Policy Analysis

When examining the legacy of the Oslo Accords, one clear outcome is the way in which diplomatic breakthroughs—along with their failures—have deeply shaped public attitudes towards the conflict. Thirty years later, fresh polls emphasize the deep erosion of trust and support for the two-state solution in Palestinian (along with Israeli) society, but a lingering hunger for some kind of breakthrough.

As rival Palestinian factions clash in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh camp and Hamas-backed militants capture UNRWA schools, new polls indicate that public frustration in Gaza and the West Bank has grown to the point where many would back popular protests.

The sense of helplessness that deepened during the course of the intifada was also accompanied by the need to find a source of the blame. In the eyes of the Israeli public, that blame was placed squarely on Palestinian leadership.

A personal journey through peace, politics, and the legacy of the Accords

While insufficient, a collapse of the Oslo edifice would come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination.

The Oslo Accords were seriously flawed but now must be preserved. Some of the mistakes can probably be fixed over time to make sure the historic agreement does not remain a breakthrough into a dead end, but instead paves the way towards a stable compromise between Israel and the Palestinians.

As we look back at the legacy of the accords, it is not the Oslo Accords that failed us, but Israelis and Palestinians who failed Oslo.

Results from a new public opinion poll conducted in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem show key differences between Palestinian attitudes and those of respondents elsewhere in the Arab world when it comes to relations with Israel and the roles of the United States, China, Russia, and other regional powers.

In Gaza, most residents are strongly supportive of increased Arab involvement in the conflict and half are open to normalizing ties with Israel were Saudi Arabia to do so. A majority of West Bank residents, however, remain hesitant about such a proposal.

With an opportunity to subtly expand its influence in the West Bank, Hamas is less likely to risk an all-out war with Israel from Gaza as they did in 2021.

Approval for contacts with Israelis remained steady through 2022, even as hesitancy on Abraham Accords continued.

Although Palestinian and Kurdish politics have similarly deteriorated into ineffective blame games, fresh U.S. policies focused on institution-building could restore the promise of progress in both cases.

A recent poll indicates that though more Gulfis now disapprove of the Abraham Accords, undertones of warming sentiments towards allowing contacts with Israelis are also present.

A new public opinion poll from Gaza shows some pragmatic, short-term moderation toward the U.S. and Israel over the past year, including opposition to Hamas policies. However, long-term views remain hardline, with few changes during the same period.

The Abraham Accords seem to have neither obfuscated not strengthened the Palestinian cause.

Without genuine, serious introspection, any resolution to the current tensions between Arabs and Jews in Israel will likely be superficial.

Hamas is using the rubble and unexploded ordnance from Israeli strikes to re-arm, and new, bold ideas are needed to prevent the continuation of recurring cycles of violence and rearmament.

While media responses to U.S. rapprochement with Egypt and Egypt's warming towards Hamas differ, it is clear that Sisi has used the Israel-Hamas ceasefire to his advantage.

The United States should address Iranian soft-power expansion in Gaza when approaching Israeli-Palestinian issues.

Members of the political class and the general public are increasingly anticipating and expecting that Palestinian elections will take place due to an unusual convergence of interests between PA president Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Hamas.