INSIDE THE CALIPHATE’S CLASSROOM

Textbooks, Guidance Literature, and Indoctrination Methods of the Islamic State
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WISH TO THANK Patrick Clawson, Sarah Feuer, Will McCants, David Pollack, Martha Simms, and Aaron Zelin for their helpful comments; Evan Charney and Erica Wenig for their research assistance; Lisa Ferraro Parmelee for her thorough editing; and Mary Kalbach Horan for her attention to detail and oversight of the entire publication process. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Aaron Zelin for his invaluable help during the research and revision stages, as well as for his website, Jihadology.net, from which many of the texts under review were downloaded. This paper benefited from its discussion at an internal whiteboard session at the Institute, and I am grateful to my colleagues who attended and shared their insights. Finally, I extend my gratitude to the Soref family, without whose generous support both this study and my fellowship at The Washington Institute would not have been possible.

—JACOB O Lidort
AUGUST 2016
NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY
AND SOURCES

Terminology

- SALAFISM. A Sunni fundamentalist movement that claims to restore the original Islam its followers believe was understood and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his first three generations of Sunni followers. Salafism adheres to strict theological and legal (rather than political) arguments. Salafists base their beliefs on a literal reading of the Quran and those hadith reports (statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad) they deem to be credible, explaining that these are the only acceptable references for the Prophet’s sunna (normative example). They also draw on the writings of medieval and modern authors they believe to have upheld their worldview, including Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), among others. They reject not only all Western and non-Sunni influences (especially Shiite ones), but also any Sunni institutions and practices that appeared after the Prophet’s early followers. This includes the Islamic schools of law, Islamic governments that took shape over the centuries, and, especially, Sufism, all of which they term bida (innovation) and consider “deviances” from the original pure version of the faith. Though in circulation for centuries, Salafi ideas were typically on the fringes and only came to form the backbone of a social movement during the latter half of the twentieth century.

- SALAFISM/ISLAMISM. Whereas Salafism is a legal and theological orientation, Islamism is a modern political ideology. Islamism was born with the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1928 as a direct response to Western influence in the Middle East. As a result, Islamists call for making Islam the only referent of political and social authority. By contrast, Salafism, which formed as a social movement in the latter part of the twentieth century, in part as a reaction to the call to direct political activism by groups like the MB, was most concerned with the kind of Islam that was introduced (exclu-
sively Sunni, literalist, and originalist). Whereas Islamists are consistent in their political ambitions and vary in the definition of Islam they promote, Salafists are consistent in the kind of Islam they promote but vary in their political ambitions.

- STATE/CALIPHATE. IS’s claim of being an “Islamic state” assumes that a truly Islamic state has never before existed in the way the group envisions it (that is, Salafi). IS first announced the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006 and in 2014 declared it “a caliphate on the Prophetic methodology”—a claim to both religious and political authority over all Muslims. The idea of reviving the caliphate had been a rhetorical theme among Islamists for the better part of the twentieth century, especially since the abolition of the caliphate by Ataturk in 1924. By claiming the title of caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi not only monopolized the Islamist and jihadist landscape (since no more than one caliph can rule the Muslim world at any given time) but also gave IS the religious jurisdiction to redefine Islamic practice and belief according to its worldview.

Sources

The sources under review were accessed on Aaron Zelin’s website, Jihadology.net, and they constitute all the sources Aaron Zelin catalogued as “Dawa Literature.” The textbooks, which cover all known subjects in the group’s curriculum, were either downloaded from the website or the Niqash report or obtained directly from Zelin. The study does not include audio or other media available for the period covered, as these have been reviewed by others.

Periodization

IS produced works before it announced a caliphate in June 2014. This study looks only at those published after that date, on the assumption that the announcement of a caliphate and the high-profile murders of Western journalists signaled both a new period in the group’s identity and a new policy priority for U.S. and Western governments.
TWO YEARS FOLLOWING the declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic State (IS), the world has become well acquainted with the group’s brutal methods, territorial expansion, finances, and ability to direct and inspire large-scale terrorist attacks inside and outside the Middle East. Less discussed are the Islamic State’s textbooks and its book-publishing activities.1 Our knowledge of the group’s ambitions and ideas are based on texts leading up to the group’s declaration of a caliphate, social media communications (in particular its English-language propaganda magazine, Dabiq, and videos), interviews with defectors, and leaked bureaucratic documents.2 Yet, to date, no systematic survey has been conducted of the Arabic-language books the group has published since June 2014.3

A study of IS’s Arabic language books and pamphlets offers a number of unique contributions. Obviously, we cannot say anything definitive about a group that prizes eloquence in classical Arabic and perpetuates a sectarian, apocalyptic narrative based in Islamic texts until we read and understand its writings about these subjects—recognizing, all the same, that these are necessary but insufficient for understanding how it functions as a terrorist organization.

Examining these publications for the first time offers a number of lessons for the policy community in how to confront the Islamic State in the Iraq-Syria theater, as well as on the thorny issue of how individuals self-radicalize to its cause. Indeed, while on the surface many of these works detail what kind of “Islamic” society the group’s leadership wishes to see imposed on the Middle East, it is arguably their ability to deliver on this promise that continues to inspire those living outside the region. Even as the Islamic State loses territory on the battlefield, these very losses may inspire others
to take up arms on its behalf—evinced, for example, by the oath of allegiance Omar Mateen pledged in a 911 call on June 12, 2016, shortly before he killed forty-nine people and wounded fifty-three others in a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.

And yet, while Mateen clearly identified himself with the Islamic State, the U.S. government has explicitly recommended disconnecting IS’s ideology from the actions and motivations of lone-wolf, or self-radicalized, attackers in the United States. No doubt a “myriad of things” could cause someone to perform an undirected act of terrorism, as one FBI official stated following Mateen’s attack. However, while we see them as lone wolves driven to violence by mental instability and social alienation, the perpetrators clearly believe that they are prides of lions connected to imagined communities of likeminded individuals whom they have never met but with whom they feel bonds of fraternity through a common worldview.

Beyond explaining the group’s ideology, its publications can also shed light on the Islamic State’s inner structure and strategy. For one thing, the group clearly has (at least) one publishing house, with multiple divisions, which seem to function and produce literature as the Islamic State fights and governs its territory, reinforcing the notion that ideas do matter on some level for its legitimacy, if not its survival. Moreover, the bearing of the group’s imprimatur by these publications, which range from short pamphlets to large tomes, suggests both their content and its curation are subjected to an editorial process, likely with oversight from the group’s senior leadership. Examining their publication dates may provide some indication as to why these particular works appeared when they did, and their content, in many cases, reveals a great deal about where the authors may come from or may have traveled to; for example, statements like “The city of San Francisco is considered the capital of sodomy, and homosexuals comprise a quarter of the city’s constituency” suggest a kind of cultural literacy that could only be acquired by spending time in the United States or by knowing Americans. Finally, the content and size of the works reveal a great deal about either the profile of their readers or what the authors hope to mold their readers into becoming, using literature ranging in genre from elementary school textbooks to pamphlets addressing fighters to editions of medieval treatises.

The literature under review here falls into two categories. The first comprises the group’s classroom textbooks for their first academic term, released in October 2015. The second is a category broadly labeled “guidance literature,” which includes pamphlets aimed at lay Muslims on topics
related to Islamic ritual practice, ethics, or contemporary issues. In addition to these works, otherwise also known as *dawa* (missionizing), the guidance-literature category encompasses a series of pamphlets for fighters, longer manuals on religious guidance and political governance, and editions of medieval texts.

The study is divided into three parts, the first of which describes the Islamic State’s publishing house, Maktabat al-Himma, and its activities and offers a rough chronology of when the group published various works. The second part examines the group’s classroom textbooks, drawing comparisons with the Saudi religious curriculum and highlighting the Islamic State’s unique program of “ISization” that makes them especially lethal. The paper’s third part features a deep dive into other literature produced by the group, including book-length editions, manuals of ritual observance, and instructions to fighters, as well as shorter pamphlets. The paper closes with a series of concluding observations and policy recommendations, as well as appendices that include a list of the works surveyed, translations by the author of selections from the classroom textbooks, images of textbook covers, and a glossary of terminology IS uses in its literature. The following paragraphs list some of the paper’s main findings.

**METHODOLOGY OFindoctrination**

Both IS’s textbooks and its other publications reveal a systematic approach to how material is presented in order to doctrinally justify the group’s quartet of aims of encouraging violence, driving an apocalyptic narrative, establishing a purist “Islamic” state, and labeling it a caliphate. However, the unprecedented nature of this project leads the group to fall into a number of ideological pitfalls, chief of which is the inclusion of sources from the tradition that more doctrinally committed followers would consider to be ideologically “impure.”

**TEXTBOOKS.** The textbooks fall into two types, those that deal with religious subjects (Qur’an, creed, law, hadith) and those that teach general knowledge and skills (for example, physical preparedness, mathematics, grammar). For the former, the Islamic State “Salafizes” them, by offering the exclusively Sunni originalist version of the faith promoted by Salafism (see scope notes). For other subjects, the group “ISizes” the subjects, framing the subject in ways that support its quartet of objectives above and training students to contribute to the Islamic State through their knowledge of the material.
In bringing in Islamic sources to support its ISization project (for example, medieval literature on the caliphate or drawing on Islamic legal schools to base religious observances) the group compromises on ideological purity by citing medieval Muslim authors whose theological views stood at odds with those of Salafists.

GUIDANCE LITERATURE. The “guidance literature” (including editions, manuals on ritual observance, and shorter pamphlets) are published with the aims of appropriating various Muslim authors as their own to claim a traditional heritage, to redefine Islam according its Salafi-IS worldview, and to address particular issues of current concern or anxiety to the group.

REDEFINITION OF ISLAM AND ITS ENFORCEMENT

The “Islam” that the Islamic State promotes in its literature blends the purism of Salafism with the empowerment of the Islamic State as the enforcer of Islam, with the justification that it is the only area in which this pure original Islam is applied and because, as caliphate, it has the authority to define what Islam is. By extension, as the IS view goes, anyone residing outside of IS territory or who refuses to defend its cause is not a true Muslim. Islamic concepts are reframed to include obedience to the Islamic State as a legally-binding obligation. For example, the group defines *hijra* (migration) as flight from a country of oppression to the Islamic State (rather than just flight from oppression).

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS

The genres in which the group publishes (textbooks, scholarly editions, short pamphlets, special editions for fighters) and the range of topics covered reflect an acute awareness of and responsiveness to different audiences and circumstances. Moreover, the examples used in their writings may provide insights into the profiles of the editors and the targeted readers. Often, but not always, the group will publish shorter pamphlets as well as a longer work around a topic—potentially both reinforcing its importance and explaining it to different audiences. Indeed, as described in the chronology section, the release dates of certain works could shed light on the group’s ambitions and anxieties—for example, the recent republication of books on “media jihad” and on lessons from the Prophet’s battles may indicate the need to strengthen group morale and guidance in the face of recent battlefield losses, as do recent publications of works calling Arab states unbelievers to address the coalition of Arab states.
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e., it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

—LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, On Certainty

It is through the mercy of God Almighty and the good of his confirmation the Islamic State has today entered a new age in laying the first brick in the edifice of an Islamic education founded upon the methodology of the Quran, the Prophetic guidance, the understanding of the pious predecessors and their first troops, with a pure vision that is neither Eastern nor Western.

—GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ISLAMIC STATE’S TEXTBOOKS

It is true that ours is an attempt to exhibit Western values, but less by what we say than by what we do.

—HENRY KISSINGER
SOME CHARACTERISTICS of IS literature can be gleaned from details noted in the published works. Except for classroom textbooks, for example, IS literature has the imprimatur of Maktabat al-Himma (Zeal Press), occasionally with the addition of “Publications of the Islamic State” (matabi’ al-dawla al-islamiyya) and “Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology,” a reference to the group’s slogan taken from a hadith report, which refers in turn to following meticulously the words and example of Muhammad (see figure 1).

MAKTABAT AL-HIMMA: THE ISLAMIC STATE PRESS

Information on the longer editions of medieval treatises indicates a subdivision of the publishing house is devoted to research and longer studies (mak-

Fig. 1: Imprimaturs of IS Publishing House: (a) Zeal Press: The Islamic State; (b) Zeal Press; (c) Second Edition, Presses of the Islamic State, Shawwal 1436H (July 2015); (d) Zeal Press: The Islamic State, Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology.
tab al-buhuth wa-l-dirasat); it may be an operation of the group’s Research and Fatwa-Issuing Committee (*diwan al-ifta’ wa-l-buhuth*). Additionally, a pamphlet on having proper intentions when fulfilling religious obligations and another warning about rampant hypocrisy carry the title, “Series on Whispers into the Fighter’s Ear” (*silsilat hamasat fi udhun al-mujahid*; see figure 2). Finally, one of the publications surveyed includes an introduction from the leading editor, bearing the title of leader (*amir*).

**Figure 2: Series titles and Imprints: (left) Series on Whispers into the Fighter’s Ear; (right) Office of Research and Studies, Zeal Press.**

**CHRONOLOGY OF PUBLICATIONS**

IS’s publication timeline since its declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 offers insights into both its responsiveness to current events and its consistent interest in maintaining its ideological brand alongside its progress on the battlefield. Although, as Aymenn Tamimi has documented, the group had well-established administrative offices and published a good deal of bureaucratic as well as ideological pamphlets since its progenitor, the Islamic State in Iraq, announced its state in 2006, these were only circulated internally and not officially publicized on social media channels, unlike those released after it announced a caliphate.

Furthermore, as Tamimi explains, how well or fully these various ministries operated is doubtful, given complications posed by the Sunni awakening and some degree of infighting between IS, al-Qaeda, and Syrian groups. Indeed, he writes that it was the competition with Syrian groups that forced IS in early 2014 to invest more aggressively in its ideological program, which included establishing a Ministry of Religious Endowments (Diwan al-Awqaf), a Ministry of Muslim Services (Diwan Khidamat al-Muslimin), and sharia institutes for both men and women, serving as the seed for its education program. By one count, the group had twenty-two sharia institutes in Aleppo in June 2014, accompanied by “implementation of Islamic law
at a stricter level than in the 2013 era.” This included a February 2014 ban on mixing genders, a March 2014 order to close shops during prayer, and an April 2014 statement on the kinds of “offenses” that merited the Islamic *hudud* (corporal and capital punishments).  

In the fall of 2014, at the starting point of the sources under review here, the group released a series of pamphlets on a number of ideological principles, presumably to echo some of those it had sought to impose on society months earlier. These included pamphlets requiring the complete covering of women’s faces and several prohibiting the construction of tombs atop graves and requiring their demolition, along with other works on the administration of society.

Also released was a series of pieces on the merits of martyrdom on behalf of the Islamic State and the religious obligation of fighting on its behalf, arguing that only its state is the bastion of true Islam. Among these was the group’s first substantial publication, *The Lofty Proofs Concerning the Unbelief of Whoever Aids the Crusader Campaign against the Islamic Caliphate*, which excommunicated any who partnered with or aided those fighting IS. Of particular note was its targeting of not only the traditional “far enemy” (the United States and Europe), the “near enemy” (Arab states), and “deviant” interpretations of Islam (Shiites and non-Salafi Sunnis), but also the countries partnering with the United States—an unambiguous reference to what would become the sixty-seven-nation counter-ISIS coalition. The introduction to the book’s first edition (from September 2014) opens with the following:

> The nations commanded, funded, and organized by the leadership of America to fight Muslims in Iraq in 1424 H [2013] and which had been put to flight—through the strength of God alone and then through the jihad of the Islamic State...have returned anew to fight Muslims in Iraq and Syria...

> We see people today divided into two groups: the greater of the two oppose this global Crusader front and stand in opposition to it...[The other] consists of those who aid the unbeliever front, whether out of negligence or out of hatred and spite for the Islamic State, which today carries the banner of Islam for Muslims.

> Whatever the reason, aiding this wicked front and standing with it in its fight against Muslims in any way is a kind of apostasy (*ridda*) and unbelief (*kufr*).
Noteworthy in this brief outline of events is the more subtle incorporation of religious doctrine into the group’s project, whereby it justifies the use of the terms “apostasy” and “unbelief” to implicate not only those who openly partner with the “Crusaders,” (i.e. Western states) but also those who do not fully fight them with their hearts, tongues, and hands.

These works were followed in the winter of 2015 (January–March) by pamphlets reinforcing IS’s ideological message. One was about calling on “loyalty to Islam and not to the nation,” reflecting the prohibition by Salafi scholars during the twentieth century of any kind of loyalty to nation-states and nationalism on the grounds that these are “innovations” that deviate from the Prophet Muhammad’s sunna. This was followed by a number of pieces on personal religious guidance (prayer, ablutions, women’s covering, beard length), generally reflecting the Salafi approach of deriving these directly from the hadith reports rather than the literature of traditional Islamic law.

IS’s publishing activities seemed to have stopped during April 2015, and then they resumed in the summer of 2015 with two lengthy publications: in May, a primer on the recitation of the Quran; in July, an edition of a biography of the Prophet Muhammad, authored by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century eponymous founding father of the Saudi religious establishment whose offspring are the country’s official religious scholars; and a book on slavery.

After another break in August, the Islamic State entered in the fall of 2015 its most prolific and doctrinally focused season, meant ostensibly both to solidify its teachings and, more narrowly, to condemn Arab states and other regional actors for forming a coalition against it.

During this period, the Islamic State published its textbooks, which it called “bricks…in the edifice of Islamic education.” It also issued a number of books explicating religious practice and ideological doctrines, including a short work on the need for Islamic governance and a commentary on a work from the Hanbali school of law. In addition, it republished works more narrowly focusing on the counter-ISIS coalition. This included the re-release of The Lofty Proofs, whose introduction gives a partial explanation for this turn to dogma. It begins by citing the year that has passed “since the beginning of the Crusader campaign against the Islamic caliphate,” but laments that there are “those who were still not convinced by the group’s insistence on excommunicating and fighting fellow Muslims.”
More specifically, IS points a finger at Saudi Arabia—not only for participating in this coalition but, more particularly, for reneging on its claim to the legacy of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (discussed below). To this end, of the eleven editions of early works by Muslim scholars that the group uses both to market itself as the rightful inheritors of his message and tobrand its attack on the counter-ISIS coalition, six are works by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In their introduction to his *Issues Concerning Pre-Islamic Ignorance*, the editors open by declaring the need for the book:

Many of the descriptions of the period of pre-Islamic ignorance that were widespread prior to the Prophet Muhammad’s mission appear today. The attributes of the people of the period of ignorance of preceding centuries are the same as the people of our period of ignorance, and they have added to it more loathsome and vile qualities! These qualities of ignorance among the people of our time are like a fire amid the dry chaff, in the shade of the tyrannical idolatrous Arab governments that spread unbelief, innovation, and depravity. They fight monotheism, the *sunna*, and virtue. Therefore it has become incumbent upon every Muslim to know the issues of pre-Islamic ignorance, to avoid it, and to warn of it and its people.  

This work was accompanied by other editions of Islamic treatises on theology and practice—aimed at supporting the group’s claim to a scholarly heritage and ideological precedent—as well as pieces linking its teachings with its military strategy. These included mobile apps for children, showing tanks and missiles firing at flags of the counter-ISIS coalition member countries; a book and pamphlets encouraging “media jihad”; and the republication of a number of works by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who succeeded Abu Mus‘ab al-Zaraqawi as head of al-Qaeda in Iraq and was minister of war of the Islamic State in Iraq under Baghdadi’s predecessor, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi. In February 2016, IS republished his thirty guidelines for commanders and armies of the Islamic State and in May a book on lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s military raids (originally written in 2010).

This rough chronology suggests not only that the group was able to invest resources into publication activities, but also that in the summer and fall of 2015, it saw both a need and an opportunity to reintroduce its core dogmatic principles for its state-building enterprise and to begin its systematic process of creating an indoctrination program for areas under its control. Put differ-
ently, after IS completed what Charles Caris and Samuel Reynolds termed its “intimidation campaign” of other competitor groups in 2013, its bureaucratic reforms during the following year laid the groundwork for the group’s “indoctrination campaign,” currently underway.”
SHORTLY AFTER IS released its textbooks, media reports provided cursory overviews of their contents, highlighting the vast range of subjects covered and the permeation of religion throughout them.

In its overview of the group’s textbooks on Islamic governance, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation mentions that the works underscore the importance of the caliphate and the essential role of jihad and battlefield victories in the progress of Islamic history. It also observed that the textbook on the Quran selectively discusses only the verses that deal with Islamic rulings and does not include any citation of classical works on Quranic exegesis. A precis from *Niqash*, republished in the *Daily Beast*, notes that the textbook on physical preparedness includes the words “remaining” and “expanding” on the cover—alluding to the Islamic State’s slogan, *Baqiya wa tatamaddad*—and the inclusion in the mathematics textbook of such questions as “If the Islamic State has 275,220 heroes in a battle and the unbelievers have 356,230, who has more soldiers?”

While illustrative, these preliminary observations do not explain how important the management of ideas is for the Islamic State, and how much the perception of an unrelenting commitment to it accounts for the group’s appeal and therefore its organizational survival and success. To ensure the latter, IS must have a deliberate strategy it can apply systematically to indoctrinating its followers.

The release of the textbooks in late 2015 followed a year in which the group’s education ministry conducted its curricular reform, what Aymenn al-Tamimi has termed “a transitional period.” These reforms followed in turn regulations issued in Raqqa, Syria, in which IS outlined which subjects were to be banned (including music, drawing, sports, philosophy) and
instructions to teachers to explain that the laws of the hard sciences had divine origins. The group particularly emphasized eradicating nationalist affiliations, banning the use of the names of modern nation states and nationalist themes, since these violate the originalist kind of Islam that IS and Salafis promote.

As IS ministries issued these regulations, reports surfaced about IS’s use of Saudi religious textbooks in their territories before they introduced their own works. In addition, IS had children go through training camps in Raqqa and elsewhere in which they were taught to decapitate blond-haired dolls and use guns. In October 2015, the group issued its textbooks, which covered grades 1–5. As appendix A indicates, the subjects ranged from religious subjects to handwriting, reading, chemistry, and biology. In addition, the group had courses in English language, computer programming, and physical preparedness. One mobile application provided for children taught the alphabet and another Islamic supplications (including instructions for taking up arms against Western states).

