaders started to work with the coalition forces in



■ *J. D. Crouch served until early 2007 as deputy national security advisor in the Bush administration.*

earnest. The key question is whether the Anbar scenario can be replicated elsewhere in Iraq. A reason to be optimistic is that in Diyala province, which is a mix of Sunnis and Shiites, local leaders are also turning their backs on AQI. To be sure, the top-down approach is a slow and more frustrating process. Although many of the national benchmarks have not been met, in the long run, national reconciliation is more important. Also, there is an emerging group of young leaders who do not carry the baggage of the older politicians and may be more prepared to work together with all the parties. Meanwhile, the Iraqi army is hanging tough.

Many ask why the previously advocated drawdown course was not chosen. Doing so would have been detrimental in many ways: it would have emboldened both the Sunni insurgency and Syrian and Iranian interference; the Iraqi government, and particularly the Shiites, would have taken such a move as a sign of abandonment; it would have been perceived as defeatist; and for the American soldiers, many of whom are now emotionally attached to the Iraqi people, it would have undermined the sense of moral purpose they have gained.

Looking ahead, the United States needs to stay out of local reconciliation while simultaneously finding a way to nurture it. Back at home, leaders have to find a consensus that will allow the United States to continue its important mission.

### ANTONY BLINKEN

AT THIS POINT, IT IS TOUGH to keep people interested in Iraq. The question is how to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. Politically, there is not enough support in the United States to sustain the current level of involvement. And in practical terms, doing so would have many repercussions: remobilizing National Guard and reserve units, extending tours of duty, and sending soldiers back for third and fourth tours, among others. There is also a growing tension between the commanders on the ground and the defense secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

If the United States leaves chaos behind, its interests in the region will be undermined for a generation, making it necessary to send troops back in five or ten years. There is a consensus that there is no purely military solution to the problem, and that a power-sharing agreement among Iraqis is essential. So what is a possible accommodation among Iraqis?

One option is letting various factions fight it out. This is an unsatisfactory option since it will take a long time, during which American forces will remain bogged down. There can also be a perpetual occupation of Iraq or a search for another dictator—both equally unwise. This leaves two viable options: either building a strong central government in Baghdad that slowly gains the trust of the Iraqi people, or implementing a decentralized federalist model. The former is flawed, since there is no trust in the current government or its capacity to deliver services to the people. The second approach,



■ Antony Blinken is majority staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and senior foreign policy advisor to the committee's chairman, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.).

however, offers more promise. Under a federalist system, people are in control over what matters most to them in their daily lives. Iraq's government does not work well, but if it is broken up into more cohesive, smaller units, it will create trust and capacity quickly.

Everyone should know that federalism is not partition. Federalism is actually designed to prevent the partition that may well otherwise occur. Federalism is also not a foreign proposition; it is enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, with regional law superceding federal law. The Bush administration seems to believe that federalism will happen organically, but it actually must be pushed. The chances of federalism's success are modest—but that is much better than the prospects of any other alternative.

When it comes to the current Iraqi government, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is only part of the problem. Iraq's difficulties are not going to be solved simply with a new administration—though as Senator Joe Biden stated, al-Maliki has neither the will nor the way to solve the issues.

Regarding the Iranians, they already have an influence in Iraq, especially in the south. There, different Shiites groups are vying for power, and Iran is playing them all against each other. Implementing federalism does not necessarily play into Iran's hands because of the complicated relationship between the Shiites of Iran and those of Iraq, dating to longstanding Arab-Persian tensions as well as the more recent Iran-Iraq War.

**If the United States leaves chaos behind in Iraq, its interests in the region will be undermined for a generation.**





---

# Israel-Hizballah-Syria: Lessons from the Last War, Preventing the Next One



# Israel-Hizballah-Syria: Lessons from the Last War, Preventing the Next One

*Nicholas Blanford and Moshe Kaplinsky*

SUMMARY

## NICHOLAS BLANFORD

FROM 2000 TO 2006, HIZBALLAH was quietly preparing for an inevitable conflict with its Israeli neighbor. It built up arms caches, bunkers, and numerous military facilities in southern Lebanon. Despite these preparations, Hizballah did not expect the war that ensued when it crossed into Israel, killing three soldiers and capturing two. The group's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that if he had known the degree to which Israel was going to retaliate, he never would have ordered the operation that sparked the war.

Throughout the 2006 summer war, Hizballah exposed its military capabilities, losing the advantage it had created since 2000, when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon. The group's training and combat tactics all became apparent to Israel, and its arsenal of weapons—clearly intended as a deterrent against potential conflict with Iran—was lost. Hizballah had built a sophisticated network of bunkers along the southern border that were equipped with running water, sewage systems, and even electricity. Some of the bunkers were located just a few meters from UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) posts, and the group's ability to build such a network without anyone noticing is curious. Yet, UNIFIL has since pushed Hizballah fighters north of the Litani River, forcing them to abandon their southern posts.

Since the end of the war, Hizballah has been rearming and rebuilding. Although Hizballah fighters are not quite ready for round two, they anticipate it and are preparing accordingly. Hizballah is purchasing land throughout the country, recruiting and training new fighters, and beginning to rebuild and operate in the north. Training for its regular troops has been stepped up, including lessons on surveillance, navigation, and weaponry, while Hizballah special forces are being sent to Iran for forty-five-day training periods. It seems that Hizballah is not trying to hide what it is doing because of the urgency to prepare for the next round.

As a popular organization, Hizballah continues to provide material benefits for the people of southern Lebanon. It is expanding roads in the



■ *Nicholas Blanford, a Beirut-based correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and Time, is author of Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East (2006).*

south, with funding from Iran, and continuing to provide many social services. It has also offered generous compensation to those affected by the war, in an effort to relieve the burden of the people's losses while simultaneously preparing for the popular backlash that would accompany another conflict.

Any such conflict would most likely take on a regional and international character, involving the United States, Hizballah, Israel, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. There are, however, a few things that the United States and Israel could do to try to prevent the next round from happening. First, Israel should stop its daily overflights in Lebanon. Such maneuvers only prove to the Lebanese that Hizballah has a legitimate role as the country's defender against Israel. Second, Israel should negotiate a prisoner swap. Third, the UN should push for negotiations on Shebaa Farms so Hizballah has no excuse to continue as a militant organization. The international community should work with the Lebanese to strengthen and train the Lebanese Armed Forces. This force is needed to protect and defend Lebanon, but also to prove that an armed Hizballah is no longer required. It may also be time to have a dialogue with Syria, since isolation is not improving the situation.



■ *Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky is deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces and former head of IDF Central Command.*

### MOSHE KAPLINSKY

PREVENTING THE NEXT WAR is the most important thing to focus on right now. This is not primarily an Israeli decision; Hizballah is the key actor in deciding whether there will be another conflict. One would hope Hizballah realized the high price it paid during the summer 2006 war—it was severely damaged, even if less than what Israel had hoped.

Although Hizballah lost 600 fighters, many weapons, and its strategic positions on the border and elsewhere, it is in the process of restoring its capabilities with the assistance of Syria and Iran. The organization, however, is having some difficulty recruiting, being forced to take lower-caliber soldiers and recruits as young as fourteen. Hizballah is nowhere near prepared for another war, although it is doing everything it can to train and equip as fast as possible.

To prevent the next war, the world needs to weaken Hizballah and strengthen the Lebanese government. One way the international community can achieve that end is to better implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. UNIFIL is doing well in the open terrain between villages, but in order to weaken Hizballah, the UNIFIL mandate must be expanded. It needs to deploy forces on the Lebanese-Syrian border, operate north of the Litani, and be able to operate within villages. Furthermore, something must be done to dismantle and disarm Hizballah in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1559—nothing is happening on this front. The international community must strengthen the police and security apparatus in Lebanon, as well as increase financial support to improve the economic situation. Monetary investment must be made


in the south in order to prevent any additional Iranian and Syrian influence. Hizballah must be declared a terrorist organization by the European Union, and contacts between them must stop. By not doing this, Europe continues to provide legitimacy to Hizballah, thus weakening the Lebanese government. A strong Lebanese government also requires capable armed forces.

Some have complained that Israeli flyovers in southern Lebanon undercut Beirut's authority. Yet, Israel carried out no intelligence flights over Lebanon between its 2000 withdrawal and the start of the 2006 war. Because of that, Hizballah was able to plan and execute the attack that sparked the war—the killing and capturing of Israeli soldiers. Israel will stop the flights over Lebanon when it no longer needs to take that extra security precaution.

Any new  
conflict would  
likely take on  
an international  
character,  
involving the  
United States,  
Iran, Syria,  
and Lebanon.



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# Israeli-Palestinian Views on Peace: What Polls Can and Cannot Tell Us



# Israeli-Palestinian Views on Peace: What Polls Can and Cannot Tell Us

*Nader Said, David Makovsky, and David Pollock*

SUMMARY

## NADER SAID

THERE HAS BEEN STRONG Palestinian support for negotiations and peace over the years. Between 1993 and 2000, Palestinian support and expectations for negotiations were high, but recently, while support for negotiations remains very high, expectations are falling. On all issues, Palestinians show a great willingness to accept compromise: 70 percent support a two-state solution based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, and 54 percent believe that Palestinians and Israelis can live side by side in individual states.

