


POLICY FOCUS

**JORDAN-ISRAEL PEACE:
TAKING STOCK, 1994-1997**

LORI PLOTKIN

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The Author

Lori Plotkin is a 1996-97 Soref Research Fellow at the Washington Institute. She received a master's degree in public administration and a bachelor's degree in government and Near Eastern studies at Cornell University. Ms. Plotkin has also studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and worked for U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in Washington, DC.

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Executive Summary

Despite the multitude of regional, bilateral, and domestic political complications frustrating efforts to build upon peace, Jordan and Israel have made substantial gains toward normalizing relations since signing their peace treaty at Wadi Araba on October 26, 1994. The treaty and more than one dozen subsequent sectoral agreements have established a solid framework for bilateral cooperation and yielded results in each of the political, economic, and cultural fields discussed therein. Heightened tensions surrounding Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, the Jerusalem tunnel crisis, Israeli decisions on Har Homa and the first of three further redeployments from the West Bank, and regional reactions to these moves have significantly exacerbated Jordan-Israel ties, but the personal commitment of King Hussein and the royal family to securing bilateral relations has sustained Jordan's support for peace during difficult periods.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Various indicators provide evidence that the first two years of peace produced economic benefits—albeit limited ones in many areas—to both Jordan and Israel. The rise in the number of people traveling to the two countries during this period represents one of the most prominent examples, although regional political crises in 1996 had negative consequences for their respective tourist industries. Israelis crossed the border into Jordan at a rate of 10,000 per month during the first two years of peace, representing over 10 percent of total travelers to the Hashemite Kingdom; Jordanians entered Israel at a significantly lower rate. Peace has also contributed to an increase in foreign investments in both countries. In the two years following the treaty's signing, foreign investment in Israeli companies more than doubled to \$5.5 billion, and foreign direct investment in Jordan increased more than 14 times to \$43 million between 1994 and 1995—in part a result of Jordan's austere economic restructuring program.

The implementation of the trade and transport agreements in 1996 has facilitated the flow of people and goods across the border. Bilateral trade from June 1996 (when commercial trade began) to December of that year totaled \$18 million. By the second anniversary of the peace treaty, fifteen joint projects between private Israeli and Jordanian businesspeople were operating in Jordan, employing 1,000 Jordanians. However, most joint projects in the Jordan Rift Valley and Aqaba-Eilat areas—specifically identified in the treaty for integrated development—remain in the planning stages. The two states have pursued joint water, environmental, and energy projects (including water pipelines and dams, oil monitoring stations, and the linking of electricity grids), but many have been delayed or canceled as a result of bilateral and regional political tensions. In general, the drive to strengthen bilateral economic ties has been hindered by complications arising from decades-long economic segregation, the wide disparity between the two countries' economies, various local economic and political interests, and popular Jordanian apprehension about normalizing relations with Israel.

OFFICIAL POLITICAL RELATIONS

Relations between the two countries' leaderships have remained one of the most solid components of peace, although they have not been immune to the tumult of wider Arab-Israeli political issues. The close personal relationship between King Hussein and the late Yitzhak Rabin set the tone for bilateral ties throughout much of the first year of peace, but Israeli activities perceived as provocative by Jordan—including military action in Lebanon in April 1996 and the opening of a tunnel alongside Jerusalem's Temple Mount in September of that year—contributed to the erosion of ties between Amman and Rabin's successors, Shimon Peres and

Binyamin Netanyahu. The tunnel opening, which Jordan felt violated treaty provisions that give it a "special role" regarding the city's Islamic holy sites, deeply offended Jordanian sensitivities and resulted in the deterioration of bilateral ties to their lowest ebb in the first two years of peace. The Hussein-Netanyahu relationship has also been complicated by what Jordan—and many others in the Arab and wider world—perceive as Netanyahu's reluctance to fulfill Israel's obligations under the Oslo accords. Despite this, King Hussein's pivotal role in concluding the January 1997 Hebron agreement and his efforts to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Har Homa crisis in March 1997 illustrate the monarch's continued commitment to both bilateral and multilateral peacebuilding.

NORMALIZATION AND THE JORDANIAN OPPOSITION

Jordan and Israel have established a solid legal and diplomatic framework for cooperative efforts in many fields, but actually fulfilling the promise of cooperation has been slow and produced mixed results. Heightened regional tensions in 1996-97 have strengthened Jordan's uncompromising opponents to normalization, who have dominated the kingdom's domestic political debate since the establishment of formal relations with Israel. Although Jordanians routinely travel to Israel for advanced medical treatment, and some Israelis enjoy less expensive Jordanian dental services, Jordan's professional healthcare associations and the negative popular sentiment surrounding normalization have discouraged the more substantive links between healthcare institutions that are called for in the bilateral health accord. Implementing the scientific and cultural exchange agreement has met similar problems, although several non-governmental peace societies have sprouted in Jordan and a handful of students and teachers have participated in bilateral exchange programs.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The peace between Jordan and Israel addressed fundamental security issues for both countries. For Israel, it transformed Jordan into a buffer against hostile states to the east. For Jordan, it invalidated the notion promoted by some Israeli political figures that "Jordan is Palestine" and qualified the Hashemite Kingdom for significant U.S. economic, military, and political support. At the end of 1996, however, Jordan's focus appeared to shift eastward with the re-emergence of Iraqi oil on the international market as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 986. The restoration of Jordan-Iraq ties may impact upon the Jordan-Israel relationship both politically and economically, through the re-opening of more traditional avenues for governmental relations and trade.

If there is fragility in the Jordan-Israel relationship, it is not because of a lack of commitment by King Hussein but rather because so few people and institutions in Jordan beyond the royal palace share his commitment. Without a broader foundation of support within Jordan's body politic—and especially its political and commercial elite—the durability of the Jordan-Israel peace relationship will remain an issue of intense concern.

I

Introduction: Taking Stock of Peace

Despite a multitude of regional, bilateral, and domestic political complications frustrating efforts to build upon peace, Jordan and Israel have made substantial gains toward normalizing relations since the countries signed their peace treaty at Wadi Araba on October 26, 1994. The treaty and more than one dozen subsequent sectoral agreements¹ have established a solid foundation for bilateral cooperation and yielded important results in all economic, political, and cultural fields discussed therein, including tourism, trade, security, and water sharing.

Significantly, these bilateral accords have allowed—and even encouraged—Jordanians and Israelis to develop personal and professional relationships that represent the building blocks of a strong and stable peace. The most tangible evidence of relations that transcend state-to-state agreements is in tourism and commerce. In the two years following the signing of the peace treaty, more than 300,000 Israelis and Jordanians crossed the Jordan River for tourist travel, family visits, and business negotiations; Israeli and Jordanian businesspeople began operating fifteen joint ventures, employing 1,000 Jordanians, in Jordan; and bilateral trade climbed steadily since its inauguration in June 1996, with \$4 million worth of goods being traded in October 1996 alone. In short, relations that were impossible—and actually illegal—several years ago have become routine among some segments of the two populations.

Simultaneous efforts to dispel prejudices developed during and exacerbated by decades of war and hostility, however, have encountered significant obstacles. As one *New York Times* article noted, “the old stereotypes of the implacable Zionist and the terrorist Arab still loom large” in each country.² Efforts at normalization have been challenged effectively in Jordan by the Islamist- and leftist-dominated parliamentary opposition and the professional associations that served as the basis of opposition before Jordan legalized political parties five years ago. Both groups have launched public campaigns against normalizing relations with Israel, the latter threatening to “excommunicate” any of their 80,000 members who conduct business with Israelis. Their anti-Israel campaigns have often been supported in word and spirit by Jordan’s weekly tabloid press, and to a lesser degree by the mainstream daily newspapers.

During periods of heightened Arab-Israeli tension, these groups take advantage of frustration within the Jordanian population—about half of which is of Palestinian origin and thus particularly sensitive to developments in Israeli-Palestinian relations—and gain strength. This phenomenon was demonstrated by the widely supported October 1996 declaration in response to Israel’s creation of a second opening in the ancient Hasmonean tunnel alongside (not under, as some have accused) the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The declaration, calling for resistance to “all forms of normalization with the Zionist enemy,”³ was signed by thirty-eight groups representing a broad range of Jordanian political parties, professional associations, and non-governmental organizations, and acutely reflected popular sentiment toward ties with Israel at the time. Similarly, after an apparently deranged Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls in March 1997, some Jordanian peace opponents lauded him as a “hero” and competed among themselves to defend him in court proceedings.

¹ The treaty required a series of sectoral agreements, the last four of which—concerning scientific and cultural exchanges, communications, the Aqaba-Eilat region, and the Gulf of Aqaba maritime boundary—were signed on January 18, 1996. Other sectoral agreements signed since the peace treaty include accords on tourism, border crossings, energy, health, the environment, police, trade and economics, agriculture, transportation, and civil aviation.

² “Jordan and Israel Find a Treaty Alone Doesn’t Make Friends,” *New York Times*, August 30, 1996.

³ *MidEast Mirror*, October 15, 1996.

Both episodes were serious tests of the Jordan-Israel relationship. During each, King Hussein emerged as both a strong (and sometimes harsh) critic of Israeli actions and a conciliator between Arabs and Israelis—first by helping to mediate the January 1997 Israeli-Palestinian agreement in Hebron and later by traveling to Israel to console the schoolgirls' families in March 1997. Thus, although heightened tensions have affected the tenor of the Jordan-Israel relationship, they have not eroded its foundation. Despite bilateral crises over the tunnel opening and the Israeli decision to commence work on the Har Homa housing project on the outskirts of Jerusalem, high-level communication and meetings between the two countries have continued, economic negotiations have resulted in new trade and transport agreements, and fundamental security cooperation remains strong. Indeed, the king (if not his ministers) has continued to press actively for greater effort toward normalization, suggesting that it should be pursued with even more vigor in order to counteract the detrimental effects of regional tension.⁴ Jordan's support for normalization is based largely on the commitment of the king and royal family, however, and because it is most closely associated with so few people, its long-term durability remains an open question.

⁴ Interview with King Hussein, *al-Quds al-Arabi*, November 14, 1996.

II

Immediate Economic Benefits from Tourism

In an effort to garner domestic support for peace and normalization with Israel after the treaty's signing, King Hussein touted the tangible benefits they would deliver to Jordan, particularly in economic terms such as tourism, trade, foreign aid and investment. In general, however, Jordanians report that they have not reaped economic rewards from peace: trade with Israel—while increasing—is a mere trickle, trade with the Palestinians continues to be obstructed, and the financial support given to Jordan by public donors and private investors has not been felt by much of the Jordanian population.

The most immediate and conspicuous economic benefits stemming from peace have been from the tourism sector. Unlike trade and joint ventures, tourism has not been dependent on extensive cooperation between Israel and Jordan; each country has been able to develop its tourism sector independently, which for Israel has meant expanding its already substantial tourist infrastructure and for Jordan, moving quickly to complement its popular sites like Petra with such infrastructure. Today, however, tourism revenues do remain threatened—not so much by a lack of cooperation in this sector as by the unstable political climate which deters foreigners from visiting the region.

FOREIGN TOURISM

When the Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994 officially ended the state of war between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel, King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin agreed to open border crossings to travelers in order to promote tourism. Immediately after the declaration's signing, Israel transferred jurisdiction over the Allenby Bridge near Jericho from its armed forces to its civilian Ports Authority. In August, the two countries opened a new border crossing just north of Aqaba and Eilat at Arava, initially only to third-country travelers. A third crossing, the Sheikh Hussein Bridge connecting the Beit She'an and Irbid regions in the north, was inaugurated when the peace treaty was ratified in November 1994, and both it and the Arava crossing were opened to Israeli and Jordanian citizens. By the second anniversary of the peace treaty, several other crossing points across the Jordan River and Jordan Rift Valley were in the planning stages and were expected to be financed by Japanese and German aid.

Both countries set records for foreign tourism in 1995, the first full year of peace. Jordan's tourism revenues surpassed \$700 million (15 percent of GDP),¹ and the number of tourists exceeded the one million mark (a 35 percent increase over 1994) for the first time in the country's history.² Israel registered a record 2.2 million visitors in 1995 and earned over \$3 billion in revenues.³ Tourist industry officials generally attribute the 1995 gains to the increase in regional stability due to progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations and maintenance of Persian Gulf security. For Israel's tourist industry, the treaty with Jordan represented one in a series of boosts stemming from the peace process; between 1993 and 1995, the industry grew by an average of 10 percent annually. For Jordan, peace with Israel opened the door to Israeli travelers and, more importantly, increased access to the lucrative U.S. and European markets: an Israeli stamp on one's passport no longer posed logistical problems for travelers who wanted to enter Jordan.

¹ *Jordan Times*, July 1, 1996.

² *Ibid.*

³ "Tourists with Reservations," *Jerusalem Report*, October 31, 1996.

Despite expectations of even more tourism in 1996, both countries' tourist industries suffered that year as a result of a series of regional crises—including the February and March suicide bombings in Israel, the April-May confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon (code-named "Operation Grapes of Wrath"), the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in May and the Arab reaction to it, the August "bread riots" in Jordan, renewed fighting in northern Iraq, and deadly Israeli-Palestinian clashes in the territories in September. These events and the resultant tensions deterred foreigners from visiting the region.

In Jordan, the number of visitors in the first eight months of the year increased from 739,000 in 1995 to 786,000 in 1996;⁴ particularly high tourist turnout during the first three months of the year offset a marked drop after Operation Grapes of Wrath. Despite the overall increase, however, the industry lost some of the highly profitable American and European tourists during this period. U.S. tourists alone declined 23 percent from 50,000 in the first five months of 1995 to 38,400 in the same period in 1996.⁵ The rise in the number of tourists from Israel and the Persian Gulf—the latter a result of improved ties between Jordan and the Gulf states in 1996 (which had been strained by Jordanian support for Iraq during the Gulf War)—did not offset the loss in revenues from Western customers, according to Jordanian hoteliers.⁶ A large number of hotel, tour, and airline cancellations in the wake of September's Israeli-Palestinian violence indicated that tourism to Jordan continued to decline significantly during the fourth quarter of 1996.

In Israel, there was a 20 percent increase in the number of tourists in the first quarter of 1996 over the same period in 1995, including a 29 percent increase in January and a 27 percent increase in February.⁷ However, each quarter of 1996 proved worse than the previous one. Israeli Tourism Minister Moshe Katsav projected a loss of \$600 million in 1996 tourism revenues compared to 1995, based on figures compiled *before* the September violence.⁸ As in Jordan, high tourist turnout during the first months of 1996 compensated somewhat for a marked decline thereafter. In total, Israel received two million tourists in 1996, a 5 percent decrease compared to 1995, but roughly equal to the 1994 record.⁹

For the most part, however, businesspeople have continued to invest in tourism-related projects in both countries. The growth of the two countries' hotel industries, for example, offers evidence of investors' long-term commitment to the region. In Petra alone, six new four- and five-star hotels with a total of 700 rooms opened in the two years following the peace treaty.¹⁰ Despite signs of some reluctance to invest in the tourism sector following the 1996 political crises,¹¹ those supporting tourism-related projects were "still betting on Israel [and Jordan's] future."¹² In September 1996, fifteen new hotel projects—including a Grand Hyatt, Sheraton, Hilton, Holiday Inn, and Four Points in Amman, two new hotels in Aqaba, and one each in Karak, Salt, Shuneh, and Ajloun—were registered with the Jordan Hotels Association.¹³ In Israel, 1,500 new hotel rooms opened in the second year of peace alone (adding to an existing 35,000) and by October 1996, another 20,000 were either planned or under construction.¹⁴

⁴ *Jordan Times*, September 21, 1996.

⁵ "RJ Complains Tourist 'Seat Factor' Down," *Jordan Times*, September 30, 1996.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ "Tourism Officials Fear Violence Will Decrease Visitors to Israel," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, October 15, 1996.

⁸ "Tourists with Reservations."

⁹ *Globes*, January 22, 1997.

¹⁰ These included the Grand View Hotel (150 rooms), Movenpick (120), the Petra Plaza (100), Taybet Zaman (97), the King's Way Inn (80), and the Nabataean Castle (150); see "RJ Complains Tourist 'Seat Factor' Down."

¹¹ After two years of planning and market research, two German Club Robinson resorts in Israel were put on hold after the violence in September; see "Tourists with Reservations."

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "RJ Complains Tourist 'Seat Factor' Down."

¹⁴ Radisson and Days Inn entered the market in 1995, the International Sheraton chain formed a joint venture with Koor Hotels and Tourism in August 1996, and Hilton International and Holiday Inn are pursuing their plans for expansion; see "Tourists with Reservations."

To capitalize on the influx of tourists, some Jordanian and Israeli entrepreneurs have pursued cooperative approaches to regional tourism, creating joint vacation packages and airline ticketing procedures. Jordanian and Israeli officials have also proposed an array of bilateral tourism projects—many of which were featured at the Cairo economic conference in November 1996. Although some of the Arab members of the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel & Tourism Association (MEMTTA)¹⁵ postponed a June 1996 meeting in order to reassess normalization with Israel after Netanyahu's election,¹⁶ the meeting eventually took place in Tunis in late September and explored the possibility of creating an inexpensive regional air ticket that would allow tourists to travel from one Middle Eastern country to another.¹⁷

BILATERAL TOURISM

Some 120,000 Israelis crossed the border into Jordan in 1995,¹⁸ accounting for 12 percent of total tourism to Jordan that year, and another 100,500 traveled to the kingdom between January and October 1996.¹⁹ Most were on four-day package tours and spent between \$500 and \$1,000 in the kingdom,²⁰ but few ventured beyond the popular tourist sites and thus were unseen by most Jordanians. This led the latter to complain that Israelis were not spending enough time or money in their country—an indication that Jordanians have not realized the economic benefits they expected from the peace treaty. During a visit to Jordan by the Israeli minister of tourism in August 1996, the two countries agreed to create a joint committee to encourage Israeli tourists to stay in Jordan for longer periods of time.²¹

Jordanian and Israeli statistics for the number of Jordanians who visited Israel during the first two years of peace differ drastically, ranging from a Jordanian estimate of under 20,000²² to a significantly higher Israeli figure of more than 120,000.²³ There are also major discrepancies between various official sources *within* the two countries. Several factors may explain these differences. Most Palestinians in the West Bank carry Jordanian passports and therefore may be registered as Jordanians by Israeli officials. Similarly, some Jordanians do not need an Israeli visa to cross into the West Bank. Moreover, the two countries often define Israel's borders differently: some Israeli figures include visitors to Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, while some Jordanian figures do not.