SAUDI AND IS TEXTBOOKS COMPARED: BETWEEN EXTREMISM AND EFFECTIVENESS

Others have conducted systematic reviews of Saudi religious textbooks; here, a brief comparison with IS textbooks is provided, given that the group has used the Saudi texts in its classrooms. Some commentators have been quick to ascribe the Islamic State’s extremism to the Saudi religious influence, perhaps owing to the twin factors of their shared commitment to the Salafi brand of Islam (which does not recognize any other interpretation) and the use by IS of Saudi religious textbooks in their territories before they introduced their own works. In a version of this argument in the broader conversation on Middle East geopolitics, Saudi Arabia is portrayed as having given birth to the Islamic State.

While extremism, or religious intolerance, is a staple of Salafism as presented in both IS and Saudi religious textbooks, IS’s curriculum is uniquely lethal in the way it teaches other subjects to justify its quartet of interests (the foundation of a caliphate, the building of an “Islamic” state, the use of merciless violence, and the perpetuation of an apocalyptic narrative). These priorities reflect the unique ambitions of the Islamic State that distinguish it not only from Salafists but also from other jihadi groups. This pedagogical program, which I have termed ISization, refers to how the group repackages
subjects outside the purview of religious studies, such as history or mathematics, to justify its cause and, where relevant, trains children to fight for it (see figure 3 for examples from textbooks on reading, chemistry, and computer programming).

In the opening to its textbook on how to use Scratch, a programming code, the textbook editors explain that higher skills are among the most important treasures in modern weaponry today, and the Islamic State fights the enemies of God among the tyrannical idolatrous Arabs and foreigners. The Islamic State has taken upon its shoulders the goal of training the fighter generation which will program not only for the sake of being employed but also for developing modern technologies to use for peace and war since the states of idolatrous tyranny [the Arab states] in the region have turned the sons of Muslims into consumers of the products of their companies. From a policy perspective, stating that the Islamic State promotes religious extremism is far from sufficient in understanding what it seeks to achieve, much less what it teaches its students. Indeed, the systematic production through the process of ISization of a “fighter generation” committed to IS’s cause is both specific and unprecedented. The next section will turn to understanding this process.

![Fig. 3: Examples of ISization from (a) the IS textbook for first grade beginners Ana Muslim, (b) the group’s textbook on chemistry for first-grade intermediate chemistry, showing the different ways gases can be consumed, and (c) the group’s textbook on how to program with the coding language “Scratch,” describing technological savvy as a form of warfare needed in defense of the Islamic State.](image-url)
FROM SALAFIZATION TO ISIZATION

In his study of terrorist organizations, Jacob Shapiro underscores the notion of ideological purity as a core vulnerability among terrorist groups, given how difficult it is to monitor, and given also that those most drawn to ideology tend not to be the most capable leaders. In light of this paradox and the many organizational and informational disparities between terrorist leadership and operatives, Shapiro writes, “Terrorist organizations will face a meaningful tradeoff, either with efficiency or control” that depends in part on “how much uncertainty there is over what operatives should do given what they observe about the world.”

Anxiety about ideological purity and consistency and the commitment to acting on it is therefore a very real concern for the Islamic State, as it is for other terrorist organizations, and carries with it real implications for the group’s operations and strategy. In a more granular study of what IS teaches and how it does so, two important points will become clear. First, rather than “a heavy religious focus,” as the Tony Blair report noted, it is the kind of religious focus we need to appreciate—namely, the strictly Salafi approach to Islam. Salafism is Sunni and exclusionary with respect to other Muslims (to say nothing of non-Muslims), textualist in how it determines acceptable behavior (looking only at the Quran and the hadith reports), and literalist in how it understands these texts. Anything else is deemed bida (innovation) and forbidden, including both Western imports and many practices and institutions central to Islamic tradition, such as the Sunni schools of law, which Salafists typically reject.

The jihadist strain of Salafism departs from the non-jihadist on the reason for and significance of one’s failure to adhere to the narrow Salafi understanding of Islam. For non-jihadist Salafists, not following Islam in the way they understand it could be due to any number of factors, including not being exposed to Salafi ideas, misunderstanding them, or sheer laziness. For jihadists, however, this failure signifies one’s explicit rejection of Islam and therefore one’s withdrawal from the fold. By excommunicating (or performing takfir on) Muslims, jihadists justify the use of violence against them for apostatizing from the faith. Much of this rhetoric is based on the writings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who introduced the notion of specific practices that can nullify one’s Islam. IS and jihadists in general have broadened this framework of nullifiers by including among them adherence to non-Islamic political orders and ideologies and participation in their institutions and process
(by, for example, forming political parties and campaigning)—all of which, according to jihadists, challenge God’s exclusive right to legislate.

Second is the question not only of this Salafi focus, which is typically designed to “correct” the traditional Islamic curriculum, but also what aspects of the curriculum IS includes to promote its unique interests: the foundation of a caliphate, the establishment of a state, the use of merciless violence, and the perpetuation of an apocalyptic narrative. The ways in which IS prioritizes these distinguish it from other Salafi and Salafi-jihadist groups, and therefore they merit scrutiny on their own terms. One finding, as might be expected, is that IS seeks out Islamic sources outside of the Salafi canon that provide doctrinal justification for a caliphate and for the administration of a state. In doing so, it naturally relies on authors and texts that might disagree with the ideological underpinnings it represents. In turn, to extend Shapiro’s discussion, it is in looking beyond the Salafi canon that IS could make ideological tradeoffs as its state building evolves. Any internal opposition to the group also will likely arise in response to such ideological tradeoffs, signs of which are already emerging.42

This study classifies IS’s organization of its curriculum into two tiers: Salafization [of Islam] and ISization [of society]. The first tier refers to how the group treats traditional subjects of religious study—the Quran, hadith, creed, and law—all defining features of Islamic faith and practice. The second has to do with other subjects—physical preparedness, history, geography, and mathematics—all of which are incidental to Islamic identity but central to training the “citizens” of their state project. The group’s presentation of these latter subjects emphasizes its quartet of caliphate, state building, violence, and apocalypse.

Together, to paraphrase Luttwig Wittgenstein, Salafization and ISization form the canvas for the Islamic State’s world picture, which Wittgenstein explains as “the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.”43 In adapting the world picture to the controversial pedagogical topic of indoctrination, C. J. B. Macmillan underscores the important role of morality and politics in convincing students to accept certain teachings:

In teaching—as in all life—the hard choices are choices of forms of life, and these constitute the moral context of our lives as well as the epistemological necessities for communication. If the trust which is logically necessary to the development of world pictures is not morally deserved, then the chaos of doubt should follow—and the should is moral.44
As this study will show, it is not merely the infusion or spread of religious ideas that is novel about what IS pursues. Rather, it is the systematic formation of a world picture in which children are given a moral basis for believing the Islamic State’s narrative and worldview are true, and everything else is false. Thus, it is not enough for policy planners to push for counter-messaging tactics. Rather, any meaningful counter-narrative strategy requires a more sophisticated understanding of how a world picture is curated, validated, and presented. More specifically, policy planners should pay attention not only to what kind of message IS promotes to validate its violent, purist, state-building project, but also to how it promotes it by appropriating parts of the mainstream Islamic tradition to justify its objectives.

**TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC SUBJECTS: SALAFIZATION**

An especially useful concept in Salafi teachings for extending its theological critique into politics is the notion of *tafarruq* (division) of the Muslim community, in particular along ethnic, national, and geographical lines, which Salafists—both jihadists and nonviolent ones—condemn.

To address *tafarruq*, IS’s textbook on creed provides a kind of foundational text, not only for the sets of beliefs the group considers part of Islam, but also the range of ways in which, according to their view, one could renge on one’s faith (thereby ceasing to be a Muslim). The table of contents (figure 4) opens with a “history of the conflict between the people of truth and the people of falsity,” and, unlike the other textbooks, it includes in addition to...
the usual general introduction an introduction for teachers, instructing them to “arm students with memorizing Quranic verses and hadith reports to support what they believe” and stressing the “strengthening” of creed in their hearts and their responsibility to proselytize to others.47

The creed textbook, as all of IS’s literature, centers on the binary of “believing in God and deeming idolatry unbelief (al-kufr bi-l-taghut),” with “idolatry” also serving as a catch-all term for many of the group’s political arguments. The agents the group decries as spreading idolatry are the “people of unbelief” (that is, non-Muslims) and the “hypocrites” (Muslim individuals or governments who partner with the West and/or do not support IS). IS also devotes chapters to different forms of Western government and political identity, explaining why each is a form of idolatry because of its violation of God’s sovereignty.48

Of particular importance, and no doubt well-developed because of the historical context in which Salafism emerged as a social movement over the second half of the last century, IS singles out democracy, nationalism (qawmiyya), and patriotism (wataniyya) as forms of political idolatry. The group demonstrates its ability to craft a message for local audiences in its discussion of Baathism—clearly a nod to Iraqi and Syrian readers. Each of these political concepts, as described in the translation in appendix B, endows people with the authority to write and pass laws, rather than exclusively entrusting legislation to God. According to Salafi scholars, nationalism and patriotism also provide ideological justification for innovating forms of association among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims that are not based on Islam and therefore unnecessarily divide Muslims.49 By extension, they argue, engaging in political actions based on any of these secular political ideologies is prohibited.50 Also on this basis, the group’s geography textbook does not include the nation-state boundaries one might expect but, instead, focuses on “natural geography,” especially as aspects of topography and geography are described in the Quran and hadith.

Other textbooks contain notable features of the Salafization dimension. The IS textbook on Islamic law does not mention the four schools of Sunni law and instead counsels directly consulting the Quran and hadith reports and following “proof texts” (see, for example, figure 5). Moreover, the textbook on the *The Quran and Its Exegesis* does not mention any of the traditional Islamic commentators who clarified the historical contexts for the verses’ revelation and what they meant. While presumably this is because of the group’s more urgent priority of citing the corporal penalties it imposes
back to Quranic evidence, another reason is that a number of traditional and modern commentators—including Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern-day takfirism and author of his own commentary, *In the Shade of the Quran*—held what Salafists would view as deviant theological views.

**FEATURES OF ISIZATION IN TEXTBOOKS**

To complete its world picture and make its indoctrination serve its principal priorities, the Islamic State frames much of this Salafization project as an ISization program for society by emphasizing its interests of the caliphate, state building, violence, and apocalypse. To this end, its textbooks include several stylistic and substantive qualities that drive these points home, including a general introduction to the series (see appendix B for translation), images, and specific subjects and narratives that justify its project.

Perhaps the most direct expression of the group’s ISization program can be found in the introduction that opens each textbook, which can be broken down into three parts. In the first, the text declares,

> It is through God Almighty’s mercy and the good of his confirmation that the Islamic State has today entered a new period from the perspective of having laid the first brick in the edifice of an Islamic education founded upon the methodology of the Quran, the Prophetic guidance, and the understanding of the pious predecessors and their first troops,
and through a pure vision that is neither Eastern nor Western. For the Prophetic [approach to the] Quran is far from whims, falsities, and deviances [that are characteristic of] the callers to Eastern socialism or Western capitalism or the brokerage of political parties, or the corrupt innovated methodologies with a clear impact on the sons of the Islamic community.