As for the upcoming U.S.-led peace conference, 40 percent of Palestinians expect a peace treaty to result, while 60 percent expect either an easing of restrictions, a stricter enforcement of occupation, or no result at all. Forty percent of Palestinians believe Mahmoud Abbas will not achieve anything at the peace meeting, while 32 percent believe he will succeed to some extent. There is, however, little discussion or debate in Palestinian society—including civil, academic, and research centers—about the peace meeting, which reflects the desire to maintain distance from the possible embarrassment that could ensue after the meeting: 42 percent of Palestinians believe that the attending Arab countries will not contribute to a successful outcome, while only 26 percent trust they will bring some success.

Of the three Palestinian leaders—Mahmoud Abbas, Ismail Haniyeh, and Salam Fayad—Fayad has the greatest support, followed by Abbas and then Haniyeh. Fayad's support is based not on the number of votes he receives, but on his performance, since he has paid salaries and made other tangible improvements. Haniyeh has the least support from Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. Support for Hamas is likewise declining significantly. Support for the party was at 50 percent after it won the parliamentary elections in January 2006, but it currently stands at 15 percent.

When asked whether they believe the gap between the West Bank and Gaza is narrowing or widening, 72 percent of Palestinians stated it is



■ *Nader Said is director of the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University and team leader for the UN's Palestine Human Development Report.*

widening. When asked which of the two main parties ( Hamas or Fatah ) is more capable of leading Palestinians out of the current situation, they showed their increasing level of disillusionment, giving both parties less than 50 percent approval.



■ *David Makovsky is director of The Washington Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace Process and an adjunct lecturer on Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.*

## DAVID MAKOVSKY

THERE ARE TWO VIEWS of the nexus between polls and policy polling data: one is the top-down approach, in which elites make decisions and the public then ratifies them; and the other is the bottom-up approach, in which the public is the decisive factor.

In Israel, the importance of polls depends on the issue. If the public feels an issue is not significant and does not relate to its core identity or sense of security, the leadership has a lot of influence in leading the public. The bottom line is that leadership matters and that public opinion moves over time. Prime Minister Golda Meir said in the 1970s that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people. By the mid-1990s, right-wing leader Binyamin Netanyahu shook Yasser Arafat's hand and signed the Wye agreement. Yet, on issues having to do with security, the public is not easily swayed. For example, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would not agree to remove the Israel Defense Forces from the West Bank immediately, knowing that the public would never support such a move while Qassam rockets were flying from Gaza into Israel. When Olmert ordered the raid on Syria on September 6, however, Israelis gave him a lot of credit, and his approval rating shot up thirty points from the lows it had reached following the Lebanon war.

Similarly, Mahmoud Abbas's ratings are higher than they have been in a very long time. Indeed, they may be at their highest point since his election.

Polls, however, are only one part of the picture. In Israel, the other driving factor is the coalition, which politicians fear more than polls because there are those within the coalition who have their own agendas. On the issue of illegal outposts, for example, the majority of Israelis believe they should be dismantled, but one settler who is part of the coalition—Avigdor Lieberman of the Yisrael Beitenu party—is giving Olmert serious problems.


## DAVID POLLOCK

THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES between American and Arab views, not just on matters of opinion, but also on facts. A good example relates to September 11. Polls over the last several years in the Muslim world show that the percentage of people who do not believe that Arabs or Muslims perpetrated the attacks is on the rise. In Egypt and Morocco, polls showed that only half the public claimed to know who was responsible for the terrorist attacks, and about one-third blamed Israel or the U.S. government.

But there are some positive trends in public opinion in the broader Arab world. The majority of people in polled Arab countries support a “lasting and comprehensive peace with Israel” in exchange for a return of all territories occupied in the 1967 war, including east Jerusalem. Another encouraging sign is that most in the Arab world think American policy in the Middle East is made on the basis of American national interests, and not on domestic politics or Israeli influence. On the issue of Iran, there has been a shift in Arab public opinion since the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war: the popularity of Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, and Hassan Nasrallah of Hizballah has declined precipitously.

Support for terrorism, al-Qaeda, and suicide bombings has also declined sharply in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In Lebanon, for example, support for suicide bombings dropped forty points between 2002 and 2007, down to 34 percent. The results were similar in Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The better economic conditions in these countries are not responsible for the changing views; in general, it is not poor people who support terrorism or al-Qaeda, but rather the middle and upper classes. And it should also be noted that the sharp decline in support for terrorism has not been associated with greater support for U.S. policies—disapproval of those policies remains extremely high.

In every country that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack at home, such as Morocco, Jordan, or Pakistan, one immediately sees a sharp drop in popular support for terrorism. Yet, Arab and Muslim publics do not turn against terrorism only when Muslims are killed. The latest polling results show that there is opposition to terrorism against American civilians as well, without any real change toward American policies or the way those policies are perceived. This suggests that the United States can fight the war on terror without entangling itself in other policies it pursues in the region, including the Arab-Israeli peace process.



■ *David Pollock is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute. His government service has included senior positions with the U.S. Information Agency, where he supervised many of the first political polls ever conducted in Arab countries.*



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# Homegrown Radicalization in the United States



# Homegrown Radicalization in the United States

*Matthew Levitt, Mitchell Silber, and Pam Byron\**

SUMMARY

## MATTHEW LEVITT

SIX YEARS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, the United States continues to face a terrorist threat. Many questions still need to be answered about this threat: How has it evolved since September 11? What is the process of Muslim youth radicalization, and how can it be countered? What progress have the United States and its allies made in the war on terror, and what more needs to be done?

The two most important reports issued on terrorism in the past year have been the National Intelligence Council's estimate of the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) study on homegrown radicalization. Both address the most pressing question of the day: Why has America not been hit by other attacks since 2001? Both conclude that it is partly due to luck and partly due to the substantial effort U.S. authorities have made against an enemy that has not stopped trying to attack the United States.

The most difficult issue the United States faces today is how to stop the next generation of potential terrorists from becoming radicalized. U.S. policy in this regard is not solid. The U.S. government is good at collecting intelligence and capturing terrorists, but it does not perform well in waging the battle of ideas or translating those ideas into an effective counter-radicalization program.

## MITCHELL SILBER

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, the NYPD's counterterrorism mission has changed. Previously, its mission had been simply to protect citizens from terrorist attacks. Now it seeks to prevent New Yorkers from becoming terrorists—an expanded mission that requires it to understand how the radicalization process occurs. The NYPD is especially suited for this task because of its excellent ability to collect "humint"



■ *Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at The Washington Institute.*

\*Speaker's remarks were off the record.

(human intelligence)—that is information from people rather than from spy satellites, listening devices, and other communications. The NYPD’s large and diverse force helps it understand what is happening on the streets.

The nature of terrorist threats has changed since September 11. The paradigm for post–September 11 plots is that the conspirators are typically citizens of the target country, unlike the foreign visitors involved in the 2001 attacks. Furthermore, although al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for those attacks, it did not directly fund or organize them. In other words, the threat has become homegrown, and the challenge now is to identify who is falling under the influence of radical ideology.

When examining case studies of post–September 11 plots, a common pattern of radicalization is apparent. The main driver is ideology—in cases like September 11, the ideology is jihadi Salafism, which sanctions violence as a legitimate means to an end. The radicalization typically occurs in four phases.

The first phase is pre-radicalization. In our case studies, the individuals who entered this phase tended to be male Muslims under the age of thirty-five from middle-class households. Most of them were well-educated university students and scholars who did not necessarily start out with strong religious beliefs. New converts to Islam often played key roles in the plots.

The second stage is the cognitive opening phase, in which individuals undergo a shock that causes them to view the world in a different way. This may be due to social factors such as discrimination, or to economic, political, or even personal factors. Isolation and failure to integrate into society can trigger this phase—something that is more prevalent in European nations. These second- or third-generation immigrants may not identify with a nationality, but they can identify with Islam. They then turn to internet groups, local imams, or student groups. This is where they encounter Wahhabi Salafism, the driving ideology behind this brand of radicalization. This awakening triggers a change in everyday behavior such as increasing mosque attendance, participating in social and political activism, and eventually joining a group with like-minded individuals.

Next comes the indoctrination phase. At this stage individuals typically leave their local mosque because it is not radical enough for them. They turn to other individuals who, while not Islamic scholars in the true sense, nevertheless lead small group meetings in private places such as basements, bookstores, and other such venues. The radicalization process then accelerates.

The final phase is jihadization. This part of the process moves very quickly and is the most difficult to identify. Without human intelligence, such individuals are very difficult to spot. Travel to a legitimate field of jihad, such as Chechnya or Pakistan, is often a trigger for these extrem-



■ *Michell Silber is a senior analyst in the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Division and coauthor of its 2007 report *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*.*

ists. Once there, they typically receive training at a camp and are sent back to the West.

Although the NYPD has not yet developed a sustained outreach or de-radicalization program, it does have a community affairs office to cultivate grassroots relations. Some European countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, already have such programs in place. Setting them up can be challenging because they must appear independent of government influence; otherwise, their effectiveness is substantially diminished.

Given the mass-casualty nature of terrorist attacks, law enforcement officials cannot wait until after a crime has occurred before intervening in the radicalization process. It is much better to develop a strategy that involves intervening at an earlier stage. Of course, one of the challenges in deciding when to intervene is determining how to balance civil liberties with security issues.

Law enforcement cannot wait until after a crime has occurred before intervening in the radicalization process.