In response to Jordanian complaints about long lines for visa applications²⁴ and delays in receiving visas, the Israeli embassy in Amman added several new employees to its consular staff and enlarged its temporary offices at the Forte Grande Hotel before moving into a new embassy building in December 1996. These complaints often had a political subtext, suggesting that Israel was trying to restrict the flow of Jordanian travelers to Israel. Though the Israeli government *is* concerned by the number of Jordanians believed to be arriving in Israel as tourists and staying past their visas' expiration date to work illegally²⁵ (which could complicate Israeli-Palestinian

¹⁵ MEMTTA was founded under U.S. sponsorship by Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Cyprus, and Turkey to coordinate efforts to enhance regional tourism.

¹⁶ *Jordan Times*, August 21, 1996.

¹⁷ "Tourists with Reservations."

¹⁸ Official Israeli figure.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ "Jordan and Israel Find a Treaty Alone Doesn't Make Friends," *New York Times*, August 30, 1996.

²¹ "Minister Reports Decline in Tourism, Blames Regional Instability," *Jordan Times*, September 29, 1996.

²² "Israeli Tourists to Kingdom Outnumber Jordanian Counterparts by 10 to 1," *Jordan Times*, June 29, 1996.

²³ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. The bureau reports that 84,429 Jordanians traveled to Israel between January and December 1995, and 37,557 Jordanians visited Israel between January and September 1996. Another official Israeli source reports that 50,000 Jordanians visited Israel between January and December 1995, and 31,000 Jordanians visited between January and October 1996. The Israeli embassy in Amman issued 14,000 visas to Jordanians in the first six months of 1996.

²⁴ During the 1996 summer tourism season, hundreds of Jordanians waited in line for visas to Israel.

²⁵ Although Israel does not grant work permits to Jordanians, by May 1996 the embassy in Amman had received over

relations by creating competition for Palestinian workers in Israel), Israel appears to have been genuinely unprepared for the large number of Jordanian requests during the high summer tourism season. Due to the number of people using the Aqaba-Eilat border crossing—close to 1,000 Jordanians entered Eilat during the first ten months of 1996, compared to almost none in 1995²⁶—Israel and Jordan agreed in October 1996 to establish consular services in the two Red Sea port cities and distribute several hundred “free access” permits among residents of Aqaba and Eilat to enable them to visit the neighboring city for a day without paying border taxes. Another 150 frequent cross-border travelers—primarily businesspeople and bureaucrats—are to be granted free, unlimited-stay visas in the other country.

The fact that a small number of Jordanians travel to Israel relative to the number of Jordan-bound Israelis—and that they do so most often to visit family members (as opposed to touring Israel’s historical and cultural sites)—has been characterized as evidence of the pervasive social and psychological barriers that still exist on the part of Jordanians. Although such barriers do exist on both sides, cultural differences regarding travel may also account for some of the discrepancy. Israelis are fond of history- and nature-oriented vacations, and thus Jordanian archeological sites such as Petra hold a natural attraction for them. Jordan’s traveling elite (and prosperous Arabs from other countries) prefer luxury vacations, which can be found more easily at a high-class resort in London or Paris, to sightseeing or hiking trips.

By any Israeli measurement, however, the number of Jordanians who traveled to Israel during the first two years of peace far surpassed that of Egyptian travelers during the same period. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports that 28,197 Egyptians visited Israel between January and December 1995 and 18,431 visited Israel between January and September 1996—a total of 46,628 in nearly two years. This “traveler gap” is even more remarkable when one considers the fact that Egypt’s population is more than thirteen times the size of Jordan’s.²⁷ Three factors may contribute to the phenomenon. Unlike Jordan, Egypt does not have a large Palestinian population with close ties to family, friends, and land in Israel and the autonomous Palestinian areas. Moreover, whereas most Egyptians must cross the Sinai to reach Israel, much of Jordan’s population resides in the western region of the kingdom along Israel’s border. The difference in the numbers of Israel-bound Jordanians and Egyptians may also be a testament to their respective degrees of normalization—in travel and otherwise—with Israel.

A bilateral transport agreement signed in October 1995 (and formally implemented for ground and air transport in several phases during 1996) has facilitated the flow of people and goods across the border, strengthening personal relationships between Jordanians and Israelis and helping to build a foundation for economic relations by making bilateral trade a reality. It was the first transportation agreement signed between Israel and an Arab neighbor.²⁸ The agreement also increased the number of transport modes beyond the tour buses that initially served as the only means of cross-border travel. By the end of 1996, six direct bus lines connected Amman and Irbid with Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Nazareth in the north and Aqaba with Eilat in the south. Private cars were allowed to travel across the border (with special restrictions). In addition, Royal Wings (a subsidiary of Royal Jordanian Airlines) and Arkia (Israel’s domestic carrier) began flying between Tel Aviv and Amman in April and May 1996, respectively, and by the end of the year each airline had five flights per week carrying up to 450 passengers. In October 1996, Jordan and Israel agreed to establish Royal Jordanian service between Haifa and Amman to target Israeli Arab customers in northern Israel; the new route was inaugurated in January 1997,²⁹ but has suffered from low usage.

3,000 requests for work permits. Tens of thousands of Jordanians are believed to be working in Israel illegally, many employed by their Israeli-Arab relatives.

²⁶ *Ha’aretz*, November 3, 1996.

²⁷ In mid-1995, Egypt’s population numbered 57.7 million and Jordan’s numbered 4.2 million, according to World Bank figures. However, the vast majority of people in both countries cannot afford to travel.

²⁸ Despite eighteen years of peace, Israelis and Egyptians still cannot drive private cars across their border.

²⁹ Israeli Arabs have crossed to Jordan in large numbers, but most have used the northern border crossings rather than drive to Tel Aviv and travel by air; see “Jordan and Israel Plan Haifa-Amman Air Route,” Reuters, October 28, 1996.

III

Trade, Joint Ventures, Foreign Aid, and Investment

Economic indicators provide evidence of overall growth in tourism earnings, bilateral trade, and foreign aid and investment in the first two years of Jordan-Israel peace. Both public and private joint ventures have demonstrated potential to deliver substantial financial rewards. Most Jordanians, however, have neither seen nor personally enjoyed the economic benefits of peace—an important concern because of its negative repercussions on popular support for normalization. Bilateral economic ties in particular have been used as a yardstick for measuring the dividends of peace, and have been disappointing for Jordanians who support normalization with Israel. Israeli Minister of Trade and Industry Natan Sharansky, who has taken pains to enhance economic relations with the Hashemite Kingdom, noted that although trade has grown since its inception in mid-1996, it is relatively easy to increase from zero.¹

In July 1995, the Jordanian parliament repealed two laws prohibiting trade with Israel—Law 66 (1953) and the United Boycott Law (1958)—thereby clearing the way for the October 1995 bilateral trade agreement. Under the terms of the accord, Israel reduced trade tariffs on cement, furniture, foodstuffs, antennas, pharmaceuticals, toys, and other select Jordanian goods on a three-tiered basis: total exemption from import duties, a 20 percent reduction, or a 50 percent reduction. In return, Jordan granted concessions of 10 percent for two years to a number of Israeli goods, including plywood, tires, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, communications equipment and other electronic components, locks, and safes. The two parties agreed to operate under this limited arrangement for three years, during which time these preferences would be expanded. A bilateral agricultural agreement signed the day after the trade accord gave Jordan first priority for duty-free produce exports to Israel, and made both countries transit points for exports to third countries.² It fixed annual quotas for Jordanian agricultural exports to Israel, including 50,000 tons of fruits and vegetables, 30,000 live sheep, 2,000 tons of cheese, and 900 tons of olive oil. Under the terms of the agreement, Israel is permitted to export to Jordan any product that Jordan imports.

Cargo trucks began carrying goods to the border in late June 1996, and by the end of the year total bilateral trade reached \$18 million. The table below quantifies Jordan-Israel trade for July through October 1996.³ Bilateral trade initially suffered from cumbersome security procedures

Bilateral Trade, July–October 1996⁴
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	July	August	September	October
Jordan to Israel	.705	.825	.725	1.450
Israel to Jordan	1.240	1.000	2.100	2.520
Total Trade	1.945	1.825	2.825	3.970

¹ Speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 18, 1997.

² The first goods (lumber) shipped to Jordan via Israel reached Haifa in late August 1996 and were loaded onto a Jordanian truck that had earlier crossed the border into Israel. Israeli customs officials accompanied the truck from the border to the port and back to the crossing.

³ Although the trade and agricultural accords were signed in October 1995, bilateral trade began only in late June 1996 following the resolution of issues surrounding the implementation of the transport agreement.

⁴ Based on official Israeli figures; Jordan's Ministry of Industry and Trade reports comparable data.

and the complications resulting from the wide disparity between the two economies (see table below), decades of economic segregation, and various local economic and political interests. Two

Comparisons of 1996 Economic Data⁵

	Gross Domestic Product (in current prices)	GDP (<i>per capita</i>)	Government Spending (as % of GDP)	Unemployment
Jordan	\$7.2 billion	\$1,663	41.2%	17%
Israel	\$93.3 billion	\$16,370	55.0%	6%

supplementary trade and transport agreements signed in December 1996 eliminated some of these impediments in an effort to expand the economic rewards of peace. The December trade agreement established a more equitable method of calculating duty reductions⁶ and extended them to many new Jordanian products. Full duty reductions were extended to pumps, automobile filters, pharmaceutical goods, roofing tiles, bakery equipment, toys, and mineral water. Duties were reduced by approximately 50 percent on fifty products including sweets, plastic pipes, and glass lenses, and by 30 percent on forty other products including clothing and textiles, refrigerators, and electrical wire.⁷

The December transport agreement eliminated security-related obstacles to trade—including the so-called “back-to-back” transport system⁸—but did not address the most common Jordanian complaint involving Israeli restrictions on trade between Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan has also sought to carry goods between Israel and third countries, particularly in Asia. Royal Jordanian Airlines appointed an Israeli firm as its cargo sales agent, and cargo trucks shuttle between the airports in Amman and Tel Aviv, completing the network.⁹ Similarly, the Aqaba Ports Corporation uses trucks to carry freight from ships docked at Aqaba to Eilat, where the cargo is then forwarded to destinations in Israel and the Palestinian Authority.¹⁰ In November 1996, Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, and British representatives met in Israel’s Negev Desert to discuss integrating Israel’s railway system with those of neighboring Arab states.¹¹

In the two years following the peace treaty, fifteen private Israeli-Jordanian projects primarily in textiles, manufacturing, and agriculture began operating in Jordan, and others are in various stages of planning and implementation.¹² Unfortunately, many of these have reinforced Jordanian fears about Israeli economic domination by combining Israeli technological “expertise” with cheap Jordanian labor. Following the August 1996 “bread riots” in Jordan, Prime Minister Netanyahu acknowledged that Israeli bureaucratic obstacles to joint projects were partly to blame for Jordanian disappointment with the economic benefits of peace and pledged to address the problem.¹³ As part of the November 1996 Cairo economic conference, two joint

⁵ “Focus on Jordan Rift Valley Development,” brochure produced by Jordan Rift Valley Steering Committee, November 1996.

⁶ Since signing the October 1995 trade agreement, Israel lowered tariffs on some imported goods, which in turn reduced the effects of the preferential discounts on Jordanian products stipulated in the agreement. (Under the terms of the 1995 accord, all tariff discounts were applied to the rates in effect on the day the agreement was signed.)

⁷ “Israel and Jordan Sign Trade MOU,” Israel Foreign Ministry statement, December 4, 1996.

⁸ For security reasons, Israel insisted on the back-to-back transport system—a costly and time-consuming procedure in which goods moving from Jordan to Israel (and to the Palestinian Authority) are unloaded from Jordanian vehicles onto Israeli (or Palestinian) vehicles. The procedure was retained for goods traveling between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, except for cement and oil. The December 1996 transport agreement assuaged the concerns of Israeli truckers, who feared Jordanian competition within Israel’s borders, by limiting the amount of time that Jordanian trucks would be allowed in Israel to only seventy-two consecutive hours.

⁹ Jordan Information Bureau (Washington, DC), *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Israel Line*, Consulate General of Israel, New York, December 9, 1996.

¹² Official Israeli source. The fifteen existing projects employ 1,000 Jordanian workers.

¹³ *MidEast Mirror*, August 21, 1996.

projects in computer programming (coordinated under the auspices of the Jordan-Israel-U.S. joint investment fund) were announced: a computerized archive for documents in Arabic, and the development of training material for technological education of Arabic speakers.¹⁴ At the end of 1996, Jordan began offering plots of land to Israeli and Jordanian entrepreneurs in an industrial free-trade zone near the Sheikh Hussein border crossing.¹⁵ In January 1997, Israel's Elscint Corporation, which manufactures magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment, won a \$1.4 million Jordanian government contract to supply a medical MRI system to Amman's al-Bashir Hospital.¹⁶

THE JORDAN RIFT VALLEY AND AQABA-EILAT

The peace treaty (Articles 20 and 23) specifically identified the Jordan Rift Valley (JRV) and the "twin cities" of Aqaba and Eilat on the Red Sea as sites for integrated development.¹⁷ Most joint projects in these areas are being developed under the auspices of the Jordan Valley Steering Committee, an outgrowth of the trilateral Jordan-Israel-U.S. economic committee established in 1993 to promote Jordan-Israel economic ties. In January 1996, Prime Minister Peres, Crown Prince Hassan, and Foreign Minister Kabariti attended a ceremony in Aqaba in which cabinet ministers from the two countries signed the last four sectoral agreements required by the peace treaty—on scientific and cultural exchanges, telecommunications, the Aqaba-Eilat region, and the Gulf of Aqaba maritime boundary. The supervisory committee in charge of completing the agreements was dissolved, and only the three permanent working groups (on water issues, Jordan Valley development, and the special security regime for Tsofar and Naharayim) remain.

Most of the projects in the JRV and Aqaba-Eilat remain in the planning stages. However, one of the first joint ventures to take shape after the treaty's signing was a natural resources processing plant near the Dead Sea. Israel's Dead Sea Works and the Arab Potash Company have launched a \$90 million project to produce bromine on the Jordanian shore of the sea.¹⁸ The plant is slated to produce 700,000 tons of potash annually for export, particularly to the United States.¹⁹ In November 1996, the Arab Potash Company was also negotiating a \$60 million joint venture to produce raw materials for Israel's Haifa Chemicals company.²⁰

The JRV steering committee prepared a fifty-page brochure for the November 1996 Cairo economic conference outlining opportunities for investment in joint projects in these areas.²¹ These range from agriculture (sheep ranching, vegetable farming, and "aqua-culture") and tourism (development of historical sites at Beit She'an and a joint tourism training academy near the Dead Sea) to a joint industrial park and healthcare facilities (private hospitals and clinics). The two governments have undergirded many of these projects: in May 1996, representatives from Jordan, Israel, and the United States met to discuss the development of the "lowest park on earth" near the Dead Sea, agreeing to connect tourist attractions on the Israeli and Jordanian shores by boat; Israel and Jordan are negotiating the details of the "peace airport" project in Aqaba for which the U.S. firm Lockheed Martin has conducted a feasibility study; and Jordan's Ministry of Transport is developing a design framework for a Gulf of Aqaba trans-shipment and distribution center. Private investors have also committed resources to other tourism-related projects in the Aqaba-Eilat region. Five new hotels to be built on Aqaba's south coast—including

¹⁴ *Ma'ariv*, December 3, 1996.

¹⁵ *Ha'aretz*, January 7, 1997.

¹⁶ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 3, 1997.

¹⁷ See appendix.

¹⁸ *Jordan Times*, November 9, 1996.

¹⁹ *Globes*, November 8, 1996.

²⁰ *Jordan Times*, November 9, 1996.

²¹ "Focus on Jordan Rift Valley Development." Approximately 60 percent of the nearly \$12 billion in potential investment projects the Israeli government presented at the conference were in the JRV; see *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 15, 1996.

the first exclusively Israeli-owned²² hotel in Jordan, slated to open in Aqaba by 1999—will provide Aqaba with at least 1,000 new rooms. Alongside the new hotels, the Aqaba Regional Authority is negotiating agreements for the construction of two \$120 million golf courses via a joint venture between local and foreign investors.²³

WATER SHARING AND DEVELOPMENT

In his effort to build popular Jordanian support for peace with Israel, King Hussein pointed to provisions in the treaty wherein Israel agreed to help Jordan increase its water supply by a total of 215 million cubic meters annually.²⁴ As part of this commitment, in June 1995 Israel began pumping approximately 30 million cubic meters of water to Jordan annually by way of a \$5 million, 3.3 kilometer pipeline (2.2 km on Israeli soil) from Lake Tiberias to the King Abdullah Canal in the Jordan Valley. Israel interprets the treaty to mean that some of the additional water it has pledged to provide to Jordan will come from dams and desalinization plants which have yet to be constructed because the Jordanian government lacks funds for such projects. Bilateral meetings were held in the summer and fall of 1996 to discuss the construction of a dam and related infrastructure to hold rain and river water, including the water flowing from Lake Tiberias to the Dead Sea.²⁵ A proposed \$100 million water carrier from the dam's reservoir would deliver an additional 30 million cubic meters of water to Jordan annually.²⁶

Other joint water projects in need of funding include a diversion and storage dam in Adasiya, a storage dam in Karameh, raising the Kafrein dam, improving water conveyance and irrigation systems in the Jordan Rift Valley, designs for the Wadi Mujib/Integrated Southern Ghors irrigation project, rehabilitation of existing agricultural developments based on ground water in Wadi Araba, expansion of the al-Samra wastewater treatment plant, and a desalinization plant in Eilat.²⁷ The Jordanian government submitted a \$450 million project at the 1996 Cairo economic conference to exploit water from the Dissi aquifer.²⁸ The World Bank is considering financing \$40 million for a \$128 million Greater Amman water and sanitation management project, and the European Union is financing a masterplan for the Jordan Valley wastewater collection and treatment network.²⁹

But Jordanian perceptions that Israel has not taken sufficient steps to fulfill its commitment—and the fact that some of the additional water is slated to come from renewable sources such as the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers, requiring agreements between the two countries and Syria and the Palestinian Authority (PA)³⁰—have sharpened popular criticism of Israel and the peace treaty within the kingdom. In the summer of 1996, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority signed a long-negotiated agreement in Oslo that created a cooperative framework for efficient management of water resources (including upgrading pipelines and exploring new means of generating additional fresh water) and called for the establishment of a water commission to oversee the joint exploitation of new sources, but did not address water allocation.³¹

Water remains an important regional issue. The multilateral working group on water resources created under the auspices the 1991 Madrid peace conference³² has convened three

²² The owner, David Lewis, is an Israeli citizen who holds a British passport and already owns six hotels in Eilat.

