Egypt’s Occasional Non-Islamist Reformists

ERIC TRAGER

On February 6, 2011, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was on the ropes. During the previous two weeks, an unprecedented mass uprising had shaken his government to its core: the Egyptian police had collapsed, protestors now occupied central squares across the country, and the military had assumed control of the streets. Meanwhile, the government’s supporters were in disarray: the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) failed to mobilize a significant response during the first week of the uprising, and Mubarakists’ February 2 assault on protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square ended in defeat. So with much of the country now demanding Mubarak’s ouster, Vice President Omar Suleiman and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik invited opposition groups to negotiate a political transition.

While the youth activists who organized the uprising’s initial protests rejected the meeting as a betrayal of the revolution, Egypt’s most prominent legal opposition parties—the nationalist Wafd, socialist Tagammu, and pan-Arab nationalist Arab Democratic Nasserist Party—accepted the invitation, as did the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the activists, these opposition groups had pursued reform, rather than revolution, throughout Mubarak’s three-decade reign. Despite their (sometimes severe) ideological differences with the Mubarak government, they worked within the existing political system, using whatever limited space the government afforded them to achieve whatever minor influence they could.

Once the January 2011 uprising began, however, the leaders of these groups relented to pressure from their younger members and joined the demonstrations. But they never ceased contact with the authorities. In this sense, they occupied the rare middle ground between the government and the revolutionaries.¹ Their February 6 meeting with top Mubarak government officials, therefore, produced a predictably middle-of-the-road compromise: a committee would be formed to amend the existing constitution; the prosecutor-general would investigate crimes committed against the demonstrators; the prosecutor-general would investigate crimes committed against the demonstrators; and the government would work with opposition parties to negotiate a political transition.

1. This paper focuses on reformists and distinguishes them from revolutionaries. Reformists are those who work within political systems to advance change and, in Egypt, include legal opposition parties such as the Wafd, Tagammu, and Nasserist Parties. Revolutionaries work to promote change by overturning existing political institutions and, in Egypt, include organizations such as the April 6 Youth Movement.

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tors since the uprising began; and Mubarak would remain in office until new presidential elections were held in September.2

The proposed transition process, in other words, favored reform over revolution: the constitution would be amended rather than overturned, and power would be transferred gradually rather than immediately. With the benefit of hindsight, some have argued that this approach might have enabled a more orderly political transition, rather than the political uncertainty, polarization, and autocratic resurgence that followed. But at the time, this proposed transition program was dead on arrival. The revolutionaries absolutely refused to end their uprising until Mubarak was toppled, and a critical mass of Egyptians appeared to share this sentiment.3 The following day, the Muslim Brotherhood backed away from the reformist transition plan, threw its total support behind the revolution, and started charting its post-Mubarak political strategy.4 Four days after that, on February 11, 2011, Egypt’s military toppled Mubarak and assumed control.

The reformists’ irrelevance at the height of the 2011 uprising wasn’t surprising. To some extent, of course, it reflected the excitement of the moment, and a broad desire within Egypt for Mubarak to leave as quickly as possible. But the reformists’ weakness also reflected the Mubarak government’s success in constraining their growth during the previous three decades. While the Muslim Brotherhood emerged from the uprising as Egypt’s preeminent political force and briefly served as the country’s governing party, non-Islamist reformists still have not established themselves as a meaningful political force in post-Mubarak Egypt, and they are mostly indistinguishable from today’s pro-government stalwarts.

This paper seeks to account for the relative weakness of reformist actors within Egypt’s non-Islamist camp, and traces the relevant groups’ evolution from the Mubarak era through the tumultuous events of 2011–2013 and onward to the present day under the government of President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

TRAPPED REFORMISTS5

By the time of Mubarak’s ouster, Egypt’s non-Islamist reformist parties were widely seen as extensions of the leadership itself, and with good reason. They existed only with the government’s permission; worked within the government’s institutions, which overwhelmingly favored the ruling NDP; and in some cases were even created by the government. They criticized the government mildly, if at all, and showed deference to Mubarak and his security services.