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

## Women, Youths, and Change in the Middle East



# Women, Youths, and Change in the Middle East

*J. Scott Carpenter, Jared Cohen, Shaha Ali Riza, and Tulin Daloglu*

SUMMARY

## J. SCOTT CARPENTER

EVEN IF THERE WERE NO current conflicts in the Middle East, the Arab world would face many challenges and opportunities—and women and youths would be central to both. Like everywhere, women make up approximately fifty percent of the population of the Arab world. And young people make up more than fifty percent. In Egypt, for example, sixty percent of the population is under the age of twenty-four, which is typical for the region.

The World Bank predicts that by 2020, Middle Eastern countries will have to create an additional 110 million jobs as the younger population enters the work force. In essence, even if all of the regional conflicts were solved instantly, these statistics ensure that the area would not lack a substantial set of serious issues. Given these large numbers, the potential positive returns from the empowerment of these two groups cannot be overlooked in the greater context of regional democracy promotion and reform.

## JARED COHEN

IT IS MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE and practical to view the young generation as an opportunity rather than as a threat. Given the large percentage of the population under thirty, such issues as democracy assistance, development, human rights, and counter-radicalization are in reality the issues that pertain to young people. Youths are in fact the majority—a huge demographic about which little is known. In effect, this group constitutes a youth party that could be the single most important opposition group.

Only a small percentage of the demographic is violently radicalized, or radicalized at all. Based on personal experiences in the region, it does not matter if somebody is an extremist or a moderate, a secularist or a non-secularist, an affiliate of a terrorist organization or a law-abiding citizen, because when it comes to social and recreational behav-



■ *J. Scott Carpenter is a Keston Family fellow and director of Project Fikra at The Washington Institute. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.*



■ *Jared Cohen is a member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and author of *Children of Jihad: Journeys into the Hearts and Minds of Middle Eastern Youth* (2007).*

ior, young people in the Middle East are not too different from young Americans. The youths of this region have the same hopes, dreams, and goals that most young Westerners do. Once the governments of the Middle East and West realize this, they can provide outlets and opportunities to encourage the maturation of productive, democratic, and liberal societies.

One way the younger population can be reached and influenced is through technology. Almost every young person in the Middle East is reachable via satellite television, mobile phone, or the internet, and the very small number who are not today will be very soon. When asking whether young people in the region appreciate the ideals of democracy, simply observe their use of technology to socialize, to generate media, to write uncensored blog posts, and to vote in opinion polls. The burgeoning youth population in Arab countries is particularly ripe for outside influence via these pathways of technology. There is a foothold to be gained in this respect if outside actors can understand that these young people are largely in search of an outlet for expression, a sense of belonging, and activities with adequate financial returns. This “digital democracy” is a very logical avenue to consider.

### SHAHA ALI RIZA

WOMEN ARE A FORCE for change in the Arab world, and despite the continuing challenges to their empowerment, they have made great strides. Over the past two decades, the region has undergone dramatic transformations in demography, politics, culture, and economic development. With the increase in educated, middle-class men and women, there are more and more who question the nature of their engagements in the public space. At the same time, new economic and political realities pose unprecedented challenges to the governments and populations of the region, who have to grapple with modernity, Westernization, and the links between both.

Very often, gender relations in the region, particularly the status of women, epitomize this political and social dilemma. A large amount of publicity has been given to Islamist movements and their revival over the past two decades. Yet, not enough attention has been given to the equally important development of educated middle-class Arab women and their entry into public life. Ironically, both of these movements actively challenge the status quo and demand a voice in the public sphere, yet it is the Islamist movement that has garnered far more publicity as a result of its violent means of communication. Arab governments have reacted to these phenomena in two different ways: by enacting policies to curtail women’s rights in response to the growing conservative trend; and by actually encouraging the work of women’s groups and organizations as a bulwark or counter against the expanding extremist tide.



■ *Shaha Ali Riza is an advisor with the Foundation for the Future.*

As with the youths of the Middle East, Islamist movements are often able to garner the support and involvement of women because of their dissatisfaction with the status quo and the Islamist promises of educational opportunities and basic public services. Encouraging female involvement in economic, political, and social life is an important means by which to counter this support for Islamist movements. Despite these impediments, significant gains over the past decade point to numerous examples of increased awareness of women's issues as well as the influence of women in politics in the Gulf countries and Morocco. More can and should be done by both the regional governments and by outside actors to support and channel these achievements.

## TULIN DALOGLU

EVEN COUNTRIES THAT ARE neither autocracies nor Islamic states still face a high hurdle when it comes to women's issues. One issue in particular dominates: the Islamic headscarf. This issue ties Turkey to the autocratic and Islamic states in its neighborhood. In Iran, for example, the headscarf is viewed as a sign of oppression, whereas in Turkey it is embraced as a symbol of religious freedom. In either situation, however, women have repeatedly been denied the fundamental right to choose whether to wear this simple yet complex symbol.

Historically, men have been in control of women's status in the region. Women were treated as goods to be traded, with no rights over their own bodies, and seen as a means for reproduction. The larger story is not one that pits Islam against the West, or Islam against Christianity, but one in which there is an internal struggle for dominance and power. There are few men in the Muslim world who see women as equals and partners—most see them as a gender to be dominated. Reflecting this idea on the enforcement of the headscarf, women in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries are forced by law to wear it. Where women are not legally required to do so, the social and political culture of a country or subgroup often pressures them into doing so anyway.

One must take heed not to narrow the issue of women's rights in the Middle East to this piece of cloth, however. Passing laws about dress codes is not the answer to the problems faced by women in the region. Despite efforts to enforce women's rights, the initiatives and policies recorded on paper often go unimplemented, and women remain the casualties of de facto social policies made by men. Education is by far the key and most basic starting point for changing ideas about women in the Middle East. It is crucial to encourage long-term social, political, and economic gains for women in the Middle East. Furthermore, the impact of media such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, as well as access to the relatively free space and forum of the internet, should not be overlooked as a means of encouraging change for women in the region.



■ Tulin Daloglu is Washington correspondent for Turkey's *Star Television* and a columnist with *Star newspaper*.



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

What Does Iran Want in the Region?



# What Does Iran Want in the Region?

*Stephen Grummon, Ahmad Rafat, Kassem Jaafar, and Mark Kimmitt*

SUMMARY

## STEPHEN GRUMMON

IRAN WANTS THE WORLD to see it as the dominant power in the Middle East. Accordingly, it tries to shape its surroundings in an image that conforms to its sense of history, entitlement, and political and economic rights. Two strands of thought contribute to this perspective: the idea that Iran is the “center of the universe” (to quote an old saying in the country), heir to a great and powerful civilization; and Shiite ideology, whose modern history has acted to reinforce Iran’s position as the natural leader of the region. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s vision of a revolutionary Islamic political order was not confined to Iran; he saw it as the leading edge of a movement that would envelop the entire Muslim world. In this sense, Iran’s Islamic Revolution is completely compatible with the country’s long imperialist tradition and vision of itself as the center of the universe.

Shifts in geographic boundaries have changed Iran’s sense of regional influence over time. Although it has not lost sight of its classical sphere of influence—which ranges from Iraq in the west to Baluchistan in the east, from the Persian Gulf shores in the south to Central Asia and the Caucasus in the north—Iran does not aspire to invade its neighbors. It is more interested in becoming the paramount regional power. Khomeini’s vision explicitly defines Iran as the legitimate, authoritative, and influential player in the Middle East. In addition, by virtue of its self-defined Islamic role, Khomeini’s vision saw the Levant, especially Israel and Lebanon, as within the Iranian sphere of influence.

Iran’s perspective drives its policies, which are aimed at protecting the regime’s values and interests. Regarding Iraq, Tehran will never allow a highly centralized, authoritarian state that could challenge Iranian domination of the region. As for the nuclear program, Tehran may well seek to use it as a political and military tool—much like Pakistan did in confronting India during the 1999 Kargil crisis, when its nuclear status provided protection for bold military steps.



■ *Stephen Grummon is former director of the Office of Middle East Analysis in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has also served as director for Persian Gulf and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.*



■ *Ahmad Rafat is general secretary of the Foreign Press Association of Italy and chief Middle East correspondent for the influential Spanish weekly Tiempo.*

## AHMAD RAFAT

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S VISION of Iran is analogous to the former shah's: to be the Middle East's superpower. The only difference is the Islamic Republic's desire to be not only the political but also the religious reference for neighboring countries. The nuclear program established in the 1970s is a good example of Iran's regional bid for power. At that time, however, the program was supported by the West and opposed by the East, whereas Iran's current nuclear ambitions are supported by the East and opposed by the West.

Iran's surroundings have changed drastically over time, with Iraq now as the center of focus. Tehran wants a weak Iraq, since the country has always been a political and military threat to Iran. The Islamic Republic also does not want an alternative Shiite-led system of government next door. Tehran believes that its leverage in Iraq can forestall any U.S. attack on Iran while allowing it to attack U.S. troops in Iraq. Iran has a strong political and economic presence in central and southern Iraq, which poses a threat to U.S. and British troops. Therefore, even if the physical presence of Iranian militants comes to an end in southern Iraq, Iran's influence will remain.

Iran feels that its policy has been successful in other countries as well. In Lebanon, for example, a weak centralized government and the presence of Hizballah has given Tehran tremendous influence.



■ *Kassem Jaafar is a former Middle East and defense correspondent with the BBC. He has also worked as a defense and diplomatic editor for al-Hayat and al-Wasat.*

## KASSEM JAAFAR

IRAN'S SENSE OF IDENTITY IS BASED on both a short and a long memory of its historical role in the Middle East. Shiism and traditional Persian identity are the two fundamental pillars that, when combined, constitute Iran's motivations.