²³ "Israeli-Owned Hotel to Go Up in Aqaba," *Jordan Times*, October 16, 1996.

²⁴ Jordan is one of the world's most arid countries, with a *per capita* water supply barely half that of Israel or Syria.

²⁵ Crown Prince Hassan met with the chairmen of Israel Chemicals Projects and Dead Sea Works in the summer of 1996, and spoke with Israeli President Ezer Weizman in November of that year about the project.

²⁶ *Globes*, November 8, 1996.

²⁷ "Focus on Jordan Rift Valley Development."

²⁸ "Jordan Business to Shy from Israel Ties in Summit," Reuters, October 30, 1996.

²⁹ *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 29, 1996.

³⁰ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² In addition to water, working groups were established on the environment, refugees, arms control, and economic

meetings since the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and has attracted foreign investors for a regional water data bank, a desalinization research center in Muscat, analyses of water demand and supply, a public awareness project, and management of pollution and system damage. Despite heightened political tensions caused by the Israeli-Palestinian impasse over Hebron, an agreement for the creation of the Muscat desalinization research center was signed there on December 22, 1996.³³ But further bilateral and multilateral efforts toward regional water allocation and cooperative exploitation of new sources have been stymied by the lack of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli political settlement, as well as by inter-Arab disputes.

ENERGY

A bilateral energy agreement signed in August 1995 calls for joint geophysical and geological research in the JRV and Aqaba-Eilat; cooperation on generating energy from oil, solar cells, and wind; nuclear radiation monitoring;³⁴ and linking the Aqaba-Eilat electricity grids (as a prelude to a more ambitious plan to link regional electricity grids³⁵). Although in late 1996 Israel canceled the largest private joint investment project so far—a deal signed at the 1995 Amman economic conference to import \$2 billion of Qatari natural gas annually to Israel (through the U.S. firm Enron) via a new \$300 million terminal at Aqaba—in favor of cheaper Egyptian gas,³⁶ Enron has expressed hope that a similar deal can be reached in the future.³⁷ At the November 1996 Cairo economic conference, the JRV steering committee highlighted two other potential energy projects for investment: a solar energy facility in the JRV and a 100-megawatt “wind farm” on the Aqaba-Eilat border. Additional Aqaba-based joint development projects in the negotiating stage include a new oil refinery, a liquid natural gas facility (which would allow Israel to import gas from Egypt), and the expansion of the Aqaba power plant. Other prospects include commercial shale oil development and oil exploration in the Dead Sea area.

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

Jordan and Israel signed an environmental agreement in September 1995 pledging cooperation in “environmental protection” and issues that affect “people, natural resources, and environmental assets in both countries.”³⁸ The two countries agreed to focus their efforts on alleviating marine pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba, environmental planning and management, air quality control, pest control, desertification, and exchanging data on projects that could imperil each other’s environments.³⁹

One of the earliest joint environmental projects has been the simultaneous development of monitoring stations in Jordan, Israel, and Egypt for fighting marine oil pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba—with the intention of close coordination and sharing of facilities and equipment among the three centers. Japan, which chairs the multilateral working group on the environment,

relations.

³³ “Regional Center for Research in Desalinization,” statement by Israeli Foreign Ministry, December 22, 1996.

³⁴ In an unprecedented gesture, Israel agreed to allow Jordan to monitor radiation levels at its Dimona nuclear facility in the Negev Desert after Jordanian officials expressed concern over potential health and environmental hazards; see *Jordan Times*, August 21, 1995.

³⁵ The plan was superseded in late 1996 by renewed emphasis on first linking the Arab countries, including Syria. Although this process will undoubtedly prove long and complex—during which comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace may be achieved, thereby making a regional electricity grid more likely—the immediate shift to an exclusively Arab project illustrates the movement by Jordan and other Arab members of the “peace camp” away from Israel as a result of increased political tensions.

³⁶ *Jerusalem Post*, February 3, 1997.

³⁷ *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 15, 1996.

³⁸ Reuters, September 7, 1996.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

supplied \$5.5 million worth of equipment to Jordan. The European Union is financing the center in Egypt, and the United States is helping to expand an existing facility in Israel.⁴⁰ Saudi Arabia, the fourth country bordering the Gulf of Aqaba, has been invited to participate in the project but has reportedly been cool to the idea in the absence of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.⁴¹ In addition, Israel and Jordan established a joint marine “peace park” comprising a research center in Eilat-Aqaba and a protected area seven kilometers south of the coast to preserve coral and other marine treasures.

The fact that so few environmental projects have been pursued and implemented stems not only from the long-term nature of such activity but also from a lack of funding (most of which has been funneled into projects such as tourism that yield immediate economic dividends), interest (relative to more pressing needs), and a comprehensive political settlement. Because the environment knows no international boundaries, cooperation in this area requires the involvement of other regional players. The tripartite monitoring stations and marine park represent efforts to accommodate the limited number of willing parties.

POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Jordanian attitudes toward economic cooperation with Israel possess a dual character: on one hand, many Jordanians wish to reap the economic rewards of peace through business relations with Israelis; on the other hand, there is a deep-seated and pervasive fear among many Arabs that such cooperation will result in Israeli regional economic hegemony. The extent to which these two sentiments overlap is difficult to gauge. Immediately after the July 1994 Washington Declaration, 82 percent of Jordanians polled believed that their economy would benefit from making peace with Israel.⁴² But in a public opinion poll taken in March 1995 among Jordanian professionals—bankers, manufacturers, traders, politicians, and others likely to interact with Israelis—71 percent opposed normal economic links with Israel.⁴³ More recently, the Jordanian Businessmen’s Association explained an October 1996 decision not to establish a regional council of private sector business organizations in Jordan, Israel, the PA, and Egypt by saying that it did “not believe the Israelis [were] ready for economic cooperation with Jordan.”⁴⁴ Jordanian attitudes about the economic benefits of peace have soured as a result of a perceived shortage of such benefits. A December 1995–January 1996 poll reported by the Office of Research and Media Reaction of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) indicated that 47 percent of Jordanians believed that Jordan’s economic situation had worsened in the previous year—the first year of peace—and only 15 percent believed it had improved.⁴⁵ A second poll in April–May 1996 reported by USIA yielded similar results.⁴⁶

There are several possible explanations for these views. The most obvious is that Jordanian expectations about the economic rewards of peace—which the Hashemite court initially raised in order to build public support for peace with Israel—have simply not been met. The December 1996 trade and transport agreements were intended to address that very issue. In addition, Amman’s austere economic restructuring program has contributed to a general loss of popular confidence in “economic security.” At the same time, the Islamist- and leftist-controlled political

⁴⁰ *Jordan Times*, October 16, 1996.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Results of opinion poll on the Washington Declaration published by the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, August 1994.

⁴³ Frederick C. Huxley, “Jordan’s Public Splits on Economic Ties with Israel,” *Opinion Analysis*, Office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information Agency, November 7, 1996. See also Hilal Khashan, *Partner or Pariah? Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan*, Policy Paper no. 41 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).

⁴⁴ “Jordanian Officials Disappointed with Progress on Trade to Israel,” *Jordan Times*, September 16, 1996.

⁴⁵ Matthew Claeson, “Jordanian Views More Upbeat on Peace Process,” *Opinion Analysis*, February 26, 1996.

⁴⁶ Claeson and Huxley, “Jordanians Sour on Peace Process,” *Opinion Analysis*, June 14, 1996.

parties, professional associations, and tabloid press have fanned the flames of anti-peace sentiments.⁴⁷ As a result, a self-perpetuating cycle has emerged in which Jordanian business leaders who wish to cooperate with Israelis are deterred from doing so by perceptions of a prevailing negative public attitude toward such relations, and this hesitation in turn deters others in a similar manner. Some Jordanian businessmen report that they are eager to pursue deals with Israelis but fear the social stigma attached to doing so and being labeled an “economic collaborator.”⁴⁸ Jordanians who do conduct business with Israelis often conceal this fact, out of concern that the revelation could cause Arab business associates to sever ties with them.⁴⁹

Jordanian support for economic cooperation and other forms of normalization has waxed and waned in conjunction with progress or heightened tensions on the other Arab-Israeli negotiating “tracks.” This was demonstrated during Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon,⁵⁰ but is probably most pronounced with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Hasmonean tunnel crisis led not only to a deterioration of the Jordan-Israel relationship in its own right—because Amman perceived Israeli unilateralism as a violation of the peace treaty’s recognition of Jordan’s “special role” concerning Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem—but also exacerbated Palestinian resentment toward Israel that had been building since the closure of the territories in March 1996 and Netanyahu’s election victory in May. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that when Israeli-Palestinian tensions flared as a result of the impasse on the Hebron agreement in early January 1997, Amman witnessed its largest public demonstration since the 1991 Gulf War—a protest by 4,000 Jordanians against the first Israeli trade fair in Jordan.

The linkage between the Israel-Jordan and Israeli-Palestinian tracks was also highlighted at the November 1996 Cairo economic conference following the tunnel crisis.⁵¹ The fact that the conference was held at all (despite demands from some Arab capitals that it be canceled) was seen by some observers as a victory for the peace process—and the result of intensive U.S. pressure on Egypt. Yet negative publicity leading up to the event seemed to have discouraged some participants from fully preparing for it. Representatives of the Jordanian private sector, who had submitted a list of 137 projects worth \$1.2 billion to the 1995 economic conference in Amman, did not produce a similar list in 1996, and only forty Jordanian businesspeople participated. And although the Jordanian government did submit a list of twenty-five potential private investment projects worth \$4 billion—including the \$100 million joint airport project in Aqaba, and multi-million-dollar Dead Sea hotel projects⁵²—most had first been promoted at the Amman conference and were still awaiting investors. Moreover, Jordan limited its official delegation to the ministerial level (Trade and Industry Minister Ali Abu Al-Ragheb) due to lack of progress in the peace process. The forty-six-member delegation included fifteen business leaders from the private sector and semi-governmental associations.⁵³

⁴⁷ In an indirect sign of Jordanian support for economic cooperation, however, one public opinion poll indicated that the political role of Jordan’s twelve professional associations (which forbid their members to engage in business with Israelis) does not enjoy widespread public support. A mid-1996 poll found that 43.3 percent supported limiting the role of professional associations solely to work-related (as opposed to political) matters. Only 27.5 percent opposed this, and 29.1 percent did not know; see poll results on democracy in Jordan published by Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 1996.

⁴⁸ Reuters, November 7, 1996.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ The two polls conducted in early and mid-1996 confirm the connection between the various peace tracks. The first poll, conducted after a full year of peace, found that 48 percent of Jordanians polled believed “it was a good idea for all Arab countries to relax their economic boycott of Israel,” and that 57 percent favored “normal diplomatic and other relations with Israel” in the event of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement (i.e., treaties with Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf states). The second, conducted during Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, indicated that only 31 percent supported a relaxation of the Arab economic boycott and 40 percent supported normal relations with Israel following a comprehensive settlement—undoubtedly the result of increased Arab-Israeli tension following Israel’s military action in Lebanon; see Claeson, “Jordanian Views More Upbeat on Peace Process”; and Claeson and Huxley.

⁵¹ The 1996 conference, which included 2,500 participants from ninety-two countries, followed two similar conferences in Amman in 1995 and Morocco in 1994 designed to integrate regional economies.

⁵² “Jordan Business to Shy from Israel Ties in Summit.”

⁵³ “Trade Minister to Lead Jordan’s Cairo Team,” Reuters, November 3, 1996. Significantly, the Israelis who boycotted

Although the conference did generate interest in Jordan-Israel projects and led to negotiations between Israeli and Arab businesspeople (particularly in the private conference rooms shielded from political pressure), no major joint deals were signed. Amoco's long-proposed "peace pipeline" to carry oil from Egypt through the Gaza Strip, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria to Turkey was abandoned in favor of a bilateral Egypt-Turkey deal to ship 10 billion cubic meters of liquefied gas across the Mediterranean. The Israel-Jordan-Egypt project to develop a "Red Sea Riviera" on the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba was also put on hold. At the conference's closing press conference, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Mousa criticized Israel for denying free trade to the Palestinians and reiterated statements by other officials that the conference had "appropriately" shifted focus away from Israel. The formal communique issued at the conclusion of the conference stopped short of directly criticizing Israel, however, and the participants pledged their commitment to the terms of the Madrid peace conference as expressed in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

In contrast to Jordanian ambivalence about economic cooperation, most Israelis have enthusiastically greeted the opportunity to conduct business openly with Jordanians, which they see as evidence of a long-awaited acceptance into the Middle East. A 1996 study by Jordan's Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation found that nearly 150 Israeli corporations had expressed interest in doing business with Jordanians, and that Israel remains a receptive market for over thirty Jordanian commodities such as detergents, household appliances, textiles, and foodstuffs.⁵⁴ The few Israelis who resist economic relations with Jordanians have based their hesitation on economic concerns about the competition from comparable products and services at a lower cost. Thus, El Al has fought to curb the number of Royal Jordanian flights between Israel and Jordan, and Israeli truckers were granted assurances that Jordanian truckers would be allowed to stay in Israel only for a limited time.

Israel's separate trade agreements with Jordan and the PA have hampered Amman's efforts to realize the full potential of its own June 1995 trade accord with the PA. The inability to increase profits from trade with the Palestinians remains the single biggest Jordanian complaint about economic relations arising from peace. 'Ali Dajani, an advisor to the Amman Chamber of Industry, complained in December 1996 that "[i]n the past ten months, Jordan was supposed to export 100 million dinars worth of products to the self-rule areas according to the Jordanian-Palestinian agreements, but it could only manage to export 4.2 million dinars [worth] because of Israel's practices."⁵⁵ The April 1994 Israel-PA economic agreement limits the number and type of products Jordan is allowed to export to the self-rule areas, partly for reasons of security and partly to protect Israel's captive Palestinian market.⁵⁶ Under the terms of the accord, Israel was to review the list of products and quotas when self-rule expanded in the West Bank, but this has not yet occurred. In a joint statement following the signing of their December 1996 trade agreement, the Israeli and Jordanian trade ministers proposed a trilateral meeting to address the issue.⁵⁷

FOREIGN AID AND INVESTMENT

Israel and Egypt have been the two top recipients of U.S. economic and military assistance since they signed the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, together receiving approximately half of total annual U.S. foreign aid. After signing its own peace treaty with Israel, Jordan became the third largest recipient of the U.S. aid to Asia and the Near East in fiscal year FY1996.

the conference—including Minister of Agriculture Rafael Eitan and Minister of National Infrastructure Ariel Sharon—claimed they did so because of flagrantly hostile attitudes toward Israel coming from the Egyptians and Palestinians, but not the Jordanians; see "Boycott of Cairo Economic Summit Widens," Reuters, November 4, 1996.

⁵⁴ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

⁵⁵ *Jordan Times*, December 3, 1996.

⁵⁶ Jordan charges that 90 percent of Palestinian trade is with Israel and 10 percent is with other states; see *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

⁵⁷ The agreement does provide for door-to-door shipment of cement and oil from Jordan to the West Bank and Gaza Strip via the Allenby bridge.

U.S. Economic and Military Assistance, FY1994–96⁵⁸
(in billions of U.S. dollars)

	FY1994	FY1995	FY1996
Israel	3.000	3.000	3.000
Egypt	1.902	2.275	2.271
Jordan	0.038	0.020	0.182

In fact, on a *per capita* basis, Jordan has received more donor support after signing the treaty than other countries of its size and income level—including “forgiveness” of official debt to the United States (\$683 million), the United Kingdom (\$92 million), Germany (\$53 million) and France (\$5 million), and rescheduling of debt by the so-called Paris and London Clubs.⁵⁹ In 1996, France converted Jordan’s \$65 million commercial debt to foreign investment bonds for development projects.⁶⁰ Much of Jordan’s remaining budget woes have been addressed through a combination of domestic reforms and concessional balance-of-payments support.⁶¹ Japan has been its largest donor, granting \$215 million in quick-disbursing concessional loans in 1995.⁶² The European Union has also provided substantial balance-of-payments support, including its largest grant of \$125 million in 1996.⁶³ The International Monetary Fund provided standby arrangements in 1989 and 1992 and \$293 million in Extended Fund Facilities in 1994 and 1996, the latter a three-year arrangement.⁶⁴ The World Bank has provided a total of \$240 million in three adjustment loans since 1993, in addition to a \$120 million loan approved in 1996.⁶⁵

Jordan’s public investment program, which incorporates twenty-eight projects valued at \$2.6 billion, has also attracted a high level of support from international donors.⁶⁶ The largest contributors are the Arab Fund, the European Investment Bank, France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the World Bank.⁶⁷ Since 1992, the International Finance Corporation has made \$85 million of investments in six projects, and is planning investments of \$420 million in small business finance, cement, and tourism in 1997.⁶⁸

Peace has also attracted unprecedented levels of private foreign investment to both Israel and Jordan. For Israel, the influx began after the 1991 Madrid peace conference (see table below).⁶⁹ Foreign investment in the Israeli stock market more than doubled in the two years following peace with Jordan, reaching \$5.5 billion by September 1996.⁷⁰ Foreign holdings of the total capital registered on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) climbed from 1 percent in 1993 to 11.3 percent by September 1996.⁷¹ During the same period, some sixty Israeli companies—with total market capitalization of approximately \$15 billion—were being traded on U.S. stock exchanges, second in number only to that of Canadian firms.⁷²

⁵⁸ United States Agency for International Development, presentations to the U.S. Congress for FY1994–1996.