Here, IS sets the scene for publishing these textbooks now. Specifically, it is a “new period” marked by its educational enterprise, presumably following some physical gains that allow the group to concentrate on these efforts. Moreover, the orientation of its pedagogy, as mentioned earlier, is marked by this Salafization objective—namely, of instructing according to “the Quran, the Prophetic guidance and the understanding of the pious predecessors,” the latter known in Arabic as al-salaf al-salih, from which the Salafi movement takes its name. Finally, this educational mission has the clear goal of countering Eastern socialism, Western capitalism, and political parties, which, as we saw earlier, are illegitimate because they depart from this originalist approach.

Next, the group introduces the exclusive authority of the Islamic State—the notion that it, alone, has the mission of countering all of these errant influences and does so in the most uncompromising fashion:

The Islamic State carries the burdens—with the agreement of God almighty—of refuting them and bringing them to a renewed monotheism and a wide Islamic expanse under the flag of the rightly guided caliphate and its outstretched branches after it won over the devils and their lowlands of ignorance and its people of destruction.

Finally, the introduction warns against those who stand in the Islamic State’s way. While it does not mention them by name, the implication is that they include anyone else who does not subscribe to its worldview:

Today [the Islamic State] proceeds along these steps, with its new methodology that spares nothing in following the way of the pious predecessors in its preparation, attentive to it in accordance with the Quran and the sunna, defining itself on the basis of these two sources and neither deviating from them nor changing them, during a time in which the corruptions of the corrupters has multiplied, [as have] the falsification of the falsifiers, the aversion of the deniers, and the excessiveness of the extremists.
IMAGE. Aside from such explicit statements, the Islamic State uses a number of stylistic tactics to interweave the elements of its program. The most direct, and least sophisticated, is the use of images—in particular, the group’s flag and pictures conveying its endorsement of violence. Especially noteworthy is the appearance of these images in unlikely places—for example, outlines of guns at the bottom of each chapter in its textbook on Arabic literature and diagrams showing how to assemble and fire weapons in the textbook on physical preparedness (see figures 6–8). These reinforce the message that to be a citizen of the Islamic State, one must also be a fighter for it.

SPECIAL FOCUS: ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE. Besides using hard-hitting images, the Islamic State organizes the substance of the textbooks and how it is presented to reinforce its social and political priorities. In addition to the textbook already mentioned on creed, a subject central to Islamic identity that IS presents through the Salafi approach, the group has released one on Islamic governance (al-siyasa al-shar‘iyya). In it, the group quite meticulously details its political objectives and draws on source material in an effort to construct a determinist view of history that culminates in the state caliphate it is building. In that respect, this particular work can be read as a blueprint for explaining IS’s mission and strategy.

The opening chapters of the Islamic governance textbook outline the obligation of both imposing religious governance and fighting those Muslims who disobey Islamic law. Significantly, it forbids any form of governance that is based on human reason and differs from God’s law.

Offering more insight—in particular for understanding what may guide the group’s own internal organization—is the part of the book that details the various administrative titles and functions of an Islamic state. IS introduces it with the statement that “Islam is a religion, state, creed, and law,” thereby reinforcing its project of using its state to redefine Islam—which, the book claims, applies to “all aspects of political, economic, social, and administrative life.” It goes on to say that “the role of the Islamic State is the establishment of the Islamic religion, to spread Islamic laws, to protect Muslim lands.” To that end, the group equates the title of “leader” with “caliph” and “commander of the faithful.” It describes the selection of their leader as a religious duty for Muslims and declares that anyone who disobeys the ruler is an unbeliever. Citing from classical theories of the caliphate, the Islamic State considers its leader to have authority over both political and religious affairs; he would therefore oversee judicial matters,
Fig. 6: A page from the textbook on physical preparedness, showing military activity and the Islamic State flag (left), and from the mathematics textbook, showing the IS flag (right).

Fig. 7: Pages from the textbook on Arabic literature (left); the textbook on grammar (middle); and the mathematics textbook (right), all showing weapons.

Fig. 8: Pages from the textbook on physical preparedness, with images of weapons and instructions for assembling them and taking different firing positions.
warfare, moral policing (*hisba*), and prayer. In other words, by describing itself as a caliphate, IS assumes a mandate to enforce its understanding of Islam at every level of society.

The textbook also serves as a kind of user’s manual for outlining the functions of the leader—his responsibilities in running affairs of the state and war. Besides the mundane duties of selecting provincial governors and bureaucrats, the leader has the responsibilities of “correcting the [application] of religion” by distributing wealth and meting out punishments and of establishing the “foundations of governance” through force and security. Also outlined is how power is to be distributed in the provinces and the priorities of governance, among them establishing corporal punishments and waging war against enemies; pages focusing on local and central records mention in particular recording the names and tours of IS fighters for both payment and promotional purposes.

Ironically, where the group does decide to make tradeoffs is in theology, drawing on Muslim thinkers who would be rejected by ideologically purist followers for not sharing their understanding of Islam. We will see in our discussion of its guidance literature how IS tries to make up for these clear ideological pitfalls by branding the most famous writings by these authors as its own. Nonetheless, the editors’ choice to include these particular references might also reinforce a view of the group’s being flexible on ideology where it needs to be, sacrificing purism for pragmatism. In conjunction with battlefield rollback, such ideological tradeoffs could feed the frustrations of more extremist elements within IS (who may attribute its losses to these tradeoffs) and, at the same time, could be real vulnerabilities that policy planners could consider in their counter messaging.

**FRAMES: LESSON PLANS AND NARRATIVES.** Another feature of IS’s textbooks is how the material is framed, and especially what lessons the group seeks to teach through the way it presents various subjects. Particularly effective in this regard are the structural features one might expect in any textbook, such as lesson plans, narratives, discussion questions, maps, and examples. Framing is especially important with regard to material that lacks a clear connection to the group’s priorities and which, therefore, can be molded to suit whatever purpose it chooses. Examples include the textbooks on history, geography, Arabic literature, and grammar.

The textbook on history provides a chronology in which the Islamic State’s project is the necessary resolution, both political and religious, to
where the Muslim community went astray. The book opens with a breakdown of five historical periods (dates added by author; see figure 9). The first is the period of the Prophecy, and the last is the Islamic State’s caliphate, beginning in 2014.55

The rest of the textbook focuses strictly on the history of the Prophet’s life, in particular his battles with neighboring tribes and other groups in Arabia. To make the material seem more real and relevant for the student, the textbook uses lesson plans and battle maps (see figure 10), some of which describe the Prophet Muhammad’s battles, interweaving commentaries on contemporary circumstances with memorization drills about historical events. The chapter on the Prophet’s life during the Medinian period (622–32) lists the following lesson goals:

1. That the student identify [the dates of] the Prophet’s Medinian period
2. That the student list the most important features of this period
3. That the student know that hypocrites exist in every age and that this is a natural occurrence
4. That the student study the functions of the mosque56

The section on the Battle of Badr (624), in which the Muslim armies reversed their fortunes through a victory over the Meccans, provides an opportunity for delivering more graphic and hard-hitting lessons, with corresponding goals:

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**Fig. 9:** Page from the history textbook outlining five stages of history through which the Muslim community shall pass.

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1. That the student memorize the various troop positions in the Battle of Badr

2. That the student recall the way in which God helped Muslims during the battle

3. That the student connect [the concepts of] reliance on God, faith, God’s aid

4. That the student understand that among the requirements of the Islamic army is terrorizing (irhab) unbelievers and frightening them

5. That the student recognize that killing families is a requirement when necessary and is a way of restoring [society’s] well-being

6. That fighting in the path of God is not limited to defense against the enemy but is rather required for establishing the rule of God and fighting unbelievers and delivering them from worshipping servants [of God] to worshipping the one and only God

These lesson goals are reinforced through discussion questions, quizzes, or exercises at the ends of chapters (see figure 11).

The textbook on Arabic literature offers a good example of how IS frames the content of subjects less connected to its explicit aims in a way that supports its project (see figure 12). Focused exclusively on poetry from the pre-
Islamic and ‘Abbasid (750–1258) periods, the subject is certainly removed from what one might expect of a terrorist group’s curriculum, much less the curriculum of first grade students anywhere. Moreover, the poets the group selects—al-Mutanabbi (d. 965), Badi‘ al-Zaman al-Hamadani (d. 1007), and Ibn al-‘Amid (d. 940)—are not only a far cry from the purist ideological vision it espouses; they are, in fact, poets and belles-lettres in the service of precisely those Islamic dynasties which, Sunni purists argue, led the Muslim community astray by embracing foreign influences.

It is precisely because these figures are commonly considered part of the traditional Islamic literary canon that IS coopts them as a jab at the Islamic scholarly tradition, much as they use Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to jab at the Saudi monarchy. Just as with the group’s parasitic battlefield strategy, in which it exploits political grievances to validate its cause, so, too, its textbooks take credit for any kind of literary or civilizational accomplishments and rebrand them as part of its own priorities.

To this end, much as it does with its history textbook, IS ties creative achievements in with politics by exaggerating aspects of the authors’ biographies to suggest similarities with the group’s priorities. The chapter on the praise form (al-mudih), for example, opens by explaining to students that the form was popular during the ‘Abbasid period “because of the many praise-givers who used their poetry to receive financial support and fame...
Many…received gifts from the caliphs in the form of official posts.”⁵⁸ Similarly, the lamentation form (al-ritha’) was popularized, according to the textbook authors, because “the community betrayed them and knowledge disappeared.”⁵⁹ Again, as with the history textbook, these passages are complemented by more hard-hitting portions that interweave traditional topics with recruitment tactics, such as the following explanation of the famous passion form (hamasa), which the book ties in with the Crusades:

These wars had a big influence on poetry and prose, and ignited the jihadist passion and the fire of religious zeal and hatred of the usurper fighters in the chests of Muslims…which was mixed with the blood of fighters shed on the battlefields of jihad. The poets fought with their tongues just as others fought with their weapons.

And the textbook explains the work of the relatively obscure Abu Muzaffar al-Abyurdi (d. 1113), which it uses as an example of “Poetry of Passion and Jihad during the Crusades,” thus:

In these stanzas…the poet warns Arabs and Muslims of the enemies’ attacks and revenge for the enemy whose occupation has sullied the treasures of the sacred land…And you Muslims who wait that such great terrors and events leave you, you turn everything on its head. For is it permissible according to the truth and the divine law to submit to feebleness, and to be content with a lax and carefree life during such critical and stressful conditions?⁶⁰
In short, the Islamic State makes its textbooks the instruments of a systematic indoctrination strategy. Through them, the group pushes a singular exclusivist understanding of Islam and clinically cross-pollinates it with a host of subjects and sources to justify the various dimensions of its cause, in a style and forum through which children in all societies today are molded into adults. As C. J. B. Macmillan writes, “If the subject must be taught, the teacher must find the beginning in the student rather than the subject matter. Different modes of teaching are appropriate, then, given different backgrounds of the student.”\textsuperscript{61} The textbooks, therefore, serve as vehicles to give children growing up in IS’s territories a common background and way of learning. Or, as the textbook authors write, they represent “bricks in the edifice” of the group’s would-be purist-fighter state.