To be sure, the reformist parties contained many stringent opponents of the government. The leftist Tagammu Party, which President Anwar Sadat established as the left “platform” of his own ruling party in 1976, incorporated many members from the secret communist organizations of the 1960s, and actively protested Sadat’s economic policies and outreach to Israel during the late 1970s.6 The nationalist New Wafd Party, which members of the pre-1952 Wafd Party established in 1984, opposed the Mubarak government’s autocratic abuses and demanded the cancellation of the peace treaty with Israel.7 And the Nasserist Party, which was established in 1992 after Nasserists broke from the Tagammu Party, similarly critic-


cized Mubarak’s pro-Western foreign policy. Moreover, these parties were not always hapless: the Tagammu Party at one point boasted more than 150,000 members, while the Wafd Party maintains headquarters in nearly every governorate and prints a daily newspaper.

But throughout his three-decade rule, Mubarak brought these opposition parties to heel by offering them a deal they couldn’t refuse: if they wanted to continue existing, they couldn’t cross his government’s redlines.

The redlines represented the upper bounds of oppositional activity that the government was willing to tolerate, and the punishments for crossing them could be substantial. Rogue oppositionists risked sanctions on their businesses, disclosures of their private lives in Egypt’s sensationalist press, harassment by authorities, and imprisonment. And to induce the opposition parties’ caution, the leadership kept these redlines somewhat ambiguous, such as by permitting intense criticism at certain times but punishing it harshly at other times.

Yet opposition party leaders understood that three topics were off-limits for criticism: President Mubarak, the Mubarak family, and the Egyptian military. They also understood that two specific activities represented clear violations of the redlines. First, parties could not participate in mass protest activities because the government viewed this as an act of insurrection. Second, particularly during the latter years of Mubarak’s rule, parties could not align with the Brotherhood because the leadership viewed the appeal of the Brotherhood’s Islamism as uniquely threatening.

In exchange for abiding by these redlines, the parties received certain privileges from the government. Legal opposition parties were permitted to maintain headquarters, where they could organize events with relatively little government interference. The parties were also permitted to print newspapers, which enabled them to send correspondents to various governmental ministries and institutions for collecting information. Finally, parties could run in parliamentary elections, and the leadership often awarded a few seats to quiescent parties. While parliament largely served as a rubber stamp for Mubarak’s policies, participation in parliament carried key benefits, including a boost in a party’s public profile. Parliamentarians also enjoyed parliamentary immunity, which enabled them and their partners to pursue lucrative business deals extralegally.

Given the autocratic context in which the legal opposition parties operated, this wasn’t such a bad deal. So long as they kept their critiques of the government within certain boundaries, they were granted a platform. Opposition leaders thus graced the pages of the major newspapers and appeared frequently on television, sometimes as counterparts to ruling-party shills. They were, in other words, prominent figures from recognized organizations.

Yet the legal opposition parties’ adherence to the government’s redlines meant that they had little support in the streets. Confined to their headquarters, these parties rarely interacted with citizens and had only a skeletal presence in most governorates outside of Cairo. They also lacked coherent political principles or agendas. Beyond the handful of seats that the leadership permitted them to win in parliamentary elections, they became increasingly insignificant over time.

The Muslim Brotherhood similarly worked as a reformist group during the Mubarak era, and tried to gain influence by participating in elections. It also largely adhered to the government’s redlines: the organization rarely critized Mubarak or his family personally and of-
ten avoided mass protest activity, including at the start of the 2011 uprising. But these constraints did not stunt the Brotherhood’s growth for two reasons. First, unlike the political parties, the Brotherhood was not primarily interested in winning parliamentary seats under Mubarak. Its foremost goal was Islamizing society through its network of social services and preaching, and the government put fewer constraints on these activities.