⁵⁹ “Jordan Highlights,” World Bank website, November 1996. The Paris and London Clubs refer to governmental and commercial creditors, respectively.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Bank Leumi (Tel Aviv), *Leumi Review: Israel Macroperspectives* (August 1996).

⁷⁰ *Ma’ariv*, November 6, 1996.

⁷¹ *Leumi Review: Israel Macroperspectives*.

⁷² Ibid.

Foreign Investment in Israel, 1991-1995⁷³
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
TASE-registered securities	15	-35	176	183	393
Direct investment	375	519	560	393	1,611

Foreign direct investment in Jordan jumped from \$3 million in 1994 to \$43 million in 1995,⁷⁴ a reflection of increased investor confidence as a result of its involvement in the peace process and sweeping economic reforms. By comparison, investment in Egypt during the same period *decreased* by 50 percent due in part to a loss of investor confidence. (However, the International Monetary Fund expects foreign direct investment in Egypt to increase to \$800 million in FY1996-1997.⁷⁵)

Foreign Direct Investment in Jordan and Egypt, 1994-1995⁷⁶

	Jordan	Egypt
1994 Investment (as % of GDP)	\$3 million .05%	\$1.256 billion 2.92%
1995 Investment (as % of GDP)	\$43 million .65%	\$525 million 1.13%

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ World Bank, *Trends in Developing Economies 1996* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).

⁷⁵ David Gardner, "An Aspiring Market Leader," *Financial Times*, May 13, 1997.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

IV

Official Cooperation and Political Relations

The close relationship between the two countries' political establishments represents one of the most solid components of Jordan-Israel peace, and has served as the basis for bilateral security cooperation and coordination in preventing terrorism and military activities against one another. Relations at the official level have not been immune, however, to the tumult of wider Arab-Israeli political issues and have deteriorated visibly during periods of heightened regional tension such as the April–May 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath, the September–October 1996 Jerusalem tunnel crisis, and Israeli decisions regarding Har Homa and the first of three further redeployments (FRDs) from the West Bank in March 1997.

King Hussein established relatively close contacts with Israeli leaders long before the 1994 peace treaty: he first met an Israeli emissary in September 1963 in London, and over the next thirty years held more than 700 hours of secret meetings and concluded thirty-nine (mostly verbal) agreements with various Israeli governments.¹ Throughout much of the first year of formal peace, however, the unusually personal relationship between the king and the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin set the tone for official relations between the two countries. The two men were both soldier-statesmen who had effectively led their people to peace with a former enemy, and had grown visibly fond of one another during the negotiating process. Rabin reportedly contrasted his trust in Hussein with the testiness of his relationship with Arafat.² This was reflected in his statement at the treaty signing ceremony, "It is not only our states that are making peace with each other today, not only our nations that are shaking hands in Arava. You and I, Your Majesty, are making peace here—our own peace: the peace of soldiers and the peace of friends."³

Israel and Jordan moved quickly to establish formal diplomatic relations in early December 1994 by opening embassies in Amman and Tel Aviv. Ambassadors Shimon Shamir and Marwan Mu'asher arrived at their respective posts in April 1995.⁴ The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed the first of two negotiated withdrawals from Jordanian territory on January 30, 1995 by evacuating a 170-kilometer area extending from the al-Ghamr region in Wadi Araba to the Aqaba-Eilat border crossing. This was immediately followed by a second withdrawal, from the al-Baqura region in the north near Irbid. Jordan reasserted its full sovereignty in these areas on February 10, 1995.⁵ A year later, the two countries signed a maritime border agreement that established their border down the middle of the Gulf of Aqaba. This is Israel's first agreement

¹ Moshe Zak, "The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: Thirty Years of Clandestine Meetings," *Middle East Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (March 1995).

² David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accords* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), pp. 158-59.

³ *MidEast Mirror*, October 26, 1994.

⁴ Criticism emanated from official Jordanian quarters when Shamir entered Jordan via the Allenby Bridge from the West Bank. "It's like the Israelis are sending a muscle-flexing message that the West Bank is Israel's," said one Jordanian official; see *United Press International*, April 6, 1995. By contrast, Mu'asher drove across the Sheikh Hussein Bridge north of the West Bank, one of two new crossing points established after the peace treaty was signed.

⁵ Under an innovative provision of the treaty, however, Jordan granted Israel conditional "rights of usage" for Kibbutz Tsofar to continue cultivating 2,000 dunums (about 500 acres) of land in the Arava Valley for twenty-five years. An additional 800 dunums of land in Naharayim also fall under a similar arrangement; see *Jerusalem Post*, October 18, 1994. Although this stipulation has often been misrepresented in the media as a lease agreement, Jordan is not compensated for the privileges Israel enjoys within Jordan's borders. These areas remain subject to Jordanian law and regulations. In accordance with Annexes I(b) and I(c), however, Israeli laws governing extra-territorial activities apply to these territories, and Jordan's criminal code does not apply to incidents involving only Israeli nationals.

with an Arab state regarding the determination of maritime boundaries, and the first agreement between any of the four countries bordering the Gulf of Aqaba (Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia).

Israel's April 1995 decision to declare "eminent domain" over Arab-owned land in Jerusalem for new Jewish housing and a police headquarters fueled the most serious crisis in Jordan-Israel relations that year. While Foreign Minister Abdul Karim Kabariti, Jordanian parliamentarians, and other officials joined the chorus of Arab voices denouncing the decision as an attempt to alter the status quo in Jerusalem, King Hussein opted for quiet diplomacy in the form of a personal letter to Rabin. Though Israel's subsequent reversal of the decision resulted primarily from an impending domestic political crisis, the king's appeal almost certainly played a role in the decisionmaking process. Mu'asher and Kabariti subsequently argued that the crisis had also demonstrated another significant benefit of peace with Israel: Jordan now had "an effective channel of influence to positively affect Israeli policy."⁶

During the first year of peace, King Hussein made several unprecedented gestures that demonstrated his warm relations with Rabin and his readiness to accelerate the pace of normalization. These included lighting Rabin's cigarette, flying over Jerusalem and remarking "I can see your beautiful country" in a radio message to Israelis, meeting with opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu (who even then was perceived by the Arab media as anti-Arab) and declaring that they shared common views, sending Jordanian aid to Bosnian Muslims in a joint mission with Israel, and conveying formal greetings to Israel on its independence day (which coincidentally followed Operation Grapes of Wrath).⁷ These activities elicited severe criticism from the Jordanian opposition. The editor of the moderate pan-Arab newspaper *al-Hayat*, for example, complained that the king was "building bridges with Israel even as the rest of the Arabs, Jordanians included, have barely begun to shake off the dust of half a century of accumulated hostility and bitterness."⁸

Rabin's murder by a Jewish extremist in November 1995 deeply affected the king. He made a historic visit to Jerusalem for the first time since 1967 to attend Rabin's funeral. In an emotional speech in front of thousands of international mourners, he eulogized his slain comrade as a "brother, colleague, and friend"⁹ and vowed to continue the peace process. Upon returning to Jordan, the king launched a "violent attack"¹⁰ on domestic opponents of the peace process, including both opposition parties and newspapers.¹¹ In a speech to army officers and public security forces at the Royal Medical Services Center three days after the funeral, the king likened the virulent anti-peace climate in Jordan to that generated by the extreme right-wing in Israel, some of whose adherents were perceived as setting the tone for Rabin's assassination.¹²

Although King Hussein did not enjoy the same warm relationship with Rabin's successor, Shimon Peres—who focused much of his efforts on negotiations with the Palestinians and Syrians while neglecting to fulfill commitments to bolster the Jordanian economy—the level and intensity of government relations continued. Peres traveled to Amman in early December, followed by Foreign Minister Ehud Barak in January 1996. That same month, King Hussein was greeted by throngs of cheering Israelis when he traveled to Tel Aviv to dedicate a new hospital wing to Rabin. In an interview in the *Jordan Times*, Peres said that King Hussein's visit had captured the hearts of Israelis, and that Israel was determined to do what it could to make peace

⁶ Asher Susser, "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, forthcoming).

⁷ *Mideast Mirror*, August 1, 1995.

⁸ *al-Hayat*, August 1, 1995.

⁹ Reuters, November 6, 1995.

¹⁰ *al-Hayat*, November 10, 1995. In December 1995, Jordan also expelled an Iranian embassy official for allegedly plotting to attack Israeli tourists at Petra.

¹¹ King Hussein was particularly infuriated by a headline in *al-Sabeel*, an opposition newspaper operated by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which summed up Rabin's assassination as "One Less Murderer."

¹² *al-Hayat*, November 10, 1995.

an economic success.¹³ The king's appointment in February 1996 of Foreign Minister Kabariti—a strong supporter of peace with Israel with an anti-Iraq tilt—as prime minister and the promotion of Ambassador Mu'asher to minister of information represented in part a broad effort to advance his desire for closer cooperation with Israel.

King Hussein was the only Arab leader to greet Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu's May 1996 election as prime minister without trepidation. "There is no reason to consider Netanyahu's victory as a move against peace," he said. "The peace process has its own dynamics and is irreversible."¹⁴ The king had telephoned Netanyahu after the signing of peace in October 1994 and met with him twice afterward; Jordanian Ambassador Omar Rifa'i had also met with Netanyahu one week before the Israeli elections. High-level talks continued between Jordan and the new Israeli leadership. In preparation for his summit with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Netanyahu met with Prime Minister Kabariti in Tel Aviv on July 16—his first post-election meeting with an Arab leader. Following the meeting, Kabariti stated, "I sense that there is a sincere commitment from Prime Minister Netanyahu when it comes to making peace."¹⁵

SECURITY COOPERATION

The security relationship that has evolved between Israel and Jordan since making peace stems from decades of secret defense cooperation, particularly with regard to intelligence exchanges and anti-terror efforts. Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff notes that unlike Israel's peace accords with Egypt and the Palestinians (and the kind of peace being discussed with Syria), the Israel-Jordan treaty does not have an annex devoted to military issues such as demilitarized zones, international observers, or inspections. Rather, the security relationship is based largely on mutual trust between the two countries' political leaderships.¹⁶ The parties have scrupulously complied with the security aspects in the peace treaty itself, including pledges to prevent military and terror activity against one another.

In October 1995, Jordanian Interior Minister Salameh Hammad and Israeli Police Minister Moshe Shahal signed the first police cooperation agreement between Israel and an Arab state at Beit Gabriel near Lake Tiberias. The agreement provides for joint efforts to combat drug trafficking and smuggling, intelligence exchanges, and cooperation on investigations and forensic and identification matters, including DNA tests and analysis of signs of forced entry.¹⁷ The agreement also includes provisions for cooperation during large-scale disasters, and the establishment of a telephone hotline between the police forces.¹⁸ The opening of the 230-kilometer border between the two countries, and the resultant increase in the number of cross-border travelers, have raised concerns about drug smuggling. Jordanian authorities have actively pursued efforts to deter and punish smuggling across the Jordan River, particularly from Syria.

The frequency of meetings between the two sides' armed forces, the high rank of the participants, and the fact that several meetings have been publicized also indicate the extent of security relations. In March 1996, for example, Israeli Foreign Minister (and former IDF Chief of Staff) Ehud Barak met with Crown Prince Hassan and intelligence officials from both countries in Amman. Later that month, Jordanian Chief of Staff Gen. Abdul-Hafez Marei-Kaabneh made the first official visit to Israel by the commander of an Arab army when he met with Prime

¹³ Jordan Information Bureau, *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (January-February 1996).

¹⁴ King Hussein interview, *Ma'ariv*, June 2, 1996.

¹⁵ "Netanyahu Sees Jordan Premier, Snubs Palestinians," Reuters, July 17, 1996.

¹⁶ Interview with author, November 1996. A bilateral security agreement signed *after* the peace treaty is not available for public review, making it difficult to determine the contours of the intended security relationship.

¹⁷ "Police Cooperation Agreement Signed between Israel and Jordan," Israeli Police Ministry statement, October 24, 1995. In the two years after the peace treaty was signed, Israel also released seventeen Jordanians imprisoned in Israeli jails, in part as a goodwill gesture. The release of more than twenty remaining Jordanian prisoners will prove more complicated because most are being held for capital crimes, including murder.

¹⁸ *Jordan Times*, October 25, 1995.

Minister Peres and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Amnon Shahak in Israel.¹⁹ Maj.-Gen. Uzi Dayan, the officer in charge of Israel's Central Command (which includes the West Bank and the border with Jordan), traveled to Jordan to meet with Jordanian army Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Tahsin Shurdum in August. In February 1997, Dayan met with the advisor to the Jordanian intelligence chief. That same month, Israel's outgoing coordinator of activities in the territories, Maj.-Gen. Oren Shachor, his successor Brig.-Gen. Yaakov Ohr, and other senior IDF officers met with the chief of the Jordanian intelligence corps in Jordan and with officials in Jordan's Defense Ministry to discuss the civilian and security aspects of the Hebron accord.

In addition to meetings and other forms of administrative coordination, the Israeli and Jordanian armed forces have engaged in cooperative activities. In October 1995, Israeli F-15s and F-16s participated with Jordanian F-5s and Mirages in a joint air show to celebrate the first anniversary of peace. The planes flew in formation—along with helicopters bearing Israeli and Jordanian flags and a banner reading "Peace"—over Tiberias, Acre, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa. Israel has also lent Jordan equipment to dismantle land mines in areas of the Wadi Araba that were returned to Jordan under the terms of the treaty, and proposed further military cooperation in training, air force operations, and defense industrial projects; Jordan has remained cool to these ideas in the absence of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, fearing political backlash from other Arab states. As a show of support for its new peace partner and in an effort to stabilize the "pro-peace" camp in the Middle East, Israel actively supported Jordanian efforts to secure F-16s from the United States.²⁰ President Clinton's designation of Jordan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (a status shared by Israel and Egypt) in November 1996 further cemented the U.S.-Jordan military relationship that has developed as a result of Jordan-Israel peace.²¹

Jordan's security forces have actively engaged in efforts to curb terrorist activity inside its borders, some of which is directed against Israel and the process of normalization. Authorities have made periodic security sweeps aimed primarily at Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In May 1995, Amman ordered Hamas leaders Mousa Abu Marzouk and Imad Alami to leave the country, but permitted less prominent members to remain. In September of that year, Jordanian authorities charged ten members of the Bayat Imam (Pledge of Allegiance to the Leader)—a Jordanian group opposed to the peace treaty—with subversion and attempted sabotage.²² In subsequent months, the government arrested several individuals for making statements critical of the king (and normalization), including engineers association president Laith Shubailat, his assistant Imad Ghanim, and the spokesman for the banned Islamic Liberation Party, Atta Abu Rushtih. It also considered action against Jordanian professional associations which threatened to expel members who engaged in business with Israelis. In March 1996, authorities arrested three men suspected of plotting to bomb Israeli tourist buses inside Jordan. In the wake of the anti-terrorism conference at Sharm el-Sheikh that month, they launched a campaign of arrests against individuals suspected of supporting Hamas.²³ Two months later (just after Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon), the government arrested forty people for planning attacks on Israeli tourists and Jordanian officials in protest over normalization with Israel.

¹⁹ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives*, (September-October 1996).

²⁰ Under a July 1996 leasing arrangement financed by the Pentagon's military assistance budget, Jordan will receive thirteen F-16s at no cost (because the planes have less than 25 percent of their expected life span remaining) and three more on a five-year, \$4.5 million lease. The \$220 million total cost of the program includes structural upgrades (primarily contracted to U.S. firms, including Lockheed Martin), engine improvements, support equipment, and training; see "Jordan Moves Ahead on F-16 Lease Program," *Defense News*, August 19-25, 1996.

²¹ According to State Department spokesman Glyn Davies, the designation "recognizes Jordan's continued support for peace and underscores the strong relationship that's growing between Jordan and the United States," and reflects the fact that "Jordan has joined Egypt and Israel as a full partner in the effort to bring peace to the Middle East"; see Reuters, November 14-15, 1996. The three other countries that share this status are Australia, Japan, and South Korea.

²² *Jordan Times*, September 2, 1995.

²³ The campaign was renewed in September 1996 and dozens of additional Hamas sympathizers were detained; see *al-Hayat*, October 31, 1996.