As for the function of the purist-fighter state, it has a far more ambitious objective—one whose core is driven and defined by the operations of the publishing house.
WE CAN SUMMARIZE the novelty and controversy of the Islamic State as a territorial jihadist group by saying it uses its state-building project as a means toward another end: redefining Islam. Here it is important to remember that the title of “caliph” that distinguishes IS’s political structure is both a temporal and a religious title—in other words, the caliph is the leader of the world Muslim community in both the political and religious sense. Having two caliphs in the world at any given time, therefore, is forbidden (at least theoretically). To its followers, a core part of IS’s appeal is its promise to establish “an Islamic caliphate on the Prophetic methodology”—not only a caliphate, but one that is truly “Islamic” (that is, Salafi)—something that had not existed since the Prophet’s time. Aside from the group’s brutality, the existential tremors IS causes for Muslim communities around the world (in a way al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups never have) are due in large part to its claiming the mantle of exclusive religious leadership, as the Prophet’s deputy in religious authority.

At least two factors are essential if one seeks to claim religious leadership over the world’s Muslim community. The first is a credible leader, and IS has exerted significant efforts to demonstrate Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi meets the criteria to have the title of caliph. The second is a literary canon to serve as an intellectual arsenal with which to define a religious tradition; Maktabat al-Himma serves this function.

The “Islamic” tradition of IS as represented in its publications since 2014 can be broken down into three categories that are very much the same as one might expect to find in any religious tradition: a scholarly heritage; a blueprint for how to behave; and a unique message to unite the community. This
study now turns to these three aspects, in particular to the question of how and why IS selects and presents the material in its publications.

EDITIONS AND SCHOLARLY HERITAGE

One of the clearest ways to demonstrate a group’s intellectual heritage is by editing and publishing the works of earlier scholars. This is not altogether different from the special function critical editions serve in launching a scholar’s career as an expert in a certain area of study. Within any religious tradition, editing and publishing works can also establish a way to study a text—as, for example, Rashi became the gateway to studying the Torah in the Jewish tradition or St. Jerome’s commentaries the gateway to the Old and New Testaments among early Christian theologians. Similarly, Islamic texts in all disciplines typically receive several layers of scholarly commentary.

Editing medieval treatises has been the single consistent preoccupation of Salafi scholarly networks for decades, and when many Salafists came to form a social movement the works they had edited came to form a kind of canon, with authors like Ibn Taymiyya serving as intellectual and historical referents. Whether deliberately or incidentally, this editorial process established the theological bona fides of the movement and its followers—a brand of authenticity that remains a powerful political force today.

Naturally, then, for the Islamic State to have a cadre of editors comb through a large volume whose author has been deceased for centuries, explaining and correcting what he meant in marginalia and publishing it with the group’s imprimatur, is an important exercise with vast implications for the study, dissemination, and ownership of that text and its ideas.

A close look at which works the IS editorial board chose to edit and publish reveals a number of both expected and surprising observations about its priorities. That six out of the eleven editions are writings of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) unsurprisingly confirms Cole Bunzel’s findings about the Islamic State’s unique competition with Saudi Arabia over his legacy, which comes to light in comments such as the following in its edition of the *Clarification of Doubts*:

> How events today resemble those of yesterday! The Islamic State is calling for the renewal of *tawhid* and jihad and *sunna*, and [the restraint of] polytheism, heresy, and innovation. The scholars of the rulers and the callers to evil during these times face them with their swords and blame the Islamic State and its rulers and armies, and spread doubt and falsity
about its creed and method, and goad the tyrants against it, and seek help from the Crusaders to fight it…and they describe themselves as adherents of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab! They do this even while they know the truth of the certainty of the Islamic State and its callers and fighters; its spread of the call of God’s oneness and jihad which the Prophet and his companions brought, and which Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his offspring renewed.67

The group publishes the longer works by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab—in particular those dealing with the life of the Prophet Muhammad and contemporary manifestations of idolatry (especially tomb visitation)—as a way of “reviving the heritage of the imams of the Najd (i.e. Wahhabi scholars).” 68 Similarly, they attack the Saudi monarchy by deriding them as al-Salul instead of al Saud, a reference to the head of an early Islamic tribe, ‘Abd Allah ibn Ubayy Ibn Salul, whose conversion to Islam was disputed.69

A slightly less clear, but no less crucial, aspect of the group’s editing enterprises is represented by the other works listed in appendix A—a collection of hadith reports by Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi (d.1277), a treatise on Arabic grammar, and a collection of three treatises on law and theology. The texts have nothing in common except that they happen to be the most widely circulated works taught in Sunni traditional circles—the hadith collection, *al-Arba’un al-Nawawiyya*, and the grammar book, *al-Ajrumiyya*, can be found in pocket-size editions in any bookstore in the Middle East and are the foundational texts of hadith and grammar. The collection of treatises is slightly less popular, but it is significant in that they are considered foundational texts in the study of jurisprudence and hadith.

The collection of three treatises is also an odd choice, given the inclusion of work by Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 1085), the author of the *Waraqat*, who also makes an appearance in IS’s textbooks on Islamic governance. He and his student, al-Ghazali, are paragons of virtually every aspect of traditional Sunni Islam that IS opposes. That IS edited an entire treatise by him—and his best-known writing, at that—is intellectually both ambitious and awkward for a group that prides itself on ideological purism. Why include works that diametrically oppose the group’s ideology? The answer is that their very popularity in mainstream Sunni circles makes them especially profitable for IS in the latter’s attempt to coopt mainstream Islamic tradition as its own.

How the group edits these works is even more telling. They do not refer to Juwayni by his more famous moniker of “imam al-haramayn” (the head of the
two holy sites[i.e., Medina and Mecca]) but rather simply as “Abu al-Ma‘ali.” Moreover, in contrast to what one might expect of them (and, indeed, in contrast to their other editions), the editors provide no forward or introduction and minimal marginalia—in other words, barely any commentary on the text itself. While the absence of evidence is not evidence in and of itself, in this case it is an indicator of intent—to remove any popular associations Muslims might have with Juwayni and, instead, merely present text without context.

The selection of texts and their treatment as Maktabat al-Himma publications reflect a clear strategy by the Islamic State not only to claim the Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab legacy as their own, but also to appropriate foundational texts of traditional Islamic learning in more subtle ways. By republishing widely distributed works with its imprimatur, IS creates a branding mechanism by which it hopes to be regarded as the authoritative gateway to the mainstream Sunni canon.

PIETY AND PREJUDICE

As mentioned previously, “correction” of how Islam is understood and practiced is a defining feature of Salafi rhetoric. In fact, in many ways it is because Salafists had maintained consistent positions on Islamic practice and theological principles rather than political platforms that they were able to weather the storms of the Arab Spring very differently from Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood, who championed inserting Islam into positions of influence but were less clear on what kind of Islam they sought.70

Claiming, as it does, to restore the first truly “Islamic” state since the Prophet Muhammad’s time, IS’s publication efforts are very much a part of its political program of redefining how the public understands and adheres to its version of Islam. In the words of the editors of the book on slavery,

> God Almighty has prepared men in this age who have given over both their valuable and invaluable [property] and have established an Islamic state, and have erected the edifice of a caliphate and have renewed all of the faith—appointed judges and jurists, missionizers, and moral police and opened up courts for litigants, and have collected alms and have placed them in reserves. They have collected the poll tax from the people of the book and have bound them to the conditions of [the caliph] ‘Umar. They have cursed the women and children of the unbelievers, and all first and last praise be to God.71
The works on personal piety and religious practice are virtually all pamphlets, except for longer pieces on prayer and fasting, Quran recitation, and another on slavery. Much like its treatment of edited volumes, IS’s presentation of practices universally regarded as part of Islam are framed as also serving the formation of its state. Indeed, as the “leader of the office of research and studies” notes in his introduction to the lengthy book on prayer and fasting, the work “would be taught in the mosques, institutes and camps so that Muslim men and women may derive benefit from it.”

On one level, these works are interventions into the kind of piety literature in circulation among Salafists; and, where the prescribed practices differ, they serve to bring them into line with IS’s worldview. In particular, IS works with titles beginning with “Characteristics of . . .” seem to be direct responses to works with similar titles by Salafi figures that sought to redefine particular practices (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage) according to hadith reports on how the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers performed them.

Finally, a number of works tie in the ritual observances with adherence to IS, thereby portraying them as part of the same religious requirement. The group’s pamphlet on “Loyalty to Islam and Not to the State,” for example, enjoins Muslims to perform the religious duty of hijra (migration), traditionally considered a requirement when Muslims face persecution in their countries of origin; but it adds to it the obligation of migrating to the territory under IS’s control, presumably because the latter is the only state truly upholding Islam.

Moreover, these pamphlets also make clear the Islamic State’s control over religious observance. A pamphlet prohibiting men from cutting their beards, for instance, describes the act as leading toward disobedience and therefore forbidden by the ruler and the moral police. Similarly, and perhaps more famously, IS editors write in their treatise on slavery that “the slave is legally bound according to the Quran, the sunna and scholarly consensus, no one may disobey this, especially some of the modernists (al-‘asraniyyun) and innovators (al-haddathiyyun).”

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND ANXIETIES

In addition to defining and policing religious practice, which earlier jihadis and other Islamic militants had dealt with in some way, IS has taken on a number of subjects that were not core concerns for its purist predecessors. These may reflect the unique anxieties IS harbors, many of which revolve
around depictions of the group in the media. In a pamphlet on destroying the satellite dish, for example, they predictably describe it as “Satan’s lighthouse,” through which

Christians spread Crusaderism, Shiites their Shiism, Communists call for atheism, secularists call for permissiveness and freedom of creed and thought, Baathists call for loyalty to the state and nationalism, Sufis spread corruptions, the [Muslim] Brothers spread democracy and peaceful coexistence, “Postponers” [i.e., non-jihadist Salafists] use it to glorify idols and fight jihadists.77

In June 2015, the group republished a fifty-page work that opens with quotations from Bin Laden, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and Humud al-Shu‘aybi about the importance of media in waging jihad. In their introduction, the editors list six objectives in publishing this work:

1. To shed light on the importance of the media jihad in today’s war between unbelief and belief, especially what has emerged from the missionary war spun by the American Crusader campaign and its deputies against the Islamic State today.

2. To remind of the greatness of the reward for those who rise up against the rifts [caused by] the media jihad and the great reward God prepares for them, especially those who rush to compete to please God Almighty.

3. To turn the attention of those who work in the field of media jihad to the important role bestowed upon them, and to remind them of their great responsibility and to awaken them to carry their weighty obligations, especially during these times during which God has blessed us with an Islamic caliphate founded upon the Prophetic method.

4. To hone the intentions of journalists to the obligation of realizing a media victory that proceeds alongside the rising military victory, and having the spiritual defeat of the enemy occur before the material one, since “half the battle is media,” as they say.