Second, the Brotherhood’s internal dynamics made it less susceptible to government pressure. Joining a legal political party under Mubarak was relatively easy: prospective members submitted written applications to internal party committees through an open process. The legal opposition parties’ members were therefore politically interested Egyptians but hardly diehards—and thus unwilling to sacrifice greatly for their party’s cause. By contrast, every Muslim Brother must pass through a five-to-eight-year indoctrination process. As part of that process, Muslim Brothers are repeatedly tested for their commitment to the Brotherhood’s cause and willingness to suffer for it as they rise through various organizational ranks before becoming full-fledged members. The Brotherhood, therefore, comprised individuals selected for their willingness to withstand government pressure, which made the group much harder for the government to constrain.

So while the Brotherhood expanded significantly during Mubarak’s three-decade reign and recruited young members at mosques and universities nationwide, the non-Islamist reformist parties grew old. By the final years of Mubarak’s rule, the parties’ headquarters felt more like social clubs than political nerve centers. Party leaders hung around talking politics (usually reminiscing about the past) but really didn’t do much of anything, since there wasn’t much that they could do even if they were so inclined, given the restrictions under which they operated.

In their quiescence, the reformists alienated the new generation of opposition activists that had cut its political teeth during the protest movements that surged at various points during Mubarak’s final decade in power. These included the protests against Israel during the second Palestinian intifada, which began in September 2000; protests against the United States, particularly after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq; the “Kefaya!” (Enough) protests, which called for domestic political reform from 2003 through 2005; various university protests against the heavy security presence on campus; and the labor strikes that gave rise to the leftist April 6 Youth Movement. With each new protest wave, the activists endured arrests and government abuse. And as the decade wore on, they increasingly called for revolution rather than reform, and viewed the reformist parties as sellouts for adhering to the government’s redlines.

REFORMISTS AFTER MUBARAK’S FALL

Egypt’s Arab Spring uprising validated the revolutionaries’ critique of the reformists. After all, the uprising had achieved far greater political change in eighteen days than the parties could claim after many decades of work. As a result, Egypt’s non-Islamist reformist parties suddenly confronted three sets of challenges.

First, they faced challenges from within. The parties’ younger members lambasted their leaders for joining the uprising belatedly and then negotiating with Mubarak administration officials during the uprising’s final days. In this vein, Tagammu Party youths occupied the party’s headquarters, while youth members of all major reformist parties joined various activist coalitions to plan further protests. While party leaders ultimately found ways to manage their disgruntled youths, these rifts kept the parties off balance in the early months of the post-Mubarak transition.12

Second, in the more open environment that followed Mubarak’s overthrow, many new non-Islamist parties burst onto Egypt’s political scene. A group led by businessman Naguib Sawiris founded the Free Egyptians Party; a coalition of leftist activists and intellectuals formed the Egyptian Social Democratic Party; another group of leftist socialists founded the Socialist Popular Alliance party; still other activists formed the Awareness Party; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fel-

low Amr Hamzawy founded the Egypt Freedom Party; revolutionary socialists founded the Democratic Workers Party; and former presidential candidate Ayman Nour and his supporters, who had been ousted from the al-Ghad Party, established the Ghad al-Thawra Party. Meanwhile, the Karama Party, which Nasserists founded in 1997, received its party license in mid-2011, while former parliamentarian Mohamed Anwar Esmat al-Sadat’s Reform and Development Party (RDP), which was founded in 2009, merged with businessman Rami Lakah’s Our Egypt Party. At the same time, former NDP leaders established at least four different parties.13

Many of these parties’ agendas overlapped with one another, at least in theory, since there were now multiple capitalist, socialist, Nasserist, and Mubarakist parties. But in reality, very few of these parties had substantive platforms. They were in most cases personality parties—small organizations built around one or two prominent political figures. They therefore had little name recognition, and almost no presence on the ground.

Third and most important, non-Islamist reformists suddenly had to contend with the Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged from the Arab Spring at a significant advantage. After all, whereas the legal non-Islamist parties had abided by Mubarak’s redlines and kept their organizations small and nonconfrontational for much of the previous three decades, the Brotherhood had established a nationwide organization of hundreds of thousands of cadres. With the collapse and subsequent outlawing of Mubarak’s NDP, the Brotherhood was the only organization that could mobilize cadres nationwide to win power.