In June 1996, terrorists believed to be members of a Damascus-based PLO splinter group led by Col. Mohammad Saeed Mousa infiltrated from Syria into Israel via Jordan and killed three Israeli soldiers. The Israeli and Jordanian armies were criticized for their lack of preparedness for such an attack. In response, Maj.-Gen. Dayan and Jordanian army Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Shurdum held a meeting on the Jordanian side of the Adam/Prince Abdullah Bridge and reached an agreement to increase cooperation, border supervision, and logistical coordination. The attack exacerbated already strained Jordan-Syria relations—at the June Arab League summit in Cairo, King Hussein presented Syrian president Hafez al-Assad with a file containing information on approximately fifty attempts by Syrian intelligence to infiltrate terrorists into Jordan.²⁴ In July, Jordan and Syria reportedly reached an agreement “to clamp restrictions on Palestinian organizations trying to establish armed offshoots in Jordan and infiltrate the Jordanian-Israeli border.”²⁵

JORDAN'S SPECIAL ROLE IN JERUSALEM

Although Israel captured the eastern half of Jerusalem in the 1967 War, Jordan continued to fund the city's *waqf* (Islamic trust), and both the Washington Declaration and peace treaty formally recognized the kingdom's “special role” in regard to Islamic holy sites in the city. King Hussein pointed to this as one of the advantages to Jordan of making peace with Israel, but the move sparked considerable controversy in the Arab world. PA Chairman Arafat—worried that it had eroded the Palestinian position in Jerusalem—scolded King Hussein for re-asserting Jordanian authority in the West Bank (which the king had earlier renounced in favor of the Palestinians), accused Israel of contravening the Declaration of Principles, and mobilized the Arab League against the clause. Other Arab leaders criticized Jordan for colluding with Israel against the Palestinian Authority and shifting the focus of Jerusalem's status from Palestinian political rights to guardianship of Islamic sites. In a conciliatory move three weeks after the treaty signing ceremony, Crown Prince Hassan declared that Jordan would give the Palestinian Authority “trusteeship” of the Islamic holy sites when Jerusalem's “final status” is determined, and explained that it was necessary for Amman to act as a moral authority in Jerusalem until Israel recognized Palestinian rights in the city.²⁶

When Peres became prime minister following Rabin's assassination, the Jordanian leadership felt that he undermined the kingdom's special status in Jerusalem by negotiating an agreement with the *waqf's* Palestinian administration to allow an area underneath the Temple Mount known as Solomon's Stables to be used as a prayer hall to accommodate the large number of Muslim worshippers during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.²⁷ Peres, who supported the idea of granting the Palestinians limited control over Jerusalem's Islamic holy sites as part of a larger final status deal, also tried to reach an agreement in January 1996 that would have given the *waqf's* Palestinian administration exclusive control over Solomon's Stables in exchange for its approval for an Israeli plan to create a new opening in a 2,000-year-old tunnel that runs alongside the Temple Mount.²⁸

This—and the fact that a Likud government would be unlikely to spring the kind of “strategic surprise” on Jordan that Labor had engineered with the PLO in Oslo—may explain why Amman did not react negatively to Netanyahu's narrow election victory over Peres. Yet it was Netanyahu's unilateral decision in September 1996 to open a second passage into the tunnel that brought Jordan-Israel relations to their lowest level in the first two years of peace.²⁹ Although the tunnel

²⁴ *Ma'ariv*, June 27, 1996.

²⁵ *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, July 15, 1996.

²⁶ *Jordan Times*, November 2, 1994.

²⁷ The negotiations did not include any *waqf* members appointed by King Hussein.

²⁸ “The Whole Story: The Secret Moves and the Pressures to Open the Western Wall Tunnel,” *Yediot Aharanot*, October 4, 1996.

²⁹ The tunnel opening also led to violent clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians—including exchanges of

does not run under or threaten any Islamic holy sites,³⁰ the move infuriated the Jordanian government which perceived it as a violation of the treaty, and deeply offended the king, who had met with Netanyahu advisor Dore Gold in Amman shortly before the impending opening but had been told nothing about it.

The tunnel crisis elicited strong official Jordanian condemnation and popular hostility toward Israel, and the political repercussions affected all aspects of bilateral ties. Crown Prince Hassan indefinitely postponed a scheduled visit to Israel, and Jordan withdrew an invitation to Amb. Shamir to attend a ceremonial planting of 120 Israeli date palm saplings near Irbid. According to Jordanian commentator Rami Khouri, the Jordanian leadership's "willingness to foster patience and understanding of the Israeli government . . . slipped a notch, toward a context in which the leadership now seems more to reflect and articulate Arab anger with Israel than to dissipate or alleviate it."³¹ For his part, Netanyahu minimized the deterioration of bilateral relations, maintaining that political differences between Israel and Jordan were natural and occurred "in the finest of families."³²

The tunnel crisis also represented a significant turning point regarding Jordan's status in Jerusalem. In October 1996, Netanyahu further angered Amman when he appeared to acquiesce to Palestinian *waqf* renovations of Solomon's Stables, which many observers saw as a *quid pro quo* for the tunnel opening. The following month, Jordan agreed for the first time to relinquish property in Jerusalem—including the Islamic college in Abu Dis, the Islamic Cultural Center, and dozens of mosques it controlled in eastern Jerusalem—to the Palestinian Authority, and stated its intention to stop paying the salaries of the 150 *waqf* employees. In December 1996, however, King Hussein signaled his continued personal commitment to Jerusalem's Islamic holy sites when he donated 2,000 square meters of new carpets to the al-Aksa mosque.³³

THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER NEGOTIATING TRACKS

The king would probably have been more inclined to deal with the Hasmonean tunnel matter privately had the volatile reaction of the Palestinians and other Arabs (including many Jordanians) not forced a more emphatic response. The Hashemite court did not want to be perceived as Netanyahu's only ally at a time when PA Chairman Arafat was encouraging the Arab world to confront Israel over what was perceived as the latest in a series of provocative moves by the new Likud government. Yet the tunnel crisis was hardly the first time that events in other Arab-Israeli arenas influenced the Israel-Jordan relationship. Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath in southern Lebanon in April and May 1996, which sent 300,000 Lebanese civilians fleeing north and culminated in the accidental deaths of over 100 of them at a UN peacekeeping base near Qana, all but erased the sympathy Israel had garnered in the wake of a series of deadly suicide bombings in February and March. The Jordanian opposition called for the abrogation of the peace treaty and the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador, and thousands of Jordanians protested against the Israeli offensive, which they saw as contrary to Israel's stated commitment to peace. In the face of the fierce reaction, the Hashemite court let it be known that Prime Minister Peres' planned visit to Amman before the Israeli elections could not go forward as planned.

Despite the tensions caused by events in Lebanon, King Hussein played a significant role in countering Syrian demands for an immediate freeze on normalization with Israel at the June 1996 Arab League summit in Cairo—the first in six years—which was convened to devise a

gunfire with Palestinian security forces—that almost derailed the peace process.

³⁰ A month earlier, the Jerusalem Society in Amman had issued an alert on the continuation of "illegal" Israeli measures in Jerusalem "designed to Judaize the city and eliminate its Arab and Islamic character." The statement, signed by the Society's secretary-general, Subhi Ghosheh, warned of Israeli plans for dismantling a section of the wall surrounding the Old City under the pretext of restoration work; see *Jordan Times*, August 19, 1996.

³¹ *Jordan Times*, October 15, 1996.

³² "Israel PM Says Differences with Jordan Natural," Reuters, October 8, 1996.

³³ Channel Two Radio News (Israel), December 11, 1996. Hussein witnessed his grandfather's assassination at the mosque in 1951.

unified Arab stance toward the new Netanyahu government. As a result of the king's efforts, the final communique merely re-stated longstanding Arab demands for the return of Israeli-occupied territory within the context of the peace process. The king and Netanyahu reportedly held secret talks in London the following month over the status of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and when they met in Amman in early August—Netanyahu's first visit to Jordan after becoming prime minister—the Israeli leader said that the "first step" in securing the peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors "is to cement and assure the progress of the peace between Israel and Jordan."³⁴

When the Hasmonian tunnel crisis led to deadly Israeli-Palestinian clashes in the West Bank and Gaza, President Clinton arranged an emergency summit in Washington between Netanyahu, Arafat, and King Hussein in October. At the summit, the king reportedly accused Netanyahu of "the arrogance of power" and warned him that Israel could not achieve security by adopting a "fortress mentality."³⁵ Afterward, the king issued a series of statements about the alarming status of the peace process and the possibility of a regional flare-up. In an interview with *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, he suggested that the Jordanian and Egyptian peace treaties with Israel would be in jeopardy if Netanyahu failed to fulfill Israel's agreements with the Palestinians, insinuating that a situation could arise again in which Netanyahu would need to "don a gas mask," as he had during the 1991 Gulf War.³⁶ That same month, Amb. Rifa'i (who had previously refrained from criticizing the Netanyahu government) emphasized the link between Israeli-Palestinian and Jordanian-Israeli relations, explaining to an Israeli newspaper that the "deterioration" of the latter could be rectified by implementing the Oslo agreements.³⁷

Rifa'i subsequently stressed, however, that "the fallout in relations with Israel is over differences on certain issues and not over the relationship" itself,³⁸ and King Hussein contended that the crisis in relations should spur more, not less, effort to build peace; normalization, he said, is "one area on which more attention should be focused now than before."³⁹ In an effort to address Jordanian concerns and demonstrate Israel's commitment to peace and normalization, Israeli President Ezer Weizman met with King Hussein in Jordan in early November 1996. The following month, Information Minister Marwan Mu'asher met with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy to discuss Israeli settlement policy and the Oslo process, Trade Ministers Natan Sharansky and Ali Abu Ragheb signed an important pact in Aqaba to facilitate trade and build public support for peace, and Foreign Minister Levy visited Amman to clarify the limits of Netanyahu's settlement policy.

Despite these high-level exchanges, criticism of what was perceived as the Netanyahu government's reluctance to fulfill Israel's obligations under the Oslo accords continued to emanate from Jordan's highest political echelon. In response to Netanyahu's public commitment to resume financial aid to Jewish settlers in the territories (which had been suspended under the Labor government), Prime Minister Kabariti stated that Amman considered settlement building as "a danger to [Jordan's] national security."⁴⁰ King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan issued more muted statements about relations with Israel, with the king suggesting that "extremists dictate the agenda"⁴¹ and the crown prince maintaining that the tension resulting from the tunnel opening "has taken a lot out of the peace treaty, [and] out of the spirit to move forward."⁴²

At the same time, however, King Hussein's recognition of the domestic and regional importance of the peace process led him to serve as an intermediary between the Israelis and Palestinians during negotiations over Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, and his shuttle diplomacy

³⁴ *MidEast Mirror*, August 5, 1996.

³⁵ "Bibi and the King," *New York Times*, October 9, 1996.

³⁶ *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 8, 1996.

³⁷ "Jordan-Israel Relations in State of 'Deterioration'," *Jerusalem Post*, October 11, 1996.

³⁸ "Solution to Crisis in Ties Only through Implementation of All Accords, Jordan to Tell Israel," *Jordan Times*, October 12, 1996.

³⁹ *al-Quds al-Arabi*, November 14, 1996.

⁴⁰ *Jerusalem Post*, December 19, 1996.

⁴¹ Reuters, December 9, 1996.

⁴² *Ibid.*, November 23, 1996.

between Tel Aviv and Gaza was crucial to reaching a final agreement. The king's optimistic remarks after a pivotal meeting with Netanyahu in Tel Aviv shortly before the agreement was concluded—"I leave here confident everything will move in the right direction"⁴³—represented an assessment that the resolution of the long and bitter Israeli-Palestinian impasse over Hebron would have positive effects on Jordan-Israel relations.

The goodwill generated by the Hebron agreement quickly dissipated, however, when Israel announced in February 1997 that it would begin construction of 6,500 Jewish homes on Har Homa, a tree-studded hill in southeastern Jerusalem. The Israeli decision—which had wide, bipartisan support within Israel—was harshly criticized in the Arab world and elsewhere,⁴⁴ and once again sparked an angry reaction in Jordan. King Hussein warned Netanyahu that it was "bound to shake the credibility of the peace process as a whole and fuel feelings of anger that will create violence and threaten the peacebuilding process,"⁴⁵ and Prime Minister Kabariti stated flatly that it was "not possible for the peace process to continue with the continuation of Jewish settlements being erected on Arab land."⁴⁶

Regional and international hostility toward Israel was compounded by the Israeli cabinet's decision in early March to redeploy its troops from a total of 9 percent⁴⁷ of the West Bank for the first of three further redeployments—significantly less than the PA claimed to have expected.⁴⁸ The king's frustration with the Israeli initiatives regarding Har Homa and the first FRD (and his umbrage at being denied Israeli permission to land his plane at the still unopened Gaza airport) culminated in a bitter letter to Netanyahu berating the prime minister for "continued deliberate humiliation of your so-called Palestinian partners."⁴⁹ In a written reply to King Hussein the next day, Netanyahu recounted his government's fulfillment of Israeli obligations under Oslo and insisted that "disagreements" on the Israeli-Palestinian track not be allowed to infect the Israel-Jordan relationship.⁵⁰ When the private Hussein-Netanyahu correspondence became public, the leaders' mutual criticism intensified and their relationship sank to its lowest ebb since the tunnel crisis. In a March CNN interview, the king warned of "a very strong chance of violence" if the Har Homa project were pursued.⁵¹ An outraged Netanyahu responded: "This kind of doomsday talk and the whole histrionic attitude toward obvious disagreement is itself not conducive to the process."⁵²

The next day, an apparently deranged Jordanian soldier manning a border patrol post opened fire with a machine gun on a group of Israeli schoolgirls visiting the island of Naharayim in the Jordan River, which Israeli farmers continued to use under the peace treaty. Seven of the girls were killed and six were wounded before the murderer was eventually overpowered by other Jordanian soldiers. King Hussein's response to the shootings—the most deadly breach in security since he signed the Jordan-Israel peace treaty—dramatically changed the tenor of his relationship with Netanyahu. The king interrupted a trip to Spain (and postponed a visit to the United States) to return to Jordan, and both he and Crown Prince Hassan strongly condemned the attack.

⁴³ *MidEast Mirror*, January 15, 1997.

⁴⁴ On March 7, 1997 the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution supported by the other fourteen council members calling on Israel to abandon plans to build Jewish homes on Har Homa. On March 13, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring the project "illegal" by a vote of 130 to 2, with the United States and Israel voting against it. Arafat succeeded in convening an international conference in Gaza on March 15 to express his frustration with Israeli decisions regarding Har Homa and the first further redeployment (FRD); U.S. Consul-General Edward Abington attended the conference despite strong discouragement from Israel. On March 21, the United States cast a second veto to abort a Security Council resolution calling on Israel to cancel the project.

⁴⁵ "Jordan Says Israel Housing Project Threatens Peace," Reuters, February 26, 1997.

⁴⁶ *Jordan Times*, March 12, 1997.

⁴⁷ For the first FRD, Israel proposed that 7 percent of the West Bank be transferred from Area B to Area A, and 2 percent be transferred from Area C to Area B.

⁴⁸ The PA claimed to have expected approximately 30 percent of the West Bank transferred in the first FRD.

⁴⁹ *MidEast Mirror*, March 12, 1997.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, March 13, 1997.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² " 'Fed Up' With Criticism, Netanyahu Lashes Out," *New York Times*, March 13, 1997.

Amman created an investigative committee with an Israeli representative (Police Commissioner Anton Ayov) to conduct an inquiry into questions surrounding the attack, including the amount of time it took to subdue the soldier (King Hussein insisted that the other Jordanian soldiers should have shot him as soon he opened fire) and the delay of about forty minutes in allowing Israeli medical teams to aid the wounded girls. In a speech to senior military officials, the king urged them to be vigilant to prevent destabilizing elements from infiltrating the armed forces.

In an unprecedented gesture by an Arab leader, King Hussein traveled to Israel and visited the families of all seven murdered girls with Netanyahu—in some cases humbly kneeling before the mourners and asking their forgiveness. “Your daughter is like my daughter, your loss is my loss,” the king said to one family.⁵³ The king’s heartfelt initiative not only soothed relations with Netanyahu but also restored his status with the Israeli public, many of whom believed that the king’s letter had created a charged atmosphere for violence. At a joint press conference with Netanyahu on the evening of his visit, King Hussein declared that “relations between Jordan and Israel . . . are on their normal and right track.” The fact that the statement was made in Arabic was seen in part as an appeal by the king to his own public to refrain from further violence.⁵⁴ Similarly, Kabariti’s forced resignation shortly after the attack and his replacement by Abd-al-Salam al-Majali—who had led Jordan’s peace negotiations with Israel in his previous term as prime minister—were seen as an attempt by the king to bolster support for relations with Israel at a time of increasing momentum against normalization. Although the controversy surrounding the Har Homa project was not immediately reconciled, the king appeared to view it as a *fait accompli* and resumed his role as an intermediary between Israel and the Palestinians.

⁵³ “A Time to Mourn: King Hussein Comforts Israelis,” *ibid.*, March 17, 1997.

⁵⁴ “Hussein, on His Knees, Begs Forgiveness for Massacre,” *Washington Post*, March 19, 1997.

V

Normalization and the Jordanian Opposition

Jordanian critics of peace and normalization with Israel can generally be divided into two groups: those who reject the treaty with Israel unconditionally, and those whose attitudes fluctuate in response to their perceptions of peace dividends and wider Arab-Israeli political issues.¹ *Jordan Times* editor George Hawatima suggested in mid-1995 that 20 percent of Jordanians belonged to the former “rejectionist” group and 60 percent belonged to the latter, with the remaining 20 percent supporting the regime’s position as they do all other issues.² Two polls reported in 1996 by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) indicated that Jordanian support for “normal relations”—in the event of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement in the future—hovered between 40 and 60 percent.³

Islamists and leftists, who comprise the bulk of Jordan’s parliamentary and other political opposition, are also the core of the minority rejectionist group. Islamist rejectionists are the kingdom’s most formidable internal challenge to normalization. They consider Israel a virulent, foreign element occupying Muslim land that must be liberated through *jihād*,⁴ and employ a wide range of Islamic imagery and symbolism to attack the government’s position on peace and normalization.⁵ They have criticized and denounced all Jordanian-Israeli meetings, negotiations, and agreements and seek to maximize their influence by capitalizing on public disenchantment with Israeli policies during Arab-Israeli crises.⁶

By contrast, the majority of Jordanians have been ambivalent about normalization with Israel; they fear it may inflict political, economic, and/or cultural damage on Jordan in the form of economic hegemony, cultural infiltration of Western values, movement away from the Arab world, and “unnatural” dependence on Israel and the United States.⁷ Significantly, even Jordanians who support normalization—believing that peace serves national interests in security and entry into the global economy—have reservations about the possible negative repercussions.⁸ The prevalence of such thinking has proven a significant stumbling block to popularizing what ordinary Jordanians often refer to as “the king’s peace.”

Jordan’s political opposition (both overt and hidden within the government bureaucracy) took an active stand against normalization from the outset. Various professional associations with a combined membership of 80,000 adopted a resolution in August 1994—three months *before* the peace treaty was signed—threatening disciplinary action including expulsion against members who engaged in business with Israelis. Although these kinds of punishments have been applied in

¹ Asher Susser, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” in *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, forthcoming). See also Hilal Khashan, *Partner or Pariah? Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan*, Policy Paper no. 41 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).