On the one hand, Iran's long memory includes resentment toward Arab Islam that dates long before the Safavid Empire of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, when Iran became a Shiite country. It stems from the failure of the great pre-Islamic Persian Empire to build a lasting new faith and race. Imam Khomeini, when returning from exile, said, "We are coming back to correct the mistakes of history," which specifically targets the religious successes of Arab Sunnis. This resentment, along with Iran's sense of nationalism, dominates the country's objectives. Iranians believe it is their inherent right to be the dominant power in the Middle East, and in order to achieve that goal, they need to control Mecca and Medina, among other things.

On the other hand, Iran has a short memory, as seen from the Iran-Iraq War. After agreeing to the 1988 ceasefire with Iraq, Khomeini—who compared the act to drinking a cup of poison—was determined that Iran would never be in that same situation again. As a result, Iran spent the next fifteen years rebuilding its military capabilities and regional networks that now include its proxies, Hizballah and Hamas. These two


organizations have allowed Iran to become a direct player in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Finally, Iran sees the nuclear program as a means of spreading its influence in the region and fulfilling certain goals. It does not need to declare possession of an actual nuclear weapon—by word or deed—in order to achieve these ends.

## MARK KIMMITT

IN ADDITION TO WHAT IRAN WANTS in the region, it is important to focus on what the country does not want. Iran does not want to be restricted to the Middle Eastern sphere, to accept its Sunni neighbors, or to be surrounded by Western powers. Moreover, it does not support the emergence of a strong Iraq or the continued existence of Israel. The behavior that Iran is displaying in the Middle East is a function of these attitudes.

Throughout the region, there is a sense that Iran is engaging in more and more hegemonic behavior. The United States seeks to maintain and assist its allies in the region, and to monitor Iran and understand what the regime does not want. Any country that continues to use terrorism as a national weapon and a nuclear program as an instrument of diplomacy and terror needs to be kept in check. So Iran must be judged by what it does not want and by the actions it takes to realize these goals.



■ *Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Mark Kimmitt is deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East.*



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# Books, Foreign Policy, and the Middle East



# Books, Foreign Policy, and the Middle East

*Jason Epstein, Kanan Makiya, and Bob Woodward*

SUMMARY


## JASON EPSTEIN

IN THE GERMAN CITY OF MAINZ 557 years ago, Johannes Gutenberg was concerned about the schisms that he believed were destroying the Catholic Church. He decided to print a uniform Bible and distribute it to every church—something that monks and scribes could never have done.

The essential technologies of Gutenberg's printing machine were developed in Europe by the fifteenth century. However, Gutenberg needed more than technology. A functional alphabet and an emerging commercial class allowed the technology to function, and separated Europe from the rest of the world. Europe's emerging bourgeoisie seized upon Gutenberg's press so that by the end of the century, more than two hundred European cities had presses of their own. This had profound implications for the Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and all that followed.


Today, the age of Gutenberg is drawing to a close. The emergence of three technologies caused this change: digitization, the computer, and the internet. These technologies have arrived at an opportune moment because the decline of the book publishing industry is both cause and consequence of a severe deterioration of backlist inventories. Thanks to these new technologies, the world's literary works that survived the tests of time can now be stored and transmitted digitally at low or no cost wherever the internet exists.

Readers can now order printed copies to be assembled on demand at a time and place convenient to them. Since the Gutenberg supply train will be severely abridged, costs to the user will decrease while returns to the publisher and author will increase. Important titles will never again go out of print, and English will no longer be the imperial language. Reference materials, manuals, directories, dictionaries, and scholarly sources will no longer be printed and shelved, but rather stored digitally to be accessed when needed.



■ *Jason Epstein, former editorial director of Random House, is one of the most influential editors of the past half-century.*

Digitization does not foreshadow a break with the past—it is an extension of that past. Google and similar search engines have simplified research, but they cannot replace the hard intellectual work of literary composition. The fact that children are now spending more time playing games on that very same internet means only that children have found a new way to pass time until they have to face the world. The proportion of young people who become strong readers has never been higher, and there is no reason to assume that this number will decline. The digital future offers readers everywhere access to books in their own language. Worldwide literacy will flourish in the digital age, as did European literacy in the age of Gutenberg.



■ Kanan Makiya is the Sylvia K. Hassenfeld professor of Islamic and Middle East studies at Brandeis University and author of *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (written pseudonymously, 1989).

### KANAN MAKIYA

WRITING A BOOK IS A LONG and personal experience. If the experience of writing is genuine—when the writer wrestles with the world’s demons and reflects or refracts those demons through his or her writing—then a good book will invariably result. A book’s beauty comes from personal opinion.

*Republic of Fear* first appeared to the public in 1989, but was actually finished in 1986. The book took six years to write, which is something one would not know from reading it. But it took those six years to change from one way of thinking about the world to another.

My first political experience was in 1967, the year of the Six Day War. Many Arabs of that generation had similar feelings about the completeness of the Arab defeat. This was not something that a young man growing up in Baghdad, who was totally immersed in school, could ignore. It was a revealing time. The event exposed the lies of the post–World War II nation-states that appeared in the Middle East. Like the rest of my generation, I pinned my hopes on, and channeled my energy into, supporting the rising star of the Palestinian resistance movement. This movement became a viable alternative to the decrepit regimes that had failed in 1967—and the realization that this too was an illusion was the real impetus behind *Republic of Fear*.

Three major events in the Middle East were crucial to the transformation that resulted in *Republic of Fear*. The first experience was the Lebanese civil war. The same Palestinian organizations through which so many Arabs had hoped to find a new beginning engaged in mafia-like conduct. The second major event was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the explosion that threw Marxist notions of progressive movements into complete disarray. The final event was the Iraq-Iran War. The casualties of the war alone, which far outnumbered those of the Arab-Israeli conflict, demonstrated that the political center of gravity did not lie in the ongoing Palestinian dilemma. Instead, the center could be found in much bigger conflicts. Other little things led to the writing of *Republic of Fear* as well, such as personal stories about the terrible atrocities inside

Iraq. There were no explanations or theories for their existence—something that added to my overall disillusionment.

In the course of writing *Republic of Fear*, I underwent a kind of political transformation from a nationalist, socialist, and Marxist perspective to one based on the liberal classics of the last two hundred years—books that were not available before the writing project began. When I discovered these writings in the early 1980s, it was so revolutionary for my own understanding that I began translating some of them into Arabic. Twenty years later, a contemporary author who wrote biting internet satires of the Iraqi political elite was enormously influenced by these translations. In this way, books live on in other writers in some shape or form.

## BOB WOODWARD

AFTER THIRTY-SEVEN YEARS of experience as a newspaper reporter, this question always comes up: why write books? In a conversation with Al Gore a few years ago, the topic of how much truth is publicly known was discussed. How much do we really find out? How much is hidden? More specifically, I asked him, what percentage of what really happened can be found in all of the articles, books, memoirs, and public data available on the Clinton administration? Gore responded by saying 1 percent. When I asked him how much of the truth readers would glean if he himself wrote a tell-all book, Gore said 2 percent. Of course, these answers were provocative and somewhat exaggerated. Yet they underscore the fact that there is a lot the public does not know and a lot that it will find out only when it is too late.

After the invasion of Iraq, the *Washington Post* gave me a one-year assignment to examine the reasons why the United States went to war. This gave me time to work up the investigational ladder, starting with low-level employees in the White House, Pentagon, intelligence agencies, and the State Department, and eventually reaching assistant secretaries and cabinet secretaries. The information gathered in the process was then reduced to a twenty-one-page memo that was sent to President Bush.

Condoleezza Rice, then national security advisor, contacted me and asked if I would still write book without being able to interview the president. I said I would, and I was given an interview with him the very next day. The interview took place over two afternoons and constituted the longest interview of a sitting president ever given on a single topic. This type of insight cannot be gained as a newspaper reporter. Only as a book author can one have the time to compose and analyze vast amounts of information, be granted extended interviews, and have the ability to ask follow-up questions.



■ Bob Woodward is assistant managing editor of the *Washington Post* and a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author.



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

# Palestinian Politics after the Hamas Coup



# Palestinian Politics after the Hamas Coup

*Ehud Yaari and Sari Nusseibeh*

SUMMARY


## EHUD YAARI

TODAY, THERE IS A CLUMSY attempt to turn Fatah's catastrophic defeat in Gaza into a victory. Hamas's takeover of Gaza—to which Fatah put up little if any resistance—was a disaster and will not be reversible for the foreseeable future. The West Bank is in more danger of an eventual Hamas takeover than Gaza is of a re-takeover by Fatah. Hamas's "green" revolution is not over. It is only the Palestinian Authority's persecution of Hamas that has prevented it from flexing its muscles in the West Bank.

Since the Gaza coup, a double-headed Palestinian Authority has emerged. It seems likely that this state of affairs will continue, even when Hamas and Fatah come to some kind of understanding. Hamas is also fragmenting into factions with different policies and objectives. On the ground, it is having trouble administering Gaza and is unable to keep daily services running. Moreover, Khaled Mashal has lost much of his influence in Gaza because he does not fully control its military wing. There are also major differences developing between Hamas in Gaza and Hamas in the West Bank, where many of its leaders criticize what is happening in Gaza. New Hamas leaders and other rivals, such as Hizb al-Tahrir, are taking advantage of the organization's troubles. In the West Bank, Salafist groups are appearing, and although the groups are still small in number, their agenda is increasingly violent.