Moreover, unlike the non-Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood was built for unity, since every Muslim Brother had gone through the organization’s multiyear indoctrination process and sworn an oath to “listen to and obey” the group’s leadership. As a result, the Brotherhood leadership easily sidelined a faction of Brotherhood youths that sharply criticized it after Mubarak’s ouster, rather than allowing this internal disagreement to destabilize the organization, as happened in many non-Islamist parties. And also unlike the non-Islamists, the Brotherhood established a single party—the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)—rather than allowing its members to establish other parties that might compete with it.

The Brotherhood’s emerging political strength was most apparent during the March 19, 2011, referendum on proposed constitutional amendments, which was the first time Egyptians headed to the ballot box after Mubarak’s overthrow. While the non-Islamist parties joined the revolutionary activists in voting “no” on the referendum, the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups commanded their followers to mobilize for “yes,” and “yes” carried the day with more than 77 percent of the vote.

Nearly ten months later, Egypt concluded its first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, and the results were similar: Islamist parties controlled roughly three-quarters of the 2012 parliament, with the Brotherhood’s FJP-dominated electoral coalition controlling a 47 percent plurality and a Salafist-led coalition coming in second with 24 percent of the seats. Meanwhile, the quarter of the parliament controlled by non-Islamists was deeply divided among sixteen different parties. Ultimately, one non-Islamist party, RDP–Our Egypt, joined the FJP-led parliamentary coalition, while the rest served in the opposition.

NON-ISLAMISTS DURING EGYPT’S ISLAMIST MOMENT

In theory, non-Islamist parties could have served as reformists in the Brotherhood-controlled parliament, working within that parliament to advance their agenda, much as they had done during the Mubarak era. But in practice, non-Islamists never adopted this approach to politics during the brief period of Brotherhood dominance, for three reasons.

First, the Brotherhood quickly became drunk on its own electoral success. It interpreted its 2011–12 parliamentary election victory and Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi’s victory in the 2012 presidential vote as mandates for fulfilling its longtime goals of “implementing the sharia” and Islamizing the Egyptian state. Moreover, it often partnered with Egypt’s Salafist parties in pushing this theocratic agenda over non-Islamists’

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objections. Given that Islamists and non-Islamists hold mutually exclusive views about the role of Islam in politics, there was very little, if any, space for non-Islamists to participate meaningfully in an Islamist polity.

In this vein, when a joint parliamentary session was held to select the Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with writing Egypt’s constitution, in March 2012, the Brotherhood and Salafists collaborated to ensure that roughly sixty-five of the assembly’s hundred members were Islamists.\(^1\) While the Islamists noted that this was actually a lower percentage than they had won during the parliamentary elections only a few months earlier, non-Islamists saw no benefit to participating in a process that would produce a theocratic constitution, and twenty-five members boycotted the first assembly session in protest. The Islamists attempted to press ahead without the non-Islamists, but the non-Islamist-led boycott gained steam, as representatives from the judiciary, Al-Azhar, and the Coptic Church all withdrew from the assembly. Ultimately, the Supreme Administrative Court intervened and disbanded the assembly.

Second, non-Islamists never embraced reformism, because working against the institutions that the Brotherhood controlled, rather than within them, proved to be more effective. In this sense, non-Islamist parties were more revolutionary than reformist during this period.

This was especially the case after President Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration, through which Morsi asserted unchecked executive authority and prevented the judiciary from dissolving the second Constituent Assembly formed five months earlier. When the Brotherhood and Salafist parties used the ensuing political crisis to hastily draft a theocratic constitution, non-Islamists boycotted the assembly and joined massive anti-Morsi protests outside the presidential palace and in Tahrir Square.\(^2\) Even after the Islamists’ constitution passed with 64 percent of the vote via referendum, non-Islamist parties still rejected it, and demanded that it be amended as part of any reconciliation process. The Brotherhood, however, refused to compromise, and as the political crisis wore on, non-Islamist parties increasingly rallied alongside revolutionary activists for Morsi’s overthrow.