² “Normalization in the Kingdom of Warm Peace,” *al-Majalla*, June 11-17, 1995.

³ Matthew Claeson, “Jordanian Views More Upbeat on Peace Process,” *Opinion Analysis*, Office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information Agency, February 26, 1996; Claeson and Frederick C. Huxley, “Jordanians Sour on Peace Process,” *ibid.*, June 14, 1996. The polls were conducted by an unnamed regional market research firm.

⁴ *al-Ra’y*, October 25, 1989.

⁵ Sabah el-Said, *Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 1989-1994*, Policy Paper no. 39 (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Susser, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”

⁸ For more on popular Jordanian opposition to normalization, see section on “Popular Attitudes Toward Economic Relations” in Chapter III.

only a small number of cases,⁹ the government took steps in 1995 to amend laws that require practicing professionals to belong to these associations. Despite this kind of official pressure, the associations stepped up their anti-normalization campaign, ignoring government instructions to limit participation in their elections to East Bank members in accordance with Jordan's 1988 decision to sever legal and administrative links with the West Bank.¹⁰

Jordan's Islamist-led parliamentary opposition has also actively fought the peace process from the start. Five days after the treaty was signed, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),¹¹ Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba'ath party, and six other parties¹² not represented in the lower house issued a communique rejecting the treaty with Israel and calling for it to be put to a popular referendum. The communique expressed views that have since become familiar anti-normalization slogans: that the treaty amounted to an invitation to Israel to "devour" Jordan's economy and "undermine" its "culture and history" and the Palestinian "national struggle."¹³ In the ensuing months, the twenty-three opposition members of parliament clashed with pro-government leaders seeking to abolish laws forbidding trade with and land sales to Israelis. They challenged the legality of annulling the legislation, disrupted the proceedings, and boycotted the last session of the lower house in which the votes on repealing the laws were scheduled, thereby denying the chamber the necessary quorum.

Following a January 1995 visit by a seven-party Jordanian delegation to Damascus in support of Syria's uncompromising stand on the peace process, the IAF, leftist parties, and professional associations collaborated on organizing an unprecedented anti-normalization conference in Amman scheduled for the spring. Although the government characterized the coalition's efforts as "subversive" and twice denied permission for the conference, the organizers were ultimately allowed to hold a smaller meeting of 300 people in September at the headquarters of the Jordanian Popular Democratic Party,¹⁴ after which they issued a statement rejecting normalization with Israel at all levels.

When Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath in southern Lebanon in the spring of 1996, Jordan's parliamentary opposition renewed its call for abrogating the peace treaty and the popular opposition staged widespread protests. The following month, while King Hussein was countering Syrian demands for an immediate freeze on normalization with Israel at the Arab League summit in Cairo, the IAF issued a declaration denouncing the new Netanyahu administration as a "Torah-based, Talmudic government set on achieving its goal of establishing a Greater Israel."¹⁵ The declaration called for "putting a stop to all forms of normalization with Israel, which is using [the peace process] to achieve its aggressive goals." In October, it condemned Israel's opening of the Hasmonean tunnel in Jerusalem as an attempt to "Judaize" Jerusalem and repeated its frequent demand for the cessation of normalization with the "Zionist enemy."¹⁶

The tunnel crisis proved a significant turning point in opposition efforts. Thirty-seven groups representing a broad range of political parties, professional associations, and non-governmental organizations joined the IAF in issuing a declaration calling for resistance to "all forms of

⁹ The Jordanian Writers Association, for example, expelled *al-Dustour* columnist Hamadeh Fara'neh for appearing in a May 1995 interview on Israeli television. The same association fired actor Hisham Yanis for performing a political satire of the peace process in Israel in December 1995.

¹⁰ Jordan Information Bureau (Washington, DC), *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (September-October 1995).

¹¹ The IAF—the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood—is the largest party in the lower house. Its deputies routinely call for the abrogation of the peace treaty; such calls usually win the support of less than twenty of the eighty elected members of the lower house; see *ibid.* (June-September 1996). See also el-Said, *Between Pragmatism and Ideology*.

¹² The six parties were the Jordanian Communist Party, the Jordanian People's Democratic Party, the Nationalist Action Front, the Jordanian Arab Democratic Party, the Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party, and the Jordanian Popular Unity Democratic Party.

¹³ *MidEast Mirror*, November 2, 1994.

¹⁴ Holding the conference on party premises ostensibly did not require governmental approval.

¹⁵ *MidEast Mirror*, June 25, 1996.

¹⁶ "Jordan's Islamists Urge Arabs to Cut Israel Ties," Reuters, October 5, 1996.

normalization with the Zionist enemy.”¹⁷ Jordanian analyst Rami Khouri commented that it was “quite an achievement to get a common position on anything by folks as different as those who signed this statement, representing as they do the far right and left and almost everything in between.”¹⁸ The October declaration’s “most telling aspect,” Khouri continued, “was the powerful resurgence of visceral anti-Zionism as a reflexive, almost biological Jordanian and Arab response” to what were perceived as offensive Israeli moves.

The shift in favor of the anti-normalization camp continued into 1997 and was bolstered by the Israeli-Palestinian impasse over Hebron. Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obaydat succeeded in organizing the largest public demonstration in Amman since the 1991 Gulf War to protest the first Israeli trade fair in Jordan, which Obaydat characterized as “damaging Jordan’s security by allowing Israel to penetrate” it.¹⁹ The January protest—supported by twenty of Jordan’s twenty-three recognized political parties—included 4,000 demonstrators, some holding banners with slogans such as “A Massacre in Hebron and an Exhibition in Amman,”²⁰ “Jordan is Not the Zionist Bridge to the Arab World,”²¹ and “Normalization is a Jewish Weapon that Threatens Our National Unity.”²² No Jordanian government officials attended the fair, which attracted 150 Israelis (representing some sixty-five companies) but only a few dozen Jordanian businesspeople. By contrast, a simultaneous Arab business conference sponsored by the Jordanian Businessmen’s Association—also the first of its kind—attracted 600 Arab businesspeople. Israel’s decision to commence work on the Har Homa housing project in southern Jerusalem further diminished popular Jordanian support for peace and normalization, and prompted twenty-two deputies to call for the abrogation of the treaty. For the first time, some 1,000 protesters in the al-Baqah refugee camp took part in a demonstration against the Israeli decision.

The subsequent shooting of seven Israeli schoolgirls by a Jordanian soldier near the Israel-Jordan border drew mixed reactions from Jordanians, with some lining up to donate blood for the victims and others calling the soldier a “hero.” The wave of dismay throughout the Arab world at the way in which King Hussein humbly knelt and asked forgiveness from the families of the murdered girls was not matched in Jordan, however, where the king traditionally enjoys immense respect from his people, but many Jordanians joined Arabs elsewhere in blaming Netanyahu’s “provocative” behavior for prompting the attack.²³ The opposition took full advantage of these sentiments, with several groups including the Jordanian Bar Association (JBA), the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), and the IAF competing among themselves for the right to defend the Jordanian soldier. Some collected donations for the soldier’s family. The JBA led a crowd of 200 supporters to visit the family in a show of solidarity with them, but were prevented from doing so by the police.

ABSENTEE PROPERTY AND REFUGEES

On July 31, 1995, the Jordanian parliament voted to annul the three laws prohibiting trade with and land sales to Israelis. The bill passed the upper house by a vote of 30 to 3 and the lower house by 51 to 21, but not without considerable controversy, including an opposition boycott. Much of the controversy surrounded Law 30 (1973), which prohibited the sale of Jordanian land to Israelis under penalty of death. The issue was reciprocity: Jordan chafed at the fact that much of Israeli territory is designated as “state land” and as such is not subject to sale to foreigners. To compensate, the parliament passed an amendment that made sales of Jordanian land—and Jordanian-owned property in the West Bank (including Jerusalem)—to non-Jordanians subject to

¹⁷ As quoted by Rami Khouri in *Jordan Times*, October 15, 1996.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ “Jordanian Activists Protest against Israel Fair,” Reuters, January 8, 1997.

²⁰ *MidEast Mirror*, January 8, 1997.

²¹ “Police Block Thousands of Protesters from Israeli Trade Fair,” AP, January 8, 1997.

²² “Jordanian Activists Protest against Israeli Fair.”

²³ *MidEast Mirror*, March 14, 1997.

government approval, limited sales of property in Jordan to nationals of countries that treat Jordanians reciprocally, and banned sales (but not leases) of farm land to foreigners.²⁴

Article 24 of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty calls for the settlement of all outstanding claims to land and property arising from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Under Israel's 1950 Absentees' Property Law, unclaimed assets (e.g., belonging to Palestinians who fled to Jordan during the 1948 War) are administered by a government-appointed custodian with all of the rights of a property owner, including the right to sell or lease land. All income from these transactions (minus administrative expenses) is held in trust, presumably to compensate absentee owners when the claims are eventually settled. Israeli Law 5755 (passed in conjunction with the ratification of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty in November 1994) reaffirms that the Absentees' Property Law applies to all Jordanians who owned property in Israel before November 1994, but not to those who acquire property in Israel after that. During his term as Jordan's ambassador to Israel, Marwan Mu'asher complained that the law contravenes the terms of the peace treaty, in which each side pledged to remove all discriminatory legislation, by not giving pre-1994 absentee property owners the same rights as post-1994 owners.²⁵ The adjudication of pre-1994 claims is expected to occur in conjunction with the determination of the status of Palestinian refugees during "final status" negotiations.

Article 8 of the peace treaty identifies two distinct fora for resolving outstanding problems related to refugees from the 1948 war and displaced persons from the 1967 war: the multilateral working group on refugees and a quadripartite (Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Egypt) committee on displaced persons.²⁶ An "informal consultative meeting" of the multilateral working group met in Petra, Jordan in November 1996. Although one Jordanian delegate described it as "a little hard," the fact that Arabs and Israelis met at all during the heightened tension caused by the Jerusalem tunnel crisis was significant.²⁷ Three days after the meeting, a Palestinian official announced the creation of a new PLO (*not*, significantly, PA) ministry headquartered in Gaza (with additional offices in Amman and the West Bank) to address issues concerning refugees and displaced persons. The new ministry is slated to replace the PLO's previous Tunis-based Department of Returnees Affairs established in 1987.

The quadripartite committee on displaced persons convened half a dozen times in the two years following the signing of the peace treaty and addressed such issues as the definition of a displaced person, their number, mechanisms for their return and absorption, and international aid for their relocation. The Israeli representatives insisted that the term "displaced person" applied only to Palestinians who had fled the West Bank and Gaza Strip during or immediately after the 1967 war, a figure they estimated to be around 220,000. The Arab representatives countered that the term applied to all Palestinians and their families who had fled since the war, which the Palestinian representatives said encompassed some 1.5 million adults and children. All four parties recognized that issues related to displaced persons and refugees remain tied to final status negotiations.

THE SOCIOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Direct phone links between Israel and Jordan were introduced two weeks after the signing of the July 1994 Washington Declaration,²⁸ and reciprocal postal service began six months after

²⁴ Jordan's Supreme Court dismissed a case in the summer of 1996 filed by Jordanian lawyer Muheeba Haddadin and her mother Fadda against the government and parliament for conceding Arab land in the territories to Israel. The petitioners charged that the peace treaty with Israel is unconstitutional, but the court argued that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case, given that the peace treaty had been ratified by parliament and thus was constitutional; see *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

²⁵ *Jerusalem Report*, November 2, 1995.

²⁶ Article XII of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles also calls for the establishment of such a committee.

²⁷ *Jordan Times*, November 27, 1996.

²⁸ By 1996, Jordan had become Israel's fourth largest market for international communications traffic, presumably due to frequent calls between Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan; see "Jordan Ranks Fourth in Phone Calls to Israel,"

that.²⁹ Although the peace treaty established a solid administrative framework for official cooperation in public services such as telephone and postal linkages and police, efforts to expand that framework into social services such as healthcare networks and scientific and cultural exchanges—which are much more visible to and dependent upon the public—have met strong resistance from Jordanian opponents to normalization.

In August 1995, Jordanian Health Minister Aref Batayneh and Israeli Health Minister Ephraim Sneh signed a bilateral health accord in the northern Jordanian town of Um Qais. The accord provides for joint medical training, exchanges of medical technology, and cooperative efforts to eradicate diseases. A year later, Jordan and Israel joined Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, and the United States in an agreement to fund the Middle East Cancer Foundation,³⁰ which will conduct research, education, and training to improve the quality of care.³¹ Two years after making peace, Jordanians routinely travel to Israel to receive advanced medical treatment³² (as some of Jordan's elite had done *before* the peace treaty), although precise figures for the number of Jordanians seeking treatment in Israel are not readily available.

Despite this official commitment to medical cooperation, Jordan's professional healthcare associations have discouraged members from associating or otherwise cooperating with their Israeli counterparts, and from treating Israeli patients. The Jordanian Dentists Association, for example, has issued a strict directive to its members to refrain from treating Israeli patients (except in an emergency) or risk losing accreditation. The Jordanian Physicians Union has drawn a distinction between care and cooperation, maintaining that individual Israelis seeking medical assistance in Jordan should not be denied treatment. Some Jordanian health professionals have ignored these directives, however—dentists in particular have successfully attracted Israeli customers with lower prices. A 1996 opinion poll conducted by the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies suggested that public support for the professional associations' political role was not widespread: 43.3 percent of those polled said they supported limiting professional associations solely to work-related (i.e., non-political) matters, and 27.5 percent opposed this.³³

The January 1996 Jordan-Israel scientific and cultural exchange agreement similarly provides for cooperation in education, professional training, research and development, and cultural exchanges including exhibitions, music, and literature. There have been numerous efforts to enhance cultural awareness and appreciation between the two peoples, particularly at the youth level. In conjunction with a July 1995 Danish seminar entitled "Learning to Live Together in the Middle East: The Role of the Educator" (in which Jordanian, Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian teachers participated), fifty Israeli Jewish and Arab children attended a week-long summer camp in Amman the following month with their Jordanian counterparts. Jordanian and Israeli youth have also participated in the Seeds of Peace camp in the United States. Two Jordanian students have studied at Israel's Hebrew University, and in the fall of 1996, a Jordanian student entered Tel Aviv University's Kellogg Recanati Business Administration program along with students from Egypt and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Jordan's leading private school, the Amman Baccalaureate, has added the study of Judaism to its religion curriculum.³⁴

Several peace-oriented social organizations have been established in Jordan, although they have shied away from media coverage out of fear of public condemnation.³⁵ The Amman branch

ibid., June 29, 1996. A U.S.-sponsored feasibility study on fiber optical communication links between Amman and Tel Aviv, the Dead and Red Seas, and Aqaba and Eilat is expected to be completed in 1997; see "Focus on Jordan Rift Valley Development," brochure produced by the Jordan Rift Valley Steering Committee, November 1996.

²⁹ Mail was initially routed through Cyprus until the implementation of the transport and civil aviation agreement in 1996 which allowed for direct air mail service.

³⁰ In January 1997, the United States budgeted \$3.75 million for five years for research and development through the foundation; see *Globes*, January 21, 1997.

³¹ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Results of opinion poll on democracy in Jordan published by the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 1996.

³⁴ Institute for Jewish Policy Research and American Jewish Committee, *Antisemitism World Report 1996*.

³⁵ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

of the Palestinian-based Mideast Peace Society has held four meetings with Israeli peace activists in Jordan.³⁶ The Jordan National Society for Peace and Culture, also a new organization, hosted the first painting exhibition by Israeli artists ever held in Jordan.³⁷ Both societies are registered with the Ministry of Culture but operate as independent, non-governmental organizations.³⁸ In a less formal sign of “cultural normalization,” Israeli photographer Varda Polak-Saam won the silver prize in the “Peace in the World” photography competition sponsored by the Jordanian Photography Association—the first time an Arab country awarded such a prize to an Israeli.

Although these kinds of youth programs and private societies represent significant steps toward improving relations at the popular level, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments continue to pervade Jordan’s Islamist-controlled institutions. Efforts to revamp the kingdom’s education system by purging school books and course curricula of such propaganda have met strong resistance from the Islamist opposition, which has a heavy hand in the system.³⁹ Though some Jordanian professors reportedly wish to alter outdated course curricula and participate in teacher exchanges with their Israeli counterparts, most refrain from doing so out of fear of ostracization by their colleagues. The Jordanian government has sought to encourage such exchanges, but has not forced its will upon university faculty. In addition, the vocal campaigns against normalization by Jordan’s Islamist- and leftist-dominated professional associations have contributed to the adverse environment for improving relations at the popular level. The resultant Jordanian sensitivity to grassroots cultural interaction with Israelis was apparent when an Israeli Arab group was forced to withdraw from a spring 1996 Amman theater festival after Egyptian and other groups refused to participate because of their presence.⁴⁰

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ The influential role of Islamists in Jordan’s education system resembles that of Hamas in the Palestinian Autonomy and the other parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The IAF—Jordan’s largest Islamic party—and Hamas are both outgrowths of the Muslim Brotherhood and are deeply rooted in the institutional framework of Jordan and the territories, respectively.

⁴⁰ *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives* (June-September 1996).

VI

Regional and International Implications

The Jordan-Israel peace treaty addressed fundamental security issues for both states, with important regional and international implications. For Israel, it solidified Jordan's role as an effective buffer against hostile neighbors to the east, which is particularly important to Israel given the close Jordanian-Iraqi military cooperation from the late 1980s until the Gulf War. Article 4 of the treaty prohibits the "entry, stationing, or operating" in either nation of third-party forces "which may adversely prejudice the security of the other party." In essence, the treaty has extended Israel's "security border" to the Jordan-Iraq border—with significant implications for Israel-Syria and Israeli-Palestinian relations.

For Jordan, the peace treaty quashed a notion popular among some Israeli political factions, that "Jordan is Palestine"—i.e., that Israel's conflict with the Palestinians can be solved by helping to empower Jordan's Palestinian majority and otherwise encouraging the creation of a Palestinian state on the East Bank. Moreover, Article 2 of the treaty forbids "involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either party," effectively invalidating the supposed option of forcibly "transferring" West Bank Palestinians to Jordan. Conversely, Jordan cannot resolve *its* refugee problem by expelling Jordanians of Palestinian origin to the West Bank.¹ Significantly, the treaty suggests that Palestinian national aspirations will be fulfilled west of the Jordan River.