In addition, Egypt has become Hamas's only major outlet from Gaza, and the Sinai, with its Bedouin population, is becoming a black hole in the triangle of peace between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. This area is exporting terrorism elsewhere, and the Egyptian government is unable to control the situation.

The question for Hamas is what to do next. There are voices urging for a unilateral ceasefire, but Hamas is still determined to stand by its military approach. Some are urging a quick resolution to the crisis, but



■ *Ehud Yaari is an Israel-based Lafer international fellow of The Washington Institute, Middle East correspondent for Israel's Channel Two television, and associate editor of the Jerusalem Report.*

these voices are a minority. Hamas is unable to choose a future direction that would be acceptable to all of its different factions.

There are no signs that Fatah is moving toward reconstruction and reform in the West Bank. In fact, after the Hamas takeover, Fatah is showing more signs of progress in Gaza than it is the West Bank. The most alarming ongoing trend is the collapse of the Palestinian community into the unwilling arms of Israel.

Regarding the upcoming Annapolis conference, there will not be a breakthrough beforehand because the Palestinians have backed down from everything that Mahmoud Abbas has agreed to with Ehud Olmert. There will be peace talks at Annapolis and negotiations afterward, but any semblance of a breakthrough will lead to a dead end. As the peace process continues, the only real option for progress is an armistice.



■ Sari Nusseibeh is president of al-Quds University and co-chairman of the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization.

### SARI NUSSSEIBEH

EVER SINCE HAMAS TOOK control of Gaza, the Palestinian community is like a ship lost at sea. Any major crisis for the Palestinians also affects the Israelis, so it is incumbent that they work together on the peace process, which could help resolve the crisis in Palestinian politics. It is impossible to reform Fatah without progress on the Arab-Israeli front, and it is unlikely that a third Palestinian party will present itself as an alternative to Fatah without a pre-made peace solution. A temporary agreement will only exacerbate the crisis, so it is vital that Israelis and Palestinians come together to find a solution that works permanently for both sides.

An organization or structure must be created to lead the Palestinians, and it must adhere to certain rules, such as fair elections, eliminating corruption, and the application of law. The only way to end the current Palestinian crisis is to create a peace solution that can also act as Fatah's election platform. If Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas can reach an agreement, it could be transformed into an agenda that Abbas could use to reform Fatah. Abbas could then call for new elections, which would spur public debate that could in turn help Fatah emerge victorious in both the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, recent polls show a drop in popularity for Hamas and suggest that Fatah could win such elections. Therefore, it is important for anyone involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations to take an active role, and not just wait for history to evolve.

Making peace is not easy. Peace, like war, is a difficult process, and rules must often be broken to achieve it. In order to reach a solution, four principles must be agreed on, with the issues of Jerusalem and refugees at the forefront of negotiations. To preserve the Jewish character of Israel, the Israelis must give way on the issue of Jerusalem; and to gain progress on Jerusalem, the Palestinians must give way on the issue of refugees.

The principles for an agreement on Jerusalem are relatively clear. First, Jerusalem must be shared between two states, entailing joint

Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty. Second, Jerusalem should be freely accessible to all people, goods, and services. Third, the one square kilometer of Jerusalem containing the Western Wall, the Haram, and the Temple Mount should have only divine sovereignty, although the Israelis would continue to control the Western Wall itself and the Palestinians would control the Haram. Finally, the whole issue must be negotiated from the starting point of the armistice agreements of 1949.

The principles for an agreement on refugees are also clear. Palestinians must allow refugees to return to the Palestinian state only, and not to Israeli territory. The demilitarization of the entire Palestinian state would also be a good way to avoid future chaos.

The negotiations working on all of these issues must be wise, not clever. This wisdom must be based on the idea that the current crisis affects the future of Israel, Palestine, and the entire region. Before Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, everyone said peace was impossible. But it was not. The existing psychological barriers can be broken, and it must happen soon. Friends and allies should encourage the two leaders to reach a settlement in November or December that is in the interest of both countries. Doing so will allow both leaders to dissolve existing political structures, call for and win new elections, and use that momentum to achieve lasting peace.

The only way to end the current Palestinian crisis is to create a peace solution that can also act as Fatah's election platform.



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

## The Bush Administration and the Peace Process (Part I)



# The Bush Administration and the Peace Process (Part I)\*

*David Makovsky, Daniel Kurtzer, Jim Hoagland, and Dennis Ross*

SUMMARY

## DAVID MAKOVSKY

AS ARTHUR SCHLESINGER SUGGESTED, the rhythms of American history move in thirty-year cycles—much like the history of the Middle East. November 2007 marks the ninetieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the sixtieth anniversary of the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine, and the thirtieth anniversary of Anwar Sadat’s historic trip to Jerusalem. A true optimist would hope that the Annapolis summit will assume a place on this list, even if the results take a long time to achieve.

## DANIEL KURTZER

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, tensions between the United States and Iran, and democracy building are three international issues that will heavily influence the outcome in Annapolis. But they should not distract from the important measures that are essential to achieving a settlement. The articulation of a goal is extremely important for long-term negotiations. Also needed is behavioral change: Israel must stop building settlements in the West Bank, and the Palestinian Authority must build government institutions and take concrete steps against terrorist groups. Defining the set of guiding principles toward final status is a third key measure, since it would allow negotiations to proceed based on what policymakers want to achieve.

A complete set of principles is needed if the discussions are to avoid hitting a dead end. This does not mean that a final-status agreement should be brokered immediately after Annapolis, since elections in both Israel and the Palestinian territories might be necessary before completing any such process. Yet both parties need to define timetables so that all involved are forced to focus on specific issues and deadlines.



■ *David Makovsky is director of The Washington Institute’s Project on the Middle East Peace Process and an adjunct lecturer on Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.*

\* Part I of this panel summarizes remarks delivered by the speakers shortly before the keynote address by Vice President Richard Cheney. Following the vice president’s remarks, the panelists reconvened; a summary of that discussion is presented in Part II.



■ *Daniel Kurtzer is the Daniel S. Abraham visiting professor of Middle East policy studies at Princeton University and former ambassador to Israel and Egypt.*



■ *Jim Hoagland is senior foreign correspondent for the Washington Post and a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize.*

Although such deadlines are largely ignored and rarely met, they set the framework for both sides to reach compromises in a timely fashion.

### JIM HOAGLAND

MANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS have occurred since Henry Kissinger began peace negotiations in 1974. Kissinger's goal was to shrink the Middle East conflict to involve only the Israelis and Palestinians, without superpowers and outside states. That strategy has largely succeeded and is of major importance for U.S, Israeli, and Palestinian interests. Although Israelis still have to deal with Qassam rockets, and Palestinians with direct and indirect occupation, both sides have made a major improvement by endorsing a two-state solution. The success of American policy in the region has led to the Annapolis summit and its potential achievements.

Another factor has been Israel's dramatically improved relations with Europe, Russia, and Turkey, among others. Europe has grown tired of Palestinian radicalism, while Israel has been more accepting of Europe and the UN, as seen by its 2006 support for an expanded UNIFIL mission. Meanwhile, Russia, a longtime enemy of Israel, has become an ally. A significant percentage of the Israeli population speaks Russian, and relations between the two countries have been transformed. Although Vladimir Putin's views on Iran's nuclear program remain unclear, it is quite certain he would not sanction the destruction of Israel. Even a large part of the Arab world has become more moderate, recognizing Israel's right to exist, while once-threatening countries such as Iraq no longer pose a military threat.

### DENNIS ROSS

WHILE PRESIDENT BUSH is currently preoccupied with the situation in Iraq, Secretary Rice has shifted her focus to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Two factors likely led Rice to convene the Annapolis summit. First, the rising threat of Iran has created convergence in threat perception among Israelis, Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians. If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved, so the logic goes, Arab countries may be willing to take a common stance with Israel regarding the Iranian threat, rather than being on the defensive regarding their populations' sympathy for Iranian-sponsored radicalism. The second factor is the Hamas takeover of Gaza. In Rice's view, this presents an opportunity to build a model of success in the West Bank, proving that Mahmoud Abbas, not Hamas, is the leader of the future.

Both of these assessments are open to doubt, however. Despite the common threat of Iran, the players do not necessarily share a common set of priorities. Also, Israelis and Palestinians alike will need to break down their respective mythologies and narratives in order to make way for peace. This is not an easy task, especially for Abbas and Ehud

Olmert, who are not the strongest leaders to saddle with such profound concessions. Both publics are also in a state of disbelief over the fact that it has been seven years since the last genuine peace talks.

Israelis are not willing to concede on West Bank issues after their redeployment from Gaza, while Palestinians see the increased West Bank settlement activity as a threat to the size of their future sovereign territory. The conceptual differences on both sides will largely affect negotiation styles. Abbas and his staff will engage in a detailed set of negotiations, while Israel will seek to deal with general concepts. And each side will seek to remain vague on its own concessions while demanding specificity from the other.

Faced with these conflicting perspectives, Washington should not seek large-scale change with minimal investment. It should also make sufficient advance preparation for the days after the summit. Grand promises must be backed by projects on the ground with immediate results. The United States should not allow Prime Minister Salam Fayad to run out of funds soon after Annapolis, as he warns may happen.

There is no mystery about the core tradeoffs that each side must make; the mystery is how to get to the point where each accepts that reality. Secretary Rice should test how ready the two sides are to take action on the possible tradeoffs. Unfortunately, there is a perception that success in Annapolis means more to her than to either of the two parties.