5. To banish the erroneous view about the function of the media—that jihad does not mean anything more than the literal understanding of fighting with physical weapons! Rather, the weapons of words can sometimes be more powerful than atomic bombs.
6. To prepare a new media generation versatile in the tools of its trade, and understand what is expected of them, and not being content with their work unless it rises to the level of the Islamic caliphate on the Prophetic methodology, which has emerged today through the grace of God alone, with whatever conventions are accepted by the caliphate.78

The rest of the work describes in detail the importance of media jihad for battlefield successes. Citing Shu‘aybi and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), the ideologue of the Islamic State’s predecessor (al-Qaeda in Iraq), the authors explain how news published on the internet reflects the intentions of various militaries, and that the jihad “of the tongue” of journalists “includes spoken, written, published, audio recorded and the preparation of screenplays (i‘dad sinariyu isdarat)” since “your jihad of the tongue can confirm the jihad of the soul.”79

To reinforce the power of media and perceptions, the work also includes anecdotes of how the group’s “media brothers” were imprisoned by Americans and interrogated because of their worth80 and of one of their own fighters, who changed his mind about fighting on behalf of IS when he saw how Americans risked their lives to free a single journalist. Borrowing Islamic terminology, the authors use these and other examples to explain how media can have the effect of “bringing good tidings (bushra) into one’s heart,” thereby rebranding its propaganda warfare as an Islamic duty.

Finally, the group’s literature has more recently narrowed its focus to the counter-ISIS coalition, which is ubiquitous in its commentaries on editions as well as in various other media, such as the supplications mobile application encouraging children to use tanks and missiles against the flags of the various coalition states.
CONCLUSIONS
AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

POLICYMAKERS CAN GAIN a number of important insights from the Islamic State’s literary production since 2014 into how the group operates in the Middle East and perhaps what drives its appeal beyond the region. That the group publishes not only short pamphlets but also lengthy editions of medieval commentaries, textbooks for an elementary school curriculum, and works on religious guidance suggests it considers ideas—and the creation of an intellectual heritage—essential to its program of building what it sees as the first true Islamic state since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Indeed, as IS loses territory and seeks to reassure its followers, it is perhaps the preservation of their intellectual heritage that will be the group’s next frontier. Key to understanding this is not only the emphasis on violence or religious intolerance on their own terms but a very specific kind of program of indoctrination, ISization, in which both religious and general knowledge and skills are presented with the aim of training a fighter generation that will be able to wage attacks on behalf of the Islamic State’s quartet of interests—building an “Islamic” (Salafi) state, claiming a caliphate, using violent methods, and driving an apocalyptic narrative.

Complementing its curriculum for training children to fight for its cause is the group’s publications for their parents on how to live inside the Islamic State and how to understand IS’s Islam and the events around them. Specifically, by claiming for itself the title of a caliphate (a traditional moniker of both religious and temporal authority), the group seeks to redefine core Islamic rituals to serve its cause and addresses current events (in particular its experiences on the battlefield) through the prism of its narrative. In short, IS’s literary agility reflects the group’s own perception of writing as not only being a weapon in its arsenal, but also a theater of conflict unto itself.
While U.S. policymakers can do little to compete with IS’s command over religious arguments, the following are ways to exploit the group’s methods while learning from them:

► **FILL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS.** Besides their utility for indoctrinating children in Raqqa and elsewhere with the group’s program of ISization, IS’s textbooks provide knowledge and skills training in conflict areas where access to these is difficult. As the U.S. government plans for day-after scenarios, it could consider making use of existing and new platforms for educational purposes, including providing textbooks and opportunities for teachers and, especially, using mobile apps, videos, and other cyber and virtual platforms for pedagogical purposes to help local communities rebuild their lives.

► **RECRUIT LOCAL ACTORS AND STATES TO RECLAIM HERITAGE.** IS’s appropriation of traditional Sunni texts as its own could rally local states and religious institutions to publish and circulate new editions of these works with commentary on their relevance in the fight against the group.

► **RECRUIT DISILLUSIONED IS FOLLOWERS** and market their grievances. Since much of the appeal of the Islamic State lies in its unique promise of a Sunni utopia in war-torn Iraq and Syria, the stories of disillusioned IS followers could serve powerfully to underscore IS’s failures and repressive measures. Highlighting IS’s indoctrination methods, in particular its training of children to become a fighter generation, would reveal the grave dangers facing children even as they are being given practical knowledge.
These constitute all known textbooks in use by the Islamic State. For those downloaded from Aaron Zelin’s website, Jihadology.net, a link is provided in the citation. Those without a link were acquired directly from Aaron Zelin.

FIRST GRADE (BEGINNER)


Appendix A: Titles Examined

- Qir‘at ana Muslim li-l-saff al-awwal al-ibtida‘i [Reading “I Am a Muslim” for the First Beginner Grade], primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 68 pp.

FIRST GRADE (INTERMEDIATE)

Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom


**FIRST GRADE (ADVANCED)**


Appendix A: Titles Examined

Islamic law for the First Advanced Grade, for Females, the First Academic Semester, primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 46 pp.


Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom

 plagued by multiple challenges, including limited educational resources and difficulties in translating Islamic texts into the local language. Despite these obstacles, the educational system has managed to provide a comprehensive curriculum designed to instill Islamic values and facilitate the development of a new generation of leaders.

The curriculum offered at the Caliphate is divided into two main stages: the First Advanced Grade and the Second Beginner Grade. Each stage is further subdivided into three main categories: Islamic Governance, History, and Islamic Ethics.

**FIRST ADVANCED GRADE**


**SECOND GRADE (BEGINNER)**


- **Sirat al-nabi li-l-saff al-thani al-ibtida'i, al-fasl al-dirasi al-awwal** [The Life of the
Prophet for the Second Beginner Grade, the First Academic Semester, primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 38 pp.


SECOND GRADE (INTERMEDIATE)


Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom


SECOND GRADE (ADVANCED)


THIRD GRADE (BEGINNER)


Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom

**FOURTH GRADE (BEGINNER)**

FIFTH GRADE (BEGINNER)


al-Qira’at wa-l-isti’ab li-l-saff al-khamis al-ibtida’i, al-fasl al-dirasi al-awwal [Reading and Comprehension for the Fifth Beginner Grade, the First Academic Semester], primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 50 pp.


Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom


SKILLS: ENGLISH

English for the Islamic State, Book One, primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 110 pp.


English for the Islamic State, Book Four, primary printing (n.l.: n.pub., 1437/2015), 120 pp.


SKILLS: COMPUTERS


SKILLS: PHYSICAL PREPAREDNESS


GUIDANCE LITERATURE


Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom


Nusrat al-dawla al-Islamiyya ‘an ahzab al-kufr wa-l-ridda wa-l-nifaq min athaq ‘urwa al-iman [Supporting the Islamic State from the Parties of Unbelief, Apost-


- *Taw’iyyat al-ra’ya bi-l-siyasa al-shar’iya* [Raising the Awareness of the Flock


EDITIONS


ca3ammad-ibn-abd-al-wahacc84b-22issues-of-the-age-of-ignorance-first-edi
tion22.pdf.


the-islamic-state-22the-six-principles22.pdf.


———. al-Wajibat al-mutahattimat al-ma’rifat ‘ala kull muslim wa-muslima
[The Prescribed Duties Known to Every Muslim Man and Woman], 4th ed.
(n.l.: Maktabat al-Himma, Jumada al-Akhira 1437/March 2016), 26 pp.,
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/muhccac3ammad-ibn-e28098abd-al-wahacc84b-22the-duties-the-knowledgable-obligations-upon-all-muslim-men-
and-women22.pdf.

al-Muqaddima al-Ajrumiyya li-l-‘allama Abu ’Abd Allah Muhammad al-Sanhaji
(al-ma’ruf bi-Ibn Ajrum); Qatr al-nada wabl al-sadda li-l-‘allama Jamal al-Din
Muhammad al-Ansari (al-ma’ruf bi-Ibn Hisham) [The Ajrumiyya Introduc-
tion by the great scholar Abu ’Abd Allah Muhammad al-Sanhaji, known as Ibn
Ajrum; Drops of Dew and the Quenching of Thirst (Grammar Book) by the
great scholar Jamal al-Din Muhammad al-Ansari (known as Ibn Hisham)], sec-
ond edition (n.l.: Maktabat al-Himma, Jumada al-Akhira 1437/March 2016),
55 pp., https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/abucc84-abd-allah-muhc-
c3ammad-al-scca3anhacc84jicc84-ibn-ajurucc84m-and-jamacc84al-diicc84n-
muhccac3ammad-al-anscca3acc84ricc84-ibn-hishacc84m-22al-ajurucc84mi.pdf.

al-Nawawi, Yahya b. Sharaf (d. 1277). al-Arba’un al-nawawiiyya [The Forty Had-
th Reports], 3rd ed. (n.l.: Maktabat al-Himma, Matabi’ al-Dawla al-Islamiyya,
com/2016/02/imacc84m-al-nawawicc84-22the-forty-hcca3adicc84th-third-edi-
tion22.pdf.


The following are excerpts from the Islamic State's textbooks; all translations are by the author. Clarifications of expressions, names, and terms appear in the notes.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH TEXTBOOK

In the name of God the Merciful the Magnificent

Praise be to God, who strengthens Islam through his aid, and who makes polytheism lowly through his conquest, and who deals in matters through his command, and who lures the unbelievers to destruction through his guile. He who preordained that the days turn through his justice and who makes rewards for those who fear his mercy,

And peace and blessings unto whomever raises God as the lighthouse of Islam through his sword.

And now for the substance:

It is through God Almighty’s mercy and the good of his confirmation the Islamic State has today entered a new period in having laid the first brick in the edifice of an Islamic education founded upon the methodology of the Quran, the Prophetic guidance and the understanding of the pious predecessors and their first troops, and through a pure vision that is neither Eastern nor Western. For the Prophetic [approach to the] Quran is far from whims, falsities, and deviances [that are characteristic of] the callers to Eastern socialism or Western capitalism or the brokerage of political parties or the corrupt innovated methodologies with a clear impact on the sons of the Islamic community.

The Islamic State carries the burdens—with the agreement of God Almighty—of refuting them and bringing them to a renewed monotheism and a wide Islamic expanse
under the flag of the rightly guided caliphate and its outstretched branches after it won over the devils and their lowlands of ignorance and its people of destruction.

Today [the Islamic State] proceeds along these steps, with its new methodology that spares nothing in following the way of the pious predecessors in its preparation, attentive to it in accordance with the Quran and the sunna, defining itself on the basis of these two sources and neither deviating from them nor changing them, during a time in which the corruptions of the corrupters have multiplied [as have] the falsification of the falsifiers, the aversion of the deniers, and the excessiveness of the extremists.

Therefore, the writing down of these methodologies is a step on the way and a brick among the bricks of building the edifice of the caliphate.

This is the effort of the destitute, for we have been stricken and God has been kind. For our sins are both from us and from Satan, and God and his messenger are free of him and we accept the advice and settlements of every lover [of God and his messenger], as the poet said:

If you find a blemish then seal it, for [God] has raised whomever has no blemish

Finally, we call to the praise of God, Lord of hosts.

“ON DEMOCRACY” FROM THE TEXTBOOK ON CREED

LESSON FOURTEEN—“DEMOCRACY”

Goals:

- That the student explain the meaning of democracy
- That the student explain governance by the people for the people and the refutation of it
- That the student explain the intention behind the independence of judges

Among the forms of idolatry found in recent times and with which one must be familiar and which one must deem a form of unbelief is “Democracy”

Democracy is the (1) rule of the people, and the (2) peaceful transition of the government, and the (3) separation of the powers, and the (4) independence of the judges, and (5) respect for human rights, and (6) imposing the law on all.
Every aforementioned statement—in its understanding as part of Democracy—is considered clear unbelief in its essence, and their explanation follows:

1. **RULE OF THE PEOPLE:** Which means law and legitimacy belong to the people and not to God Almighty.