By signing the treaty, Jordan joined Israel and Egypt as a recipient of substantial U.S. aid. During FY1994-96, Jordan received \$241.2 million in economic and military aid. This does not include the nearly \$700 million in U.S. official debt relief promised to Jordan in 1994, or special military allowances and Jordan's designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally in November 1996. The \$182.7 million granted to Jordan for FY1996 was the third largest U.S. aid package in Asia and the Middle East that year, after Israel and Egypt. U.S. aid, along with Jordan's austere economic restructuring program, contributed to an inflation-adjusted GDP growth rate of 6 percent in 1995. In a further gesture of U.S. commitment to Jordan, the Peace Corps signed its first agreement with Amman in October 1996, allowing for twenty-five volunteers to begin serving in the kingdom in the spring of 1997.

By the beginning of 1997, however, Jordan's focus appeared to be shifting eastward. The re-emergence of Iraqi oil on the international market as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 986 has made Baghdad a more appealing trading partner than Israel to Jordan's business community, for both market-oriented and political reasons. Two January 1997 economic cooperation agreements between Jordan and Iraq—one adjusting the fixed price of Iraqi oil, and the other increasing the amount of Iraqi oil Jordan receives for debt compensation from \$250 million to \$300 million annually—have re-invigorated their long-standing trade relationship. The appointment of Abdul Salam al-Majali as prime minister in February—and his subsequent criticism of Secretary of State Albright's strongly worded policy statement on Iraq—suggested that a political warming may be in the offing, too. The restoration of Jordan-Iraq ties while Saddam Hussein remains in charge in Baghdad may have political and economic effects on the Jordan-Israel relationship, but King Hussein's commitment to the peace process—highlighted by his pivotal role in concluding the January 1997 Israeli-Palestinian agreement on Hebron, and subsequent efforts to bring Netanyahu and Arafat back to the negotiating table during the March 1997 Har Homa crisis—suggests that the foundation of Jordan-Israel relations remains solid.²

¹ Robert B. Satloff, "The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: A Remarkable Document," *Middle East Quarterly*, March 1995.

² Interestingly, in response to a November 1996 suggestion by Iraqi Vice President Taha Moheiddin Maarouf that

The fact that the king continues to press his Arab neighbors toward accepting Israel as a permanent member of the Middle East bodes well for the future of the Jordan-Israel relationship and reflects the Jordanian leadership's view that its relations with the United States remain an important consideration in the formation of foreign policy. If there is fragility in the Jordan-Israel relationship, it is not because of a lack of commitment by King Hussein but rather because so few people and institutions in Jordan beyond the royal palace share his commitment. Without a broader foundation of support within Jordan's body politic—and especially its political and commercial elite—the durability of the Jordan-Israel peace relationship will remain an issue of intense concern.

Appendix

**TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL
AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN**

PREAMBLE

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th July, 1994, and which they are both committed to honor;

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice, and respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in particular to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this Treaty of Peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1—ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the "Parties") effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2—GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

1. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence;
2. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
3. They will develop good neighborly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;

4. They respect and recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the region;
5. They respect and recognize the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;
6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3—INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

1. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate.
2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I(a), is the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.
3. The Parties recognize the international boundary, as well as each other's territory, territorial waters, and airspace, as inviolable; and will respect and comply with them.
4. The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded not later than nine months after the signing of the Treaty.
5. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of natural changes in the course of the flow of the river as described in Annex I(a), the boundary shall follow the new course of the flow. In the event of any other changes, the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed.
6. Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on its side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I(a).
7. The Parties shall, upon the signature of the Treaty, enter into negotiations to conclude, within nine months, an agreement on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.
8. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/Baqura area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights, the Parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I(b).
9. With respect to the Tsofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out in Annex I(c) will apply.

ARTICLE 4—SECURITY

1. (a) Both Parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and cooperation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests, and cooperation; and to aim toward a regional framework of partnership in peace.
(b) Toward that goal, the Parties recognize the achievements of the European Community and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in the Middle East, of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME).
This commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post-World War era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.
2. The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

3. The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the following:
 - (a) to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons (conventional, nonconventional or of any other kind) against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party;
 - (b) to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting, or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion, or violence against the other Party;
 - (c) to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion, or violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through, or over their territory (hereinafter the term "territory" includes the airspace and territorial waters).
4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:
 - (a) joining or in any way assisting, promoting, or cooperating with any coalition, organization, or alliance with a military or security character with a third Party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty;
 - (b) allowing the entry, stationing, and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel, or materiel of a third Party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.
5. Both Parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will cooperate in combating terrorism of all kinds. The Parties undertake:
 - (a) to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion, or violence from being carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators;
 - (b) without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence, and cooperation in their territory of any group or organization, and their infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other Party by the use of or incitement to the use of violent means;
 - (c) to cooperate in preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations.
6. Any question as to the implementation of this Article will be dealt with through a mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and, where necessary, other mechanisms and higher level consultations. The details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an agreement to be concluded by the Parties within three months of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, toward the following:
 - (a) the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;
 - (b) the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and nonconventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting, and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation, and goodwill.

ARTICLE 5—DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. The Parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6—WATER

With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them:

1. The Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities, and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall be fully respected and complied with.
2. The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just, and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.
3. The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation.
4. In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that cooperation in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties and will help alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality including the possibility of transboundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortages and to cooperate in the following fields:
 - (a) development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability, including cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;
 - (b) prevention of contamination of water resources;
 - (c) mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
 - (d) transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use.
5. The implementation of both Parties' undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II.

ARTICLE 7—ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. Viewing economic development and prosperity as pillars of peace, security, and harmonious relations between states, peoples, and individual human beings, the Parties, taking note of understandings reached between them, affirm their mutual desire to promote economic cooperation between them, as well as within the framework of wider regional economic cooperation.
2. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties agree to the following:
 - (a) to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at each other, and to cooperate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third Parties;
 - (b) recognizing that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of goods and services should guide their relations, the Parties will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free-trade area or areas, investment, banking, industrial cooperation, and labor, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty;
 - (c) to cooperate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums, toward the promotion of their respective economies and of their neighborly economic relations with other regional Parties.

ARTICLE 8—REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them toward the alleviation of human suffering, the Parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.
2. Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance

with international law, including the following:

- (a) in the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians;
- (b) in the case of refugees,
 - (i) in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees;
 - (ii) in negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this Treaty;
- (c) through the implementation of agreed United Nations programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.

ARTICLE 9—PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERFAITH RELATIONS

1. Each Party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.
2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.
3. The Parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working toward religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious worship, and tolerance and peace.

ARTICLE 10—CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

The Parties, wishing to remove biases developed through periods of conflict, recognize the desirability of cultural and scientific exchanges in all fields, and agree to establish normal cultural relations between them. Thus, they shall, as soon as possible and not later than nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, conclude the negotiations on cultural and scientific agreements.

ARTICLE 11—MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS

1. The Parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and accordingly undertake:
 - (a) to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against each other, and to take all possible legal and administrative measures to prevent the dissemination of such propaganda by any organization or individual present in the territory of either Party;
 - (b) as soon as possible, and not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, to repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation;
 - (c) to refrain in all government publications from any such references or expressions;
 - (d) to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other's citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.
2. Paragraph 1(a) of this Article is without prejudice to the right to freedom of expression as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. A joint committee shall be formed to examine incidents where one Party claims there has been a violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 12—COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

The Parties will cooperate in combating crime, with an emphasis on smuggling, and will take all necessary measures to combat and prevent such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit

drugs, and will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard, they take note of the understandings reached between them in the above spheres, in accordance with Annex III, and undertake to conclude all relevant agreements not later than nine months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 13—TRANSPORTATION

Taking note of the progress already made in the area of transportation, the Parties recognize the mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations in the area of transportation and agree to the following means to promote relations between them in this sphere:

1. Each Party will permit the free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory taxes or restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.
2. The Parties will open and maintain roads and border-crossings between their countries and will consider further road and rail links between them.
3. The Parties will continue their negotiations concerning mutual transportation agreements in the above and other areas (such as joint projects, traffic safety, transport standards and norms, licensing of vehicles, land passages, shipment of goods and cargo, and meteorology) to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
4. The Parties agree to continue their negotiations for a highway to be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel, and Jordan near Eilat.

ARTICLE 14—FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial waters in accordance with the rules of international law.
2. Each Party will grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other Party. Such access will be granted on the same conditions as is generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations.
3. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either Party through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15—CIVIL AVIATION

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges, and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.
2. Any declaration of national emergency by a Party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other Party on a discriminatory basis.
3. The Parties take note of the negotiations on the international air corridor to be opened between them in accordance with the Washington Declaration. In addition, the Parties shall, upon ratification of this Treaty, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Civil Aviation Agreement. All the above

negotiations are to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 16—POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Parties take note of the opening between them, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, of direct telephone and facsimile lines. Postal links, the negotiations on which having been concluded, will be activated upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties further agree that normal wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio, and satellite will be established between them, in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations. The negotiations on these subjects will be concluded not later than nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 17—TOURISM

The Parties affirm their mutual desire to promote cooperation between them in the field of tourism. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties taking note of the understandings reached between them concerning tourism agree to negotiate, as soon as possible, and to conclude not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, an agreement to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.

ARTICLE 18—ENVIRONMENT

The Parties will cooperate in matters relating to the environment, a sphere to which they attach great importance, including conservation of nature and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV. They will negotiate an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 19—ENERGY

1. The Parties will cooperate in the development of energy resources, including the development of energy-related projects such as the utilization of solar energy.
2. The Parties, having concluded their negotiations on the interconnecting of their electric grids in the Eilat-Aqaba area, will implement the interconnecting upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties view this step as a part of a wider binational and regional concept. They agree to continue their negotiations as soon as possible to widen the scope of their interconnected grids.
3. The Parties will conclude the relevant agreements in the field of energy within six months from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20—RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

The Parties attach great importance to the integrated development of the Jordan Rift Valley area, including joint projects in the economic, environmental, energy-related, and tourism fields. Taking note of the terms of reference developed in the framework of the Trilateral Israel-Jordan-U.S. Economic Committee toward the Jordan Rift Valley Development Master Plan, they will vigorously continue their efforts toward the completion of planning and toward implementation.

ARTICLE 21—HEALTH

The Parties will cooperate in the area of health and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 22—AGRICULTURE

The Parties will cooperate in the areas of agriculture, including veterinary services, plant protection, biotechnology, and marketing, and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within six months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 23—AQABA AND EILAT

The Parties agree to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, and not later than one month from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, on arrangements that would enable the joint development of the towns of Aqaba and Eilat with regard to such matters, *inter alia*, as joint tourism development, joint customs, free trade zone, cooperation in aviation, prevention of pollution, maritime matters, police, customs, and health cooperation. The Parties will conclude all relevant agreements within nine months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 24—CLAIMS

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 25—RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other Party and independently of any instrument inconsistent with this Treaty. For the purposes of this paragraph each Party represents to the other that in its opinion and interpretation there is no inconsistency between their existing Treaty obligations and this Treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.
4. Both Parties will also take all the necessary steps to abolish all pejorative references to the other Party, in multilateral conventions to which they are parties, to the extent that such references exist.
5. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.
6. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 26—LEGISLATION

Within three months of the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty, the Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the Treaty, and to terminate any international commitments and to repeal any legislation that is inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 27—RATIFICATION

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective national procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
2. The annexes, appendices, and other attachments to this Treaty shall be considered integral parts thereof.

ARTICLE 28—INTERIM MEASURES

The Parties will apply, in certain spheres, to be agreed upon, interim measures pending the conclusion of the relevant agreements in accordance with this Treaty, as stipulated in Annex V.

ARTICLE 29—SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 30—REGISTRATION

This Treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba Crossing Point this day, Heshvan 21, 5755/Jumada Al-Ula 21, 1415, which corresponds to October 26, 1994, in the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For the State of Israel:

Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

Abdul Salam Majali
Prime Minister

Witnessed by:

William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

ANNEX I(a)

**ISRAEL-JORDAN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION**

I. It is agreed that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty, the international boundary between the two states consists of the following sectors:

- A. The Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers
- B. The Dead Sea
- C. The Emek Ha'arava/Wadi Araba
- D. The Gulf of Aqaba

II. The boundary is delimited as follows:

A. **JORDAN AND YARMOUK RIVERS**

1. The boundary line shall follow the middle of the main course of the flow of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers.

2. The boundary line shall follow natural changes (accretion or erosion) in the course of the rivers unless otherwise agreed. Artificial changes in or of the course of the rivers shall not affect the location of the boundary unless otherwise agreed. No artificial changes may be made except by agreement between both Parties.

3. In the event of a future sudden natural change in or of the course of the rivers (avulsion or cutting of new bed) the Joint Boundary Commission (Article III below) shall meet as soon as possible, to decide on necessary measures, which may include physical restoration of the prior location of the river course.

4. The boundary line in the two rivers is shown on the 1:10,000 orthophoto maps dated 1994.

5. Adjustment to the boundary line in any of the rivers due to natural changes (accretion or erosion) shall be carried out whenever it is deemed necessary by the Joint Boundary Commission or once every five years.

6. The lines defining the special Naharayim/Baqura area are shown on the 1:10,000 orthophoto map.

7. The orthophoto maps and image maps showing the line separating Jordan from the territory that came under Israeli military government control in 1967 shall have that line indicated in a different presentation and the legend shall carry on it the following disclaimer:

“This line is the administrative boundary between Jordan and the territory which came under Israeli military government control in 1967. Any treatment of this line shall be without prejudice to the status of the territory.”

B. **DEAD SEA AND SALT PANS**

The boundary line is shown on the 1:50,000 image maps. The list of geographic and Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of this boundary line shall be based on Israel-Jordan Boundary Datum (IJBD 1994) and, when completed and agreed upon by both Parties, this list of coordinates shall be binding and take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line in the Dead Sea and the salt pans.

C. EMEK HA'ARAVA/WADI ARABA

1. The boundary line is shown on the 1:20,000 orthophoto maps.
2. The land boundary shall be demarcated, under a joint boundary demarcation procedure, by boundary pillars which will be jointly located, erected, measured, and documented on the basis of the boundary shown in the 1:20,000 orthophoto maps referred to in Article II-C-(1) above. Between each two adjacent boundary pillars the boundary line shall follow a straight line.
3. The boundary pillars shall be defined in a list of geographic and UTM coordinates based on a joint boundary datum (IJBD 94) to be agreed upon by the Joint Team of Experts appointed by the two Parties (hereinafter the JTE) using joint Global Positioning System (GPS) measurements. The list of coordinates shall be prepared, signed, and approved by both Parties as soon as possible and not later than nine months after this Treaty enters into force and shall become part of this Annex. This list of geographic and UTM coordinates when completed and agreed upon by both Parties shall be binding and shall take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line of this sector.
4. The boundary pillars shall be maintained by both Parties in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon. The coordinates in Article II-C-(3) above shall be used to reconstruct boundary pillars in case they are damaged, destroyed, or displaced.
5. The line defining the Tsofar/al-Ghamr area is shown on the 1:20,000 Emek Ha'Arava/Wadi Araba orthophoto map.

D. THE GULF OF AQABA

The Parties shall act in accordance with Article 3.7 of the Treaty.

III. Joint Boundary Commission

- A. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the Parties will establish a Joint Boundary Commission comprised of three members of each country.
- B. The commission will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The Commission may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.
- C. The commission may form, as it deems necessary, specialized teams or committees and assign them to technical tasks.

ANNEX I(b)

THE NAHARAYIM/BAQURA AREA

1. The two Parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Naharayim/Baqura area ("the area") on a temporary basis, as set out in this Annex. For the purpose of this Annex the area is detailed on the attached map.
2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land ownership rights and property interests ("landowners") in the land comprising the area ("the land"), Jordan undertakes:
 - (a) to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from, land usage and movement within the area to the landowners and to their invitees or employees and to allow the landowners freely to dispose of their land in accordance with applicable Jordanian law;
 - (b) not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to landowners, their invitees, or employees crossing from Israel directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;
 - (c) not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;
 - (d) to take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this Annex;
 - (e) to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force access to the area for the purpose of investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the landowners, their invitees, or employees.
3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area, Israel undertakes:
 - (a) not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;
 - (b) not to allow any person entering the area under this Annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2(e) of this Annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area; unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this Annex;
 - (c) not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.
4.
 - (a) Subject to this Annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area;
 - (b) Israeli law applying to the extra-territorial activities of Israelis may be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area, and Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws;
 - (c) Having regard to this Annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli nationals.
5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the Parties in the area, the terms of this Annex may be altered for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the Parties at any time. One of the options to be discussed in the context of the joint projects would be the establishment of a free-trade zone.
6. Without prejudice to private rights of ownership of land within the area, this Annex will remain in force for twenty-five years, and shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either Party, in which case, at the request of either Party, consultations shall be entered into.
7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4(a) of this Annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approval of Jordan.
8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this Annex.

ANNEX I(c)

THE TSOFAR/AL-GHAMR AREA

1. The two Parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Tsofar/al-Ghamr area ("the area") on a temporary basis, as set out in this Annex. For the purpose of this Annex the area is detailed on the attached map.
2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights ("land-users") in the land comprising the area ("the land"), Jordan undertakes:
 - (a) to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from, land usage, and movement within the area to the land-users and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land-users freely to dispose of their land in accordance with applicable Jordanian law;
 - (b) not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-users, their invitees, or employees crossing from Israel directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;
 - (c) not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;
 - (d) to take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this Annex;
 - (e) to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force access to the area for the purpose of investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the land-users, their invitees, or employees.
3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area Israel undertakes:
 - (a) not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;
 - (b) not to allow any person entering the area under this Annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2(e) of this Annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area, unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this Annex;
 - (c) not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.
4.
 - (a) Subject to this Annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area.
 - (b) Israeli law applying to the extra-territorial activities of Israel may be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area, and Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws.
 - (c) Having regard to this Annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli nationals.
5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the Parties in the area, the terms of this Annex may be altered for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the Parties at any time.
6. Without prejudice to private rights of use of land within the area, this Annex will remain in force for twenty-five years, and shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either Party, in which case, at the request of either Party, consultations shall be entered into.
7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4(a) of this Annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approval of Jordan.
8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this Annex.