Third, non-Islamist parties did very little to develop themselves during this period. Perhaps because they saw revolutionary activity against the Brotherhood-dominated institutions as preferable to working within those institutions, they did not use the relative freedom of the post-Mubarak era to expand their parties beyond the major cities, recruit many new members, or formulate substantive policy agendas that might have represented alternatives to the Brotherhood’s Islamist project. Non-Islamist parties also remained numerous, which contributed to their individual weakness. As a result, very few of these parties had meaningful name recognition on July 3, 2013, when Egypt’s military responded to another round of mass protests by removing Morsi from office. A severe crackdown on the Brotherhood followed.

**NON-ISLAMISTS DURING THE SISI ERA**

After Morsi’s ouster, non-Islamist party leaders entered the new government at the highest levels. Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi and Deputy Prime Minister Ziad Bahaa Eldin, among others, hailed from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. Vice President for International Affairs Mohamed ElBaradei and Minister of Social Solidarity Ahmed El-Borai were founding leaders of the Constitution Party. And Minister of Industry Mounir Fakhry Abdel Nour was a longtime Wafdist leader, while Minister of Manpower Kamal Abu Eita hailed from the Karama Party.\(^3\)

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3. “Who’s Who: Egypt’s Full Interim Cabinet,” Ahram Online, July 17,
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Yet Egypt’s post-Morsi political dynamics made political reform virtually impossible. After all, the new government was locked in an existential struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood, which sought to topple it and reinstate Morsi. So while Western countries tried to encourage “reconciliation” between the Brotherhood and the new government on the assumption that political inclusiveness would promote stability, the new government saw the Brotherhood’s inclusion as suicidal.

The non-Islamist parties therefore aligned unconditionally with Egypt’s military and security services, and deferred to these institutions as they cracked down brutally on the Brotherhood’s pro-Morsi demonstrations. Indeed, when Egyptian security forces killed hundreds of Morsi supporters while clearing their Cairo and Giza protest sites on August 14, 2013, only Mohamed ElBaradei resigned in protest. The others effectively shrugged. As they saw it, the Brotherhood had pushed Egypt to the brink and declared war on an Egyptian public that had roundly rejected it. The security forces, in the non-Islamists’ view, did what they had to do.

Today, with tens of thousands of its members in prison and perhaps thousands more living in exile, the Brotherhood is no longer a significant political threat to the Egyptian government. But its exclusion from Egyptian politics did not create a more hospitable environment for political reform. On the contrary: the successful crackdown on the Brotherhood, as well as the subsequent return to normalcy on Egypt’s streets, bolstered the government’s argument that stability required a strong—meaning repressive—state. And according to the government’s narrative, those who advocated for greater political openness were in fact advocating for a weak state and possibly chaos.

Framed in this way, Egypt’s non-Islamist political parties faced a stark choice: they were either with the state, meaning aligned with the security forces, or they supported political upheaval. So when former defense minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi ran for president in a barely contested election in May 2014, many non-Islamist party leaders endorsed him. And when new parliamentary elections were held in late 2015, the most prominent non-Islamist parties joined the pro-Sisi “For the Love of Egypt” electoral list, which the security services helped to assemble. Indeed, for much of the past three years, the Egyptian leadership has viewed proponents of political reform as proponents of instability, which is why Egypt’s non-Islamist parties have largely abandoned any pretense of being reformists.

To be sure, there are exceptions. Some reformists are working within parliament, focusing for the time being on providing social services to their constituents with the hope that they will gain sufficient credibility to then advocate for greater human rights. Others have lost faith in the government’s institutions entirely, and instead hope to exert influence by fleshing out reformist ideas in their newspaper and think-tank articles. But these reformists are so politically weak right now, and so fearful of repression, that they refuse to be quoted on the record, or to explain their outlooks or strategies in greater detail for fear this might expose them.