   The people govern themselves as they choose, and legislate what they wish, and permit what they want and forbid what they want. This takes place through their unbeliever legislative bodies. The legislative bodies are those of unbelief and idolatry that obstruct God’s rule, and mock his law, and make themselves a partner of God’s in legislation and permitting and forbidding and separating among people.

   God Almighty said: “Truly His is all creation and command, may God, Lord of hosts, be blessed.” (Q. 7: 54)

   God Almighty said: “For your Lord creates what he wishes and chooses what is best [for mankind], may God be exalted above anything with which they associate him.” (Q. 28: 68)

   God Almighty said: “They have partners [for God] who have legislated for them something of the faith which God had not permitted. Were it not for God’s word to adjudicate between them, torment awaits the wicked ones.” (Q. 42: 21)

   The Prophet said: “God is the rule and unto him is the rule.” (traced by Abu Dawud, and it is sound)

   God Almighty is the creator of everything, and he is the one who commands and legislates, and that is the rule by which he governs and adjudicates among his servants. No one may legislate alongside God or choose what opposes God’s rule. Whoever does so refutes God’s rule and rejects it, and makes himself a partner of God’s, and an idol to be worshipped instead of God. Therefore God Almighty said at the end of the verse, “May God Almighty be exalted above anything with which they associate him.”

   Ishaq b. Rahawayh said: “Muslims have agreed that whoever rejects anything that God almighty brought down is an unbeliever because of that, even if he accepts everything [else] that God brought down.” (*al-Sarim al-maslul*, 1/9)

   Shinqiti said: “Whether association with God in his rule or association with God in his worship, all have the same meaning, and there is no difference whatsoever between them. Whoever follows a system other than
God’s system, and a law that is not God’s law, such as the one who worships statues and bows to idols, there is no difference in any respect between them, both are the same, and both are polytheism. (*Adwa' al-bayan by Shinqiti*, 7/162)

2. **PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT:** This means the abolishment of the duty of jihad against the unbeliever ruler, that [political] transition can only take place through peaceful elections, and that the people submit to whomever is elected, even if he is the most unbelieving among the people, and that the most deserving of loyalty and rule belongs to whomever is selected by a majority of the people, with no regard for religion or lawfulness.

The scholars have agreed that loyalty may not be given to an unbeliever. Rather, if unbelief befalls him it is required to rebel against him and distance from him.

God Almighty said: “God will not provide a path for the unbelievers over the believers.” (Q. 4: 141)

Concerning the unbeliever’s rule over the Muslim and his path over the believers [in this matter],

The Prophet said: “Islam will rise up, and will not be risen over.” (transmitted by Daraqutni, Bayhaqi, and Bukhari mentioned it in the passive tense)

And the rule of the unbeliever is raised above the word of the unbeliever over the word of Islam.

This form of unbelief manifests in two ways:

First, by granting authority to the majority, even if it is [comprised of] unbelievers. And this is clear unbelief, since it contradicts that which the community agreed upon—that governance may not be granted to an unbeliever.

Second, by forbidding rebellion against him if he commits unbelief. The Prophet said, “Except, if you see unbelief become known to you, there is a sign from God.”

Ibn al-'Arabi\(^{85}\) and Ibn Hajar\(^{86}\) describe the consensus of rebelling against a ruler if unbelief befalls him.

3. **SEPARATION OF THE POWERS:** At its root, what this means is the separation of religion from rule and governance and the domestic system. This is the principle of secularism upon which the lands of unbelief were founded and which is intended by the dissolution of teaching and applying the religion. The idola-
ters have brought this unbelief to the lands of the Muslims to distance them from the instruction of Islam and the application of its principles, and they have greeted them with claws of polytheism and idolatry, and breakdown of ethics.

4. **THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES:** By which they mean the judiciary that reigns in the lands of unbeliever and the apostate systems; this is the judiciary whose source is man-made laws and polytheistic legal councils. This is among the strongest definitive instances of unbelief and fighting against God and his Messenger.

Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim said concerning the categories of [what constitutes] governance according to other than what God brought down, the form of unbelief that removes one from the fold of Islam: The fifth: glorifying it, making it comprehensive and revealing its contradiction to the divine law, and making it greater than [the divine law’s] rulings, and making it seem desirous to God and his messenger and similar to the Islamic courts, both in how it is derived and applied, in its observations, sources, rulings, composition, variety, rulings and requirements…These courts exist in many Islamic cities, prepared and completed, with open doors, and people, one herd after another, all being adjudicated according to what opposes the rule of the *sunna* and the Quran from among these laws, requiring that people follow and obey them, and codifying them. Is there a worse form of unbelief and anything that nullifies attestation that “Muhammad is the Messenger of God” more than this? [*al-Durar al-saniyya* 16/216]

5. **RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:** God legislated for us the most just and best rulings, and gave every person what is rightfully his. There is nothing odd about this since he is the Creator who is all knowing in the affairs of his creations, for

> God Almighty said: “How could he who created all not know all?” (Q. 67: 14)

God has distinguished among his friends and his enemies, and has distinguished the rights of men and women and gave each what is rightfully theirs.

Unbelievers have overcrowded and are bothered by what the Islamic faith has decreed concerning relations between people according to principles of the faith and creed.

They loathe the divine prescriptions concerning the corporal and criminal codes, and [what the divine law] has defined in terms of rights between men and women. Instead, they have spread what they call “human rights” to distort
the rulings of the faith, and to turn people away from the creed of “loyalty and disavowal,” and have estranged Muslims from Islamic laws.

“Human rights” means:

- Conduct with people on the basis of humanity, far from the religious and creedal foundations, and no distinction among them between Muslims and unbelievers
- Rejection of the Islamic penal code: such as retribution, amputation, stoning, flogging, all of which they consider to contradict the idea of humanity
- Rejection of the kinds of separation of men from women required in Islamic law, such as divorce, inheritance, financial compensation, and the like, out of their interest in upholding humanity

Every one of these three points is unbelief, since they are lies about the Quran and rejections of its regulations. For the community has agreed upon the fact that whoever rejects or lies about anything in the Quran is an unbeliever.

6. **IMPOSING THE LAW ON ALL:** Meaning that the main foundation upon which the state stands is the law, and it is not permissible to anyone to disobey it or abandon it, because it is the principal source upon which the unbeliever system is founded and on which it is based.

The law is that which is worshipped, obeyed, and followed and is what must be safeguarded and whose rulings are binding, and it must be reference in every matter. This is among the gravest matters that could negate God’s oneness and the attestation that Muhammad is his messenger.

Given this, democracy in its true meaning is considered idolatry that is worshipped instead of God, and it must be denounced as unbelief, disavowed, and its people excommunicated and disavowed from them and their customs.

**PREPARATORY QUESTIONS**

**QUESTION 1:** God Almighty said: “How could he who created all not know all?” Explain this verse.

**QUESTION 2:** God Almighty said: “God will not provide a path for the unbelievers over the believers.” To what is this verse referring?

**QUESTION 3:** What is the ruling concerning one who governs according to man-made laws?
LESSON SIXTEEN: NATIONALISM

GOALS

- That the student familiarize himself with nationalism
- That the student explain what the callers to nationalism are striving toward
- That the student explain that nationalism and patriotism are both derived from idolatry that seeks to overpower religion

NATIONALISM: a heretical mission of pre-Islamic ignorance whose goal is the defeat of Islam and banishing its rulings and education, and replacing it with nationalism, and making nationalism the umbrella under which rights are arranged, and according to which “loyalty and disavowal” are to be applied.

Nationalists consider the call to the religion of Islam insufficient for realizing the aspirations of nationalists, and in fact consider religion to be backward and from which they must be liberated and which must be separated from the state.

Callers to nationalism strive to ensure that nationalism replace prophecies, that for the prophecy of nationalism every valuable and inexpensive item be sacrificed, and that belief in it be stronger than any other connection, and that it must be the counterweight of belief in God Almighty, and that nationalism be the religion of every Arab.

The callers to nationalist thought resemble greatly the poet’s words:

A gift was given to me of Arabs becoming a community…and that they trod on my corpse by their religion of Marham.

Greetings to the unbelief uniting us…and good tidings after it in hellfire!

A number of Arab nationalist thinkers say: If in every time period there is a holy prophecy, then Arab nationalism is the prophecy of this age. One of them said:

O Muslims and O Christians, your faith…is the religion of Arabness, and it is one and not two.

If this is clear to you, you will come to know that nationalism is among the forms of idolatry that became a distinct religion, and through which loyalty and disavowal are enforced. It must be deemed unbelief, to be disavowed and its people must be excommunicated and distanced from them and their customs.
**Patriotism:** God has formed man to love the land in which he was raised, and the love of the state could take the form of this natural love with no connection to the faith, and this could be considered [the] “original” or “natural” state.

But after the [original] Islamic state was torn up, the enemies of the faith divided the lands of Islam into states and drew artificial borders for each part, and gave each a flag. Then the unbelievers and their idolatrous agents sought to plant the glorification of education and patriotism into the hearts of Muslims such that they would rid their hearts of Islamic unity and fraternity and move away from their faith and from “loyalty and disavowal” through it and turn, instead, toward the sanctification of the state and binding themselves through “loyalty and disavowal” and fraternity, and victory through it and to distinguish between people on the basis of the state and not the faith. All the while, this was accompanied by the banishment of Islamic principles, ethics, and the ties of Islamic law.

Rather, this opened the way for unbelief, apostasy, freedom of thought and religion, while preserving the unity of state and not being bound to the person of the ruler or the system.

Among the distinguishing features of patriotism, the truth of the ruler, the system, and the education are all considered greater than the truth of God and of his messenger. Whoever commits unbelief in God or insults the faith or the Prophet is not considered a criminal in their view, but rather his actions fall into the sphere of freedom of patriotism. As their famous saying goes: “Religion unto God, and the state for all.” As for whomever insults the ruler or rebels against the system or rejects their education, that person is considered a criminal deserving of punishment.

Given this, patriotism as defined above allows for the glorification and sanctification of idolatry, and through it is determined “loyalty and disavowal.” It is obligatory to deem this patriotism of unbelief as a form of unbelief, to distance oneself from it and its people and their customs.89

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**INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXTBOOK ON ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE**

In their history Muslims have erected an advanced civilization, stretching from the far West to the far East, a civilization that permeates all aspects of life in politics, administration, economy, and all affairs of the people.

For every aspect of this civilization the pure original Islamic law was the guide and source and rule, in permitting and forbidding. To this end, every system of the Islamic civilization was predisposed in its nature to the Islamic character, and among
the beliefs of Muslims there was nothing missing in their ritual observances—in prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, among other areas of life.

This curriculum is a short survey of the political systems that existed in Islamic civilization, such that the first section is devoted to a discussion of Islamic governance and its types, the nature of the relationship between divine law and governance, and the circumstances of why the rule of divine law separated from governance, and the rule of the original divine law from those who remove themselves from the rule of Islamic law. As for the second part, it is concerned with a discussion of the system of rule in the Islamic State, and it concludes with a description of the imamate and the various rulings that apply to it. As for the third part, it is concerned with a discussion of Islamic governance in the appointment of rulers, leaders, and officials. The survey concludes with the fourth section, which discusses the administrative system in the Islamic State, and is divided into two parts: the first describes the most important positions of government, and the second describes the most important positions dedicated to the preservation of the faith and the establishment of divine law.