■ *Dennis Ross, The Washington Institute's counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow, is former special Middle East coordinator for the Clinton administration.*



2007 WEINBERG FOUNDERS CONFERENCE



---

Special Address by  
Vice President Richard Cheney



# Special Address by the Vice President

*The Honorable Richard B. Cheney*

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT


IT'S BEEN MY PRIVILEGE over the years to address The Washington Institute a number of times. In fact, most of you knew me long before anyone called me Darth Vader. I've been asked if that nickname bothers me, and the answer is, no. After all, Darth Vader is one of the nicer things I've been called recently.

All of us do know each other rather well, and I see some good friends in the audience. And I, in particular, want to thank your president, Howard Berkowitz, Chairman Fred Lafer, and Chairman Emeritus Mike Stein, and Vice President Wally Stern. I also want to thank Barbi Weinberg, who is not here but whose work has been invaluable. She has the respect of all of us.

I've gained much from the wisdom of many in the room today; people like Dennis Ross and, of course, Rob Satloff, as well as from the many other analysts who've been affiliated with The Washington Institute. I'm proud to say your former deputy director, John Hannah, is now my assistant for national security affairs. And you can't have him back yet. John and his staff are on duty night and day, and with his leadership, they're doing a tremendous job.

I'm pleased to be among the many participants in the conference, a group that includes your keynoter, Walid Jumblatt, from Lebanon. I've met with Mr. Jumblatt on a number of occasions, and I admire the courageous stand he's taking for freedom and democracy in his home country.

This is a period of great consequence for the Middle East, and, as always, The Washington Institute, under Rob Satloff's leadership, is providing a forum for calm, nonpartisan, rigorous discussion. For twenty-two years, you've brought clear and careful thinking to bear on some of the most complex and vital issues of the age. You've provided a venue for many fine scholars, and you've hosted countless forums for the sharing of ideas and discussions. It's an enormously productive enterprise, and your work is more relevant and useful today than ever before. All of us respect The Washington Institute for its high standards of research,



■ *Richard Cheney's four decades of public service include time as a congressman from Wyoming, chief of staff to President Ford, and secretary of defense to President George H. W. Bush.*

“Real stability depends on giving men and women the freedom to conduct their own affairs and to choose their own leaders.”

study, and insight. And so, for both myself and for the president, I want to congratulate the men and women of the Institute on the exceptional work that you do each and every day.

You're focused on many of the same matters that make up a good deal of our time in the White House, starting with the intelligence briefing that I have with the president every morning. In nearly every category of national interest, what happens in the Middle East is of direct concern to the people of the United States. The region is home to important allies, valued friends, and trading partners. Its resources and commercial routes are at the very heart of the global economy. Its history and its holy sites have deep meaning to hundreds of millions of people in many, many countries. And, of course, across the broader Middle East—from the Sinai Peninsula to the Arabian Sea, to the Iraqi desert, to the mountains of Afghanistan—many thousands of our fellow Americans are on military deployments.

As a nation of influence and ideals, the United States has been engaged in the Middle East for generations. Our goal is peace among its many nations, and a lasting stability that benefits all the world. And the stability we seek is not the kind that simply keeps a lid on things. Real stability, long-term stability, depends on giving men and women the freedom to conduct their own affairs and to choose their own leaders. This, we believe, offers the only real chance of resolving the underlying problems of the region, and of lifting the hopes of all who live there. As President Bush has said, so long as the Middle East “remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.”

The ideological struggle that's playing out in the Middle East today—the struggle against radical extremists—is going to concern America certainly for the remainder of our administration, and well into the future. On September 11, 2001, we suffered a heavy blow, right here at home, at the hands of extremists who plotted the attacks from an outpost thousands of miles from our shores. Since that terrible morning, Americans have properly called this a war. For their part, the terrorists agree. The difference is they began calling it a war a good many years prior to 9/11. And they've been waging that war with clear objectives, aggressive tactics, and a strategy they want to carry out at any cost.

They've stated their objectives. The terrorists want to end all American and Western influence in the Middle East. Their goal in that region is to seize control of a country so they have a base from which they can launch attacks and wage war against governments that do not meet their demands. Ultimately they seek to establish a totalitarian empire through the Middle East, and outward from there. They want to arm themselves with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; they want to destroy Israel; they [want to] intimidate all Western countries, and to cause mass death here in the United States.

The tactics, of course, are familiar to all the world: suicide attacks, car bombs, beheadings, messages of violence and hatred on the internet, and the hijackings of 9/11. And the strategy is clear, as well: Through acts of stealth and murder and spectacular violence, they intend to frighten us and to break our will; to hit us again and again until we run away. It's not easy for a civilized society to comprehend evil like that of Osama bin Laden or Zawahiri. It shocks us to hear such men exhorting other people's sons to "join a caravan" of so-called martyrs, proclaiming that heaven favors the merciless and murder is the path to paradise.

They've chosen this method because they believe it works, and they believe the history of the late twentieth century proves the point. During the 1980s and '90s, as terror networks began to wage attacks against Americans, we usually responded, if at all, with subpoenas, indictments, and the occasional cruise missile. As time passed, the terrorists believed they'd exposed a certain weakness and lack of confidence in the West, particularly in America.

Dr. Bernard Lewis explained the terrorists' reasoning this way: "During the Cold War," Dr. Lewis wrote, "two things came to be known and generally recognized in the Middle East concerning the two rival superpowers. If you did anything to annoy the Russians, punishment would be swift and dire. If you said or did anything against the Americans, not only would there be no punishment; there might even be some possibility of reward, as the usual anxious procession of diplomats and politicians, journalists and scholars and miscellaneous others came with their usual pleading inquiries: 'What have we done to offend you? What can we do to put it right?'" End quote.

Not surprisingly, the terrorists became more ambitious in their strikes against American interests, choosing ever bigger targets, racking up a higher body count. In Beirut in 1983, terrorists killed 241 of our servicemen. Thereafter, the U.S. withdrew from Beirut. In Mogadishu in 1993, terrorists killed 19 Americans, and thereafter, the U.S. withdrew its forces from Somalia. This emboldened them still further, confirming their belief that they could strike America without paying a price, and more than that, they concluded that by violence they could even change American policy.

We had the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993; the attack on U.S. facilities in Riyadh in 1995; the murder of servicemen at Khobar Towers in 1996; the attack on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and, of course, the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000; ultimately, September 11 and the loss of nearly 3,000 lives inside the United States in the space of a few hours.

In a violent world, the safety of distance was suddenly gone. And with grave new dangers directly in view, the strategic situation changed fundamentally. From the morning of 9/11, we have assumed correctly that more strikes would be attempted against us. So we have made enor-

**“We cannot protect the nation, much less win a war, by simply bracing for another attack or by seeking the guilty afterwards.”**

“The National Security Agency’s program is not domestic surveillance; it is international surveillance.”

mous changes to harden the target and to better prepare the nation to face this kind of emergency. We’ve reorganized the government to protect the homeland, and put good people in charge of big responsibilities. One of them is Judge Michael Mukasey, who presided over the trial of the blind sheikh and has a profound grasp on the work at hand. Judge Mukasey had his confirmation hearing this past week. He did a superb job. I believe he’ll make an outstanding attorney general.

But we cannot protect the nation, much less win a war, by simply bracing for another attack or by seeking the guilty afterwards. The president made a decision to marshal all the elements of strategic power to confront the extremists, to deny them safe haven, and above all, to deny them the means to wage catastrophic attacks. We’ve also made clear that in the post-9/11 era, regimes that harbor terror and defy the demands of the civilized world should be held to account before it’s too late.

One of the best weapons against terrorism is good intelligence, information that helps us figure out the movements of the enemy: the extent of the network, the location of their cells, the plans they’re making, and the methods they use to hit the targets they want to hit. Information of this kind is the hardest to obtain, but it’s worth the effort in terms of the plots averted and the lives that are saved. So our government has taken careful but urgent steps to monitor the communications of our enemies and to get information from the ones that are apprehended.

In the days following 9/11, the president authorized the National Security Agency to intercept terrorist-linked international communications that have one end in the United States and the other end overseas. This is the very kind of communication that was going on prior to the attack on America, and the 9/11 Commission was rightly critical of the government’s inability to uncover links between terrorists at home and terrorists abroad. It’s called connecting the dots, and in times like these, it’s critical to protecting the American people.

The program has been falsely referred to as domestic surveillance. It is not domestic surveillance; it is international surveillance. It is limited in scope to surveillance associated with terrorists. It is carefully conducted. The information obtained is used strictly for national security purposes. It’s been carried out with the utmost regard for the civil liberties of American citizens. Appropriate members of Congress have been briefed into the program from the very beginning. Indeed, I have personally conducted many of those briefings. This program has, without question, helped to detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks against the United States.

We’re also asking Congress to update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. The law was written nearly thirty years ago, before the age of the internet and disposable cell phones. Some read the law to require that legal protections meant only for people in the United

States should now apply to terrorists overseas. That left a huge gap in the kinds of intelligence we could gather. We were missing a lot, so we asked Congress to fix the problem. Congress did the right thing, but they also wrote some fine print into that law. The FISA revisions they approved are set to expire on the first of February, some 103 days from now. We're asking Congress to renew the FISA revisions as soon as possible.