ANNEX II

WATER-RELATED MATTERS

Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, Jordan and Israel agreed on the following articles on water-related matters:

ARTICLE I—ALLOCATION

1. Water from the Yarmouk River

(a) Summer period—15th May to 15th October of each year. Israel pumps twelve million cubic meters (mcm) and Jordan gets the rest of the flow.

(b) Winter period—16th October to 14th May of each year. Israel pumps 13 mcm and Jordan is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined hereinbelow: Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an additional 20 mcm from the Yarmouk in winter in return for Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the quantity specified in paragraph 2(a) below from the Jordan River.

(c) In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use, downstream of point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to waste unused.

2. Water from the Jordan River

(a) Summer period—15th May to 15th October of each year. In return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter in accordance with paragraph 1(b) above, Israel concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period 20 mcm from the Jordan River directly upstream from the Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate this transfer.

(b) Winter period—16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of 20 mcm of the floods in the Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article II below). Excess floods that are not usable and that will otherwise be wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two Parties including pumped storage off the course of the river.

(c) In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided, however, that Jordan's use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses. The Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article VII below) will survey existing uses for documentation and prevention of appreciable harm.

(d) Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of 10 mcm of desalinated water from the desalination of about 20 mcm of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will explore the possibility of financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to Jordan of this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination facilities are operational, and upon the entry into force of the Treaty, Israel will supply Jordan 10 mcm of Jordan River water from the same location as in paragraph 2(a) above, outside the summer period and during dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission.

3. Additional Water

Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of 50 mcm/year of water of drinkable standards. To this end, the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one year from the entry into force of the Treaty, a plan for the supply to Jordan of the above-mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the respective governments for discussion and decision.

4. Operation and Maintenance

(a) Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli territory that supply Jordan with water, and their electricity supply, shall be Israel's responsibility. The operation and maintenance of the new systems that serve only Jordan will be contracted at Jordan's expense to authorities or companies selected by Jordan.

(b) Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such new systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be signed between Israel and the authorities or companies selected by Jordan.

ARTICLE II—STORAGE

1. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion efficiency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the diversion of Israel's allocation of the river water. Other purposes can be mutually agreed.
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along their common boundary, between its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of paragraph 2(b) of Article I above. The system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to three mcm/year of added storage capacity.
3. Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon mutually.

ARTICLE III—WATER QUALITY AND PROTECTION

1. Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own jurisdiction, the shared waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and Arava/Araba groundwater, against any pollution, contamination, harm, or unauthorized withdrawals of each other's allocations.
2. For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the quality of water along their boundary, by use of jointly established monitoring stations to be operated under the guidance of the Joint Water Committee.
3. Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the course of the Yarmouk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural use. Implementation of this prohibition shall be completed within three years from the entry into force of the Treaty.
4. The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given location shall be equivalent to the quality of the water used from the same location by the supplying country.
5. Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are earmarked for desalination within four years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be disposed of in the Jordan River or in any of its tributaries.
6. Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own territory, supplying water to the other, against any pollution, contamination, harm, or unauthorized withdrawal of each other's allocations.

ARTICLE IV—GROUNDWATER IN EMEK HA'ARAVA/WADI ARABA

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, some wells drilled and used by Israel along with their associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the borders. These wells and systems are under Jordan's sovereignty. Israel shall retain the use of these wells and systems in the quantity and quality detailed in an Appendix to this Annex, that shall be jointly prepared by 31st December, 1994. Neither country shall take, nor cause to be taken, any measure that may appreciably reduce the yields or quality of these wells and systems.
2. Throughout the period of Israel's use of these wells and systems, replacement of any well that may fail among them shall be licensed by Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations then in effect. For this purpose, the failed well shall be treated as though it was drilled under license from the competent Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling. Israel shall supply Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical information about it to be kept on record. The replacement well shall be connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems.
3. Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and systems in Jordan by up to 10 mcm/year above the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to a determination by the Joint Water Committee that

this undertaking is hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing Jordanian uses. Such increase is to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of the Treaty.

4. Operation and Maintenance

(a) Operation and maintenance of the wells and systems on Jordanian territory that supply Israel with water, and their electricity supply shall be Jordan's responsibility. The operation and maintenance of these wells and systems will be contracted at Israel's expense to authorities or companies selected by Israel.

(b) Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such wells and systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies selected by Israel.

ARTICLE V—NOTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT

1. Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by mutual agreement.

2. Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of any intended projects which are likely to change the flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary, or the quality of such flow. The subject will be discussed in the Joint Water Committee with the aim of preventing harm and mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause.

ARTICLE VI—COOPERATION

1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources through the Joint Water Committee.

2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional, or international cooperation.

ARTICLE VII—JOINT WATER COMMITTEE

1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the Parties will establish a Joint Water Committee comprised of three members from each country.

2. The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The committee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required.

3. The committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of specialized subcommittees and assign them technical tasks. In this context, it is agreed that these subcommittees will include a northern subcommittee and a southern subcommittee, for the management on the ground of the mutual water resources in these sectors.

ANNEX III

COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

Pursuant to Article 12 of the Treaty of Peace, Israel and Jordan have decided to cooperate in the following fields:

A. Cooperation on Combating Dangerous Drugs

1. The two Parties shall cooperate in fighting illicit drugs according to the legal system of their countries.
2. The two Parties shall take all necessary measures to prevent drug smuggling between the two countries.
3. The two Parties shall exchange information regarding drug trafficking and dealers' activities concerning the two countries.
4. Information given by one of the Parties may not be shared with a third Party without the consent of the Party which provided the information.
5. The two Parties shall exchange and share the experience of fighting against drugs, including anti-drug education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation programs, technical means, and methods of concealment.
6. In order to identify the persons involved in drug archives, the two Parties shall facilitate controlled deliveries of drugs between the two countries according to their law.
7. Drug law enforcement officers from both sides shall meet periodically to coordinate efforts pertaining to drug problems concerning the two countries.
8. The two Parties shall maintain open channels of communication such as fax, telephone, and telex for liaison purposes in drug matters concerning the two countries.
9. The two Parties shall cooperate with the multilateral forums which deal with drug issues in the area.
10. The two Parties shall cooperate in investigating procedures necessary for collecting evidence and indictment in cases against drug dealers which concern either or both countries.
11. The two Parties shall exchange information regarding statistics on the type and number of drug crimes committed in each country including detailed information regarding suspected and convicted persons involved in these cases.
12. The two Parties shall exchange all relevant information regarding the narcotic drug producing laboratories if revealed in either of the two countries, including structure, working methods, and technical features of the laboratory as well as the type and mark of the product.
13. The cooperation described in this document will be carried out in accordance with the legal systems of the two countries.

B. Crime

The Parties have agreed that the Agreements to be negotiated pursuant to Article 12 of the Treaty shall cover the following issues:

1. Crime

- Exchange of information concerning all aspects of smuggling, theft (including art objects, vehicles, national treasures, antiquities, and documents), etc.;
- Apprehension of criminals and exchange of information including transmission of evidence in order to carry out judicial procedures in each of the two countries, subject to the relevant treaties and regulations.

2. General Cooperation

- Exchange of information regarding technical matters;
- Exchange of information regarding training and research;
- Joint police research projects on topics of mutual interest to both countries.

3. Additional Issues

- Rescue;
- Unintentional border crossing, fugitives from justice;
- Notification of detention of nationals of the other country;
- Establishment of a liaison mechanism between the sides.

C. Cooperation on Forensic Science

1. The two Parties shall cooperate on the subjects of criminal identification and forensic science.

2. The two Parties shall share and exchange professional experience and training programs, *inter alia*:

- (a) Use of field kits for preliminary examinations;
- (b) Analysis of illicit drugs;
- (c) Analysis of poisons and toxic materials;
- (d) Forensic biology and DNA examinations;
- (e) Toolmarks and materials examinations;
- (f) Questionable documents examinations;
- (g) Analysis of voice prints;
- (h) Analysis of fire arms;
- (i) Detection of latent fingerprints;
- (j) Analysis of explosive traces;
- (k) Examination for arson in laboratories;
- (l) Identification of victims in mass disasters;
- (m) Research and development in forensic science.

ANNEX IV

ENVIRONMENT

Israel and Jordan acknowledge the importance of the ecology of the region, its high environmental sensitivity, and the need to protect the environment and prevent danger and risks for the health and well-being of the region's population. They both recognize the need for conservation of natural resources, protection of biodiversity and the imperative of attaining economic growth based on sustainable development principles.

In light of the above, both Parties agree to cooperate in matters relating to environmental protection in general and to those that may mutually effect them. Areas of such cooperation are detailed as follows:

- A. Taking the necessary steps both jointly and individually to prevent damage and risks to the environment in general, and in particular those that may affect people, natural resources, and environmental assets in the two countries respectively.
- B. Taking the necessary steps by both countries to cooperate in the following areas:
- Environmental planning and management including conducting Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and exchanging of data on projects possessing potential impact on their respective environments;
 - Environmental legislation, regulations, standards, and enforcement thereof;
 - Research and applied technology;
 - Emergency response, monitoring, related notification procedures, and control of damages;
 - Code of conduct through regional charters.

This may be achieved through the establishment of joint modalities and mechanisms of cooperation to ensure exchange of information, communication, and coordination regarding matters and activities of mutual environmental concern between their environmental administrations and experts.

C. Environmental subjects to be addressed:

1. Protection of nature, natural resources, and biodiversity including cooperation in planning and management of adjacent protected areas along the common border, and protection of endangered species and migratory birds;
2. Air quality control, including general standards, criteria and all types of man-made hazardous radiations, fumes and gases;
3. Marine environment and coastal resources management;
4. Waste management including hazardous waste;
5. Pest control including house flies and mosquitoes, and prevention of diseases transferred by pests, such as malaria and leishmaniosis;
6. Abatement and control of pollution contamination and other man-made hazards to the environment;
7. Desertification: combating desertification, exchange of information, and research knowledge, and the implementation of suitable technologies;
8. Public awareness and environmental education, encouraging the exchange of knowledge, information, study materials, education programs, and training through public actions and awareness campaigns;
9. Noise: reducing noise pollution through regulation, licensing, and enforcement based on agreed standards;
10. Potential cooperation in case of natural disasters.

D. In accordance with the above the two Parties agree to cooperate in activities and projects in the following geographical areas:

1. The Gulf of Aqaba

1.1 The Marine Environment

- Natural resources;
- Coastal reef protection;
- Marine pollution;
 - Marine sources such as oil spills, littering and waste disposal, and others;
 - Land-based sources such as liquid waste, solid waste, and littering;
 - Abatement including monitoring and emergency response actions.

1.2 Coastal Zone Management—The Littoral

- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Liquid waste;
- Solid waste;
- Tourism and recreational activities;
- Ports;
- Transport;
- Industry and power generation;
- Air quality;
- Hazardous materials;
- Environmental assessments.

2. The Rift Valley

2.1 The Jordan River

Israel and Jordan agree to cooperate along the common boundaries in the following aspects:

- Ecological rehabilitation of the Jordan River;
- Environmental protection of water resources to ensure optimal water quality, at reasonably usable standards;
- Agricultural pollution control;
- Liquid waste;
- Pest control;
- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Tourism and historical heritage.

2.2 The Dead Sea

- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Pest control;
- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Industrial pollution control;
- Tourism and historical heritage.

2.3 Emek Ha'arava/Wadi Araba

- Environmental protection of water resources;
- Nature reserves and protected areas;
- Pest control;
- Tourism and historical heritage;
- Agricultural pollution control.

ANNEX V

BORDER CROSSING POINTS PROCEDURE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN

In pursuance of Article 28 of the Treaty of Peace, the Parties have agreed as follows:

1. The Crossing Points between Israel and Jordan shall be opened in both directions for Jordanians, Israelis, and third country nationals.
2. Procedures of crossing shall be in accordance with the regulations in both countries.
3. Both Parties shall mutually recognize passports of the other, and the stamps and visas affixed by the other Party on passports. The stamps on the passports will include English and Hebrew/Arabic, and will include the date of the crossing, the name of the country which stamps the document, and the name of the Crossing Point.
4. The Crossing Points shall be opened five days a week, from Sunday to Thursday, during all the year, except for Yom Kippur and the first day of the Al Hijrah calendar. The dates of these two holy days shall be communicated to the other side beforehand.
5. The Crossing Points shall be opened from 08:00 to 18:30.
6. Each Party has the right to refuse entry to a person, in accordance with its regulations. In this case, each Party undertakes to accept this person back into the country, without delay, according to international practices.
7. Each Party shall apply its customs regulations.
8. Each Party shall provide the passengers with the A.17 international immigration form of the other Party, before crossing.
9. Direct links, both telephonic and fax, shall be established between the authorities of both sides of the Crossing Points, in order to provide solutions to any problem.
10. The passenger's passport should be valid for at least six months after the date of the crossing, in accordance with the international practices.
11. Each Party shall provide the other with a list of the countries whose citizens are exempted from visa requirements.
12. These arrangements shall go into effect as from the day following the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
13. Within a period of up to three months from the date stated in paragraph 12 above, interim arrangements regulating passage of persons through the Crossing Points, and visa procedures shall be applied. Both Parties may shorten this period by mutual agreement.
14. During the interim period mentioned in paragraph 13 above, visas to Israeli and Jordanian citizens shall be granted as agreed between the Parties.
15. Pending the mutual opening of the Embassies in the two countries, Israeli and Jordanian nationals shall be granted the necessary visas through the following procedures:
 - (a) The tourist should apply for the visa through a travel agent in his country, who shall convey the application to his counterpart travel agent in the other country. This correspondent travel agent shall apply for the visa to the Ministry of Interior in his country. The visa shall then be collected at the Crossing Point with a copy to be sent to the travel agent, and another one shall be delivered to the terminals on each side. Upon the opening of the Embassies in both countries, the Parties will adjust the

above procedures as necessary.

(b) Visitors such as businessmen, scientists, officials, and journalists, shall contact the respective counterpart who in turn shall apply on their behalf to the Ministry of Interior as above. The visa shall then be collected at the Crossing Point, and a copy shall be delivered to the terminals on each side. Upon the opening of the Embassies in both countries, these persons will apply for visas through the respective Embassies.

16. (a) Visa fees shall be collected on a reciprocal basis.
(b) Terminal fees shall be collected in accordance with applicable regulations in both countries.
17. This system shall be revised after two months and a half from the date mentioned in paragraph 12 above, in accordance with any relevant bilateral agreements to be signed as an outcome of this Treaty.
18. The existing arrangements for Muslim Israeli nationals who cross into Jordan in transit to Saudi Arabia for Muslim pilgrimage shall continue to be applicable.
19. Transportation for Israeli and Jordanian tourists between the terminals of each of the Crossing Points shall be by shuttle bus, and the tourist vehicles provided by travel agents of the visited country shall carry them from its terminal to their final destination.
20. The Parties agreed that matters relating to persons entering one of the two countries by one Crossing Point, harbor, or airport, and wishing to exit that country also through other border Crossing Points, harbors, or airports shall be discussed during the interim period mentioned in paragraph 13 above.
21. The Parties agreed that matters relating to the passage of vehicles through the Crossing Points shall be discussed during the interim period mentioned in paragraph 13 above, taking into account the transportation, tourism, and any other relevant bilateral agreements, to be concluded by the Parties.
22. Teams of the two Parties shall monitor the implementation of this Annex.

Border Crossing Procedures According to Paragraph 14 of Annex V to the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan

1. According to paragraph 13 of Annex V to the Treaty of peace, which states that within a period of up to three months from the next day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Peace, interim arrangements regulating passage of persons through the Crossing Points, and visa procedures shall be applied. Both parties may shorten this period by mutual agreement.
2. During the aforementioned interim period, visas to Israeli and Jordanian nationals will be granted on the following basis:
 - (a) For Israeli visitors crossing into Jordan for touristic purposes only, through the Crossing Points, the total number of visas granted shall be up to 550 passports per day.
 - (b) Out of this total number, up to 250 passports per day shall be granted visas to cross through the Southern Araba/Arava Crossing Point. For those crossing through the Jordan River Crossing Point, up to 300 passports per day shall be granted visas.
 - (c) All the tourist visits in points (a) and (b) above, shall be on a group basis only, and through travel agents.
 - (d) Visitors crossing for other purposes (such as businessmen, scientists, officials, journalists) shall be granted visas, but they are excluded from the provisions of paragraph 2(a) and 2(c) above.
 - (e) All existing regulations for family visits will remain unchanged.

AGREED MINUTES

A. Concerning Article 3(f) stating that:

“Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on each side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I(a).”

The Parties recognize the practical questions connected with the deployment (such as demarcation, minefields, fences), and therefore would interpret the language to mean that the deployment would start immediately, continue uninterruptedly and expeditiously, and conclude no later than three months after the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

B. The Parties will, upon the signature of this Treaty, establish a joint committee headed by senior officials to monitor the implementation of this Treaty and the conclusion of relevant agreements, in accordance with the Treaty provisions.

C. In the spirit of peace, the governments of Israel and Jordan attach high priority to the planned recreation joint venture project in the Naharayim/Baqura area, they favorably consider the partnership in peace to be created there, and will endeavor together to promote its implementation as soon as possible.

D. With regard to economic and monetary matters pertaining specifically to the territories under Israeli military control, the two governments shall consult with each other with the aim of:

1. Eliminating or mitigating adverse effects on their economies;
2. Giving each other enough time to make the necessary adjustments.

The above is without prejudice to activities which are the result of relations with other states or to former obligations with regard to the territories referred to above, except to the extent that the implementation of such obligations may have adverse effects and to the extent that the implementation is within their control.

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