The following sections will make manifestly clear the strength of the link between the rule of divine law in the lives of Muslims, as will become clear the false pride of those who claim there is no connection between religion and the lives of Muslims.

And God is the arbiter of success.⁹⁰
APPENDIX C

SELECTED TEXTBOOK COVERS

Quran and Its Exegesis

Geography

Physical Preparedness

Islamic Governance
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence

Arabic Literature

History

Arabic Grammar

Terminology of Hadith

Creed
Bida: INNOVATION. While traditional Islamic law includes debates about what kinds of “innovation” are permitted, Salafists in general (and the Islamic State in particular) forbid anything they broadly term *bida*, which in their definition includes anything imported from outside of Islam, as well as anything from within the traditional Islamic experience that appeared after roughly the eighth to ninth centuries (the period of the *salaf*).

Dawa: MISSION, CALL. Refers to proselytizing activity.

Hadith (pl.: *ahadith*): Report containing the statements or actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Ilhad: HERESY.

‘Ilmaniyya: SECULARISM.

Iman: BELIEF.

Kharijite: THOSE WHO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM THE COMMUNITY. Reference to early Islamic sect by the same name, used today by non-jihadist Salafists and other Muslims as a derogatory label to condemn jihadists for having a low threshold for excommunicating fellow Muslims and fighting them.

Kufr: UNBELIEF. (For the practice of deeming someone an unbeliever, see *Takfir*).

Munafiq: HYPOCRITE. Term that appears in the Qur’an and refers to those during the Prophet’s time who outwardly expressed solidarity with his cause but, in fact, opposed him in their hearts. Jihadists appropriate the term to refer to contemporary Muslim societies and states that profess to being Muslim but, in their view, are “hypocrites” because they do not fully implement Islamic law and do not follow the jihadists’ exclusivist understanding of Islam, and are therefore not true Muslims.
Murji’ite: “those who postpone [judgment].” Early Islamic theological sect that held that one’s actions do not necessarily reflect one’s beliefs, and therefore judgment of one’s Muslim status must be deferred to God. Jihadists use this term today as a derogatory label against non-jihadist Salafists for claiming to uphold a purist understanding of Islam but refusing to excommunicate and fight other Muslims who do not support their worldview.

Murtadd: APOSTATE.

Qawmiyya: NATIONALISM. Salafists, particularly jihadists and the Islamic State, see nationalism as a foreign import, an arbitrary form of identity that unnecessarily divides the Muslim community, and an ideology that violates God’s exclusive sovereignty to legislate, thereby making those who follow nationalism unbelievers.

Rafidah: Derogatory term used by Sunnis against Shiites (literally, “those who refuse/reject [the authority of the first three ‘Rightly-Guided Caliphs’]”) because the latter rejected the legitimacy of the first three caliphs who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad—Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman—and instead only accept ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, as the Prophet’s successor.

Safavid: REFERS TO THE S AFAVID EMPIRE that ruled Persia from 1501 to 1722 and was credited with introducing Twelver Shiism as the official version of Islam in that area. IS and Salafists use the term to refer to Iran.

Shirk: POLYTHEISM (literally, “partnering [God with others]”). Salafists, particularly jihadists and the Islamic State, apply this term quite broadly to anything they believe violates God’s oneness (tawhid)—in politics, to secular ideologies; in ritual, to the construction of tombs within mosques and their visitation by lay Muslims; and in belief, the refusal to take literally the descriptions of God’s attributes in the Qur’an and hadith.

Sunna: NORMATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD. Salafists, particularly jihadists and the Islamic State, believe the only acceptable source of Islamic observance is the Prophet Muhammad’s sunna, as this was understood by his earliest Sunni followers (his salaf, or predecessors, from which Salafists take their name). The sunna is found in the hadith reports.

Taghut: [TYRANNICAL] IDOLATERS. Jihadists, and in particular the Islamic State, apply this term to the heads of Muslim-majority states whom they consider “tyrannical idolaters” for their brutal repression of Islamists domestically and their refusal to apply Islamic law in its totality as jihadis demand.

Takfir: EXCOMMUNICATION (literally, “deeming someone an unbeliever”). While
discussions on what constitutes believing and being a believer are central to Islamic tradition, contemporary takfir by jihadist groups is especially controversial because of the low threshold jihadists have for excommunicating fellow Muslims (for example, for failing to adopt their understanding of Islam, for being obedient to secular governments, for refusing to join in their call to violence, and so on).

Tawhid: God’s Unity. Tawhid is a central concept in Islamic tradition. Just as takfir sets a low threshold for excommunication, jihadists, and especially the Islamic State, set the bar high for accepting anyone as a true monotheist—who, in their view, is only someone who agrees with their understanding of Islam, rejects all secular forms of government, and joins in their violent cause. Anyone else, in the jihadist narrative, fails to meet the criterion of upholding God’s oneness and therefore ceases to be a true Muslim.

al-Wala’ wa-l-barâ’: Loyalty, Disavowal. Jihadist concept that stipulates those with whom “true Muslims” (that is, according to jihadists, their followers and sympathizers) are permitted to associate (that is, like-minded jihadists), as well as those with whom they must desist contact (Muslims who do not agree with their understanding of religion, as well as anyone else).

Wataniyya: Patriotism. Like nationalism (see Qawmiyya), Salafists—particularly jihadists and the Islamic State—view patriotism as a violation of God’s exclusive sovereignty because it causes individuals to pledge support to what they consider an arbitrary source of communal identity (the nation state) rather than the Muslim one—in their view, the only permissible identity for Muslims.

Wathaniyya: Idolatry. A term applied by jihadists, particularly the Islamic State, to the heads of Muslim-majority states implying that they promote modern-day idolatry by not applying Islamic law in its totality. (See Taghut.)


5. I am grateful here to Peter Mandaville for reminding me of Benedict Anderson’s work, Imagined Communities, and for making the very constructive link between it and the question of self-radicalized attackers.


7. See appendix A for a list of texts reviewed.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


15. The study will refer to both the Islamic *Hijri* date and the corresponding Gregorian date when the original Arabic source only mentions the former.


17. A foundational text on this topic is ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Baz (d. 1999), *Naqd al-qawmiyya al-arabiyya* (Critique of Arab Nationalism).


19. See translation of “General Introduction” in appendix B.

20. While it is odd for a Salafi group to publish works from the traditional schools of law, one could also see the usefulness of this, as groups like IS seek to build a system of legal practice with which Salafism is not necessarily consistent. The publication of a primer on Hanbali law in particular, in this case, may also have been a jab at Saudi Arabia, more of which the group would take in the following months by publishing a series of works by Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab.
21. The Lofty Proofs, 8.

22. Issues Concerning Pre-Islamic Ignorance, 3–4.


24. See appendix A for a full list of textbook titles.

25. See note 3.


30. For a full description of education regulations, see the work of Aymenn al-Tamimi, whose archive of translated leaked documents is one of the best resources for access to this material: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents.


33. See appendix A for a full list of classroom textbooks.


40. Jacob N. Shapiro, *The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 57. The three other variables Shapiro mentions (which will not be discussed here) are “how discriminate they need to be in the use of violence given their political goals; how much divergence there is in underlying preferences within the group; and the level of security pressure they are under from government forces.” Borrowing from economics and political science, Shapiro calls these “agency problems,” which emerge “when three conditions exist: (1) a principal needs to delegate certain actions or decisions to an agent; (2) the principal can neither perfectly monitor the agent’s actions, nor punish him with certainty when a transgression is identified; and (3) the agent’s preferences are not aligned with those of the principal” (see ibid., 33n).


45. For my discussion of the subject, see Jacob Olidort, “The Game Theory of Terrorism: How ISIS Radicalizes Others,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 10, 2015, in which I borrow a similar concept from game theory, a frame, to describe the appeal of IS propaganda.

46. In particular, the hadith about the so-called “saved sect” (*al-firqa al-najiya*). In it,
the Prophet Muhammad foretells a time in which the Muslim community will divide into nearly seventy sects, all of which will perish except for one that will be saved. Salafists associate themselves with this saved sect, arguing that they alone follow the Prophet’s guidance in lockstep.


48. See appendix B for selected passages.

49. See Ibn Baz, *Critique of Arab Nationalism*.

50. A particularly controversial product of this view was the opinion issued by the Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) prohibiting jihad in the name of Palestine, on the grounds that the Palestinian cause is a secular nationalist rather than religious one. See Alan Verskin, *Oppressed in the Land? Fatwas on Muslims Living Under Non-Muslim Rule from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2013), 151–52.


52. *Islamic Governance*, 20.

53. Ibid., 38.

54. Ibid., 51.

55. *History*, 9.

56. Ibid., 42.

57. Ibid., 50.


59. Ibid., 9–11.

60. Ibid., 42.


64. For one example of this, see the discussion of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), who began as a local hadith scholar in Syria and emerged as a leader of the Salafi movement, in no small measure because of his steady publications with

65. See appendix A.


68. Ibid., 7.


70. To see how these differences have played out since 2010, see Jacob Olidort, “Fall of the Brotherhood, Rise of the Salafis,” Lawfare blog foreign policy essay, October 11, 2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/fall-brotherhood-rise-salafis.


73. IS’s publications here on the hijab, which requires the woman’s full covering, is a direct response to a controversial work with roughly the same title by Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), in which he argued, based on hadith reports he deemed credible, that a woman is not legally required to cover her arms and face.


79. Ibid., 21.

80. Ibid., 28.


83. “The pious predecessors” (Arabic, “al-salaf al-salih”) refers to the first three generations of the Prophet’s Sunni followers—in traditional Islamic parlance, known as his “Companions,” “Successors,” and “Successors of Successors”—and it is these three generations with which contemporary Salafists claim to associate (as indicated by their name, taken from the Arabic word salaf, or predecessor). They base this claim on a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad said, “The best of my community is my generation, then those who follow them, then those who follow them.”

84. Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti (d. 1973) was a Mauritanian scholar who taught at the Islamic University of Medina until his death.

85. Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240), Andalusian scholar of Sufism, Islamic philosophy and law. Most likely, this paraphrase is from his al-Tadbirat al-ilahiyya fi islah al-mamlaka al-insaniyya (Divine Governance in Correcting Human Kingship).
86. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (d. 1449), scholar most known for his work on the canonical hadith collections.

87. Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh (d. 1969) was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia until his death and was most famous among jihadists for having penned an open letter to the Saudi monarch criticizing him for issuing man-made laws. The letter became a core part of the jihadist argument that applying non-Islamic laws constitutes a violation of God’s exclusive right to legislate, and therefore violates God’s oneness (tawhid), making the governments who apply such laws and the people who follow them polytheists.


89. *Creed*, 44–45.

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Dr. Olidort received his BA in history and Middle Eastern studies from Brandeis University, an MA in Near Eastern languages and civilizations from Harvard University, and an MA and PhD in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University, where he focused on the intersection of Islamic law, theology, and modern politics. He has spent nearly two years in the Middle East, conducting work funded by a Fulbright Scholarship in the United Arab Emirates and field work on Salafism in Jordan. He has given presentations on the Islamic State to academic and policy audiences. His work has appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, the *Washington Post*, and the *National Interest*, among other publications. Dr. Olidort has taught at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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