In other words, despite the vicissitudes of Egyptian politics during the past six years, little has changed for Egypt’s political reformists: they still exert practically no influence, and fear that openly declaring their reformist intentions will invite blowback or worse.


17. This is based on interviews with multiple former ministers in the first post-Morsi cabinet, conducted by the author in Egypt from 2014 to 2016.


19. In response to the author’s requests.
APPENDIX

CATEGORIZING EGYPT’S OPPOSITION PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS

Non-Islamist Revolutionaries

- **APRIL 6 YOUTH MOVEMENT:** This leftist organization was founded as an outgrowth of the April 2008 labor strikes in al-Mahalla al-Kubra, and it helped organize the initial protests of the January 2011 uprising. Following Mubarak’s overthrow in February 2011, it declined to form a political party and focused on organizing demonstrations against the ruling military junta. It endorsed Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi during the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, but then protested Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration, in which he declared virtually unchecked executive authority. Following Morsi’s overthrow, however, the movement continued protesting against the new military-backed government’s autocratic abuses, and many of its leaders are currently imprisoned for violating the November 2013 demonstrations law.

- **JUSTICE AND FREEDOM MOVEMENT:** Established in July 2010, this socialist organization worked to organize laborers and farmers against the Mubarak government while campaigning for higher salaries and educational improvement. It was a leading force in the initial protests of the January 2011 uprising, and its most prominent members continued to protest the various governments that followed Mubarak’s February 2011 ouster.

Non-Islamist Reformists

- **NEW WAFD PARTY:** Founded in 1918 to represent Egypt’s interests at the Paris Peace Conference, the Wafd (which means “delegation”) was the preeminent nationalist party of its era and led multiple governments prior to the 1952 Free Officers’ coup, after which it was outlawed. In 1984, a group of former Wafdist and their descendants established the New Wafd Party, which participated in most Mubarak-era parliamentary elections. The Wafd belatedly endorsed the January 2011 uprising, but participated in negotiations with the Mubarak government at the height of the uprising. Following Mubarak’s ouster, the party continues to contest elections.

20. Author interviews with Ahmed Said, Feb. 27, 2011; Mustafa Abbas, Feb. 27, 2011; Mustafa Shawqi, March 5, 2011.

ing Mubarak’s February 2011 overthrow, the Wafd initially aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, but ultimately broke from the Brotherhood prior to the 2011–12 parliamentary elections. Following Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration, it joined the anti-Morsi National Salvation Front, which initially called on Morsi to retract his declaration but over time called for his overthrow. It participated in the June 30, 2013, anti-Morsi protests, and has taken part in Egypt’s political process since Morsi’s July 2013 ouster. The party currently holds thirty-six seats in Egypt’s parliament.

**TAGAMMU PARTY:** Established in 1976 when the Sadat government divided the ruling Arab Socialist Union into three “platforms,” the National Progressive Union Party, which is its full name in English, absorbed many communist activists from the Nasser era. It has participated in most elections since 1976. It currently holds two seats in Egypt’s parliament.

**NASSERIST PARTY:** Founded in 1992 as an offshoot of the Tagammu Party, this party embraces former president Gamal Abdul Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism and socialism. It has participated in every parliamentary election since 1995, and currently holds one seat in Egypt’s parliament.

**REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY:** Although Mohamed Anwar Esmat al-Sadat, the nephew of Egypt’s late president, founded the party in 2009, it did not receive its license until after the 2011 uprising. Its platform emphasizes rural development, equitable relations with the West, and political reform. During the 2011–12 parliamentary elections, it merged with the Our Egypt Party and won nine seats, and Sadat was later appointed chairman of the parliament’s human rights committee. The RDP later split from Our Egypt, and it currently holds three parliamentary seats. Sadat initially served again as chairman of the human rights committee in the current parliament, but resigned from his post in September 2016, expressing his frustration with the leadership’s lack of cooperation with his efforts.