Members of Congress are also well aware that some companies are now facing multi-billion-dollar lawsuits merely because they are believed to have assisted in the effort to defend the United States after 9/11. We're asking Congress to grant liability protection to those companies. Without that protection, the lawsuits carry the risk of laying state secrets in front of our enemy. And that's not a risk we ought to be taking in the middle of a war.

It's worth remembering a few things that the president told Congress and the country in his speech on September 20, 2001. He said, "The thousands of FBI agents now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it." He asked Americans for patience in a long struggle. And he said the fight against terror would involve not one battle, but a lengthy campaign, including perhaps "dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret because they're successful—and secret even in success."

Most everyone understood this when the memory of 9/11 was still fresh. Most everyone understood that it would be a luxury and a fantasy to suppose that we could answer terrorism without going on the offensive against the terrorists themselves. Because we've been focused, because we've refused to let down our guard, we've gone now more than six years without another 9/11. No one can promise that there won't be another attack; the terrorists hit us first and they are hell-bent on doing it again.

We know this because of their public declarations and because of the intelligence we've gathered through monitoring and, yes, through interrogations. There's been a good deal of misinformation about the CIA detainee program, and unfair comments have been made about America's intentions and the conduct of America's intelligence officers. Many of the details are understandably classified. Yet the basic facts are these. A small number of high-value detainees have gone through the program run by the CIA. This is different from Guantanamo Bay, where select captured terrorists are sent and interrogated by the Department of Defense according to the Army Field Manual. The CIA program involves tougher customers and tougher interrogations.

The procedures are designed to be safe, legal, in full compliance with the nation's laws and our treaty obligations. They've been carefully reviewed by the Department of Justice. The program is run by highly trained professionals who understand their obligations under the law. And the program has uncovered a wealth of information that has foiled

**“The United States is a country that takes human rights seriously. We do not torture.”**

“The extremists in the Middle East are not really trying to win hearts and minds, but to paralyze them.”

specific attacks, information that has on numerous occasions made the difference between life and death.

The United States is a country that takes human rights seriously. We do not torture. We're proud of our country and what it stands for. We expect all who serve America to conduct themselves with honor. And we enforce the rules. Several years ago, when abuses were committed at Abu Ghraib—a facility having nothing to do with the high-value detainee program—when those abuses came to light, Americans were mortified and rightly outraged. The wrongdoers were arrested, prosecuted, and punished, as justice demanded. America is a fair and decent country, and President Bush has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that our duty to uphold the laws and standards of this nation admits no exceptions in wartime. As he put it, “We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.”

The war on terror is, after all, more than a contest of arms and more than a test of will. It is also a battle of ideas. To prevail in the long run, we have to remove the conditions that inspire such blind, prideful hatred that drove nineteen men to get onto airliners to come kill us. Many have noted that we're in a struggle for the “hearts and minds” of people in a troubled region of the world. That is true and it should give us confidence. Outside a small and cruel circle, it's hard to imagine anybody being won over, intellectually or emotionally, by random violence, the beheading of bound men, children's television programs that exalt suicide bombing, and the desecration of mosques. The extremists in the Middle East are not really trying to win hearts and minds, but to paralyze them, to seize power by force, to keep power by intimidation, and to build an empire of fear.

We offer a nobler alternative. We know from history that when people live in freedom, have their rights respected and have real hope for the future, they will not be drawn in by ideologies that stir up hatreds and incite violence. We know, as well, that when men and women are given the chance, most by far will choose to live in freedom. That's the cause we serve today in Afghanistan and Iraq—helping the peoples of those two nations to achieve security, peace, and the right to chart their own destiny. Both peoples face attack from violent extremists who want to end democratic progress and pull them back toward tyranny. We are helping them fight back because it's the right thing to do, and because the outcome is important to our own long-term security.

When historians look back on the especially difficult struggle in Iraq, I think they'll regard recent events in Anbar province to have been deeply significant to the broader effort. Local residents and tribal leaders, Sunni Muslims, are rising up against al-Qaeda, sick of the violence and repulsed by the mindless brutality of al-Qaeda. Proud of their local traditions and culture, and serious about their Islamic faith, the people of Anbar now see al-Qaeda as the enemy, and they've worked with Iraqi

and American forces to drive the terrorists from their cities. It's still dangerous in the province. The terrorists recently killed one of the sheikhs who had been a leader in the fight against al-Qaeda. But that fight goes on, and America's support will not waver.

Our new offensive strategy in Iraq—led by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker and backed up by a surge in forces—is producing good results. Even though we have more troops carrying out perilous missions, our casualty rates are down. Many al-Qaeda sanctuaries have been wiped out. Our military has seized the initiative, and conditions in the country are getting better.

President Bush has made clear that America's word is good, and our nation will do its part to keep Iraq on the road of freedom, security, and progress. And we expect Iraq's national government to press much harder in the work of national reconciliation to match the kind of cooperation now taking place at local and provincial levels. We'll continue, as well, our intensive effort to train Iraqi security forces so that over time Iraqis can take the lead in protecting their own people. Progress has been uneven at times and the National Police especially need improvement. But Iraq's army is becoming more capable. And because there's now a greater degree of cooperation from local populations, Iraqi forces are better able to keep the peace in areas that have been cleared of extremists.

We have no illusions about the road ahead. As Fouad Ajami said recently, Iraq is not yet “a country at peace, and all its furies have not burned out, but a measure of order has begun to stick on the ground.” Iraq won't become a perfect democracy overnight, but success will have an enormous positive impact on the future of the Middle East, and will have a direct effect on our own security, as well. The only illusion to guard against is the notion that we don't have to care about what happens in that part of the world, or to think that when we took down Saddam Hussein our job was done.

America has no intention of abandoning our friends, of permitting the overthrow of a democracy, and allowing a country of 170,000 square miles to become a staging area for further attacks against us. Tyranny in Iraq was worth defeating, and democracy in Iraq is worth defending. We're going to complete the mission so that another generation of Americans doesn't have to go back and do it again.

Success in Iraq will confirm our good intentions in the Middle East more than words alone ever could. Especially in a region of such great strategic importance and so many dashed hopes, commitments are credible only if they're backed up by deeds. The United States, and certainly this administration, has shown a willingness not just to proclaim great objectives, but to work and sacrifice to achieve them.

George W. Bush is the first president to call for a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security. He has announced a meeting to be held in Annapolis later this year to review

“We expect Iraq's national government to match the kind of cooperation now taking place at local and provincial levels.”

“Syria and its agents are attempting to prevent the democratic majority in Lebanon from electing a truly independent president.”

the progress toward building Palestinian institutions, to seek innovative ways to support further reform, to provide diplomatic support to the parties, so that we can move forward on the path to a Palestinian state. Secretary Rice just made her most recent journey to the Middle East to lay the groundwork to support movement toward the establishment of such a state.

We are, of course, hopeful and greatly concerned about the future of Lebanon, which will elect a president in coming weeks. The United States supports the democratic aspirations of the Lebanese people, and we have done so through difficult years of the Cedar Revolution. Lebanon has shaken off years of Syrian occupation, and many courageous democracy advocates have stepped forward at great personal risk. Through bribery and intimidation, Syria and its agents are attempting to prevent the democratic majority in Lebanon from electing a truly independent president.

Lebanon has the right to conduct the upcoming elections free of any foreign interference. The United States will work with free Lebanon's other friends and allies to preserve Lebanon's hard-won independence, and to defeat the forces of extremism and terror that threaten not only that region, but U.S. countries [sic] across the wider region.

Across the Middle East, further progress will depend on responsible conduct by regional governments; respect for the sovereignty of neighbors; compliance with international agreements; peaceful words; and peaceful actions. And if you apply all these measures, it becomes immediately clear that the government of Iran falls far short, and is a growing obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

Given the recent appearance by the Iranian president in New York City, no one can fail to understand the nature of the regime this man represents. He has called repeatedly for the destruction of Israel; has spoken of his yearning for a world without the United States. Under their current rulers, the people of Iran live in a climate of fear and intimidation, with secret police, arbitrary detentions, and a hint of violence in the air. In the space of a generation, the regime has solidified its grip on the country and grown ever more arrogant and brutal toward the Iranian people. Journalists are intimidated. Religious minorities are persecuted. A good many dissidents and freedom advocates have been murdered, or have simply disappeared. Visiting scholars who've done nothing wrong have been seized and jailed.

This same regime that approved of hostage-taking in 1979, that attacked Saudi and Kuwaiti shipping in the 1980s, that incited suicide bombings and jihadism in the 1990s and beyond, is now the world's most active state sponsor of terror. As to its next-door neighbor, Iraq, the Iranian government claims to be a friend that supports regional stability. In fact, it is a force for the opposite. As General Petraeus has noted, Iran's Quds Force is trying to set up a "Hizballah-like force to serve its

interests and to fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.” At the same time, Iran is “responsible for providing the weapons, the training, the funding, and, in some cases, the direction for operations that have indeed killed U.S. soldiers.”

Operating largely in the shadows, Iran attempts to hide its hands through the use of militants who target and kill coalition and Iraqi security forces. Iran’s real agenda appears to include promoting violence against the coalition. Fearful of a strong, independent, Arab Shia community emerging in Iraq, one that seeks religious guidance not in Qom, Iran, but from traditional sources of Shia authority in Najaf and Karbala, the Iranian regime also aims to keep Iraq in a state of weakness that prevents Baghdad from presenting a threat to Tehran.