**FREE EGYPTIANS PARTY:** Founded after the 2011 uprising by Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris, its platform emphasizes religious equality and free market economic principles. During the 2011–12 elections, it partnered with the Tagammu Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party as part of the non-Islamist Egyptian Bloc, and won fifteen of the Bloc’s thirty-five seats. It later supported the ouster of President Morsi, and participated in the post-Morsi transition. The party currently holds a sixty-five-seat plurality in Egypt’s parliament.

**EGYPTIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY:** Founded by a coalition of left-wing thinkers and activists following the 2011 uprising, it advocates a civil state and “leading role” for the private sector in the national economy, but also advocates state regulation to some extent. During the 2011–12 elections, it partnered with the Tagammu Party and the Free Egyptians Party as part of the non-Islamist Egyptian Bloc, and won sixteen of the Bloc’s thirty-five seats. It later supported Morsi’s ouster as president, and two of its founding leaders served in high positions in the first post-Morsi government. It currently holds four seats in parliament.

**Islamist Revolutionaries**

**AL-GAMAA AL-ISLAMIYAH:** This U.S.-designated terrorist organization emerged during the 1970s, and fought an insurgency against the Egyptian state from 1992 through 1998. It renounced violence in 2003, and formed the Building and Development Party following the 2011 uprising. Al-Gamaa opposed President Morsi’s July 2013 ouster. Some of its leaders are currently imprisoned, while others

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23. Ibid., pp. 44–45.

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have joined the Brotherhood in opposing the current government from exile.

- **MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD** (since 2013): Since Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, the Brotherhood has refused to participate in the political process and instead called for the toppling of Egypt’s current government. In a January 2015 statement, the Brotherhood called for a “long, uncompromising jihad.”

- **WILAYAT SINAI**: The Sinai-based terrorist organization previously known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014, and declared itself IS’s Sinai Province (Wilayat Sinai in Arabic). It seeks to overthrow the existing Egyptian government and replace it with a radical theocracy, and has killed hundreds of Egyptian security personnel since 2013. It is also believed to be responsible for the October 2015 Metrojet attack, in which 224 people were killed.

**Islamist Reformists**

- **MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD** (until 2013): Founded by schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Brotherhood is a rigidly hierarchical organization that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt and, in the longer term, a “global Islamic state.” For much of its history, it tried to achieve this goal by winning influence or power within the existing political structures. It therefore participated in most of the Mubarak-era parliamentary elections, won a 47 percent plurality in the 2011–12 parliamentary elections, and its candidate Mohamed Morsi later won the June 2012 presidential elections. Following Morsi’s toppling in July 2013, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to overthrow the new government and restore Morsi, rendering it revolutionary rather than reformist.

- **NOUR PARTY**: Founded by the Alexandria-based Salafist Call after the 2011 uprising, it favors implementing a rigid interpretation of sharia. It formed an electoral alliance with three smaller Salafist parties in the 2011–12 parliamentary elections, and held 107 of the alliance’s 123 seats. Although the party initially collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in appointing parliamentary committee chair heads and in drafting the theocratic December 2012 constitution, it later supported Morsi’s July 2013 ouster as president. It was the only Islamist party to participate in the 2015 parliamentary elections, winning eleven seats.

- **WASAT PARTY**: Founded by former Muslim Brothers in 1996, it did not receive its party license until after the 2011 uprising. The party describes itself as a “civil” entity that favors an “Islamic frame of reference.” It won ten seats in the 2011–12 parliamentary elections, and ultimately became one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s chief allies during Mohamed Morsi’s yearlong presidency. Wasat opposed Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, and its top leaders were arrested following the August 14, 2013, massacre at the pro-Morsi protest sites in Cairo and Giza. It has not participated in Egyptian politics since then, but its chairman, Abu Elela Madi, is widely seen as a possible facilitator of “reconciliation” between the Muslim Brotherhood and those political forces that rejected it.

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Eric Trager, the Esther K. Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute, is an expert on Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. His writings appear frequently in numerous publications, including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Atlantic, and New Republic.