Perhaps the greatest strategic threat that Iraq’s Shiites face today in consolidating their rightful role in Iraq’s new democracy is the subversive activities of the Iranian regime. The Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is the defender of the theocracy. The regime has used the Quds Force to provide weapons, money, and training to terrorists and Islamic militant groups abroad, including Hamas; Palestinian Islamic Jihad; militants in the Balkans; the Taliban and other anti-Afghanistan militants; and Hizballah terrorists trying to destabilize Lebanon’s democratic government.

The Iranian regime’s efforts to destabilize the Middle East and to gain hegemonic power are a matter of record. And now, of course, we have the inescapable reality of Iran’s nuclear program; a program they claim is strictly for energy purposes, but which they have worked hard to conceal; a program carried out in complete defiance of the international community and resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. Iran is pursuing technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. The world knows this. The Security Council has twice imposed sanctions on Iran and called on the regime to cease enriching uranium. Yet the regime continues to do so, and continues to practice delay and deception in an obvious attempt to buy time.

Given the nature of Iran’s rulers, the declarations of the Iranian president, and the trouble the regime is causing throughout the region—including direct involvement in the killing of Americans—our country and the entire international community cannot stand by as a terror-supporting state fulfills its most aggressive ambitions.

The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose serious consequences. The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.

The irresponsible conduct of the ruling elite in Tehran is a tragedy for all Iranians. The regime has passed up numerous opportunities to be a positive force in the Middle East. For more than a generation, it had only isolated a great nation, suppressed a great people, and subjected them

“The Iranian regime aims to keep Iraq in a state of weakness that prevents Baghdad from presenting a threat to Tehran.”

“The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.”

to economic hardship that gets worse every year. The citizens of Iran deserve none of this. They are the proud heirs of a culture of learning, humanity, and beauty that reaches back many centuries. Iranian civilization has produced shining achievements, from the Persian Book of Kings, to the poetry of Rumi and Khayyam, to celebrated achievements in astronomy and mathematics, to art and music admired on every continent. The Iran of today—a nation of 70 million, a majority of them under the age of 30—is a place of unlimited potential. And the Iranian people have every right to be free from oppression, from economic deprivation, and tyranny in their own country.

The spirit of freedom is stirring in Iran. The voices of change and peaceful dissent will not be silent. We can expect to hear more from the courageous reformers, the bloggers, and the advocates of rights for women and ethnic and religious minorities, because these men and women are more loyal to their country than to the regime. Despite the regime’s anti-American propaganda, the Iranian people can know that America respects them, cares about their troubles, and stands firmly on the side of liberty, human dignity, and individual rights. America looks forward to the day when Iranians reclaim their destiny; the day that our two countries, as free and democratic nations, can be the closest of friends.

It’s been given to us, ladies and gentlemen, to live in an era crowded with decisive events, and we’ve had to face challenges that no generation would choose for itself. All of you know those challenges better than most, and you’ve devoted time, energy, and intellect to the great issues confronting the Middle East today. In all your discussions, and in all that lies ahead, you can be certain that our country will stay engaged in the Middle East, making the hard choices and providing the kind of leadership that makes this world a better place. We accept that responsibility for the sake of our own security and in service to our founding ideals. And as long as America continues to lead—steady in the face of the adversaries and firm in the defense of freedom—this young century will be a time of rising hopes, and of advancing peace.



---

## The Bush Administration and the Peace Process (Part II)



# The Bush Administration and the Peace Process (Part II)

*David Makovsky, Jim Hoagland, Dennis Ross, and Daniel Kurtzer*

SUMMARY

## DAVID MAKOVSKY

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH only briefly mentioned Annapolis and the Arab-Israeli peace process, yet focused more intently on Lebanon. His points on the Lebanese presidential elections were quite direct. It was also interesting that he had tough words for Iran's nuclear ambitions and support of terrorism, yet still praised the Iranian people.

## JIM HOAGLAND

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS reflect the Bush administration's pride that it has not moved into the post-September 11 era. He took pains to show that the administration does not suffer from a crisis of confidence.

He also hardened the case to stop Iran's nuclear program. Several developments on the international scene—such as the new government of Nicolas Sarkozy in France and the election of Ban Ki-moon as UN secretary-general—suggest that more pressure may be put on Iran.

## DENNIS ROSS

VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY was extremely careful in choosing his words. For instance, he used “extremists” rather than “terrorists” or “radical Islamists.”

His words about Iran were also tough. He seemed to be addressing those in the administration who disagree with his policy as well as those in the Middle East who are concerned about how strong of a stance the United States will take toward Iran. Specifically, he emphasized that Iran would not be allowed to have nuclear weapons—and his choice of words suggests that force would be used to prevent Iran from acquiring such weapons if the need arose. This higher level of urgency regarding Iran is different from the sentiment expressed by some in Europe.

The vice president's words suggest that force would be used to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if the need arose.

### **DANIEL KURTZER**

IN HIS ELOQUENT REMARKS, Cheney did not address process. This aspect of diplomacy, which is part of the national security toolbox, is largely ignored and disparaged by the administration. For instance, dialogue and engagement with Iran, rather than consistently strong rhetoric, could allow better prospects for diplomacy.

He also did not challenge Americans to respond to what he described as a major change in national security threats. Involving Americans in projecting U.S. values abroad could be successful because the United States is not currently perceived as a just nation in many parts of the world. Enhancing the Peace Corps and facilitating travel to the United States are some ways of positively projecting U.S. ideals and power.

---

# The Washington Institute

## *Executive Committee, Advisors, and Staff*

---

### **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**

#### *President*

Howard P. Berkowitz

#### *Chairman*

Fred S. Lafer

#### *Chairman Emeritus*

Michael Stein

#### *Founding President and*

#### *Chairman Emerita*

Barbi Weinberg

#### *Senior Vice Presidents*

Bernard Leventhal

James Schreiber

#### *Vice Presidents*

Charles Adler

Benjamin Breslauer

Walter P. Stern

#### *Secretary*

Richard S. Abramson

#### *Treasurer*

Martin J. Gross

#### *Committee Members*

Richard Borow

Maurice Deane, *emeritus*

Gerald Friedman

Robert Fromer

Roger Hertog

Peter Lowy

Daniel Mintz

Fred Schwartz

Dimitri Sogoloff

Merryl Tisch

Gary Wexler

#### *Next Generation Leadership*

#### *Council*

Jeffrey Abrams

Anthony Beyer

David Eigen

Adam Herz

Daniel Mintz, *co-chairman*

Zachary Schreiber

Dimitri Sogoloff, *co-chairman*

Jonathan Torop

### **BOARD OF ADVISORS**

Warren Christopher

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Alexander Haig

Max M. Kampelman

Samuel W. Lewis

Edward Luttwak

Michael Mandelbaum

Robert C. McFarlane

Martin Peretz

Richard Perle

James G. Roche

George P. Shultz

R. James Woolsey

Mortimer Zuckerman

**STAFF**

*Executive Director*

Robert Satloff

*Counselor and Ziegler*

*Distinguished Fellow*

Dennis Ross

*Deputy Director for Research*

Patrick Clawson

*Senior Fellows*

Soner Cagaptay

J. Scott Carpenter, *Keston Family*

*Fellow*

Michael Eisenstadt

Simon Henderson, *Baker Fellow*

Michael Jacobson

Matthew Levitt

David Makovsky

David Schenker

*Lafer International Fellows*

Hassan Barari

Michael Knights

Ehud Yaari

Mohammad Yaghi

*Adjunct Scholars*

Hirsh Goodman

Avi Jorisch

Joshua Muravchik

Daniel Pipes

Robert Rabil

Harvey Sicherman

Raymond Tanter

*Military Fellows*

Lt. Col. Sonny Blinkinsop, *U.S.*

*Air Force*

Capt. Don Hursey, *U.S. Army*

Jeffrey White, *Berrie Defense*

*Fellow*

*Visiting Fellows*

Chuck Freilich, *Ira Weiner Fellow*

Nazar Janabi, *Next Generation*

*Fellow*

Mehdi Khalaji

Martin Kramer, *Wexler-Fromer*

*Fellow*

James Lindsay

David Pollock

*Researcher and Special Assistant*

*to Dennis Ross*

Zachary Snyder

*Research Assistants*

Hiva Feizi

Audrey Flake

Emma Hayward

Megan Khoury

Gerri Pozez

Albar Sheikh

Akin Unver, *Dr. Marcia Robbins-*

*Wilf Young Scholar*

Margaret Weiss, *Dr. Marcia*

*Robbins-Wilf Young Scholar*

*Research Interns*

Jasmine El Gamal

**ADMINISTRATION**

*Deputy Director for*

*Administration*

Stephen Borko

*Events Coordinator and RA/Intern*

*Program Coordinator*

Maya Chertock

*Data Services Coordinator*

Beverly Sprewer

*Administrative Assistant*

Gina Vailes

**DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS**

*Director of Development*

Laura Milstein

*Director of Communications*

Alicia Gansz

*Regional Director, California*

Judy Cole

*Regional Director, Florida*

Jeanne Epstein

*Regional Director, New York*

Lori Posin

*Managing Editor*

George Lopez

*Website Manager*

Scott Rogers

*Associate Editor*

Paul Hidalgo

*Development Associate and Media Relations*

Joanna Campione

*Development Assistant*

Christal Shrader

*Development Intern*

Kira Wolf

**EXECUTIVE**

*Executive Assistant*

Rebecca Saxton

**FINANCE**

*Chief Financial Officer*

Laura Hannah

*Financial Coordinator*

Dawn Joseph